

207

Re: The Centro Mondiale Commerciale

had offered to testify that he had conferred with Shaw, Jack Ruby, and Lee Oswald from two to nine in the evening, on September 2, 1963. The meeting purportedly took place at the Jack Tar Capital House Hotel in Baton Rouge. Rumors indicated that assertions were being made that Mr. Shaw contributed financial support to Mr. Johnson's campaign.

Garrison's office also claimed that it had unearthed evidence of three rendezvous between Shaw and Oswald in small, rural Louisiana towns during the late summer of 1963.

The New Orleans *States-Item* then ran a copyrighted story¹¹ by Hoke May, David Snyder, Ross Yockey, and Rosemary James of its staff and R. T. Endicott of the Dayton (Ohio) *Daily News*, which began to crack the shell of denial regarding the CIA's involvement in the case and with some of the principal participants. Gordon Novel had already announced that he intended to hide behind the cloak (and his famous "Mr. Weiss letter" suggested even the dagger) of the Central Intelligence Agency in the face of the looming Garrison inquiry. Now Shaw himself was seemingly revealed as having connections with that mysterious department of the United States government. Certainly he was associated with two organizations which were widely identified by responsible figures as being arms, fronts, or financial conduits for its activities.

Rather than draw on the excellent, but necessarily secondhand, report of the group of star journalists mentioned, the author established communications with the original source, the newspaper *Paesa Sera* of Rome. What follows is the result of that line of inquiry.

There was established in Rome an organization named the Centro Mondiale Commerciale. Its origins, functions, rotating presidency, geographical displacements, sub-, subsequent, and alternate designations, were so complex and labyrinthine as to make a comprehensive and comprehensible description of it in anything less than a moderate-sized book impossible. Nonetheless, the essence of its activities can be sketched here, and as they seem to deeply incorporate Clay Shaw, a former OSS colonel, Italian Fascists, supporters of the far, paramilitary right in Europe, the CIA, and other like subjects, it is vital that the fundamentals of this situation be clarified as much as space and the entire business' innate irreducible confusion permit.¹²

In 1959 another of the mysterious figures who appear to comprise the major portion of the persons somehow related to the investigation in New Orleans, a Hungarian, George Mandel, at one point Italianized to

¹¹ New Orleans *States-Item*, New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, and Dayton (Ohio) *Daily News*, April 25, 1967.

¹² *Paesa Sera*, March 4, 1967.

Giorgio Mantello, created a Società Italo-Americana, the purpose of which was announced as industry and commerce. On November 14 of that year he inaugurated what *Pesa Sera* regards as his most important "creation," the Italo-American Hotel Corporation. Its stated object was the construction of the Hotel du Lac of the EUR (Exposition Universale Roma). The largest of its shareholders were three foreign credit groups, "represented in Italy by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, the De Famaco Astalde Vaduz (Swiss), the Miami Astalde Vaduz (American), and the Seligman Bank of Basel. The De Famaco and the Seligman institutions were among the most powerful stockholders of the Centro Mondiale Commerciale."¹³

The CMC was founded in 1961. Spokesmen asserted that it would function as an international commercial organization, that it would aid in the establishing of a permanent exposition, and generally assist concerns involved in trade. The staffing was expansive, the offices elaborate, and it gave all the appearance of being a rather grand operation.

The board of directors was interestingly assorted. Several respected Italians were present—Christian Democrat Deputy Mario Ceravolo and former Social Democrat Deputy Corrado Bonfantini. Listed as president was Carlo D'Amelio, lawyer and administrator of the former royal family's interests. The remainder of the board consisted of non-Italian names. Swiss Minister Ernest Feisst; Swiss Professor Max Hagemann, owner-editor of the newspaper *National Zeitung* (not to be confused with the neo-Nazi German *National und Soldaten Zeitung*); Hans Seligman-Schürch, Basel banker; Professor Edgar Salin, president of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Basel; Dr. Enrico Mantello, brother of George Mandel (Mantello), the power behind the Società Italo-Americana; Ferenc Nagy, former Hungarian premier and erstwhile leader of the anti-Communist Countryman's party, and president of Perminindex (the head office of the CMC); Prince Gutierrez di Spadafora, industrialist and landowner of oddly totalitarian turn of mind, related through his daughter-in-law to Adolf Hitler's notorious Minister of Finance, Hjalmar Schacht tried as a war criminal at Nuremberg; and Clay L. Shaw, of New Orleans.¹⁴

Now what of these associates of the "old-fashioned liberal of the Wilson-Roosevelt persuasion"? What kind of persons did they seem to be? Again, space precludes a full examination of each, or, for that matter, even a cursory individual analysis, but we certainly can look into the background and activities of a few.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

First there is Giorgio Mantello (Mandel), a Hungarian refugee, Austrian citizen, functioning in Italy, Switzerland, and elsewhere with financial transactions reaching throughout Europe, Africa, and America, who has, according to *Paesa Sera*, been condemned for his "criminal activities" in Switzerland. This latter revelation was originally carried in the August 19, 1961, issue of the Basel newspaper *A-Z*, which featured a report about directors of government agencies, saying: "In many articles we have justly spoken of the criminal activities of Messrs. [Ferenc] Nagy and Mantello." Mantello initiated a suit against the Swiss journal, then abruptly abandoned it, causing *A-Z* to observe: "Too bad; we would have heard some great things at the trial."¹⁵

Ferenc Nagy was closely associated with Mantello in his highly secret financial-political maneuverings. When Mantello founded Permindex, the head office and other face of the Centro Mondiale Commerciale, Nagy became its president. He was the Nagy accused of "criminal activities" along with Mantello, and identified by Swiss newspapers as a "dependent" of the CMC in Rome.

"As president of Permindex, I would like to thank the Italian government for the good will and sincere interest shown toward our great undertaking, the permanent industrial exposition and the CMC," orated Nagy, as the operation he fronted began. It was all very grand and impressive, but to quote *Paesa Sera*:

"The farce . . . reached the point of the grotesque when the lawyer D'Amelio, praising Permindex as 'a capillary organization located in the principal centers of production, with its head office [CMC] in Rome' (an organization, all the while, virtually non-existent), brought all of Italian civilization into play by affirming that thanks to the Centro [CMC], 'Rome will recover once again her position as *caput mundi*, as center of the civilized world.'"¹⁶

Actually it was soon to become evident that the seemingly vast, mighty structure was not a rock of solidarity, but a shell of superficiality; not constructed with mass, supporting promise, but composed of channels through which money flowed back and forth, with no one knowing the source or the destination of these liquid assets.

Ferenc Nagy, who, while premier of Hungary, was "compelled by Communists in key government positions to expel from his party various of its members who had been arrested for plotting . . . against the government,"¹⁷ and who, while on a trip to Switzerland on May 29,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, March 11-12, 1967.

¹⁷ *Universal Standard Encyclopedia*, Vol. XVI, p. 5,974.

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1947, telephoned his resignation to Budapest, moved in shadowy areas of finance and politics. "President of Permindex and Board Member of the CMC," reports *Paesa Sera*, "[he] was said by the French press to be a munificent contributor to the philo-fascistic movement of [Jacques] Soustelle, and [a] patron of far-right movements throughout Europe, including Italy."¹⁸

Certainly one is led to wonder why, of all the hundreds of nations on earth, Nagy ended up in the United States; and why of all the thousands of cities in the United States, Nagy ended up in Dallas. For that is where the violently right-oriented, OAS-financing, president of Permindex and board member of the Centro Mondiale Commerciale did end up, in the city that boasted the infamous "Wanted for Treason" manifesto, which accused Kennedy of being a Communist; in the city where the President was assassinated—in Dallas.

These were two of liberal Clay Shaw's associates in his European activities.

Prince Gutierrez di Spadafora, Undersecretary of Agriculture in Mussolini's Fascist government, was another. After his wartime achievements he turned his talents to his vast landholdings and commerce, especially to the establishment of a corporation, with himself as president, which constructed a huge refinery at Milazzo, in Messina, Sicily. He is also president of the Sicilian Compagnia Armatrice Industriale Petroli-fera Armatoriale, which is involved with arms and oil. The prince also owns what is reputed to be the largest hothouse in the world, in Pachino, Syracuse. The more than a hundred employees were for some time supervised by "landsmen" from his feudal estates in Valle d'Olma and Mus-someli, in the province of Caltanissetta who rode about in velvet jackets and high black boots, with fancy revolvers flashing from their belts. According to *Paesa Sera* "the Syracusans, unaccustomed to these Mafia-like habits, held a great general strike in protest, in December, 1962, and the Mafiosi of the Prince were forced to return" to his more feudal properties.

The Centro Mondiale Commerciale boasted another interesting name in its background. He is Giuseppe Zigiotti, president of the Fascist National Association for Militia Arms.

"Another fact which may help us understand certain things about the personalities around the CMC," said *Paesa Sera*, "is the presence in this group of H. Simonfay, Hungarian refugee, who directs BO-DA, an agency for provocative information from and for the socialistic countries. He is director in Italy of ACEN (specializing in hostile activities on the

¹⁸ *Paesa Sera*, March 4, 1967.

confrontations of socialist countries), who had an important position in the field of public relations for the CMC, for which he received a secret fee of half a million lire a month."¹⁹

However, no behind-the-scenes figure is more intriguing than Maj. L. M. Bloomfield, formerly of the American OSS, and later suspected by Jim Garrison of having some affiliation with the CIA.

On July 21, 1961, Giorgio Mantello appeared at the Italian Assembly representing all the stockholders of the CMC. These included himself, his brother Enrico, another Hungarian refugee, Joseph Slifka and Fellender Erwin, banker Hans Seligman, and lawyer Carlo D'Amelio . . . holder of 500,000 lire worth of shares. And Major L. M. Bloomfield, who held *half the shares* or 250 million, for party or parties unknown.²⁰

Now obviously the activities of these Shaw associates were closely orchestrated, considering the financial-political manipulator Mantello was permitted to represent not only himself but the six other stockholders of the CMC, including Bloomfield, former United States espionage agent and now a banker in Montreal, who is reputed to control Le Credit Suisse of Canada, Heineken's Breweries, Canscot Realty, the Israel Continental Company, the Grimaldi Siosa Lines, Ltd., etc.²¹

Even Montreal is not without significance, for to quote the Canadian journal *Le Devoir*:

"But here is where the affair assumes stranger and stranger characteristics. It has just been learned that the name of Clay Shaw was found among that of eleven directors of a company which, up until 1962, had its headquarters in Montreal [italics added] . . . [presently] in Rome, it is known as the Centro Mondiale Commerciale. . . ."²²

Shortly thereafter, while alluding to other directors, *Le Devoir* reports:

"Ferenc Nagy, exiled head of the Hungarian Peasants Party . . . maintains close ties with the CIA and which link him with the Miami Cuban colony." Also listed are the previously mentioned Fascist Giuseppe Zigiotti, Bloomfield, and an Egyptian, Faruk Churbagi.

This particular episode is worthy of mention for various reasons, not the least of which is its exemplifying of some of the tactics which seem as common to forces behind the CMC and its activities as to those of other forces halfway around the world.

The CMC or the Italo-American Hotel Corporation (into which part

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, March 14, 1967.

²² *Le Devoir*, March 16, 1967.

of the former turned) are, relates *Paesa Sera*, "also linked to other names which have appeared recently in the yellow press; another sign that, taking part in the same groups as the CMC and its former members, are persons who are quite suspect.

"One of these persons is Faruk Churbagi, the young Lebanese-Egyptian industrialist who was killed in Rome under still unexplained circumstances. It is said in groups around the former CMC that shortly before he was killed, the young man had turned over 200 million lire as dues for participation in the activities of the Centro. . . ."

And then there was the German Christa Wanniger, connected to the CMC by business dealings and "personal friendships," who was stabbed to death in Via Veneto under [apparently inevitably] unexplained circumstances." ²³

However, to return to areas of CMC endeavors about which a fragment or two more is known.

Le Devoir elaborates on Bloomfield, noting that he was active in the espionage arm of the U.S. government during World War II and "was at the time the principal shareholder in a society having headquarters in Switzerland and affiliated with the Centro Mondiale Commerciale in Rome, known as Permindex. Other shareholders in Permindex were banks of a more or less shadowy character with headquarters in Liechtenstein, plus Miami Astaldo Vaduz, De Famaco Vaduz, and the Credit Bank of Geneva. Among the directors, the name of Max Hagemann was noted, director of the *Nazionale Zeitung*, a newspaper specializing in anti-Communist diatribes. Whatever the case may be, the Centro Commerciale and Permindex got into difficulties with the Italian and Swiss governments. They refused to testify to the origins of considerable amounts of money, the sources of which are, to say the least, uncertain, and they never seemed to engage in actual commercial transactions. These companies were expelled from Switzerland and Italy in 1962 and then set up headquarters in Johannesburg." ²⁴

Another individual described by *Paesa Sera* as a "high level financial backer" was one Dr. David Biegun, "national secretary of the National Committee for Labor Israel, Inc., whose offices are in New York. Biegun was the person who actually handled the liquidation of the agency (CMC), receiving considerable credit for this, though officially 'unknown to the banks.'" ²⁵

"A short time [after its inauguration]," reports *Paesa Sera*,

²³ *Paesa Sera*, March 4, 1967.

²⁴ *Le Devoir*, March 16, 1967.

²⁵ *Paesa Sera*, March 18, 1967.

when the enormous Centro began to show the true face of its organization with very precise goals, which were anything but commercial, certain persons in Parliament became interested. Odo Spadazzi presented the question to the Chamber. But when the news came out, Spadazzi quickly withdrew. Shortly thereafter, he became [the new] president of the CMC.

While under the presidency of Spadazzi, the Centro was again questioned by the Christian Democrat Mario Ceravolo, who asked for an accounting of all of the activities of the Centro. Ceravolo, a member of the CMC's Board of Directors . . . had been a member of the board since its founding. Since then, he had seen money spent left and right, and had also seen that no commercial activities were being concluded. He wanted to know where the money was going and where it was coming from, but could get no accurate response. At this point, in 1962, he returned [sic; resigned?] from the board and directly demanded the bankruptcy of the Centro, obtaining a confiscation of two million lire.²⁶

The Centro's attorneys immediately assured one and all that "the CMC is straightening itself out" and was "now in the process of complete recovery." A recovery which never occurred.

It was these curious and mostly untraceable manipulations which led Ceravolo to make public the following letter:

I refer to the article concerning Clay Shaw which appeared in your paper [*Paesa Sera*] of 4 March 1967. My name was mentioned therein.

To avoid misunderstandings and false interpretations, I ask that you please publish the fact that I left the administrative board of the CMC on 25 July 1962 because it was no longer possible to understand the sources of great sums of money obtained abroad by Mr. Giovanni [Giorgio] Mantello, and the real destination of this money.

I was the first to call for the bankruptcy of the CMC and of Mr. Mantello, which paid their representatives, administrators, employees, etc. according to their own pleasure. The magistrate did not wish to grant the request for bankruptcy which I, first of all, presented against the Centro.²⁷

²⁶ *Ibid.*, March 11-12, 1967.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

The letter is clear, and so is the question it poses. Who was giving virtually unlimited sums of money to the CMC and who was getting it? And for what?

In less than five years of activities which seemed to begin nowhere, go nowhere, and accomplish little or nothing, while receiving from unnamed sources and delivering to anonymous persons and causes vast sums of money, the CMC found reason to change its presidents or directors ten times, or on an average of every six months, although the men controlling its destinies—whatever they may be—are always the same. "Among its possible involvements (supported by the presence in directive posts of men deeply committed to European organizations of the extreme right)," comments *Paesa Sera*, "is that the Centro was a creature of the CIA . . . set up as a cover for the transfer of CIA . . . funds in Italy for illegal political-espionage activities. It still remains to clear up the presence on the administrative board of the CMC of Clay Shaw and ex-Major Bloomfield."²⁸

"It is a fact," the newspaper subsequently commented, "that the CMC . . . is nevertheless the point of contact for a number of persons who, in certain respects, have somewhat equivocal ties whose common denominator is an anti-communism so strong that it would swallow up all those in the world who have fought for decent relations between East and West, including Kennedy."²⁹

A mysterious financial manipulator and a former Hungarian premier who supported the military right-wing OAS, kept close ties with the CIA and went halfway around the world to live in Dallas, both of whom were accused of "criminal activities" by the Swiss press. These are two of Shaw's European associates. A former member of Mussolini's cabinet, father-in-law to the daughter of Hitler cabinet minister Hjalmar Schacht, and the leader of a national Fascist organization. Two more who sat on the CMC board with Shaw. A mysterious ex-spy and a man who resigns from the organization out of conscience. Two more of Shaw's companions in business in Rome.

Surely a strange assortment of colleagues for an "old-fashioned liberal of the Wilson-Roosevelt persuasion." But then, the Centro Mondiale Commerciale and Perminindex are curious operations, as has become evident.

Clay Shaw's name first appeared in the Rome newspapers in relationship to the CMC on February 14, 1962, in *Paesa Sera*, but, as that

²⁸ *Ibid.*, March 4, 1967.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, March 14, 1967.

journal itself said, his "name did not have, at the time, any particular significance." Later that was to alter, of course.

"There have been great repercussions from the revelations of *Paesa Sera*," remarked that publication in its March 6, 1967, issue, "concerning the connection between Clay Shaw, the man incriminated by D.A. Garrison in the Kennedy assassination, and the World Trade Center (CMC) which was [until] recently working in Rome. The information we published was amply followed up by all the Italian dailies. *Il Giorno* of Milan, *La Gazzetta del Popolo* of Turin, *De La Sera* in Rome, even *Il Tempo*, which wrote 'the businessman accused by D.A. Garrison was among the administrators of the CMC. . . .'"³⁰

"... the lawyer d'Amelio," continued *Paesa Sera*, "... confirmed Shaw's presence on the administrative board of the CMC at the time he [d'Amelio] was its President." Subsequently d'Amelio called Shaw "the inventor" of this type of commercial organization. Unfortunately, no one seemed to know quite what kind of organizations the CMC and Permindex were. One of the few things public about them—if one looked—was that Clay Shaw of New Orleans was a member of both of their boards.

"D'Amelio has tried to justify Shaw's presence (in the CMC and on its Board of Directors)," says the newspaper, "by the fact that Shaw 'had organized in New Orleans a permanent trade exhibit like the one which we wanted to set up in Rome,' and therefore 'through courtesy, we offered Shaw a position on the administrative board.'"

"D'Amelio did not speak of the activities of Ferenc Nagy who, through the CMC's head office, Permindex, had financed [Jacques] Soustelle and the OAS; he did not know that several Swiss newspapers had called the activities of Nagy and Mandel [Mantello] 'criminal'; and he did not speak of the completion of the CMC (nor could he, since [in terms of its publicly announced intentions]) this has turned out to be nothing but a tremendous failure."³¹

On March 14 *Paesa Sera* observed that Clay Shaw had "confirmed everything" it had reported regarding his European alliances. "That is to say," it wrote, "that he has declared that he had been, in effect, administrative adviser to the CMC. Shaw, however, has tried to minimize the importance of this, saying that he had accepted the position 'in exchange for two New Orleans-Rome airline tickets.'"³²

Comments *Paesa Sera*: "According to American sources, Shaw left the

³⁰ *Ibid.*, March 6, 1967.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, March 14, 1967.

U.S. two days after the assassination of Kennedy and came to Europe, visiting, among other places, Italy."³³

Further, it reports, "Clay Shaw, by his own admission, came to Rome during the time preceding the disbanding of the CMC."

Two enigmatic organizations, shadowy figures of finance, neo-Nazi, Fascist individuals manipulating interests in various areas including arms and oil, untold funds from unnamed origins funneled to unspecified ends—the information piles higher and higher, and one senses that one has barely begun to climb the mountain of mystery atop which these men sit and direct their unknown acts to unknown ends. However, to sum up very briefly Clay Shaw's role in this extraordinary drama, a final quote from *Paesa Sera* of March 6, 1967.

It is certain that Clay Shaw, who was arrested in New Orleans . . . (and, therefore, whether on true grounds or not, is a person who is certainly not limited to the quiet pursuit of his profession as a director of industry, but who must therefore have his finger in the pies of it is not clear what political activities) had a position on the board of the CMC in Rome.

It is certain that the CMC (taking advantage of the good faith of d'Amelio and of other Italians who were involved in that disastrous enterprise) has not fulfilled any of the activities for which it was originally projected.

It is certain that an important shareholder in the CMC was an ex-official of the American service.

Concerning the CMC and the organizations formed by Mandel, it is not clear on whose account many Hungarian refugees who were implicated in espionage activities were working, nor through what agencies large financial dealings in European political movements have been taking place.³⁴

It was stated at the beginning of this examination of Clay Shaw's European participations and alliances that the entire matter of the CMC, Permindex, and the various presidents, directors, members of the boards, shareholders, theoretical and actual intentions, extra- and inter-organizational financial manipulations, far- and military-right sponsorings, and so forth, was so complicated as to require a book to cover what is known about these subjects, and that, even then, the most one could draw from would be iceberg visibility. However, it was felt that to under-

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, March 6, 1967.

stand anything of this strange man, Clay L. Shaw of New Orleans, and who knows where, the simple two-dimensional sketch offered to the public should be given the depth a more concrete mass of material would reveal.

One last point must be noted before we leave this particular area of inquiry. Seeking more information regarding the Centro Mondiale Commerciale, the author telephoned the office of the Italian Consul General in New York. After having received silence in response to requests for information in three successive steps, the author was turned over to an apparent superior. When the question "What can you tell me about the CMC in Rome?" was put, for the fourth time, to a man whom the entire series of exchanges indicated to be of considerable authority, he replied: "Why don't you contact the American Embassy?" "The American Embassy?" echoed the author, not a little surprised at the candor implied. "The American Embassy in Rome," the anonymous informant repeated. "But we are interested in the CMC as seen from the Italian perspective," the author explained. "Try the American Embassy, I can't help you any further." The gentleman was thanked for his assistance and the conversation concluded.³⁵

In New Orleans, Clay L. Shaw is a distinguished citizen.

In Rome he was a key member of the boards of two highly recondite, clandestine organizations, numbering among his colleagues persons accused of "criminal activities" on an international level, Fascists, and victims of European assassinations.

Are they, in any way, reconcilable images?

The complexity of Shaw's associations does not end with the Centro Mondiale Commerciale and Permindex, but extends deeply into his personal relationships in Europe. His private address and telephone book, for example, carries the name and address of the wife of a well-known English Fascist, as well as the name, address, and private telephone number of Principessa Marcelle Borghese (now Duchessa de Bomartao), who is related to Prince Valerio Borghese, sometimes referred to as "the Black Prince," or "the New Duce," leader of the Movimento Sociale Italiano, the anti-British, anti-American neo-Fascist organization. The prince was a much-decorated midget-submarine commander during the war, following which he was tried and sentenced to twelve years in prison for cooperating with the Nazis after the Italian armistice with the Allies was signed. However, as he had spent four years in jail awaiting trial, after sentencing, the remaining prison period was suspended.³⁶

³⁵ Author's private files.

³⁶ Dennis Eisenberg, *The Re-emergence of Fascism* (London, MacGibbon and Lee, 1967).

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A different form of excitement took hold now as court was called to order and the name Edward Lee McGehee was called out. All heads craned around at the door as a balding man wearing glasses walked in, took the witness chair, and was sworn in. Mr. McGehee was a barber in Jackson, Louisiana, a town about 120 miles north of New Orleans. Under Alcock's guidance he identified a picture of Lee Harvey Oswald and testified that he had given Oswald a haircut in late August or early September of 1963. Oswald had been interested in securing a job at the Louisiana State Hospital, the barber said, adding he'd referred Oswald to a state representative, Reeves Morgan, and suggested if he were a registered voter he might have a better chance of getting a job. He testified that Oswald's car, parked in front of the barbershop, was old and battered and that a young woman sat in the front seat and what looked to be a baby bassinet occupied the back. (The Warren Report stated that neither Oswald nor his wife, Marina, could drive a car.) McGehee had never seen Oswald before or since, but he testified he'd mentioned to his wife upon seeing Oswald's picture the day of the assassination that "I recognized him from somewhere." The barber testified Oswald was neat and clean-shaven.

Dymond then took over. He was interested in the precise date of the haircut. McGehee said it was either late August or the first half of September. He remembered because the weather had turned cool. He was definite about it not being past September 15. (It was well documented that Oswald had departed New Orleans for Mexico City toward the end of September.) Asked how he remembered Oswald as being clean-shaven, McGehee replied, "Barbers notice that. When you give a man a haircut, you try to sell him a shave." The barber had testified under direct questioning that he'd never contacted the FBI or any other agency about Oswald's presence.

Dymond then asked, "Is there any reason that you waited five years to come forward with this information?"

The barber's reply was a snappish "No one approached me."

To me, the next obvious question should have been: Who approached you to testify in this trial? I was disappointed that Dymond didn't ask it and instead excused the witness.

Reeves Morgan, the man to whom McGehee had referred Oswald, was sworn in next. He testified that Oswald came to see him in the latter part of August or early part of September; he'd advised the young man to get an application form and take a civil service examination, also suggesting it would not hurt if he were a registered voter in the area. Mr. Morgan said he did contact the FBI after the assassination to tell them he recognized Oswald as a man who'd come to see him about a job, but he claimed the FBI already knew Oswald had been in the vicinity of Jackson, that they thanked him for his call but that was the end of it. Reeves Morgan also recalled Oswald as clean-shaven and neatly dressed, and the weather as cool.

So far, Clay Shaw's name had not been mentioned, but the third witness of the day—John Manchester, the lean true-grittish town marshal of Clinton, Louisiana, a small town near Jackson—fingered him. Manchester testified under examination by Andrew Sciambra that in the summer of 1963 there had been a civil rights registration drive to get more Negro voters on the rolls. That summer, he said, there were many strangers and strange cars in town. It was his job to keep law and order and he was suspicious of outsiders. One day in August or September, he related, a black Cadillac pulled up and parked near the voter registrar's office. The town marshal claimed he had walked over to speak with the driver, who said he was from the International Trade Mart in New Orleans. "Do you see the man in this courtroom that you talked to?" Sciambra asked. The town marshal pointed to Clay Shaw.

When Dymond questioned the man, he asked the town marshal how long he'd spoken to the man in the driver's seat. The answer was "I'd venture to say two minutes." Dymond asked, "Before today and exclusive of the incident in Clinton, have you ever seen the defendant before?" The town marshal said he'd seen him two weeks previously, in this very courtroom, during the selection of

the jury. Dymond asked a man for testimony. The town marshal had now, Manchester, after the preliminary examination after Mr. Shaw testified, figured if the Dymond tossed the town marshal as the object of your keep Negroes other assistance. "Objection!" that, Dymond.

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the jury. Dymond wanted to know how it was possible to speak to a man for two minutes five years earlier and positively identify him. The town marshal replied, "I forget names, but I don't forget faces." Then Dymond got into the matter of when the town marshal had reported the essence of what he was testifying to right now. Manchester didn't remember. Dymond pressed him: "Was it after the preliminary hearing?" Manchester said he thought it was after Mr. Shaw was indicted. Dymond asked why he hadn't contacted the Warren Commission. John Manchester snorted, "I figured if they wanted it, they could come and get it." Now Dymond tossed in a question which was meant to discredit the town marshal with the Negroes on the jury: "Isn't it true the object of your presence at the voter registration drive was trying to keep Negroes from voting?" This brought Alcock and one or two other assistant D.A.s jumping to their feet, shouting, "Objection! Objection!" Manchester replied, "No, it certainly was not!" At that, Dymond excused him.

The fourth witness for the prosecution was Henry Earl Palmer, a fuddled man who had been the registrar of voters in Clinton for eleven years. When asked where his office was, in which building, he could not say. He struggled mightily with this problem until you could feel the embarrassment in the courtroom. He was obviously the registrar of voters, but he simply drew a blank on this one particular point. He testified that in the summer of 1963 there were a lot of out-of-towners in Clinton trying to get the locals to vote (one got a definite idea of his feelings about this effort) and that he had seen a black Cadillac outside the registration office. He'd seen the car parked there six times during the day—whenever he'd left for lunch or coffee breaks—and although he'd never been closer than fifteen or twenty feet to it, he said the man seated on the passenger side of the front seat had strange hair and eyebrows—"messed up," as he put it. He identified a picture of David Ferrie as this man. He described the man behind the wheel as being tall with white hair, broad shoulders and a ruddy complexion. The witness then identified Clay Shaw as that man. He went on to testify that he'd seen Lee Harvey Oswald in the predominantly Negro registration line and that in the afternoon he'd spoken to Oswald when his turn came up but had not registered him because he had no proof he lived in the area.

Palmer told Irvin Dymond he'd recognized Oswald's picture from the papers after the assassination. The lawyer asked if he'd also recognized Clay Shaw's picture. Sciambra quickly objected, but before the judge could rule the witness had replied, "I did not." Dymond then zeroed in on just how good a look he'd gotten at the two men in the black Cadillac. Palmer finally admitted he had not seen their faces, he'd only seen "the back of the head and shoulders of one and the profile of the other."

On re-direct Sciambra showed Palmer a photograph of Guy Bannister, the deceased lawyer many people said resembled Clay Shaw. Sciambra asked Palmer if he knew Bannister and the man said he'd known him in World War II. On re-cross, Palmer told Dymond he would recognize Guy Bannister on sight, but not if he saw only his head and shoulders.

I was hoping Dymond would then ask: And yet you recognize a man you had *not* known but only seen from a distance of fifteen or twenty feet five years ago and have testified that you did not even see his face—as *Clay Shaw*? But the witness was excused.

The last witness of the day was the most damaging. He was Corrie C. Collins, a Negro who had been the head of the Clinton chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) at the time of the registration drive. Here was someone who would not be expected to corroborate the town marshal's story; they must have been on opposite sides of the fence, at least in the summer of 1963. Collins testified he'd seen the black Cadillac and identified Oswald, from a photograph, as the man who got out of the back seat and stood in the registration line, and he described the man behind the wheel as having a heavy build, gray hair and wearing a light-colored hat. Sciambra asked Corrie Collins if that man was in the courtroom and Collins pointed to Clay Shaw. He then described Ferrie by means of his eyebrows and hair and identified a picture of him.

When Dymond took over this witness, he was a much more persistent questioner. The lawyer wanted to know how he'd come to be a witness in this case. Collins said, "They came to me a few months after the defendant was arrested." He got Collins to admit he'd never volunteered any of the information to the Warren Commission or any other agency and asked him why he had not. "I felt if they wanted to know, they'd ask me," he replied.

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he was a much more to know how he'd come. They came to me a few. He got Collins to admit mation to the Warren d him why he had not. e," he replied.

DYMOND: When did you first see a picture of Clay Shaw?

COLLINS: In 1967 in the newspapers.

DYMOND: On the basis of a picture in the newspapers, you recognized a man you'd seen for only a matter of minutes at a distance of twenty to thirty feet years before?

COLLINS: I'd seen him here in this courtroom.

This verified the suspicion that all of the Clinton people had been brought to the courtroom to view Clay Shaw during the voir dire.

Now Dymond got him to admit that when he'd first seen Clay Shaw's picture he had not immediately recognized him. "I looked at the picture," Collins said, "studied it and began to place where I had seen him." Dymond wanted to know what were the main points of identification. Collins replied they had been Shaw's gray hair and the build of his shoulders. Dymond quickly said, "But you said he had a hat on?" Collins replied, after a pause, "Yes, but the hat didn't completely cover his head."

Dymond was warmed up now and he added, "Then you only saw gray temples?" "Yes," Collins admitted. Dymond further confused the witness by trying to get him to recall whether the car was to his right or left. Collins could not remember that, or which direction the car was pointed in, although he remembered it was on his side of the street. When Dymond insisted he remember, Collins said he could not do it "because I wasn't necessarily standing in the same position the whole time." Dymond returned to the fact that Collins had seen Clay Shaw in court during jury selection. "Yes," Collins answered. "And you had not seen him between 1963 and 1969?" "That's right," the witness said. "And you say it's the same man?" "Yes," Corrie Collins replied, and he was then excused.

As we all soon were. It had been a long day and it was good to be released from the courtroom.

The Rolfes were anxious to rub in the Clinton folk's testimony. "Well, what about that?" June asked. "Yes," Dick added, feigning a look of empathetic understanding at what I must be going through, "doesn't look good for Clay, does it?" I had to admit that if the witnesses kept clocking in at a steady rate, it did not look good. "You see, Jim [Garrison] just didn't make this up out of his

own head," Dick said. (No, I thought, Jim Garrison must have *something*!) The Rolles were never known *not* to belabor a point so I took my leave as graciously as possible. They dispensed small pained smiles that were meant to say, Cheer up, you've just been hoodwinked; we know this is hurting but you had to learn the truth eventually.

The Clinton people—soon known as the "Country Folk" because of their group homeliness—were not the steadiest clump of witnesses that had ever been trotted before a jury, but the very fact that they were such a mixed bag lent impressiveness to their testimony. Most of all, one could not help wonder how they got together, who first contacted one of them, and who took it from there, rounding up the others. A reporter told me he saw Corrie Collins drive off in a car with the town marshal. They were not playing the cobra and the mongoose now.

The jury this first day had listened to the Country Folk with active interest; from the seriousness of their expressions there was not much doubt they were impressed by the state's opening barrage.

Court started at 9 the next morning. Judge Haggerty invariably began the proceedings by asking the jury if they'd had a good night. Several of them would mumble and smile in return, a few would nod, and the rest would look at him, heads cocked, as if to say, Good night, indeed, locked up three-four-five to a room.

Another one of the Country Folk began the day. A second Negro CORE worker from the summer of 1963—William E. Dunn, Sr.—testified about the black Cadillac car and the man sitting behind the wheel. Sciambra asked what made him notice the man. "He was a stranger to me," Dunn replied. He then described the man as having "big shoulders, a big man, with gray hair." At that point he identified Clay Shaw.

The defendant reacted virtually the same to any moment of identification. Head up, he would look his identifier in the eye—not with belligerence or even disbelief—simply look at him.

Under direct questioning, Dunn went on to say he was not sure about any other passenger in the front seat. He said he noticed "one white boy" in the voter registration line and after looking at a picture of Lee Harvey Oswald, identified him as having been the one.

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Under cross-examination, Dymond asked Dunn how he'd come to be a witness in the case. "The D.A.'s office got in touch with me about a year ago," was the reply. He also testified he'd come to court during jury selection for a look at the defendant. "Did the D.A.'s office ask you to look at him?" Dymond asked. "I don't know," the witness replied.

I was positive Dymond would ask the next obvious question: Then who *did* ask you to come to the courtroom to look at Clay Shaw? But the defense lawyer went on to concentrate upon Dunn's identification, asking if the man he'd seen in Clinton didn't have longer hair than Clay Shaw. The witness said he did not. Dymond pursued this question, wanting to know if Dunn would remember the length of a man's hair, since he'd seen the man only briefly five years ago. To this Dunn gave a marvelously all-inclusive answer: "Look, when a man's in town, I notice him, and I don't forget him." Dymond asked if the man in the car had worn a hat. "He didn't have no hat on," the witness said. Dymond immediately picked this up: "What if I told you Corrie Collins said the man was wearing a hat—" Alcock quickly objected while Dunn added, "I said he didn't have a hat." At one point Dymond asked, "Before seeing him [Shaw] in Clinton had you ever seen him before?"

DUNN: I can't remember.

DYMOND: Did he look familiar?

Dunn, for some reason, had extreme difficulty understanding this question and Judge Haggerty eventually asked the lawyer to rephrase it without using the word "familiar." Dymond: "Did he look like someone you'd seen before?" "No," replied the witness, "I'd never seen him before." A sigh rose in the press section.

Dunn had said earlier he'd recognized Shaw's picture in the newspapers when he was arrested and now Dymond asked why he hadn't come forward to make a report of this strange man he'd remembered seeing in Clinton the same day that Oswald was there. To this, William Dunn gave a reply that won him a few smiles: "I didn't think I had to report it. When I saw his picture he was already arrested—what am I gonna have cause to get him arrested again?" Dunn testified that Clay Shaw had worn a dark suit, but he could not remember what Lee Harvey Oswald wore. Asked why that was, he said he thought "the man in the car was

the FBI." He was questioned further about the location of the car and finally released.

The Clinton people had a strong effect on the press and speculators and, one presumed, the jury at the opening of the trial.

Hugh Aynesworth of *Newsweek* told me a story that casts some light on these Country Folk. I later asked him to write down his impressions of a visit he'd made to Clinton right before the start of the trial. Excerpts from his account follow:

Sometime around mid-January I was in Dallas, running down a rumor that Clay Shaw's name had been found in old papers of Jack Ruby's . . . the wire services had used the story directly from the *Dallas Times-Herald* without checking. It said that in Ruby's papers was the notation "Opening for Shaw."

I got up there, found the guy who had the stuff and looked at the page in question. It said simply "Opening of *Show*." On the same page were names and addresses of show business characters and contacts Ruby had. That is a perfect example of how irresponsible most of the press was in the matter.

Anyway while in Dallas I checked with a few well-placed contacts, informers and the like . . . and lo and behold, a guy I hardly knew called me and told me he could supply me with a list of all the witnesses Garrison was planning to use. Was I interested, he asked? Well, yes and no. I had run down about 75 to 100 similar "tips" and usually had found they were worthless—figments of somebody's vivid imagination or false. But at this point I felt Garrison had such an advantage I had to take a look-see.

There on a three-page sheet were the names, addresses and planned testimony (capsuled) of more than 20 Garrison witnesses. Most of them I recognized, but a few were completely new. Most of the new were from the Clinton-Jackson area.

I had heard several months before, that Garrison's investigators were supposed to have found that Lee Oswald had sought a job at the state mental hospital at Jackson. Upon checking the dates and checking Oswald's whereabouts on those days, I found the odds about 100-1 that Lee Harvey Oswald could have been there. But, this was 1969 and after watching Garrison's behavior for better than 18 months, I knew that logic, fact or common sense had no place in Big Jim's strange world.

I asked Bill Gurvich . . . to go with me. About two-thirds of the names on the list were unknown to Gurvich also. In other words they had come forth more than five months after the preliminary hearing of Clay Shaw, and about six months after "the Giant" had bragged that he knew all the names, places and etc.

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About two-thirds of Gurvich also. In other months after the previous months after "the places and etc.

Gurvich and I drove to Clinton in his car, following a visit with a top Louisiana State Police official in Baton Rouge. We learned enough from the State Police official to let us know that the whole thing was a hoax, but we decided to visit several of the witnesses anyway—in the belief that if we could talk with them, and tape-record the conversation, we would probably find flaws in their stories. "It's for sure they'll never be able to tell the same wacky story twice," said Gurvich. This turned out to be true.

John Manchester, the town marshal, was the first witness we encountered. He was shocked that we knew that he was to testify. Manchester, a foul-talking, dirty and scruffy man who looked like the only way he could whip a man was to kick him in the groin, wouldn't comment on his testimony at first, but he kept saying, "Ain't no way that son-of-a-bitch (Oswald) coulda fired all them shots. Ain't no way."

Manchester told me he recognized Oswald at that time—the day Oswald shot Kennedy, adding, "And I told several people about it." I pressed him to give me the names of those people he had mentioned this to, but beyond a stammer or two, he couldn't come across. "You probably still run around with the same guys now you did then, don't you?" I taunted the skinny racist. "Damn right," he replied, "when I got a friend, he's a friend." He said he worked with and drank coffee with most of the same people in 1963 and 1968, but when I kept asking him who he mentioned seeing Oswald in Clinton to, he just grinned that brown smile and changed the subject. Once he said I reminded him of a guy he knew in the Air Force or the Army. "I got enough of that shit real fast," he added, "and I'm gettin' enough of these questions of yours too."

Some of his cronies were kidding Manchester that when Irv Dymond "got a hold of him, he'd shake loose and tell everything he knew." Manchester wiped mud from his cowboy boots and snapped, "Sheeit . . . ain't nobody gonna make me do nothin'." They told him he'd have to dress up when he appeared in court. "Sheeit . . . I'll wear just what I got on. If that ain't good enough for 'em, screw 'em," he said.

Gurvich, who is a well-known and respected referee at State Police (and other law enforcement) shooting matches, got to telling Manchester how Oswald shot Kennedy. Manchester said he couldn't believe it, that Oswald had help and that probably they "was plannin' the whole thing when they's up here that summer."

I kept talking to him about his early (November of 1963) identification of Oswald as having been there and he got angry and told me how he had "knocked the Hell out of a reporter" at a

recent trial in Clinton. "He tried to come over that bar, towards the jury, you know, and I jes let him have it. He might still be pukin'." He added, "I don't mess around with these rabble rousers . . . the press. You or anyone else messes with me, I'll cut 'em a new asshole."

We went to see Corrie Collins, but were told he had left town. A deputy took us to his house and barged right in and sat down in the living room as Collins' father, Emmett "Snowball" Collins, looked at the three of us with fear in his eyes. It was just after dark and he knew we weren't there to watch TV. He told us his son now lived in Baton Rouge and worked at the Post Office there. The white-haired man of 70 told us he didn't know anything about the case and didn't know what his son knew.

We left and drove to Baton Rouge, where about 11 P.M. we just missed him at the Post Office, but we found that he was working there under an assumed name. We tried to find his home, but to no avail. We never found Corrie, but it was simple to see how he *had* to testify to what Manchester and the other scrub-nuts wanted him to. His father was simply terrified by three white men barging into his house after dark. In short, being a Negro in Clinton—a hotbed of the red-neck and the Klan—is not much fun.

Henry Burnell Clark, a clerk at the Stewart and Carroll Store in Clinton, was supposed to have identified Ferrie and Shaw on the Clinton main drag. He didn't want to talk about it. "Go 'way, man," he winced. "I don't know what you're talkin' about."

We didn't get around to the others up there. It wasn't the most pleasant town to be in and we figured we'd come back another day. But Manchester soon called Garrison to complain about us and within days Garrison had sent Alcock to complain publicly at a press conference that Kent Biffle, Gurchich and I had been talking to witnesses. They weren't sure, said the little punk, Alcock, but there was a possibility that we were trying to bribe them. Of course, nothing ever came of it—except that Garrison dropped some of the witnesses.

Manchester, you'll recall, testified that he had spent two minutes talking to Clay Shaw that summer of 1963 and Dymond asked him how he could be so sure—to have only seen a man for two minutes five years before. "I don't forget faces," Manchester snapped. "I may not remember names, but I remember faces. It's my job to." More importantly, perhaps, three to four weeks after I'd spent one to two hours with the man discussing the very subject he was concerned with, Manchester did not recognize me when I went up to talk to him following his testimony on the stand. "Newsweek, eh," he said. "Yeh, I met a feller from there not

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away—him, still not recognizing a man with a 12-inch scar on his
face whom he had threatened a few days before. Quite a memory
has mister Manchester!

Many people have asked me about the Clinton-Jackson wit-
nesses. Were they mistaken? Who did they see? How could so
many be wrong? And so on. I honestly cannot explain how it
happened, though I have some small insight into how it could
have occurred. First, I think John Manchester and a State Police-
man . . . put it all together. I'm certain that there were many out-
of-towners—FBI, press, etc.—during that 1963 Voter Registration
Drive in Clinton. And, I feel certain every damn one of them was
resented. And remembered. Maybe one of them looked something
like Shaw or like Oswald. Funny though that nobody came forth
after Oswald's face was plastered all over the world, November
22-24, 1963, when their memories should have been ultra sharp.

The rest of the morning, following the last of the Country Folk,
was uneventful. Two women from the Louisiana State Hospital
testified to Lee Harvey Oswald's alleged attempt to secure employ-
ment and his job application—which was missing. They were
followed by a parade of New Orleanians, several of whom were
policemen, who testified that Oswald had passed out "Hands Off
Cuba!" leaflets in New Orleans in the summer of 1963 and to his
subsequent arrest as the result of a street altercation. Dymond
claimed much of this was irrelevant but the judge overruled his
objections, and the defense lawyer took the usual bills of excep-
tion at every opportunity.

CHAPTER SIX

The Mystery of 544 Camp Street

*I now fully realize that only the powers
of the Presidency will reveal the secrets of
my brother's death.*

—ROBERT KENNEDY,
June 3, 1968,
two days before he was shot

I

IT IS NOT to detract from the reputation of New Orleans as the fun spot of the Southern Rim to suggest that to many of the loyal readers of the New Orleans *Times-Picayune* the news in the summer of 1963 was largely devoid of good cheer. The paper was full of stories about John F. Kennedy's new wave of civil rights policies, which were not greeted with universal approbation in the parish city, and dispatches about the progress of arms control negotiations in Washington and Moscow, two capitals that remained in little more favor in the modern South than in the preceding century.

There was, however, in the first edition of the *Times-Picayune* of the first day of August of that year a local item of international implications that seemed on first reading to be good news. CACHE OF MATERIAL FOR BOMBS SEIZED, the headline read. The FBI in its preliminary announcement of the arms raid said that the contraband grabbed was part of the bureau's ongoing investigation of a plot "to carry out a military operation against a country with which the United States is at peace." The joy diminished considerably when it became evident several editions later that the country in question was Cuba.

The previous day FBI agents had raided a pink cottage in a sparsely settled resort area north of nearby Lake Pontchartrain and confiscated more than a ton of dynamite, twenty 100-pound aerial bomb casings, bomb fuses and striker assemblies, a 50-pound container of Nuodex, and all the stuffings to make napalm.

The New Orleans FBI chief, Harry G. Maynard, a square-jawed cop out of Dick Tracy who combed his black hair straight back and parted it down the middle, refused to comment beyond the bare facts of the raid. He would not speculate if the target country was Cuba. He declined to say if arrests were imminent. There was reason enough for that since the FBI had already thrown the alleged criminals back into the intelligence swamp of the CIA. They were not small fish.

Cuba became the target apparent when newsmen questioned the wife of the vacation cottage's owner, William Julius McLaney, a businessman, formerly in the business of gambling in Havana, Cuba. "If it weren't for that goddamn Castro," William McLaney had once said, "Caesar's Palace would have been built in Havana." Mrs. McLaney said that she and her husband had lent their summer place to a Cuban newly arrived in New Orleans named José Juárez. She said that she personally did not know José Juárez. They had turned over their retreat as a "favor to friends" they had known in the good old days in Havana. As to the kinds of people Mr. Juárez might be associating with on their front porch, Mrs. McLaney said that her husband was "such a good-hearted guy that he didn't ask any questions."

The FBI had grabbed eleven men at the resort bomb site and then released them without charges. Among the Lake Pontchartrain Eleven released by the FBI was Sam Benton, a middleman between the gambling interests and the Cuban exiles whose belt was cinched on the mob side. Benton was a sort of impresario of revolution who specialized in finding funding, usually in the shade of the law, for exile enterprises, and who took a finder's fee off the top. Benton in the fifties had worked in the Havana casinos and described himself as a "commission broker in Latin American commodities"—which included goods not listed on any exchange. He was also described, in testimony before a Senate rackets committee, as "a dealer in counterfeit money, both domestic and foreign, [who] has been involved in dealing with stolen securities and other securities closely associated with . . . gamblers in Miami."

Another individual but briefly inconvenienced by the FBI's raid on the rural napalm factory was Rich Lauchli, a baby-faced tough guy, cofounder of the fanatical Minutemen and an Illinois arms purveyor who had previously supplied guns to the mob-financed, Chicago-based provisional government of Paulino Sierra for a Castro-less Cuba. Most of the others caught

up in the FBI net were Cubans. Mrs. McLaney's mystery guest, Mr. Juárez, was not to be found.

As with so much of the Secret War, the Lake Ponchartrain raid was evidence that circles existed within circles. The most violent and rabidly rightist of exile elements, feeling that JFK had betrayed them, were turning to the mob and the radical paramilitary right wing for help in a war that was to turn against the government itself. While JFK was slapping these unauthorized exile operations down with his left hand, they were getting a little help from the CIA's right hand.

The Lake Ponchartrain plot was bigger than the FBI's Maynard had let on. The chain of events leading to the Lake Pontchartrain bust began in Miami on June 14, when a tipster told the FBI "that a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery in Cuba." The next day customs agents, apparently alerted by the FBI, arrived at an abandoned airfield south of Miami just as a twin-engine Beechcraft was about to be loaded with two 250-pound bombs, 300 sticks of dynamite, 55 gallons of napalm, and a supply of grenades and M-1 rifles. Benton was there, along with four of the five Cubans later nabbed at the McLaney cottage. They were briefly detained.

This raid also made the papers. The pilot had flown in from another state and was headed for a bomb run on the industrial complex in Cuba before flying on "to a friendly Central American country," the Miami *Herald* reported. An FBI follow-up report on October 3, 1963, from Miami to headquarters stated: "It was ascertained that Michael McLaney supplied the money and explosives for this operation." Mike McLaney, the former Havana casino operator who used Benton as his contact with the Cubans, was William McLaney's brother and business partner.

Mike McLaney's faith in victory through air power had been frustrated. Shortly after the Bay of Pigs he had submitted a plan to the CIA to fire-bomb the Shell, Esso, and Texaco refineries. Top brass said no. This time McLaney was ignoring channels.

On July 19 the FBI's informant "advised there was another plan to bomb Cuba, using bomb casings and dynamite located on the outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana." That tip sent the FBI to the McLaney cottage—a trip which in turn caused the hurried evacuation of another nearby exile training camp that the bureau evidently did not know about. The camp had been set up a year earlier by Gerry Hemming and Frank Sturgis at the request of the New Orleans branch of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

At the time of the FBI raid Sturgis's training camp was occupied by the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC) under the guise of training secu-

rity guards for a lumber mill in Guatemala. But the MDC military chief, Laureano Batista, later admitted to the New Orleans district attorney that the trainees actually were destined, with the approval of General Somoza, for the CIA-supported naval guerrilla base of Manuel Arttime in Guatemala.

The camp was used by various groups of the exile far right—the DRE, 30th of November Movement, and MIRR—all of which huddled under the wing of Paulino Sierra's short-lived, mob-connected provisional government. In 1976 the Senate Intelligence Committee disclosed that the camp "was directed by the same individuals who were involved in procuring the dynamite the FBI seized," a reference to Rich Lauchli and Sam Benton and his Cubans, who had moved from the moribund Triple A to the growing MIRR of Dr. Orlando Bosch,² a fanatical ex-pediatrician so far to the right that he considered the Miami *Herald* a tropical edition of the *Daily Worker*. He had fought in the revolution but was one of the first to turn against Castro. In the pre-Bay of Pigs era, MIRR operatives were trained in sabotage by the CIA and infiltrated into the Escambray Mountains, where they were supplied by Sturgis's boat runs.

While other exile leaders sought the limelight, Bosch worked in the shadows and was particularly close to the murderous Operation 40. But he quickly became convinced that the CIA was using the exiles ineffectively. Bosch rebelled early in 1963, when the agency sliced one of his major infiltration operations down to one five-man crew. "We will do this if you send your mother with us," he told the case officer. He published an angry pamphlet, *The Tragedy of Cuba*, charging the Kennedy administration with betraying the exile cause. The House Select Committee on Assassinations reported that he sent a personal copy to President Kennedy.³

Bosch combined his operations with Frank Sturgis's International Anti-Communist Brigade. In March the MIRR military chief, Major Evelio Duque, Sturgis, and Alex Rorke, the Stork Club Kid, took off in Rorke's cabin cruiser, *Violynn III*, intent upon lining up a Soviet tanker in the sights of a deck cannon which they had borrowed from the Minutemen. But someone had tipped off the FBI, who notified authorities in the Bahamas. *Violynn III* was impounded by British police upon arriving at Norman's Cay for refueling.

Bosch's collaboration with Sturgis resulted in eleven air strikes against Cuba, beginning on April 25, when Rorke dropped a spray of bombs on the Shell and Esso refineries near Havana. *The New York Times* termed this "the first bombing raid since the Bay of Pigs." But after the twin raids at the Florida airfield and Lake Pontchartrain, Bosch came to the conclusion

that he would be better off out of range of a schizoid government that was doing in its own troops. He announced that the MIRR would thereafter launch its air raids with three twin-engine planes based in Central America, "where the host country approves." Ex-MIRR pilot Carl M. Davis has since identified the country as Guatemala, where an airstrip was hacked out of a half-million-acre jungle plantation owned by United Fruit.

Bosch's flight commander was a friend of Sturgis's who had done contract flying for the CIA. Sturgis's buddy lined up the pilots, paying them \$2,000 a mission (he charged Bosch \$4,000) and selected the targets: a MiG base at Santa Clara; oil storage tanks near Casilda; the huge Brazil sugar mill. Bosch had to furnish the planes as well, and it cost him dearly. No one seemed to know where it came from. Some funding for Bosch came from Paulino Sierra's provisional government and its gambling-interest backers, but this wasn't enough to keep Bosch in the military manner to which he was becoming accustomed. Pilot Howard Davis, an Interpen instructor, says that Mike McLaney himself was "all flaps and no throttle" when it came to putting up money. For a time speculation centered on Carlos Prio, who had openly voiced support for Bosch.

It eventually became known that the major backer was H. L. Hunt of Dallas. Hunt, a millionaire who ate brown-bag lunches, was the benefactor of countless right-wing causes. Tony Veciana, who was negotiating for Alpha 66 for the use of MIRR airplanes, remembers an incident when his CIA contact, Maurice Bishop, summoned him to Las Vegas. "We were in a hotel and Bishop left to do something," Veciana said. "In his briefcase I saw a memo with the plans we were doing, movements to contact, the activities of commando groups in Texas. The memo had the initials 'To HH.' There was a millionaire in Texas, very conservative. I thought, since Bishop was so right-wing himself, maybe he was in contact with the millionaire. Other times I think he works with Howard Hughes [who had not yet arrived in Las Vegas]."¹⁴ During a 1968 trial of Bosch's group in Miami, a telephone tape transcript was introduced in which Bosch indicated that a Mr. Hunt—"the one of the wells"—was providing backing.

Orlando Bosch remained the mystery figure, the behind-the-scenes manipulator flitting in and out of the country on his errands that almost invariably were lethal. Many of Bosch's early associates, such as Alex Rorke, met violent or mysterious deaths. On September 30, Rorke took off from Fort Lauderdale airport in a blue and white twin Beechcraft and banked south. With him were pilot Geoffrey Sullivan and a Cuban exile. Rorke had filed a flight plan for Panama, although he had told his wife that he was going to Nicaragua to confer with General Somoza about an import-

export venture. There was later speculation that he was on a secret mission for Bosch.

A few hours later the Beechcraft refueled at Cozumel off Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula, took off again, then vanished, as in poof! Gone. No one ever learned what happened to the Stork Club Kid, except that it was, for him, the end of the good times. Frank Sturgis heard a rumor that the craft had been shot down by Castro. Gerry Hemming is convinced that the Cuban passenger was a double agent who hijacked the plane to Cuba. There is the additional theory that the socially well-connected Rorke—who had once been an FBI employee—was the anonymous informer who repeatedly tipped the bureau about the *Violynn III* mission, the bombing run from the Florida airstrip, and the bomb cache at Lake Pontchartrain—all Bosch-directed plots. Bosch found out, the story goes, and sent Rorke on a flight to oblivion.

Among the mysteries of Lake Pontchartrain is why the FBI—otherwise diligently following JFK's orders to crack down on the Neutrality Act violators—would release the Lake Pontchartrain Eleven and attempt to cover up the fact that they had been detained in the first place. One answer lies in the Secret War connection between the McLaney summer cottage and the other nearby exile training camp, and a dingy office building on Camp Street in downtown New Orleans, where the right flank of the Cuba Project went bump in the night with creatures of various persuasions.

II

W. Guy Banister, a salty, snappish man with wavy gray hair, was the boss of the Chicago FBI office until his retirement in 1955. He was not the typical FBI clone. He wore a .357 Magnum revolver under his coat, said unmentionable things about headquarters ("The bureau and the field have been living in adultery for years"), and religiously defied J. Edgar Hoover's two-martini limit. When he retired, he became a New Orleans police official. He was sacked for shooting off his gun in a bar, and then he opened a private detective agency called Guy Banister & Associates at 544 Camp Street.

A onetime Banister associate described the business in a manner not easily categorized in the Yellow Pages: "Guy participated in every important anti-Communist South and Central American revolution which came along, acting as a key liaison man for the U.S.-Government-sponsored anti-Communist activities in Latin America."

During the Bay of Pigs mission, Banister collaborated with the New

Orleans delegate to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, Sergio Arcacha Smith, an immaculate man with a pencil mustache who had served in the Batista diplomatic corps. Arcacha's office was located conveniently across the hall from Banister's in the 544 Camp Street building and was known as the Cuban Grand Central Station. Arcacha created the Crusade to Free Cuba in order to solicit donations in the Anglo community. With Banister as an incorporator, Arcacha also formed the Friends of Democratic Cuba with outwardly similar goals. Ronnie Caire, Arcacha's public relations coordinator at the time, has revealed that the Friends doubled as "an undercover operation in conjunction with the CIA and FBI which involved the shipment and transportation of individuals and supplies in and out of Cuba."⁶

The building at 544 Camp Street had figured in the planned diversionary strike and provocation during the Bay of Pigs. The munitions in the *Santa Ana's* hold had been procured by Arcacha and Banister. A week earlier Arcacha and two CIA contract employees, David Ferrie and Gordon Novel, had picked them up at a Schlumberger Well Services Company bunker outside New Orleans. Novel later described the bunker as "a CIA staging point for munitions destined to be used as part of the abortive Bay of Pigs attack." The munitions were stored temporarily at Novel's and Ferrie's residences—and Banister's office. A close friend of Banister's recalled seeing numerous wooden crates stenciled "Schlumberger" in the office. "Five or six of the boxes were open," he said. "Inside were rifle grenades and land mines and some little missiles I had never seen before. When a friend warned Banister that possession of the munitions might bring trouble, Banister said, 'No, it was all right, that he had approval from somebody. He said the stuff would just be there overnight, that somebody was supposed to pick it up. He said a bunch of fellows connected with the Cuban deal asked to leave it there overnight.'"

The *Santa Ana* mission failed when the rebel impostors got cold feet about attacking U.S. forces directly, which would have provided a pretext for full scale American intervention. Banister's clandestine activities intensified after the Bay of Pigs. A frequent visitor to his Camp Street office was Colonel Orlando Piedra, the ex-chief of Batista's secret police, a highly feared man who may have been involved with Operation 40. Among their discussions were assassination plots against Castro. According to one exile who sat in on a conversation between Banister and Piedra, one of the plots under consideration involved "putting poison in the air-conditioning ducts in the Havana Presidential Palace and killing all occupants."⁸

Jerry Milton Brooks, a former Minuteman, who was a political re-

searcher for Banister during this period, says that the ex-FBI man became Louisiana coordinator for the Minutemen. Banister was also instrumental in the Anti-Communist League of the Caribbean, a pet project of Nicaragua's General Somoza, and was part of a global network of right-wing hard-liners. The Anti-Communist League of the Caribbean was one of a global family that originated with the Asian People's ACL, a creature of the Nationalist Chinese, and included the pro-Batista ACL of Cuba and the Chicago-based ACL of America. Banister's associate, attorney Maurice B. Gatlin, Sr., of New Orleans, was counsel to the ACL of the Caribbean as well as a member of the steering committee of the umbrella World ACL, along with Richard Nixon's good friend Alfred Kohlberg of the China Lobby. The ACL affiliates engaged in propaganda and lobbying and collaborated with the intelligence branches of their respective governments.

Banister was also prone to racist comments. He published a smear sheet called the *Louisiana Intelligence Digest* that labeled the civil rights movement as communist-inspired and hurled imprecations at John Kennedy for his "pinko" support of blacks. The ex-Chicago FBI chief also had a network of young informants on the Tulane and Louisiana State campuses. Banister collected information on the left from every imaginable right-wing source, amassing what he proudly hailed as the largest file system of "anti-Communist intelligence" in the South. Jerry Brooks regularly couriered this data over to the New Orleans FBI office, which incorporated it into its files.⁹

Jerry Brooks said that Maurice Gatlin, who regarded him as a protégé, often bragged about his dual life. "I have pretty good connections," Gatlin asserted. "Stick with me—I'll give you a license to kill." One connection was the CIA, for which Gatlin said he was a "transporter," arranging the movement of people in and out of the country and delivering money abroad. "He showed me his passport," Brooks recalled. "It was filled with the stamps of airports all over the world." On one occasion Gatlin displayed a thick wad of bills, saying that he was going to Paris to give the money to a French Army clique preparing to assassinate Charles de Gaulle.¹⁰

During the summer of 1963 a clean-cut ex-Marine named Lee Harvey Oswald began passing out pro-Castro literature on the streets of downtown New Orleans. One batch of pamphlets was rubber-stamped with the return address "FPCC, 544 Camp St., New Orleans, La." It was the address of the small weather-beaten Newman Building at the corner of Camp and Lafayette streets. On the ground floor was Mancuso's Restaurant. On the second floor was the vacated office of the Cuban Revolutionary Council—Arcacha had departed for Texas the year before following a rhubarb over

missing funds. Also on the second floor was Guy Banister & Associates. The security-minded Banister used a side-entrance address of 531 Lafayette Street.

For Oswald to receive left-wing mail at the right-wing Camp Street building would have been tantamount to Madalyn Murray O'Hair's having an office at the Vatican. The missing link between Oswald and the paramilitary right wing was David William Ferrie, the sometime CIA operative who had helped remove the munitions from the Schlumberger bunker and who was extremely close to Guy Banister. Former New Orleans DA Jim Garrison, no stranger to hyperbole, once called Ferrie "one of history's most important individuals." He was certainly one of its strangest. Ferrie was a moth to the light bulb of anticommunist causes. In 1950 he offered his services to the U.S. Air Force, saying, "There is nothing that I would enjoy better than blowing the hell out of every damn Russian, Communist, Red or what-have-you." An Eastern Airlines pilot, Ferrie became commander of the Falcon Squadron of the Civil Air Patrol. In 1956 a high school student named Lee Harvey Oswald came briefly under his wing; there is a formal photograph of Oswald in Ferrie's unit looking somber in his CAP uniform and cap.

Ferrie got into the anti-Castro action early. He flew fire bomb raids in 1959 in the pay of former Cuban Congressman Eladio "Yito" del Valle, who had piled up a small fortune smuggling cigarettes and contraband in partnership with Santos Trafficante, the well-known Mafia figure. Ferrie was psychologically devastated by the Bay of Pigs. In a speech before the Military Order of World Wars, he ranted on so bitterly about Kennedy's "double cross" of the invasion that members of the audience walked out. He was obsessed with how the CIA bungled the invasion and would sketch on a blackboard where the battle plans had gone sour for the benefit of his roommates. An Eastern colleague recalled Ferrie was convinced that "the communists" were out to get him.

But he had friends. Not long after the Bay of Pigs, Arcacha Smith wrote to Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, Eastern's chairman, praising Ferrie's work for the CRC in purging dissidents. Arcacha urged Rickenbacker to grant the pilot an extended leave with pay "so that the work at hand can be completed." This became unnecessary when Eastern fired Ferrie for being a homosexual. Guy Banister flew to Miami to put in a good word for him at the dismissal hearing.

Banister then took Ferrie into his firm. Ferrie's talents were catholic—medical dilettante, Greek scholar, sidewalk lawyer. One of Ferrie's clients was Carlos Marcello, the New Orleans Mafia chieftain. Marcello in 1961 had

been deported to Guatemala by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He slipped back into the United States in February 1962. The Little Man, as the short Marcello was called, was due to go on trial in December 1963, and Ferrie was assisting in the defense.

Ferrie was a hairless man who wore an ill-fitting red wig and pasted-on eyebrows. He religiously attended to his anti-Castro duties. He became an instructor at the Lake Pontchartrain camp when it opened. He told associates that he was training Cuban guerrillas and flying to Cuba and back with passengers, using the Florida Keys as an intermediate stop. And he confided to one of his CAP cadets that he was training five-member small-weapons units in "guerrilla warfare tactics under the auspices of the U.S. Marines for action in Cuba."

On August 5, only five days after the FBI raid on the Lake Pontchartrain camp, Oswald showed up at a store run by Carlos Bringuier, the local DRE representative who had helped in the evacuation of the Christian Democrat trainees from the lake. Displaying a Marine manual, Oswald told Bringuier he "had been in the Marine Corps and was willing to train Cubans to fight Castro." A friend of Bringuier's who heard the conversation recalled that Oswald boasted he knew "a few things about guerrilla warfare. . . . He said the thing he liked best of all was learning how to blow up the Huey P. Long Bridge."¹¹

Bringuier could therefore hardly believe his eyes when he spotted Oswald on the street a few days later dispensing his pro-Castro literature. There was a heated exchange of words, then a scuffle. Both were jailed for disturbing the peace. Oswald put in a call to his uncle, Charles "Dutz" Murret, who had been his surrogate father in the formative years, seeking the \$25 bail. Murret, who is described by the House Select Committee on Assassinations as an associate of "significant organized crime figures affiliated with the Marcello organization," wasn't home. But his daughter contacted family friend Emile Bruneau, a big-time gambler, who arranged for the bail to be posted.¹²

After the fight a Cuban Revolutionary Council public relations man named Manuel Gil set up the famous radio debate between Oswald and Bringuier in which Oswald declared on August 21 over WDSU, the local NBC affiliate, "I am a Marxist." Three months later those words would be rebroadcast, this time to the nation, after John Kennedy was shot.

The debate contributed to a well-established belief that Oswald was in fact a committed Marxist who had tried to infiltrate Bringuier's group. But information compiled by the authors and by the House Select Committee on Assassinations suggests it was all a charade. Guy Banister's widow has

revealed that her husband's office storeroom contained a supply of the "Hands Off Cuba!" handbills that were distributed by Oswald. George Higgenbotham, one of Banister's collegiate undercover agents, recalled that when he kidded his boss about sharing a building with people papering the streets with leftist literature, Banister snapped, "Cool it—one of them is mine."¹³

In 1979 the House Select Committee investigations discovered that Jack Mancuso, proprietor of the restaurant below Banister's office, served Oswald as well as Banister—both were frequent customers. And Delphine Roberts, Banister's longtime secretary, told the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978 that she "saw Oswald in Banister's office on several occasions, the first being when he was interviewed for a job during the summer of 1963." It seems less than coincidental, then, that Oswald landed a job at the Reily Coffee Company, a firm less than a block away. Reily Coffee was managed by another ex-FBI agent.¹⁴

At the coffee company, Oswald distinguished himself only by his absences. He was let go in late July and immediately began his street evangelism, although he quickly discarded the 544 Camp Street address in favor of a postal box under a fictitious name. In late August he was seen waiting in line to register to vote in Clinton, Louisiana, during a registration drive by the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) in the area. The six people who saw Oswald, including state legislator Reeves Morgan, a deputy sheriff, and a registrar of voters, noticed him because he drove up in a big black car. With him, the witnesses said, were David Ferrie and Clay Shaw, a New Orleans foreign trade official who had a long history of CIA connections.¹⁵

Any doubt that Oswald was setting up a left-wing Potemkin Village in New Orleans has been dispelled by Delphine Roberts in her testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations and in her elaborations to British journalist Anthony Summers, author of the recent book *Conspiracy*.¹⁶

She knew that her boss received CIA funding and that he ran a network of young agents. When Lee Oswald showed up, filled out an "agent" form, and went into a long closed-door meeting with Banister, she gathered that the two had already known each other. Thereafter Oswald appeared frequently, using a vacant office. He accompanied David Ferrie to the training camp north of Lake Pontchartrain "to train with rifles." It therefore came as something of a shock when Roberts spotted Oswald dispensing pro-Castro literature on the streets. "He's with us," Banister calmed her. "He's with the office," Roberts understood. "I knew there were such things as

counterspies, spies and counterspies," she said, "and the importance of such things."¹⁷

Oswald was now in the most dangerous of worlds. He was acting out pro-Castro pantomimes under the command of a violently anti-Castro cabal dominated by autonomous intelligence operatives and mob elements.

In June 1963, a mysterious man named George de Mohrenschildt arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. His intimates called him the Baron. The son of a czarist nobleman, he was variously rumored to have spied for the French, Germans, Soviets, and Mexicans during World War II. After the war he became widely known in White Russian circles in America and widely mentioned in the society pages. In the days before tennis players wore shorts he was seen on the courts at the Long Island estate of Jack and Janet Bouvier, Jackie Kennedy's parents. He was also seen, with unseemly rapidity for the day, in the divorce courts. His fourth (and last) wife was Jeanne, well known in her own right as a fashion designer and the daughter of a director of the Nationalist Chinese railway system.

De Mohrenschildt's business was oil. In 1945 he became a co-owner of the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Trust Company, which he described as "a land development company to promote eventually a large oil drilling campaign in Cuba." He was also government-connected, as so often happens with transnational operators. In the late 1950s he traveled to Yugoslavia and Ghana as a geological consultant for the CIA-funded International Cooperation Administration, charged with directing the oil flow from those countries away from the Soviet Union and toward the West. In 1960 he gained an audience in Mexico with Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan.

In 1962 de Mohrenschildt opened an office in Dallas and joined the exclusive Dallas Petroleum Club. By this time he was on a first-name basis with such Who's Whoers as William R. Grace of Grace Lines, oilman John Mecom (current owner of the New Orleans Saints of the National Football League), and Houston construction magnates George and Herman Brown, who had sponsored Lyndon Johnson's political career.

Up to now the charming White Russian had been only rubbing shoulders with the archangels of finance capital. Then an amazing thing occurred. He and his wife, Jeanne, became, as Marina Oswald would later express it, "our

best friends in Dallas." The Baron hastened to look up the lowly Oswalds after they returned from their unsettling stay in the Soviet Union. The two couples became as thick as thieves. This unnatural relationship puzzled the Warren Commission, which finally wrote it off as just one more strange aspect of Oswald's strange existence. There was another explanation.

In April 1963, about the time that Lee Oswald left Dallas for New Orleans, de Mohrenschildt traveled to New York and Washington en route to Port-au-Prince, ostensibly preparing to undertake a \$300,000 contract for geological surveys awarded by the Haitian government. Two years before, he and Jeanne had hiked through Central America, arriving in Guatemala just as the Cuban brigade shoved off for the Bay of Pigs, and upon his return he had submitted a written report with photographs to the CIA. The Haitian contract, the Baron told his social friends, had eventuated from a chance encounter with Haitian officials during that hike.

De Mohrenschildt may have been undertaking a contract of an entirely different kind. A clue surfaced in 1976, when a declassified CIA Office of Security file dated April 29, 1963 revealed: "[Deleted] Case Officer had requested an expedite check of George DE MOHRENSCHILDT for reasons unknown to Security." That terse sentence blended nicely with the concurrent disclosure of former CIA contract agent Herbert Atkin that de Mohrenschildt's real mission when he arrived in Port-au-Prince in June was to oversee a CIA approved plot to overthrow the dictator "Papa Doc" Duvalier. "I knew de Mohrenschildt as Philip Harbin," said Atkin, now an oil company employee in Los Angeles. It was a chivalrous touch, typical of the Baron. Jeanne de Mohrenschildt had been born in Harbin, China.

The map of de Mohrenschildt's life was dotted with close links to both the CIA and Army Intelligence. He finally admitted the year of his death in 1977 that a CIA agent in Dallas had asked him to keep an eye on the Oswalds after their return from Russia. This at least would explain the puzzling intimacy between the shabby Oswalds and the dashing de Mohrenschildt. He was, in CIA lingo, Oswald's "baby sitter." He was also something of a clairvoyant. On November 22 de Mohrenschildt was having a drink in a Port-au-Prince hotel when he heard the news from Dallas. He asked immediately if the suspect's name were Lee Oswald. "It was subconscious," he later explained, "a sort of flash that came probably from knowing that Oswald had a gun."¹⁸

The Cuban Student Directorate was suspicious of Lee Harvey Oswald. Believing that he had tried to infiltrate them, they tried to manipulate him. One of Bringuier's aides was sent to penetrate Oswald's communist "cell."

He came back with the impression that Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba chapter did not exist. The Directorate people thought Oswald was acting strangely for a loyal supporter of the Beard. He proffered his services as a potential assassin for Castro, bragging that he could shoot anyone; he mentioned John Connally, the then secretary of the Navy, as a target. The next thing the Directorate heard was that Oswald had come into some money and disappeared.

Oswald was, in fact, on his way to Mexico City. On September 25 he boarded a bus for the first leg of the long journey. That same evening there occurred a remarkable incident. Three men appeared unannounced at the Dallas doorstep of Sylvia Odio, a well-known Cuban exile and a backer of Manuel Ray's JURE, the social-democrat group that most exiles considered flamingly pink. The trio's Latin-looking spokesman called himself Leopoldo. He said it was a "war name." He introduced a dark companion with a stocky build as "Angelo." The third man, an Anglo who stood shyly in the background, he introduced as "Leon Oswald."

The man called Leopoldo said that they had just come from New Orleans and were "leaving for a trip." He claimed that he and his friends were affiliated with JURE. As proof he gave Mrs. Odio current details about her parents, who had been imprisoned on the Isle of Pines since 1961 for harboring one of Tony Veciana's would-be assassins. Leopoldo appealed for money "to buy arms for Cuba and to help overthrow the dictator Castro." Odio, unsure of the strangers, was noncommittal.

A day or so later, while Oswald was riding a bus through the Mexican interior and confiding to two Australian tourists that he was going to Cuba with the hope of meeting Castro in person, Leopoldo telephoned Sylvia Odio. He spoke glowingly of Leon, saying he was an American ex-Marine and a crack shot. "He is great, he is kind of nuts. He told us we don't have any guts, you Cubans, because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs. . . . It is so easy to do. He has told us."¹⁹

Oswald arrived in Mexico City with a book by Lenin under his arm. He went directly to the Cuban Embassy and applied for a visa that would allow him to visit Cuba en route to the Soviet Union. He tried to ingratiate himself with the consular officials. He showed them newspaper clippings about his fight with Bringuier, a U.S. passport showing that he had lived in Russia, and forged documents naming him secretary of the New Orleans chapter of the FPCC. The Cubans checked at the Russian consulate and were told that there would be a four-month delay in processing visas. Oswald said he was in a big hurry. As a friend of the Cuban revolution he demanded an immediate Cuban visa. Oswald was told that was impossible. He would

whose uncle...

have to have the Soviet one first. He created such a fuss that Consul Eusebio Azcue was summoned. Azcue advised that "a person of his type was harming the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it" and kicked Oswald off the compound without his visa.

Oswald persisted, bouncing between the Russian and Cuban embassies. Neither relented. He had said that his wife was in New York—she wasn't—and would follow him to Russia, but it seems clear that from the start he intended to go no farther than Havana and was attempting to get around the Cuban visa policy, or was attempting something else. Mostly, he was attempting to be visible. Speculation over Oswald's curious actions in Mexico City has developed into a cottage industry. Not the least, and not the least supported, of the explanations is that Oswald—or it may have been Oswalds, plural, as there is a body of evidence, photographic and otherwise, that someone impersonating Oswald may have been visiting the embassies²⁰—was polishing his left-wing brass in a way to implicate the Cuban revolution in the Dallas crime.

III

Edward I. Arthur was one kind of Dead End Kid, a part-Shawnee Indian orphan who had grown up in reform schools and graduated from jail. Ed Arthur was also a patriot. At fourteen he conned his way into the Army and got as far as jump school before his tender age was discovered. During the Missile Crisis, Arthur went to Miami and signed on as a weapons expert with Commandos L, the MIRR ally, where he quickly developed a reputation as one tough Indian.

With his powerful build, black crew cut, and bluff manner, Arthur looked the part of an executioner. This may account for why Sam Benton, one of the mob's busiest schemers, singled him out for the job he had in mind. It was September, barely a month after Benton had been nabbed by the FBI at Lake Pontchartrain. Benton had met Arthur two weeks before through attorney Charles Ashman, the legal firebrand of the anti-Castro movement. He called Arthur at the Mayflower Hotel to say that he might have a lucrative assignment for him.

They drove toward Miami Beach. On exclusive Pine Tree Drive, Benton pulled into a winding driveway leading into a magnificent but deteriorating estate. He stopped under the weather-beaten porte-cochère and led Arthur into the impressive house. The sunken living room, with a commanding marble fireplace, looked out over a large expanse of lawn broken by a

swimming pool and leading down to a boat slip with davits. The Fontainebleau Hotel stared down from across muddy Indian Creek.

A swarthy man was sitting on a couch as big as a bus stop. A too sharply dressed younger man lounged by the window in the classic "torpedo" pose. A beautiful blonde came in, wearing a dress that had been buttered on. Arthur thought he had walked into a George Raft movie. The phone rang, and the blonde picked it up. She said Chicago was on the line. The swarthy man took the phone. "Yeah, we've got him here now," he said. "Ninety grand. We'll see what we can do." He promised to call back and hung up.

The man on the couch had a business proposition. He wanted Ed Arthur to assassinate Fidel Castro. The pay would be \$90,000. "We have access to an airplane and 500 pound bombs and other munitions," he said. "What about flying over the Presidential Palace and dropping bombs?"

Arthur argued that Castro moved around too much—the palace might be leveled without him in it. "I could do the trick with a scoped rifle from a hotel across the street," Arthur suggested. "It's more practical." The man nodded. He and Benton tried to impress Arthur by dropping names of Havana nightclubs the dispossessed owners of which they said were backing the effort—the Half Moon Club, the Tropicana. Arthur said he'd have to think about it. "I recognized those clubs as syndicate-owned," he said later. "I had no qualms about bumping off Castro, but I wanted no part of the syndicate."

On the drive back to the hotel Benton chatted like a parrot. He told Arthur he was missing a "wonderful opportunity" if he didn't accept the proposition. He said "the organization" had been double-crossed by Castro. He repeated the mob party line that Castro had promised the casinos could continue to operate for \$12 million up front plus a percentage of the receipts, then shut them down after getting the money.

Benton rambled on. The assassination project had the approval of "certain well-connected people in Washington," he said. Pushing back his coat just enough to reveal a revolver, he mentioned that he had to go to New Orleans to see the Little Man. He repeated the name again, with reverence. Arthur had no doubt Benton was talking about Carlos Marcello.²¹

Arthur never did figure out why he was offered the uneven sum of \$90,000. It was more like the mob to deal in round figures. A mob source said that Benton was a kind of "broker" who took a 10 percent slice off the top, which would account for the offer.

When the authors interviewed him, Arthur looked at a photograph of Mike McLaney and thought he recognized the tough-talking man who had propositioned him. At the time McLaney lived two blocks down the street

from the mansion, which, we learned by following Arthur's detailed description, is at 4609 Pine Tree Drive, Miami Beach. It was purchased in 1960 by Marcos Pérez Jiménez, the ex-dictator of Venezuela who fled with a large chunk of the national treasury. Carlos Marcello, who was in the habit of visiting Venezuela during Pérez's reign, was rumored to be part owner of the Pine Tree Drive estate. Pérez was in tight with the casino crowd—his daughter married one of Meyer Lansky's casino managers—and he had given money to Interpen's Castro crusades. The stocky, balding Pérez kept a mistress at the mansion, familiar to readers of this volume as Frank Sturgis's beautiful spy, Marie Lorenz.

Pérez and Lorenz were gone by the time Ed Arthur visited the mansion. Only two months before, Bobby Kennedy had had Pérez extradited to Venezuela to face embezzlement charges. The mansion remained in his name for years. In 1974 the caretaker, an old Pérez retainer, remembered that McLaney had visited there frequently in "the old days."

Assassination was not a subject that McLaney, who now runs the Casino Internationale in Haiti, wished to discuss when we interviewed him. He was still smarting over charges made in the fall of 1973 before a Senate subcommittee that he tried to arrange the assassination of Bahamas Premier Lynden Pindling in 1968. The charges were leveled by a convicted peddler of stolen securities, Louis P. Mastriana, who claimed that FDR's son Elliott, then the mayor of Miami Beach, acted as a middleman. McLaney was mad at Pindling, Mastriana testified, for reneging on casino concessions after Meyer Lansky had invested \$1 million in the premier's election campaign through McLaney. Mastriana said he was offered \$100,000 to "whack" Pindling.

"If I was going to hit Pindling," McLaney asked rhetorically, "would I do it through a guy as dumb as Roosevelt?" He is equally incensed by suggestions of his organized crime connections. "Listen"—he wagged a thick finger—"I met Meyer Lansky once, and then for only thirty seconds." But all he would say about the Lake Pontchartrain episode was that "they were making some napalm there." McLaney did not see the wisdom of talking about other aspects of his campaign against Castro. "Have a drink," the gambler said. "They have long memories up in Washington and might not recognize that the statute of limitations has run out."

◆

The two men stood under the flashing lights that said Carousel Club. It was tacky enough—the type of place where Dallas attorney Carroll Jarnagin hoped to find a job for one of his clients, an exotic dancer who used the stage name Robin Hood. Tall and blond, Jarnagin looked out of place as he and his out-of-work customer walked in and slid into a booth. A chess champion and student of such prodigious memory that he once scored 100 on a Southern Methodist University chemistry exam involving complicated formulae, Jarnagin would recall his October 4, 1963, visit to Jack Ruby's club in precise detail.

The day following the assassination of JFK, Jarnagin wrote a letter to J. Edgar Hoover reporting on the alleged meeting between Ruby and Oswald. In the dimly lit club Jarnagin recalls he noticed a rumpled young man in a windbreaker appear in the lighted entrance and ask for Ruby. The attorney believes he recognized him as Lee Harvey Oswald. Oswald had arrived from Mexico City the previous night.

Jarnagin overheard the putative Oswald and Ruby talking in a nearby booth. Oswald said he had just gotten in from New Orleans. He needed money. "You'll get the money when the job is done," Ruby said, adding that if there was a slip-up, "they" would want all their money back or feel double-crossed. The job, Jarnagin remembered, was to shoot Texas Governor John Connally, who, Ruby said, was not opening up the state to the rackets. "The boys in Chicago have no place to go, no place to really operate," Ruby complained. "They've clamped down the lid in Chicago, Cuba is closed."

Ruby knew what he was talking about. The lid was indeed on in Chicago. Bobby Kennedy's organized crime steamroller was in high gear—and Sam Giancana was directly in its path. Giancana felt bitter, believing that contribution to JFK's election had earned him protection (the Chicago mob automatically put its muscle behind candidates endorsed by Mayor Richard Daley's Democratic machine, and Giancana boasted to his and JFK's girlfriend, Judith Campbell, that he had put her boyfriend in the White House). That summer Giancana had filed a suit charging FBI agents with too much tailing—they followed him everywhere, cocktail lounges, church, his late wife's mausoleum, even the golf course. A federal judge ordered the surveillance relaxed, specifying that agents stay at least one foursome back on the links. Bobby Kennedy also was pushing a law through Congress that would jail anyone refusing to testify before a grand jury under immunity, and Sam Giancana, no stranger to the Fifth Amendment, was in line to be one of its first major applications.

According to Jarnagin, Oswald suggested that Bobby Kennedy ought to

be hit. Ruby said no—the security in Washington was too tight; besides, his brother would stop at nothing to solve his death. It was Connally who had to go. When Oswald argued that killing the governor would also bring plenty of “heat,” Ruby replied, “Not really, they’ll think some crackpot or communist did it, and it will be written off as an unsolved crime.”²² There were other credible reports of an Oswald-Ruby link, including that of a garage owner, who said Oswald drove Ruby’s car, and an auto repairman, who said Oswald brought Ruby’s car in for repairs.

Jack Ruby was an alumnus of the Chicago mob, class of 1947, who retained his old-school ties. He was known to hang around with a rising young mafioso named Sam Giancana and with mob enforcers Lenny Patrick, who was a shirttail relative, and Dave Yaras. When Ruby opened a nightclub in Dallas after the war, it coincided with a major move by the Chicagoans into Texas rackets territory. Ruby became the fixer for payoffs to police, the man to see for a piece of the action. In deference to syndicate protocol, he made his peace with Joe Civello, who was aligned with Marcello and Trafficante in the Sunbelt Mafia.

When the syndicate turned Havana into a casino boomtown in the late 1950s, Ruby’s old Chicago chum Dave Yaras was “credited” by the McClellan Senate Rackets Committee—Robert F. Kennedy, chief counsel—with playing a significant mob role in Havana as well as being implicated with the corruption-ridden Teamsters Local 320 in Miami. Ruby himself did not miss out on the action. One report had it that he had helped smuggle guns to Castro when the mob was hedging its bets. Ruby was especially close to a gambling supervisor named Lewis J. McWillie, whom he visited in Cuba in the summer of 1959. McWillie, who described Ruby as a “brother,” had followed a lucrative trail to Havana, where he was employed by Norm “Roughhouse” Rothman at the Sans Souci. Later he was manager of Lansky’s Tropicana. According to an FBI memo, “McWillie solidified his syndicate connections through his association in Havana, Cuba with Santos Trafficante; . . . Meyer and Jake Lansky; Dino Cellini and others who were members of or associates of ‘the syndicate.’”²³

When the House Select Committee on Assassinations examined Ruby’s long-distance telephone calls preceding the Kennedy assassination, it found that he had been in touch with such heavies as Robert “Barney” Baker, Jimmy Hoffa’s muscle and bagman in Chicago; Irwin Weiner, a Chicago bondsman “well-known as a frontman for organized crime and the Teamsters”; Murray “Dusty” Miller, a Hoffa deputy and “associate of various underworld figures”; Nofio J. Pecora, a top lieutenant of Carlos Marcello’s;

and Dave Yaras's fellow hired gun, Lenny Patrick. Ruby wasn't the only mob type busy making phone calls on or about November 22. Baker called Yaras in Miami Beach on the eve of the assassination. The call lasted three minutes. No one knows what they talked about.²⁴

Sam Giancana was impatiently jiggling his ankle. The drawn-out Castro project had been a slow-burning failure, and his credits were being used up with the CIA, which had been helping him out in the importation of prostitutes from Marseilles. Johnny Roselli was to be given his walking papers. In October, shortly after Oswald returned from Mexico, Giancana called a summit meeting in Miami.

It was held at the secluded mansion on Pine Tree Drive. Giancana opened the table to discussion in the Mafia equivalent of democracy; no one disagreed with his verdict that Roselli be replaced, nor with his choice of a replacement, Charles Nicoletti, the Chicago mob's senior hit man. Nicoletti was an Al Capone protégé who had stuffed more bodies in trunks than anyone cared to count. When he was given a contract, the victim was considered as good as dead.²⁵

But Fidel Castro wasn't the only enemy on the mobsters' minds that day. Like Giancana, Trafficante had become a prime target in Bobby Kennedy's war on crime. This only inflamed Trafficante's long-standing grudge against the Kennedys. A year earlier he had met in Miami's Scott Bryan Hotel with Miami businessman José Alemán, whose father, a former Batista official, became famous for taking millions from the Cuban treasury in suitcases. They discussed a \$1.5 million Teamsters loan to Alemán that "had already been cleared by Jimmy Hoffa himself." Trafficante spoke harshly of the President: "Have you seen how his brother is hitting Hoffa, a man who is a worker, who is not a millionaire, a friend of the blue collars? He doesn't know that this kind of encounter is very delicate. Mark my word, this man Kennedy is in trouble, and he will get what is coming to him."

Alemán expressed the view that Kennedy would surely be reelected.

"No, José," Trafficante said softly, "he is going to be hit."²⁶

IV

Bradley Ayers was briefing his killer commando team at the CIA base on Elliott Key near Miami. A single-engine Cessna came over low. Ayers thought it was a press plane trying to find exile training bases. He ordered his men inside the house. But as the Cessna circled and came back, he

recognized it as one of the CIA's. As it passed overhead, a white object was released directly over the old house. It was a roll of toilet paper, streaming out as it fell toward the ground. Taped inside the cardboard tube was a message in Gordon Campbell's printing:

NOVEMBER 22, 1963

PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAS BEEN SHOT BY AN ASSASSIN. SUSPEND ALL
ACTIVITY. KEEP MEN ON ISLAND. COME ASHORE WITHOUT DELAY.

Ayers's mind shot back to a scene at the Point Mary safe house used by Johnny Roselli's team: "The crack of a rifle fired by an anti-Castro sniper shatters the quiet, and a cormorant, sitting on a mangrove root five hundred yards away, explodes in a burst of crimson and black, leaving only bits of feather to float on the blue water."²⁷

French correspondent Jean Daniel was engaged in a marathon interview with Fidel Castro at the premier's villa. Three weeks earlier Bill Attwood had arranged for Daniel to interview John Kennedy, who indicated that peace with Cuba was uppermost on his mind. Kennedy had asked Daniel to report back to him after talking with Castro.

An aide interrupted with the news from Dallas.

"This is bad for Cuba," Castro said.

Then, upon hearing that Lyndon Johnson had been sworn in as President at the airport, Castro asked, "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?"²⁸

David Ferrie was all smiles in the New Orleans federal courthouse. All his trips to Guatemala and conferences at Churchill Farms had just paid off. Carlos Marcello had been acquitted.

Ferrie and two young male companions piled into his Ford station wagon and drove like speed freaks through the worst rainstorm of the season heading for Houston.

Harry Williams told the authors in an interview that he was meeting in a CIA safe house in northwest Washington with Richard Helms, Howard Hunt, and several other CIA agents. It was, Williams would say, "the most important meeting I ever had on the problem of Cuba." Williams was buoyant. Plans for his invasion from the Dominican Republic were crystalizing. Manuel Artime was "ready with his things in Central America," and he and Williams were about ready "to do a whole thing together."

Williams and the CIA brass were about to go out for a late lunch when they heard that the President had been shot in Dallas.

It was evening in Paris. Desmond FitzGerald and a local CIA case officer met with Rolando Cubela, code name Amlash. The case officer assured Cubela that President Kennedy's speech in Miami four days earlier signaled that he supported a coup. Kennedy had branded the Castro government a "small band of conspirators" who formed a "barrier" that, once removed, would ensure American backing for progressive goals in Cuba. The case officer said that FitzGerald had had a hand in writing the speech, which was not true.

FitzGerald handed Cubela an ordinary-looking ball-point pen fitted with a hypodermic needle so fine that the victim would not feel its insertion. He recommended that Cubela use Blackleaf-40, a lethal poison that was commercially available.

Upon leaving the meeting, FitzGerald and the case officer learned that the President had been assassinated.²⁹

In Washington, at Teamster headquarters, Harold Gibbons—Jimmy Hoffa's right-hand, and a liberal on Teamster terms—cut short his lunch when he heard the news from Dallas. Hoffa was out of town. Gibbons went back to the office, dismissed all employees for the day, ordered the flags at half-staff, and sent a message of condolence to Mrs. Kennedy.

When Hoffa heard about this he was furious. "He started screaming at me 'Why the hell did you do that for him?' and 'Who the hell was he?'" Gibbons said.³⁰

Sylvia Odio and her sister, Annie Laurie Odio, were glued to the television set in their Dallas apartment as bulletins on the assassination came in. A suspect named Lee Harvey Oswald had been apprehended. When his picture was flashed on the screen, Sylvia fainted. She had recognized him as the silent third man, introduced as Leon Oswald, who had materialized on her doorstep two months earlier, the one Leopoldo later quoted as saying, "President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs."

Annie Laurie, who also had seen the trio, agreed that Oswald was a dead ringer for the man.

The NBC network scored a coup, thanks to its New Orleans affiliate WDSU. Early in the evening it played a tape of Oswald's voice professing admiration for Fidel Castro and declaring, "I am a Marxist!" The tape had

been made during Oswald's August radio "debate" with Carlos Bringuier of the Revolutionary Student Directorate. D

There was joy in the CIA's Tokyo station. "It was a scene of great excitement, confusion, and wild talk. The conservatives were obviously elated and there was talk of an invasion of Cuba," said Jim Wilcott, the Tokyo station financial officer in 1963. According to Wilcott, CIA hardliners "hated Jack Kennedy" because they felt he betrayed the agency over the Bay of Pigs. Agents were breaking out bottles and having drinks to Oswald. Tongues became loose, and there was a great deal of talk about Oswald's connections with the CIA. It was accepted as given that Oswald worked for the agency. This is what Wilcott says he learned:

Oswald was originally under control of the Tokyo station's Soviet Russia Branch. He was trained at Atsugi Naval Air Station, the secret base for Tokyo CIA special operations. [Oswald's standard biography has him stationed with a Marine Corps unit at Atsugi from 1956 to 1958.] When Oswald returned from the USSR in June of 1962, he was brought back to Japan for debriefing. They were having some kind of difficulty with Oswald. The Soviets were on to him right from the start. That apparently made him very angry and he became difficult to handle. D

Wilcott told the authors that at first he found it difficult to accept that the man who was said to have shot the president worked for the CIA. "Then I heard about more and more employees who had been working on the Oswald project in the late 1950s." Part of Wilcott's job was to hand out cash for covert CIA operations. "When I expressed disbelief, they told me 'Well, Jim, so and so drew an advance from you for Oswald' or 'You gave out money for the Oswald project under such and such a crypto.'"¹¹

Guy Banister was chain-drinking bourbons in the Katz & Jammer Bar, next door to the Newman Building. With him was one of his investigators, Jack S. Martin, a coreligious with David Ferrie in an offbeat reactionary sect called the Apostolic Orthodox Old Catholic Church. After a while the two went up to Banister's office. An argument erupted. Suddenly Banister whipped out his monogrammed revolver and savagely pistol-whipped Martin. Martin was rushed to Baptist Hospital and treated for head injuries. But he refused to press charges. He told the police that Banister was like a father to him, and they had simply argued over "politics and other things."¹² D

At a late-night press conference, Dallas District Attorney Henry Wade stated, "Oswald is a member of the Free Cuba Committee." He was im-

mediately "corrected" by Jack Ruby, who had mingled with the reporters. "No," Ruby said, "he is a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee."

On Saturday morning Secret Service agents, armed with Fair Play for Cuba literature of Oswald's bearing the address 544 Camp Street, went to the Newman Building to find out if the Dallas suspect "had occupied office space." They learned that "Cuban revolutionaries" had been tenants until recently. They talked to an exile accountant who revealed that "those Cubans were members of organizations known as 'Crusade to Free Cuba Committee' and 'Cuban Revolutionary Council.'" The accountant said that one Sergio Arcacha Smith was authorized to sign checks for both organizations, but he had moved to Texas. Guy Banister's office, where pro-Castro "Hands Off Cuba!" handbills of the type distributed by Oswald were stored, was closed.

The agents reported that they had been unable to find any trace of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.¹³

In Dallas Deputy Sheriff Buddy Walther typed up a "Supplementary Investigative Report" in which he advised the Secret Service that "for the past few weeks at a house at 3128 Harlendale some Cubans had been having meetings on the weekends and were possibly [sic] connected with the 'Freedom for Cuba Party' of which Oswald was a member." Walther's informant subsequently told him that "Oswald had been to this house before" and that the Cubans had suddenly moved out.

Jack Martin's head was still throbbing when he called Herman Kohlman, a contact in the New Orleans district attorney's office and said he had information linking Guy Banister and David Ferrie to the assassination. Martin speculated that Oswald had been in Ferrie's Civil Air Patrol squadron and had been taught to shoot with a telescopic sight by the pilot. Ferrie's role in the conspiracy, Martin thought, was to fly escaping participants across the Texas border into Matamoros, Mexico.

Kohlman took the allegations seriously. DA investigators hit all of Ferrie's known haunts to bring him in for questioning. But no one knew where he was.

David Ferrie was standing by a pay phone in the Winterland Skating Rink in Houston. The proprietor, Chuck Rolland, thought it all a bit odd. Ferrie had called from New Orleans the previous day, saying he wanted to ice skate and asking what hours the rink was open. But after driving all that way, he wasn't skating.

At 5:30 P.M., after standing by the phone for two hours, Ferrie received a call. Then he left. □

In Miami the Student Revolutionary Directorate put out an extra edition of its publication *Trinchera* reporting that Oswald had been in Miami during the Missile Crisis and again in March 1963. On the first occasion Oswald handed out literature paid for with a Fair Play for Cuba Committee check at an anti-Castro rally in Bayfront Park and thus "instigated a riot." *Trinchera* claimed that Oswald had come to Florida to try to infiltrate exile groups.

At 11:20 A.M. on Sunday Jack Ruby shouldered his way through a line of reporters in the basement of the Dallas jail and fatally shot Oswald as he was being led to an armored car for transfer.

That afternoon Seymour Ellison, a law partner of Melvin Belli in San Francisco, received a phone call from Las Vegas. Ellison, who had done legal work for Moe Dalitz of the Desert Inn, knew that the caller was connected with casino proprietors who had been ousted from Cuba. "Sy," the Las Vegas man said, "one of our guys just bumped off that son of a bitch that gunned down the President." He wanted Belli, who was in Riverside defending an associate of mobster Mickey Cohen in a murder trial, to take on the defense of Jack Ruby. It was to be understood that the client of record would be Jack's brother, Earl Ruby. Ellison called Belli, who was excited about taking the important case. The Las Vegas group sent a \$25,000 retainer, but the promised big money down the line never materialized. Belli not only lost the Ruby trial but lost a considerable amount of his own money in expenses.²⁴

On Monday Guy Banister received a telephone call from Ernest C. Wall, Jr., of the FBI, which had just been ordered to take over the assassination investigation by President Johnson. No introduction was needed. The Spanish-speaking Wall had long been a bureau liaison with anti-Castro groups, including the Friends of Democratic Cuba created by Banister and Arcacha Smith. His call apparently was prompted by the fact that Secret Service agents had come up with Arcacha's name in connection with the Newman Building.

Wall was simply going through the motions, if his report is any criterion. Consisting of one paragraph, it said Banister "advised that SERGO [sic] ARCACHA SMITH of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, who was the □

head of that organization . . . some time ago, had told him on one occasion that he, SMITH, had an office in the building located at 544 Camp Street. Mr. BANISTER stated that he had seen a young Cuban man with SMITH on a number of occasions in the vicinity of 544 Camp Street, but could not recall the name of this young man."³⁵ End of report. Thus was the lid put on the mystery of 544 Camp Street.

Upon returning to New Orleans from his Houston trip, Ferrie surrendered to the DA's office. He insisted that the trip had been recreational, made on the "spur of the moment" in celebration of Carlos Marcello's court victory. Ferrie claimed that on Saturday he and his companions had ice skated in Houston and on Sunday had gone goose hunting near Galveston.

~~DA Jim Garrison found the story absurd. He ordered Ferrie booked as a "fugitive from Texas" and turned over to the FBI. The suspect was questioned by Ernest Wall, the same FBI agent who had phoned Guy Banister earlier, and was released. The FBI report noted that Ferrie had admitted being "publicly and privately" critical of Kennedy for withholding air cover at the Bay of Pigs and had used expressions like "He ought to be shot." The FBI said that he did not mean the threat literally.~~

In Chicago an FBI bug picked up a conversation between Sam Giancana and one of his lieutenants. The lieutenant remarked that Oswald was an "anarchist" and a "Marxist Communist." Giancana coolly replied, "He was a marksman who knew how to shoot."³⁶

Now, for once in the whole sorry intelligence swamp mess in which Lee Harvey Oswald floated, things began to go click click. It was possible to see the sudden clockwork as cogs in the wheel of disinformation about Oswald calculated to direct angry suspicion about the president's death toward the left, in general, and Cuba, in particular. Oswald's watch-me activities in New Orleans and Mexico City—and the mysterious visitors of Mrs. Odio—had set the stage. Then in rapid sequence:

~~On Tuesday John Martino, the Mafia technician who had been on the Flying Tiger expedition, charged on a talk show over Miami radio station WQAM that Oswald had distributed Fair Play for Cuba Committee literature in Florida and had traveled to Cuba via Mexico in September.~~

Interviewed by FBI agent James O'Connor, Martino stated the information came from a Cuban source, who also said that Oswald "had made a telephone call to the Cuban Intelligence Service in Cuba from a private residence in Miami" and, in Houston, "tried to sell marijuana and handled

the exchange of Cuban pesos for American dollars."

Pressed to divulge his source, Martino said that the Cuban was en route from California to join the counterrevolution and could not be contacted. Martino never did produce the Cuban.³⁷

That same day the Pompano Beach *Sun-Sentinel* attributed to Frank Sturgis the news that Oswald had been in telephone contact with Cuban intelligence and "had connections with the Cuban government in Mexico and New Orleans, Louisiana." The article was by-lined by James C. Buchanan, whose brother Jerry belonged to Sturgis's International Anti-Communist Brigade.

Agent O'Connor talked to Sturgis, who ~~conceded~~ he had made "offhand comments" ~~to Buchanan but~~ styled them "guesses, speculation and rumor."

In Dallas the Secret Service predictably intercepted a letter addressed to Oswald that had been mailed from Havana. Dated November 10 and signed by "Pedro Charles," the letter implied, as the Secret Service put it, that "Oswald had been paid by Charles to carry out an unidentified mission which involved accurate shooting." In Washington the Justice Department received a similar letter addressed to Robert Kennedy and signed by "Mario del Rosario Molina," who claimed Oswald "assassinated President Kennedy at the direction of Pedro Charles, a Cuban agent who has traveled in the United States under various aliases," and that Oswald "met with Charles in Miami several months ago and was paid \$7,000 by Charles." Both letters were postmarked in Havana the day after the assassination.

Laboratory examination determined that the two letters were written on the same typewriter. They were dismissed as a crude attempt by persons unknown in Cuba to blame Castro.³⁸

In Washington J. Edgar Hoover and Nicholas Katzenbach, who was minding the Justice Department store in the absence of Bobby Kennedy, were greatly concerned about the ripple effect the rumors of Oswald's foreign ties were generating. Hoover was desperate to avoid suspicion that the FBI had failed in its duty. Katzenbach and other senior government officials were fearful that implications of a foreign-directed conspiracy might provoke international tensions. The previous day he had memoed Bill Moyers, a special assistant to the new President:

The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large. . . . Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting

thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists.

In discussing the situation, Hoover and Katzenbach agreed that it was imperative to convince the world quickly that Oswald had acted alone. Katzenbach told the FBI chief that the report LBJ had ordered him to prepare should "settle the dust, insofar as Oswald and his activities are concerned."

It was a hot lead in the estimation of Maurice G. Martineau, acting special agent in charge of the Secret Service office in Chicago. A reliable informant, Thomas Mosley, had just told one of his agents that the day before the assassination, a Cuban exile with whom he had been negotiating the sale of machine guns boasted his group now had "plenty of money" and would make the buy "as soon as we take care of Kennedy." The exile, Homer Echevarría, had been outspokenly critical of the President.

In an urgent communication to headquarters, Martineau advised that he was undertaking a top-priority investigation. In subsequent meetings surveilled by the Secret Service, Mosley found out that Echeverría was affiliated with the 30th of November Movement and that an associate named Juan Francisco Blanco Fernández was military director of the DRE. From what Echeverría and Blanco disclosed, the arms deal was being financed by Paulino Sierra's provisional government with money obtained at least in part from "hoodlum elements," who were "not restricted to Chicago." (Sierra's operation cashed in its chips shortly after the assassination. It was not to be heard of again.)

It was a significant development, and Martineau was prepared to place an undercover agent inside the Echevarría group. It is possible that an expanding investigation might have uncovered the Sierra cabal's link to the Lake Pontchartrain camp and the Mafia and the Castro assassination plots, which in turn would have opened a Pandora's box of leads to Ruby and Oswald. But the FBI effectively choked off the investigation. After LBJ ordered it to assume primary jurisdiction in the JFK case, the bureau "made clear that it wanted the Secret Service to terminate its investigation," as the House Select Committee on Assassinations recently phrased it. The Secret Service complied, turning over its files to the FBI. The FBI did not pursue the matter.⁴⁰

On December 3 the UPI put a story on the wires that led off: "An exhaustive FBI report now nearly ready for the White House will indicate

that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone and unaided assassin of President Kennedy, Government sources said today." The story, carried in newspapers throughout the nation, was leaked to the UPI on orders of J. Edgar Hoover.

On December 9, barely three weeks after the assassination, Hoover handed President Johnson the FBI summary report concluding that both Oswald and Ruby acted alone. Although the report was supposedly confidential, more details were leaked.

On December 16 the Warren Commission, conceived by LBJ as a means of substantiating the FBI findings, sat down for its second executive session. As the members bantered about such items as where their wives should park to pick them up, Congressman Gerald Ford dropped a little bomb. A wire service bureau chief he knew had called. "Jerry, I'm surprised that we got, and the other press services got, stories out the very same day." Ford knew what he was fishing for. "The minute he said that," the congressman said, "it led me to the belief that he was inferring that there had been a deliberate leak from some agency of the Federal Government, and now they wanted us to confirm by Commission action what had been leaked previously."

The commission realized it had been stuck with the FBI's conclusion. "I just don't find anything in that [FBI] report that has not been leaked to the press," Earl Warren complained.

"Anyone can look at it," General Counsel J. Lee Rankin chipped in, "and see that it just doesn't seem like they're looking for things that this Commission has to look for in order to get the answers that it wants and it's entitled to."

Allen Dulles puffed impassively on his pipe. What he knew he kept to himself. He proposed that all material on Oswald in the Soviet Union be forwarded to the CIA for evaluation, prompting a rejoinder from Senator Richard Russell: "I think you have more faith in them than I have. I think they'll doctor anything they hand to us."⁴¹

On December 19, dual pairs of FBI agents took turns double-teaming a bank robbery suspect named Richard Case Nagell in the El Paso, Texas, hoosegow. A lanky man with a vertical scar on his forehead, Nagell was supremely uncooperative, so much so that the FBI report of the extended grilling session consisted of but one sentence: "For the record he would like

to say that his association with OSWALD (meaning LEE HARVEY OSWALD) was purely social and that he had met him in Mexico City and in Texas.¹⁴²

As a bank robber Nagell could have been out of Ripley's *Believe It Or Not*. On September 20 he had walked into the State National Bank in El Paso, pulled out a .45 automatic, and fired two shots into the ceiling. He never asked for a dime. He walked outside, sat down on the curb, and waited to be arrested. He did it, he would later say, for "the sole purpose of having myself arrested and detained by federal authorities." He wanted to be in the comforting arms of the law for his own protection—he said he had stumbled into "a domestic-formulated and domestic-sponsored conspiracy" to assassinate John Kennedy.

All of this could have been written off as a bit whacko were it not for Nagell's exemplary record—with the military and with the CIA. During the Korean War he had won a battlefield commission, then graduated from the army intelligence school at Fort Holabird, Maryland, at the top of his class. Upon leaving the Army, he was recruited by the CIA, which dispatched him to Mexico City during the Missile Crisis and thereafter assigned him to keep tabs on the more fanatical Cuban exiles there.

During his assignment in Mexico Nagell encountered Oswald, whom he knew only as Aleksei Hidell. Nagell claimed Oswald was being used by an anti-Castro cabal bent on assassinating Kennedy, a group who wanted the assassin branded a Castro agent so the United States might invade Cuba.

In early September Oswald, unaware that he was being set up, boasted to Nagell, "We will kill him before the month is out." Nagell frantically warned his CIA case officer, whom he identified as one Robert Graham, about the assassination plot. Nagell said Graham told him to "take care of" Oswald as a means of "stopping the clock"—but Nagell could not bring himself to murder. Instead, on September 13, he sent off a registered letter to J. Edgar Hoover giving the FBI the details of the plot to kill Kennedy. A week later he strode purposefully into the El Paso bank. It was the first bank handy on his way out of Mexico.

When he heard that Kennedy had indeed been shot, Nagell handed a jailer a note asking to see the Secret Service on an urgent matter. An FBI agent showed up. Nagell, angered that the bureau had failed to heed his warning, refused to talk to him. He continued to stonewall the FBI. At his trial he would say only that the bizarre robbery attempt had provided a "temporary solution" to an "unbearable problem."⁴³

The judge meted out the maximum sentence of ten years. This was a stiff

rap for a war hero and first offender who didn't even try to take any money. Five years later an appellate court overturned Nagell's conviction on the grounds that there was no evidence of intent to rob.

The man who had shot a bank walked out of Leavenworth Penitentiary, carrying with him whatever secrets he knew about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

On May 13 CIA Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton called FBI Domestic Intelligence Chief William C. Sullivan to suggest that the FBI, like the CIA, carefully rehearse the testimony of its top officials before the Warren Commission. Angleton said that "it would be well for both McCone and Hoover to be aware that the Commission might ask the same questions, wondering whether they would get different replies from the heads of the two agencies." Angleton gave Sullivan examples of what he believed McCone would be asked and the "replies that will be given":

Q. Was Oswald ever an agent of the CIA?

A. No.

Q. Does the CIA have any evidence showing that a conspiracy existed to assassinate President Kennedy?

A. No.⁴⁴

In 1979 the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded that there most probably had been a conspiracy and that the FBI and CIA were derelict in not pursuing it. However, the committee charged, had had "a personal predisposition that Oswald had been a lone assassin" and had wrapped up the investigation with unseemly haste. An FBI assistant director told the committee that conspiracy was an "ancillary matter." "We were in the position of standing on the corner with our pocket open, waiting for someone to drop information into it," he said.

The committee also found that after the Warren Report had been issued, the FBI steadfastly refused to explore fresh leads pointing to a conspiracy. It specifically noted that in 1967 the bureau had balked when given information by Earl Warren "regarding organized crime figure John Roselli's claim of personal knowledge relating to Cuban or underworld complicity" and "took repeated action to discredit the source" instead of investigating advice that "New Orleans Mafia leader Carlos Marcello had allegedly made a threat against the life of President Kennedy."⁴⁵

The committee similarly rebuked the CIA for passivity, echoing 1976 criticism by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Senate report stinging observed:

Even if CIA investigators did not know that the CIA was plotting to kill Castro, they certainly did know that the Agency had been operating a massive covert operation against Cuba since 1960. The conspiratorial atmosphere of violence, which developed over the course of three years of CIA and exile group operations, should have led CIA investigators to ask whether Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby, who were known to have at least touched the fringes of the Cuban community, were influenced by that atmosphere. Similarly, arguments that the CIA domestic jurisdiction was limited belie the fact. CIA's Cuban operations had created an enormous *domestic* apparatus, which the Agency used both to gather intelligence domestically and to run operations against Cuba.⁴⁵

The Warren Commission, hamstrung by its dependency on the FBI and the evasiveness of the CIA, went about its business as best it could. Staffers assigned to probe Oswald's background could find no plausible motive for him to have shot Kennedy. Leads suggesting that he had Cuban backing were washing out; one, in which a Nicaraguan falsely claimed to have witnessed Oswald's being handed a thick wad of bills in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, was suspected as the handiwork of General Somoza.

Two staff attorneys, W. David Slausen and William Coleman, began thinking along opposite lines. In an internal memo they wrote:

The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involvement in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them. . . . It is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President. . . . The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed, Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would blame the assassination on the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible.

Slausen and Coleman pressed for an investigation of this hypothesis. The most logical place to start would have been with Guy Banister, who was certainly capable of engineering such a scenario. But Banister was permanently unavailable, having been found dead in bed of an apparent heart attack with his monogrammed Magnum at his side. When gathering up his effects at the 544 Camp Street building, his widow, Mary Banister, reportedly found the large stack of Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba literature. No investigation was ever conducted along the lines Slausen and Coleman urged.

The CIA's Maurice Bishop had a delicate assignment for Carlos Veciana. He wanted Veciana to offer his cousin, a member of the Cuban intelligence service in Mexico City, a large sum of money to defect and say that it was he and his wife who had met with Oswald in the Mexican capital. Veciana agreed but had difficulty making contact.⁴⁷

By August the Warren Commission, under pressure from LBJ to get its report out in time for the November 1964 election, had concluded its deliberations and was in the process of preparing its final report. Major questions remained unanswered. One concerned the report of Sylvia Odio that in September three men claiming association with JURE had solicited her help, and that one had called back touting Oswald as a potential assassin of Castro or, in the alternative, Kennedy. Odio remained firm in her account, and she had checked out as a solid witness.

On August 23 Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin wrote to J. Edgar Hoover requesting that an attempt be made to identify the three men. "It is a matter of some importance to the Commission," Rankin said, "that Mrs. Odio's allegation either be proved or disproved."

Rankin, a man not partial to hyperbole, was not understating the problem. Unless something popped up to explain Mrs. Odio's story, her strange visit was *prima facie* evidence of a conspiracy to set up Oswald.

The answer came out of the blue, as if in answer to a prayer. In vetting its files, the Dallas FBI reported that the previous October an agent had questioned Loran Hall and a William Seymour after the pair was stopped by police hauling a load of supplies and medicine to the Interpen encampment in the Florida Keys. At the time a notation was made: "Active in the anti-Castro movement . . . Committee to Free Cuba." (Although the bureau may not have made the correlation, the Committee to Free Cuba was headed by Eladio del Valle, the onetime smuggling partner of Santos Trafficante and the man who hired David Ferrie to drop fire bombs over Cuba. Loran Hall has said that he was present when Sam Giancana offered Eddie Bayo \$30,000 to kill Castro in February 1963 and that Trafficante staked Bayo to expense money.)

When finally located in California on September 16, Hall volunteered that the previous September "he was in Dallas, soliciting aid in connection with anti-Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs. Odio." Hall named Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-American Interpen instructor, and Bill Seymour, who "generally resembled" Oswald, as his companions.⁴⁸

The Warren Commission, confronted with a press deadline, took refuge

in geography. Comforted by the convenient Hall explanation, it wrote off the Odio incident by noting that Oswald had begun his journey to Mexico and probably did not have time to detour to Dallas.

Howard and Seymour subsequently denied to the FBI that they had been at Odio's, whereupon Hall recanted his story on the basis that he had confused dates and places.

The Odio file remained closed. Still open was the question of who had impersonated Oswald, setting him up as a potential assassin of Castro and Kennedy.

The Warren Report was unveiled to a salute of twenty-one publicity guns. Gerald Ford became its star salesman. His "inside account" was *Life's* October 2 cover story on how the commission "pieced together the evidence" and "nailed rumors of a conspiracy."

Tony Veciana was having no luck in reaching his cousin in Cuban intelligence in Mexico City. He finally asked Maurice Bishop if the money offer still stood. "Bishop said there was no need to talk about that plan any longer," Veciana recalled.⁴⁹ He said Bishop told him to "forget the whole thing and not to comment or ask any questions about Lee Harvey Oswald."

In 1979 the House Assassinations Committee, after spending \$5.4 million to exhume the leads buried over ten years before by the Warren Commission, concluded that the President's murder was probably the product of a conspiracy. The most probable conspirators were mobsters and possibly anti-Castro Cubans.

But the committee said too many years had passed to be sure.

Commission theory of Dallas has by this time been as definitively overturned as it can be in public debate. The majority of the American people have long believed on the basis of popular intuition that the Warren Commission Report was a whitewash. Close association with the issues only strengthens this conviction. But we do not know with the same certainty that this or that oil baron or defense contractor or Cuban superpatriot or CIA clique or crime syndicate grouping or some combination of such types actually called the first meeting, moved on to the next, narrowed its plans, fueled its resolve, organized its hit team, thought through the cover story, persisted, and finally achieved its purpose. These are the things we all want to find out. But now we can only press our beliefs and call for the opening of a campaign within the legal and legislative systems to determine what actually took place.

4. THE SHOOTINGS OF KING, ROBERT KENNEDY, AND WALLACE

We have concentrated on the assassination of John Kennedy. But we believe it will ultimately prove to be of a piece with the other assaults on presidential figures of the past decade. The JFK, MLK, RFK, and Wallace cases appear to have been covered up at the same level of complexity and political influence.

There is evidence of conspiracy and cover-up of a uniform pattern in four successive acts of political assassination. All four assassinations served the same cause of militarism and clandestineism, each with its lone half-mad dissociated radical turning in demented solitude, stalking his prey as though in the pages of a cheap spy thriller, each assassin with his diary revealing the essential Dostoevskian model, and so far, each with his silence—Oswald's enforced by death; Ray's, Sirhan's, and Bremer's by prison.

Is there a connection between these crimes? In any simple murder context such similarities in the method of attack alone would kindle suspicion that the architect of Dallas is also the architect of Memphis, Los Angeles, and Laurel. The sensitivity of the issues requires that we double-flag this as speculation. But the issues are also momentous, and one needs to feel free to point out the obvious, namely, that do-

mestic forces of repression and militarism prospered as result of Dallas, just as they prospered again in 1968 through the murders of King and Kennedy, and in 1972 with the wounding of Wallace. Among the results of these acts of violence have been the violation of the civil liberties of hundreds of thousands of civil rights activists and dissenters against the Vietnam War, the escalation of U.S. involvement in Indochina through a massive covert air war, the "Phoenix" assassination program, as well as criminal interventions in the internal affairs of other sovereign states from the Dominican Republic in 1965 to Chile in 1973.

In brief, a sharp convergence of political and physical circumstances supports the view that to expose one of these conspiracies is to expose them all. We will abandon this hypothesis as coming evidence may dictate and certainly do not propose it as dogma. But on the face of the larger facts as they are currently discernible, the linked-conspiracy hypothesis illuminates better than rival theories the primary observable features of the situation that presidential assassinations and the elimination of black leaders have brought about.

Chapter 14?

Part II: Political Strategy

Here we state as clearly as we can our reasons for proposing the question, "Who killed JFK?" as a slogan for a new citizens' movement to reclaim the spirit of revolutionary America.

1. The issue of presidential assassination conspiracy transcends normal politics for the simple reason that conspiracy to assassinate a head of state calls into question the very medium of normal political transactions. It is equally in the interest of all but a few Americans that the nation finally get to the bottom of the assassination mysteries, finally uncover the identities and real purposes of those who conceived and engineered a plot to kill a President.

Many of us have theories about how it is going to turn out, who is going to be finally revealed as the true killer, and indeed we will continue to differ as to the probable final truth. But we all have an interest in discovering what that certain truth is. Lyndon B. Johnson, for instance broadly

hinted that the assassination plot of Dallas was the work of Castro partisans. Now comes the speculation that Soviet "defector" Nosenko did not tell all, and with it, the insinuation that Oswald was actually a pawn of the KGB. If this is so, let the evidence reveal it. And the other way around as well. The principled conservative will equally want to know the truth if, as AIB believes, the Dallas killing is traced to the American paramilitary reactionaries. However complex and difficult the "final truth" might ultimately prove to be, let it be known, let everyone see. That is the only way we can be a country true to our best heritage again.

We mean to be as elementary as possible in identifying three main ideological traditions in American politics. By identifying them in terms of current major political party groupings, but reduced to the status of common-noun terms, we mean to emphasize our belief that the American political tradition itself is at stake.

By *democracy* we mean to invoke the American faith in popular self-government. By *republican*, the faith in a society based on law. By *independent*, the faith in the individual.

The AIB proposes precisely not to break any new ground with these conceptions. We state them as simply and as familiarly as possible, as our honest judgment of what the living political values of our tradition are. We do this, plainly, in order to inaugurate an appeal for a movement beyond the customary political definitions.

We are saying that everyone who has an interest in restoring the framework of public trust and reasserting the full spirit of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence should join together in exposing the truth of Dallas.

2. The discoveries set in motion around Watergate and the great aftershocks of Chile and Cointelpro have crystallized public awareness of the realities of power politics in the United States. We are at one of those moments when a providential convergence of events opens a window and shows us the treacheries involved in the struggle for state power. It is more possible today for masses of Americans to understand the need for a new framework of political thought which coherently situates these murders in an overall perspective on American politics during the Cold War. "Who killed JFK?" ought to be a leading slogan of the whole Bicentennial period. The struggle to get the full answer to that question is AIB's proposal for the best way to celebrate the anniversary of the Revolution.

3. In terms of practical steps, how does AIB propose to pursue its goal of politicizing the issue of the domestic assassinations?

First, we think it is already an important change for people to come to recognize explicitly the problem of American clandestineism.

Second, we believe that a general discussion of the question of political organization around the conspiracy themes must continue. We have long felt such organization necessary, but we have had misgivings about the traditional organizing forms. AIB believes in the need for a strong independent movement, set apart from the whims and aspirations of any one individual, which can express itself through political action in all layers of society. AIB believes it is now necessary and possible to increase the energy flowing around this question and bring together a base of activists whose work will put "Who killed JFK?" on the national agenda.*

We do not discount the kind of basic lobbying effort in Washington aiming to spread awareness among influential people that the case of JFK-Dallas is not closed. Congressional and other institutional support can indeed be important and should be sought.

At the same time, we do not and will not believe in the power of "the system" to motivate its own changes. While we constantly appeal to the influence and support of offices whose public commission is precisely to receive such appeals generously, we will never fasten our hopes on such offices. Only a popular demand for the truth will get the truth out. This means to us that a primary task is the encouragement of local educational activities. AIB has been active in high schools and universities in supporting experimental study groups and college-accredited courses. We will be increasingly interested in the development of high school and college curricula around the issues of the politics of conspiracy. As we have gained experience on this, we have sought to share it with others around the country.*

In particular, AIB will continue to hold training programs for people interested in acting as an educational cadre. We

* To aid this effort, the AIB has developed and distributed an information package of slides and written material on the JFK assassination, as a tool for community education and organization. Information about this package can be purchased from the AIB, 63 Inman Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

have found such programs to be instrumental in moving the question of organizational action to a higher stage.

In the same regard, we will continue with a nationwide tour delivering our audiovisual presentations on the JFK assassination and our expanded program of workshops and seminars on other assassinations in the politics of conspiracy on university campuses and to interested community groups.

AIB has encouraged discussion of some national activity that could impart a focused burst to national consciousness on these questions. As this book goes to press, the November 22 coalition has formed to do precisely that. Through an intensified series of actions—teach-ins, media onslaught, rallies—we hope to direct Congressional attention to the urgent need for investigations and to promote the development of concrete organizational relationships within the community of concerned citizens.

We believe the above program offers ways for individuals and groups to continue transforming their interest into activity, with a sense of participation in some larger movement—a sense that we find has been welcomed generally.

But the commission got tangled up in the sensitive problem of whether to risk the wrath of J. Edgar Hoover by conducting an independent probe of Oswald's connections to the FBI. In the end, they relied on Hoover—he denied that Oswald had ever been more than a target of FBI surveillance—and the questions of Oswald and the FBI, and the FBI and the Kennedy assassination were left largely unexplored.

The questions linger. What role did the FBI play in the killing of Kennedy? Did they manipulate Oswald? Did they cover up and obscure the truth? And what role did the CIA play? Oswald as spy would explain the trip to the Soviet Union and the State Department permissiveness about his return. In New Orleans, Oswald moved in a world of right-wingers and Cuban exiles that had been tied to the agency since the Bay of Pigs. Or was it like Watergate, with private interests funding intelligence operators and soldiers of fortune? We are left with questions, yet the questions have hovered over the political scene for so long that they have become answers about the secrecy of our government.

Notes

Symbols: WR—Warren Report
H—Warren Commission Hearings and Exhibits
CE—Commission Exhibit

1. WR, 149, 648; 3H, 224.
2. WR, 163; 2H, 259.
3. 6H, 443.
4. Meagher, Sylvia, *Accessories After the Fact*, Bobbs-Merrill, 1967, p. 256.
5. WR, 180.
6. WR, 598-636. Meagher, Chapt. 10.
7. *Ibid.*
8. WR, 388.
9. 8H, 281. Scott, Peter Dale, *The Dallas Conspiracy*, unpublished manuscript.
10. 8H, 298; 11H, 84. Scott manuscript.
11. 8H, 298.
12. Meagher, chapter 19.
13. 19H, 680.
14. 19H, 736; Scott manuscript.
15. WR, 689; 22H, 78.
16. 22H, 180.
17. WR, 690; 18H, 162.
18. Meagher, p. 332.

19. 8H, 298.
20. WR, 703; Scott manuscript.
21. WR, 771.
22. WR, 764; Meagher, p. 328.
23. WR, 713; Scott manuscript.
24. WR, 777.
25. 8H, 352; 9H, 235.
26. 5H, 288; Scott manuscript.
27. 9H, 180-183; CE, 1672, 3116.
28. Garrison, James, *A Heritage of Stone*, Putnam, 1970, pp. 108, 109.
29. *Ibid.*, 149-150.
30. 10H, 32, 43.
31. Garrison, 113.
32. 11H, 325.
33. 11H, 340-360.
34. *New Orleans Times Picayune*, February 10-20, 1969, Clay Shaw trial.
35. *Ibid.*, February 23, 1967.
36. WR, 722.
37. WR, 517.
38. 11H, 370, 377.
39. Meagher, pp. 376-380.
40. *New York Review of Books*, April 3, 1975.
41. Meagher, pp. 376-381.
42. WR, 318, 319.
43. CE, 3001.
44. 6H, 270.
45. WR, 327.

completion. The next day a condensed version of the report appeared in the local press. Cassibry followed the publication of the report with the comment that public apathy had "allowed the theory of open city and its attendant evils to take hold of us again."⁹²

On December 5, 1954, Morrison called for "a termination of the diatribe of negative smear advocated by certain persons and interests." Two days later he declined to appear on a television program to discuss the SCIC report. On December 8, however, he "emphatically" disagreed "with the critics of our police department of our city who are, with words and statements, trying to make our citizens believe that we have a bad city." Councilman Cassibry and Aaron Kohn, new managing director of the Metropolitan Crime Commission, were clearly the targets for this remark. The mayor then stated that "we have the best police enforcement that we have ever had in the history of New Orleans." He later argued that the police had complied with or put into effect twenty-two of the SCIC recommendations.⁹³

Morrison, however, could not completely ignore the views of his critics. In August, 1954, he had organized the Police Bureau of Investigation (PBI) to investigate departmental matters. On August 4, he appointed attorney Edward K. Pinner, attorney William M. Zibilich and accountant Kenneth G. Blackwell to his "little FBI." Despite hopeful promises the plan backfired. On August 21, police booked Zibilich on a simple drunk charge that led to his dismissal. His conduct temporarily ended the work of the PBI.⁹⁴

In January, 1955, the mayor revived the plan. On January 4, he offered the post of police department secretary to Guy Banister, former FBI agent in charge of the Chicago office. Under the terms of their agreement Banister, possessor of a five-thousand-volume library on criminology, would become head of the PBI and director of police training. Publicly, the mayor later stressed the qualifications of the crime expert and his desire for a thorough investigation of the police force. He also had private reasons. After an interview with Banister, Morrison told *Item* reporter Bill Reed that the new man "was going to be all right, he hates that son of a bitch Kohn." Unaware of the

Banister

mayor's motives Robert R. Rainold, president of the Metropolitan Crime Commission, praised Morrison for the Banister appointment. On January 9 the former federal man accepted the position.⁹⁵

On January 17, 1955, Judge J. Bernard Cocke cleared Joseph Scheuering of malfeasance charges. After the acquittal Chief Administrative Officer David McGuire, at the request of the mayor, reinstated Scheuering, who had been reduced to "acting superintendent" during the SCIC controversy in May, 1954. Scheuering also took action. He filed a lawsuit against Councilman Cassibry for defamation of character and asked \$100,000 in damages. During his campaign to remove the superintendent, Cassibry had repeatedly charged Scheuering with "lack of qualifications, incompetence and neglect of duty" because he participated in the litigation against the SCIC, associated with known criminals, refused to enforce the law and failed to preserve the civil rights of prisoners. These accusations were the bases of the court action. Despite the lawsuit Cassibry was firm. On January 18 he stated that the legal maneuver was an attempt to intimidate him and other police critics. The councilman reiterated that Scheuering was incompetent.⁹⁶

On January 21, 1955, a *Times-Picayune* editorial commented that with the reinstatement of the police superintendent, "Mayor Morrison has made final his disagreement with the citizens' committee over Mr. Scheuering." The superintendent, furthermore, used his suit against Cassibry "to give notice to all and sundry that he considered himself firmly entrenched and they had better keep off his toes." The observations seemed accurate. After two public hearings on the competency of the superintendent, the municipal council endorsed his conduct and supported the police department. On February 1, Scheuering blamed Aaron Kohn for his public difficulties. Councilman Cassibry later tried to reopen investigations into the competency of the superintendent, but failed. Morrison and Scheuering were in command.⁹⁷

In late March the advantage shifted to Aaron Kohn. On March 24, 1955, the managing director of the crime commission began a ten-day jail sentence for contempt. He had refused to divulge the identity of his informers to the grand jury. Following the prison sen-

tence—the maximum under law—the investigator became a martyr for the cause of law enforcement. Many indignant citizens charged that the prison term was the result of political intimidation and protested the decision in letters and telephone calls to the crime commission, the mayor, and the grand jury. On March 28, the irate people formed a citizens' "sympathy" committee under the leadership of Dr. J. D. Grey, minister of the St. Charles Avenue Baptist Church, and marched on City Hall to demonstrate their support for Kohn. The crowd numbered two thousand.⁹⁸

The presence of dissatisfied voters on the steps of City Hall must have affected the mayor. In early April, 1955, he devised a plan for Councilman Glenn Clasen, an administration stalwart, to introduce a motion for the dismissal of the police chief. Morrison could then publicly defend Scheuering. On April 8 Clasen initiated the plan. He asked Scheuering to resign. The superintendent, however, refused. The next day Clasen vowed to ask the council to retire Scheuering. He praised the record of the superintendent, but contended the resignation would lift a "cloud of suspicion" from the police department. Despite these arguments the council voted to retain Scheuering. Clasen, Moore, and Cassibry opposed the measure.⁹⁹ In early May, however, the superintendent became agreeable. He retired in a shower of praise for his administration and his sacrifice. Editorials in the *Item* and in the *States* predicted that the resignation of the superintendent would smooth the controversy in the city. For the sake of public opinion Scheuering had become expendable. The mayor, moreover, had saved face.

On May 4, 1955, Provosty Dayries became superintendent of police. Five weeks later he promoted Guy Banister to the number two post in the department and ordered him to continue the police probe. Banister needed no coaxing. When Morrison invited the one-time FBI agent to New Orleans, he admitted a wolf to the fold. Banister could not accept the thought of corruption in his police department and sought to root it out. He established liaison with Aaron Kohn, the man whom he supposedly hated, and launched a thorough investigation of the police force. Morrison and Dayries objected to Banister's efforts, and the mayor demanded that he end his meetings with Kohn. In

July the press reported that several CCDA ward leaders openly expressed their dislike for Banister, who refused to mix law enforcement and politics.¹⁰⁰

On August 17, 1955, the assistant superintendent suspended Major Joseph DePaoli for insubordination, disobedience, and negligence in a bribery case. The following day Morrison called a conference with Dayries, Banister, and McGuire. After the discussion Dayries reinstated DePaoli and claimed that Banister had used "indiscretion" in his decision. Before the meeting DePaoli had reputedly visited the Morrison home and convinced the mayor to revoke the suspension.¹⁰¹

This action created a new furor in the city because on May 22, 1955, Dayries had stated that a ranking officer "can even suspend a man on the spot—he has that authority." On August 21, an *Item* editorial pointed out that in recent weeks several district commanders had suspended subordinates. The Dayries decision, however, reversed this policy. All suspensions required his approval. The *Item* further stated that the superintendent also had to approve all PBI investigations under the new ruling. On August 22 a *States* article called for a clarification of Banister's powers. Under a previous agreement between the mayor and Dr. J. D. Grey and Morgan Whitney, president of the Metropolitan Crime Commission, Banister could conduct investigations into misconduct and criminal acts "without limitation," was directly responsible to the mayor, could suspend or discharge any police officer regardless of rank, and could expect the support of the mayor. At the time of the agreement Banister was only police department secretary. The mayor replied that an "abnormal situation" existed under the administration of Scheuering which required special powers for Banister. Conditions, however, had returned to "normal" under Dayries, and the special authority for the assistant superintendent was no longer necessary. On August 28 Morrison stated that the superintendent alone had the power to appoint, to discipline, and to suspend. Banister had to take orders from Dayries. On September 2, 1955, the superintendent asserted that the new policy relieved an "untenable" situation in the chain of command. One week after the Dayries statement, Joseph DePaoli announced his retirement. He was the last of the three top police officials from the Scheuering days.

to leave the force. His retirement caused Superintendent Dayries to cancel a scheduled open hearing into charges the crime commission had leveled against the traffic supervisor, reputed "bagman" or collector for the police graft network.¹⁰²

Although the dispute over the powers of Banister faded from the public eye, the police controversy continued into the following year. The crime commission frequently reported the location of illegal establishments to the mayor and to the police department, but these places remained in operation months later. The mayor and Superintendent Dayries maintained an administrative policy that hampered the progress of the FBI probe into misconduct and criminal violations on the police force. In January, 1956, Councilman Cassibry made an unsuccessful effort to transfer control over the police department from the mayor to David McGuire, the chief administrative officer of the city.¹⁰³

On March 20, 1956, Mayor Morrison conceived a new scheme to divert the activities of Guy Banister. He appointed Banister to conduct a study of Communist subversion in New Orleans in conjunction with Senator James Eastland's internal security committee. On March 22 Morrison and Banister met with the senator from Mississippi to discuss the details of the investigation. A confidential agent for the Metropolitan Crime Commission informed Aaron Kohn that the mayor had used this ruse to obstruct Banister because the fight against communism would be popular with the public. The assistant superintendent of police joined the Eastland investigation, but he did not permit his new task to interfere with the current probe of police graft.¹⁰⁴

The need for further study into the conduct, administration, and practices of the police department was obvious. On May 2, 1956, the mayor reinstated Patrolman Dominick Longo although Superintendent Dayries had dismissed the officer from the force when fellow policemen discovered him on the scene of a handbook operation during a raid. Dayries and Aaron Kohn protested the decision, but Morrison remained firm. He said that Longo had a "perfect" record and that subsequent investigation indicated "that there was grave doubt as to his personal dereliction" of duty. On May 4 the mayor refused to submit an explanation of his action to the council despite the demands

of Cassibry. Councilmen Schiro and Fitzmorris backed Morrison. The press, however, later found several "blemishes" on the record of Patrolman Longo, including a censure from A. Adair Watters. The mayor, furthermore, had stated publicly that the handbook operation was difficult to detect because the "handbook paraphernalia downstairs was covered by a sack of onions." The official police photograph of the crime scene which appeared in the *Item* on May 10 showed lottery lists and telephones in clear view. The room was on the first floor, and no onion "sacks" were in sight.¹⁰⁵

After the Longo incident Mayor Morrison sought an early end to the police investigation. On May 18, 1956, McGuire advised Morrison to "have the police advisory board to adopt a resolution calling for an early conclusion to the [police] investigation, and have this resolution publicized." The mayor should then issue a directive to the police department through Dayries that fixed "a deadline of June 1, or July 1, for the completion of the investigation." Dayries later supported this plan and added that many civic, business, and tourist organizations, particularly the Young Men's Business Club, which deplored the impact of the police situation upon business and tourism, wanted an end to the probe. The plan worked beautifully. On June 27, 1956, the mayor announced the termination of the police probe. He stressed the improvement in law enforcement and the dismissal of graftees. District Attorney Leon Hubert stated, "From the standpoint of the district attorney's office, no further action is indicated."¹⁰⁶ The next day the council voted 4 to 2 to support the mayor. Cassibry and A. Brown Moore opposed the measure. After the vote Cassibry asked the mayor if he was prepared to admit that a graft system had existed in the police department. Morrison replied that "I am not prepared to admit anything that I do not know of my own personal knowledge." Banister and Dayries were silent on the question of a graft system. The police department, however, announced one of its many reorganizations. On July 1 Superintendent Dayries took direct control of the Police Bureau of Investigation and shifted his assistant to other duties.¹⁰⁷

The executive announcement and council vote did not end the controversy. On June 30, 1956, William J. Guste, Jr., president of

the Metropolitan Crime Commission, rejected and condemned the decision to halt the police probe and vigorously favored a continuation of the police investigation under the direction of Guy Banister. The mayor chose not to answer the declaration. A few weeks earlier he had privately contended that "the Metropolitan Crime Commission is principally today a harassment agency against Morrison."¹⁰⁸

On June 6, 1956, George Chaplin, editor of the *Item*, Henri Wolbrette, managing editor, and William Reed, reporter, sued Dayries and Banister under the Louisiana Public Records Act to make public the records of the police graft investigation, a file that included two hundred cases. The previous day Dayries had refused to show the files to Reed. The lawsuit in effect reopened the police investigation. On July 12 Banister testified that he had not recommended the termination of the police probe. The suit failed.¹⁰⁹

On July 24, 1956, Aaron Kohn insisted that the ranking police officers who were primarily responsible for the graft system remained on the force. Despite pending charges, three of these men received promotions. The investigator later stated that the "only reason a widespread police graft system hasn't been proven is because public officials don't want it revealed." The mayor replied: "I suppose we'll have to put up with irresponsible statements from Mr. Kohn forever." The statement, however, was hardly irresponsible. On October 17 Judge J. Bernard Cocke stated, "The fact that there was a systematic collection of graft and its distribution among police personnel of the Third District . . . has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The court found Edwin Sbisá, a former police captain, guilty of malfeasance because he permitted a system of graft to operate in the district that he commanded. Here was the solid proof that Mayor Morrison claimed to have sought.¹¹⁰

On February 5, 1957, the mayor and Superintendent Dayries reported the elimination of organized graft in New Orleans. Dayries added that during his administration the police ended open prostitution, handbooks, and lottery. Fred Cassibry asserted that these admissions vindicated the accusations of Kohn, the SCIC, and the Metropolitan Crime Commission against the police department. On February 13 the crime commission asked the status of officers who partici-

pated in graft. The mayor refused to "hash over" the police probe.¹¹¹

On March 1, 1957, during the night, Assistant Superintendent of Police Guy Banister became involved in an altercation at the Old Absinthe House, a French Quarter bar. Witnesses claimed that the police official created a disturbance, assaulted a bartender without provocation, cursed him, drew his service revolver, and asserted that he had killed two people and one more made no difference. Dayries immediately suspended his subordinate. The incident had the overtones of a "frame." For several days the Metropolitan Crime Commission worked to clear Banister, but it could not. The charges appeared to be true. Aaron Kohn later discussed the matter with Mary Banister, wife of the assistant superintendent, and she stated that her husband had secretly undergone brain surgery in Chicago. The operation had damaged his mind, she said, and made him commit irrational acts occasionally. Public opinion, however, forced the reinstatement of Banister. At the request of the mayor, the police superintendent reprimanded his assistant and returned him to service on April 1, 1957. Dayries later stated that Banister would have limited duties. When Banister brazenly protested the restriction of his activity, the superintendent dismissed him from the force, effective June 1, 1957. The mayor endorsed the decision.¹¹²

After the firing of Banister, the YMBC and the Metropolitan Crime Commission demanded the resignation of Dayries, but Morrison refused. He had other ideas. With the support of the mayor, the superintendent of police dismissed ten ranking officers for failure to act against graft. On July 17, 1957, the mayor made a television address that explained the entire police situation and once more affirmed his faith in the department—"the best law enforcement in history." This presentation won wide public support and virtually ended the police investigation. Although advocates of a more thorough study of police operations later convinced a grand jury to study the competence of Superintendent Dayries, the examination proved nothing. On February 12, 1958, another grand jury indicted several former police officers and gamblers, including Joseph Scheuering, Harry Daniels, Milton Durel, and members of the Mills family, but there were no convictions.¹¹³

Provosty Dayries held the post of superintendent until August 3, 1960. One week later Joseph I. Giarrusso, a veteran of the force, became superintendent of police. An excellent public relations man and administrator, Giarrusso initiated the reforms and improvements in local law enforcement that most citizens wanted. With his appointment the police uproar truly died.¹¹⁴

The long police controversy severely damaged Morrison's reform reputation. On July 20, 1956, Ralph M. Pons, a friend of the mayor, told Morrison that "I am afraid that in the process of politics you may have lost your soul and your intellectual honesty about some things. . . . Chep, on the face of the record, and the facts that are known to date, I don't think you can convince me or anyone else that the citizens have gotten a square deal, insofar as a house cleaning of the Police Department is concerned." Pons blamed Morrison for the confusion in the minds of many people.¹¹⁵

On July 4, 1957, Charles M. Elliott wrote a similar letter to Morrison. He recalled that "if my memory is correct—Aaron Kohn and Banister both came to New Orleans with your blessing and then when they uncovered things in the police dept. which were embarrassing to your administration you seemed to want to disassociate yourself from them. . . . I think since you have been Mayor you have done a very good job but the Police situation isn't going to help you in future elections—if things continue like they are going now." On July 5, 1957, Scott Wilson contended that "whatever comes of it [the police situation] cannot fail to be damaging to some degree." Wilson was right. After the police scandals the citizens of New Orleans never completely trusted the mayor. The Morrison image of reform was never again quite the same.¹¹⁶

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 1971; Sullivan, interview,
 ship of the SCIC funds
 Memorandum, February
 in Crime Commission

- files. Although the grand jury praised the SCIC, it protested the definite lack in law enforcement in New Orleans. Morrison replied that the laws were being enforced. *Times-Picayune*, March 3, 1954.
87. *States*, April 26-29, 1954; *Item*, April 26, 27-29, 1954; *Times-Picayune*, April 27, 30, May 4, 1954. See also *SCIC Report*, 1-VI.
 88. *Times-Picayune*, May 20, June 11, 1954; AMK, Investigative Memorandum, May 31, 1954, AMK, Memorandum, September 3, 1954, in Crime Commission files. In an address to the YMBC, Scheuering said that the *SCIC Report* was a "sham."
 89. *Item*, May 13, 14, 17, 1954, April 3, 1955; *Times-Picayune*, May 13-15, 1954; Foley, Memorandum, February 27, 1954, in Crime Commission files.
 90. Press Release, July 25, 1954, in DSM Papers, TU; *Times-Picayune*, July 26, 1954.
 91. *Times-Picayune*, September 2, 10, 1954. During this period the conditions of local prisons also came under fire due to poor health facilities and overcrowding. The mayor, however, stated that prisons in New Orleans were "adequate" and not overcrowded. On March 7, 1955, the Orleans Parish grand jury said that conditions in local prisons were "shocking" and in a "miserable state." *Times-Picayune*, September 22, October 22, November 9, 1954, March 8, 9, 1955.
 92. *States*, October 27, November 17, December 8, 1954; *New York Times*, December 7, 1954. *Item*, April 3, 1955. For a rebuttal to the mayor's remark, see *Item*, December 7, 1954.
 93. *Item*, December 7, 1954, April 3, 1955; *Times-Picayune*, December 9, 20, 1954; *States*, December 20, 21, 24, 1954.
 94. *States*, August 4, September 11, 1954; *Times-Picayune*, August 5, 23, 24, September 2, 15, 1954; *Item*, September 1, 15, 1954.
 95. *Times-Picayune*, January 5, 10, 16, 1955; *Item*, January 16, 1955; Cassibry, interview, July 1, 1971; Reed, interview, January 13, 1971. See also AMK, Investigative Memorandum, January 17, 1955, Robert R. Rainold to DSM, January 26, in 1955, Crime Commission files.
 96. McGuire to Scheuering, January 17, 1955, in McGuire Papers; *Item*, January 18, 1955; *Times-Picayune*, January 18, 1955; *States*, January 18, 1955. For the remarks of Cassibry, see *States*, November 29, 30, December 2, 7, 1954, January 18, 1955.
 97. *Times-Picayune*, January 19-22, 29, February 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, March 10, 11, 1955.
 98. *States*, February 25-28, 1955; *Times-Picayune*, March 27-29; *Item*, April 3, 1955. See also AMK, Investigative Report, September 9, 1955, in Crime Commission files.
 99. AMK, Investigative Report, March 30, 1960, in Crime Commission files; *Times-Picayune*, April 8-12, 17, 1955, *States*, April 8-10, 17, 1955; *Item*, April 8-10, 1955.
 100. *States*, May 4, 5, June 2, 13, 15, 17, 1955; *Item*, March 24, 28, 29, May 4, 5, June 2, 16, 1955; *Times-Picayune*, May 4, 5, 17, June 2, 14, July 22, July 23, 1955; AMK, Investigative Report, May 23, 1955, in Crime Commission files.
 101. Guy Banister to Joseph R. DePaoli, August 17, 1955, DePaoli to Banister, August 9, 1955, AMK, Memorandum, August 19, 1955, all in Crime Commission files; *Times-Picayune*, August 19, 1955.
 102. *States*, August 23, 24, 29-31, 1955, September 2, 3, 10, 1955; *Item*, August 21, 26, 28, September 2, 1955; *Times-Picayune*, August 24, 26-28, September 1, 2, 1955. See also AMK, Investigative Memorandum, August 29, September 9, 1955, Press Release, December 10, 1955, in Crime Commission files.
 103. Rainold to DSM, January 3, 1955, Morgan Whitney to DSM, March 10, 1955, William J. Guste, Jr., to DSM, April 20, June 4, 1956, AMK, Investigative Memorandum, October 24, 1955; Confidential Memorandum, January 25, 1956, Investigative Report, February 3, 1956, Investigative Report, May 10, 1956, July 12, August 13, 1956, J. F. Cottingham, Investigative Report, March 2, 1956, all in Crime Commission files; DSM to Guste, Whitney, Raburn Monroe, Gervais Favrot, Charles Smithers, and Jay Weil, Jr., April 3, 1956, DSM to Guste, May 9, 1956, DSM to James E. Fitzmorris, Jr., January 27, 1956, L. A. Andrepoint to DSM, January 29, 1956, Fitzmorris to DSM, February 24, 1956, DSM to Fitzmorris, February 24, 1956, all in DSM Papers, NOPL; *States*, January 5, 1956; *Times-Picayune*, May 17, 23, April 27, 28, 1956.

104. AMK, Investigative Report, May 14, 1956, in Crime Commission files; *Times-Picayune*, April 27, 28, May 17, 23, 1956; *Item*, March 20, 25, 26, 1956.
105. *Times-Picayune*, May 3-5, 8, 1956; *States*, May 4, 7, 8, 1956; *Item*, May 10, 1956.
106. McGuire to DSM, May 18, 1956; Provosty A. Dayries to DSM, May 18 (1956?), in DSM Papers, NOPL; *Times-Picayune*, May 18, June 27-30, 1956.
107. *Times-Picayune*, June 29, 30, 1956. See also *Item*, June 28, 29, 1956.
108. Guste to DSM, June 30, 1956, in Crime Commission files; *Item*, July 2, 5, 1956; *States*, July 2, 1956; *Times-Picayune*, July 3, 4, 1956; DSM to Gervais Favrot, June 7, 1956, in DSM Papers, NOPL.
109. *Item*, July 6, 7, 9, 12, 19, 1956; *Times-Picayune*, July 7, 11, 1956.
110. *States*, July 24, August 10, 1956; *Item* August 10, October 17, 1956; *Times-Picayune*, August 10, 1956, January 19, 1957.
111. *Item*, February 5, 13, 1957; *States*, February 6, 8, 20, 1957; *Times-Picayune*, February 8, 1957. See also Guste to DSM, February 12, 1957, in DSM Papers, NOPL.
112. Dayries to Banister, March 3, 1957; Statements of Louis Markey, Edward A. Despain, Charles F. Short, Jr., Frank V. Battle, Lawrence G. Nuhoberac, George E. Johnson, Harold Gerhardt, and Benjamin Allen Murrey, Curtis M. Hennesy to DSM, March 28, 1957; Dayries to Banister, April 1, 1957, all in DSM Papers, NOPL; AMK, interview, June 28, 1971; McGuire to Dayries, June 4, 1957, in Victor H. Schiro Papers, New Orleans Public Library; *Item*, April 2, 4, 17, June 10, 1957; *Times-Picayune*, April 4, 18, 30, June 7, 11, 1957; *States*, April 2, 17, June 3, 6, 10, 1957.
113. Harry R. Cabral, Jr., to Schiro, June 20, 1957, in Schiro Papers; Cabral to DSM, June 20, 1950, in DSM Papers, NOPL; Charles A. Mehurin to DSM, June 28, 1958, in Crime Commission files; *Times-Picayune*, June 25, 26, 1957, Statement of Mayor Chep Morrison on WDSU-TV, July 17, 1957, in DSM Papers, TU; *Times-Picayune*, July 16, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29, 1957. For the controversial aspects of the Marc Antony grand jury, see AMK, Investigative Report, November 13, 15, 1957, in Crime Commission files; AMK, interview, June 28, 1971; *States*, February 12, 1958.
114. McGuire to DSM, August 9, 1960; McGuire to C. Alvin Bertel, Jr., August 12, 1960, in DSM Papers, NOPL; DSM to Bertel, August 3, 1960, in Schiro Papers; *Times-Picayune*, August 15, 1960; AMK, interview, July 29, 1970. See also Rosemary James, "The Man Who Wouldn't Run," *New Orleans*, V (October, 1970), 20.
115. Ralph M. Pons to DSM, July 20, 1956, in DSM Papers, NOPL.
116. Charles M. Elliott to DSM, July 4, 1957, in DSM Papers, NOPL; Wilson to Moley, July 5, 1957, in Wilson Papers; Cassibry, interview, July 1, 1971; Reed, interview, January 13, 1971; Sullivan, interview, March 6, 1971.

CHAPTER XI

1. Howard and Friedman, *Government in Metropolitan New Orleans*, 15; "New Orleans Completes Railroad Terminal Program," *American City*, LXIX (July, 1954), 120; *Times-Picayune*, May 1-3, 1954; Fitzmorris, interview, May 29, 1970.
2. Howard and Friedman, *Government in Metropolitan New Orleans*, 15; *Item*, May 3, 1954.
3. *Item*, May 3, 1954.
4. *Ibid.* See also *Times-Picayune*, June 20, 1954; McCloskey, interview, July 6, 1970.
5. For details on the duties of the chief administrative officer, see Howard and Friedman, *Government in Metropolitan New Orleans*, 16-17.
6. *Item*, May 3, 1954; Robinson, interview, February 27, 1971; *Times-Picayune*, June 20, 1954; Sullivan, interview, March 6, 1971.
7. *Item*, April 20, May 3, 1954; *Times-Picayune*, April 21, 1954; Wilson to Boggs, April 20, 1954, in Wilson Papers.
8. *Times-Picayune*, June 20, 1954; McGuire to DSM, August 24, 1954, in McGuire Papers.
9. *Times-Picayune*, January 30, 1955; Schiro, interview, September 29, 1970; McGuire to Heads of Departments, Offices, and Boards, January 31, 1955, in DSM Papers, NOPL.
10. *Times-Picayune*, June 13, 1954; Sullivan, interview, March 6, 1971; Gillis, interview August 24, 1970, March 9, 1971; Cassibry, interview, October 27, 1970, July 1, 1971.

and weaknesses. Time and familiarity had not had the opportunity to tarnish his image. The people saw only the smiling face and vigorous enthusiasm. To the public Morrison was both fresh and refreshing. His presence enlivened a dull primary and provided the citizens of New Orleans with a bright new image of reform.²³

The various reform groups of New Orleans rallied behind Chep Morrison. The newly formed Independent Women's Organization under the leadership of Mrs. Arthur C. Waters, Mrs. J. W. Reily, and Hilda Phelps Hammond, long-time reform leaders, found it easy to endorse the good-looking antimachine candidate. During his bachelor years Morrison, the playboy, had an attractive reputation in society, and the "girls" remembered. Returning veterans comprised another group that heartily embraced Morrison. Men who had fought on Omaha Beach and at the Bulge felt special closeness to one of their number. On December 10, 1945, the Morrison Veterans Organization announced its creation and began work in the Morrison headquarters on Carondelet Street in downtown New Orleans. Sixteen days later, on Wednesday, December 26, 1945, Morrison reported the establishment of a veteran ward organization with leaders in fifteen of the seventeen city wards. These two groups—women and veterans—gave a new scope to political opposition in New Orleans. Women and veterans lived in all parts of the city, not in the uptown section alone. They provided the basis for the strong citywide organization that was mandatory for the defeat of the Old Regular machine.²⁴

Morrison waged a tireless campaign. His workday commonly stretched to eighteen hours or more. Food, sleep, and family became secondary. Early in the morning the former soldier visited surprised workers at textile plants and streetcar barns during the change in work shifts. He then moved out to the wharves, the heart of the New Orleans economy, where longshoremen loaded and unloaded a multitude of ships. During the day he attended luncheons and meetings with women, veterans, businessmen, and the press. Somehow between meetings he managed to confer with leaders of the reform organization. At night there were more public appearances and frequently radio speeches. Throughout the hectic day and night Morrison kept smiling, talking, and shaking hands. This technique stunned New Orleans

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Mayor Morrison, like his subordinates, nonetheless, persisted in his attempts to deal with the opposition. In March, 1950, Long ally William C. Feazel of Shreveport, a former United States senator, visited New Orleans and spoke with the mayor. Shortly after their meeting Senator Russell Long informed his supporters in New Orleans, including Charles Zatarain, that he expected little opposition in the July Democratic primary for the United States Senate. At the same time Mayor Morrison held a conference with Blair Lancaster, Jr., chairman of the CCDA caucus, Finance Commissioner Lionel G. Ott, Gervais F. Favrot, Clifton L. Ganus and Mrs. Gladys Reilly of the IWO. During their discussion Morrison expressed his desire to trade neutrality or support for Russell Long for the restoration of municipal revenue and full police power to New Orleans. Although the mayor continued to appoint the superintendent and the police advisory board, one of the "punitive" legislative acts of 1948 had shifted several local police functions to the commissioner of public safety and to the state government.⁵

On March 14, 1950, Long aide A. A. Fairbanks denied the reports of a Long-Morrison truce in a public statement from Baton Rouge. When newsmen attempted to speak with the mayor, they discovered that he, his wife, son, and three-year-old daughter Corinne Ann, were on an automobile vacation in the West. Morrison, however, learned of the news stories. In a communication from Los Angeles, he said that the proposed truce was "pure speculation."⁶

When the mayor returned from his trip in late March, he changed his statement. At that time Morrison admitted that informal talks with representatives of the Long administration had taken place. The mayor planned to exchange nonopposition to Russell Long for revenue increases and home rule. Morrison added that the door to cooperation was still open and that many municipal workers who faced dismissal due to lack of funds favored a truce.⁷

The proposed compromise invoked a strong response from Morrison backers. On March 23, 1950, the Independent Women's Organization met at the Jewish Community Center to discuss the truce. During the session 80 percent of the IWO members opposed the planned peace. Several unnamed CCDA ward leaders agreed. The veteran

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and the Sewerage and Water Board, these irate citizens forced the mayor to provide adequate sewerage for their subdivisions.⁴³ It was one of the few contests with the mayor that Brahney won.

In October, 1952, Mayor Morrison drew opposition from his women backers. After the mayoralty victory of 1946, the Independent Women's Organization and other pro-Morrison women's groups had turned their attention to the New Orleans schools. During the Maestri administration the RDO had used the school board primarily for a source of patronage. Local education was resultantly poor. After the election of Morrison the IWO sought to free the public schools from political control, and the mayor apparently gave his blessings to their efforts. When a vacancy appeared on the school board in 1948, the ladies nominated Mrs. Jacqueline T. Leonhard, a part-Indian divorcee from Oklahoma, for the post. With her election, reform of the school board began. Two years later the women chose Dr. Clarence Scheps, a Tulane University official, and C. Paul Besse, a New Orleans engineer, to run for the board. Both men won. Together with Mrs. Leonhard, Scheps and Besse controlled the body. In 1950 Mrs. Leonhard became its president. At that point the movement for an independent school board was successful.⁴⁴

The politically ambitious chief executive, however, soon became a threat. On October 23, 1952, the IWO charged that Mayor Morrison was attempting to gain control over the school board through the election of Dr. Louis "Dutch" Legett, a dentist, and Dr. James T. Conner, an attorney and precinct captain in the CCDA. Although the Morrison organization could not legally endorse the two men or place their names on sample ballots, CCDA ward leaders and precinct bosses could support the candidates as individuals. During the dispute Mrs. Gladys Reily claimed that the mayor had betrayed his early promises to keep politics out of the schools. Mrs. Leonhard, Dr. Scheps and Besse agreed. Scheps said that Morrison was using "undue pressure to elect his candidates." The Citizens for Progress in the Public Schools, a proeducation civic group, and the local press also joined the IWO in its fight for an independent school board. These various organizations and individuals supported the candidacies of Emile Wagner, Jr., and Theodore Shepard, Jr.⁴⁵

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"mullets," as Wilson derisively termed the local voters, with a steady stream of informative propaganda. His excellent management of the campaign, no doubt, made the difference. On April 15, 1947, a heavy rain and light vote narrowed an already tight election. The final count was 13,181 to 12,112, and the property vote was \$56 million to \$43 million. Only 1,069 ballots saved the Morrison building program from defeat.⁴⁷

The bond election did not end the terminal controversy. On April 25, 1947, Mayor Morrison introduced a motion to the commission council that called for the city government to pay approximately \$27,000 in advertising fees for the bond election campaign. Morrison, after consultation with city attorneys, declared that the payment was both legal and proper under an appropriation to the mayor's office for participation in civic affairs. Commissioner Hotard disagreed strongly. He argued that he had paid for advertising in opposition to the bond issue, but had not received compensation from the city. Although the motion eventually carried, Hotard refused to accept Morrison's case for the payment.⁴⁸

In early June, 1947, the property commissioner, who had also conflicted sharply with the mayor on both a proposed tunnel in downtown New Orleans and a paving scandal within his own department, announced his formal separation from Mayor Morrison and his Crescent City Democratic Association (CCDA). Hotard then joined with attorney Richard A. Dowling, businessman A. W. Johness, the chairman of a taxpayers' association, and several other terminal opponents in a series of civil suits to prevent the construction of the union passenger station and related projects. Although the litigation prevented the sale of terminal bonds for nearly two years, Louisiana courts systematically dismissed these cases and allowed the implementation of the terminal agreement to proceed. On October 22, 1947, city officials and representatives of the nine railroads signed a three-hundred page, five-pound terminal contract and ended a day of ceremonies with dinner at Arnaud's in the French Quarter.⁴⁹

The international trade movement that Chep Morrison fashioned into an important and often far-reaching extension of his city administration did not begin with his inauguration. Before World War II

several business leaders gave careful consideration to the establishment of a permanent trade organization in New Orleans. This proposed "trade club" sought to encourage foreign visitors, especially Latin Americans, to trade with the United States through the port of New Orleans. Although the outbreak of war temporarily dampened the trade club idea, it did not die. In the spring of 1942 two advertising executives, Lawrence H. Stevens and Harley B. Howcott of Stone-Stevens, Incorporated, revived the plan. They proposed the erection of a trade structure that would house information centers, reception and conference rooms, exhibit halls, and dining facilities for both visitors and local traders to E. O. Jewell, the new general manager of the port of New Orleans. Jewell liked the idea and approached William G. Zetzmann, Rudolph S. Hecht, chairman of the board of the Hibernia National Bank, and Theodore Brent, president of the Mississippi Shipping Company, for assistance. For a year these men studied and developed the concept of an international trade organization. On December 28, 1943, the trade club dream became an officially incorporated reality. In June, 1945, International House welcomed visitors from all parts of the globe to its new headquarters in downtown New Orleans.

The new center enjoyed an almost immediate success that motivated Brent, Hecht, and Zetzmann to establish a second trade organization that would complement the program of International House. In the fall of 1945 these men chartered the International Trade Mart, another nonprofit, self-supporting private agency that would feature exhibition and merchandising facilities. Although construction of the new organization proceeded rapidly, the doors of the International Trade Mart did not open until June 6, 1948. By that time Mayor Morrison had become leader in the international trade movement in New Orleans.⁵⁰

The international trade program was a superb microcosm of Mayor Morrison and his administration. Although the trade movement developed independently of the city government, the mayor quickly became its greatest exponent. Morrison later recalled that Rudolph Hecht first introduced him to the importance of trade, particularly with Latin Americans. Perhaps Hecht did supply a needed push in the proper direction, but the former wartime port commander in Europe, undoub-

- January 10, 1946, DSM to Riso, April 7, 1947, Zetzmann to Editor, New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, December 8, 1948; DSM to Robert E. Lacey, April 2, 1947, DSM to Oliver Depoorter, April 2, 1947, DSM to E. J. Bowen, April 7, 1947, Committee Representing Eighteen Railway Labor Organizations to DSM, April 9, 1947, Minutes of Commission Council Meeting, February 12, 1947, all in DSM Papers, NOPL.
46. John H. Bernhard, "Another View of New Orleans," *New Republic*, September 14, 1947, p. 39; Bernhard also questioned the decrease in crime and the increase in trade that Morrison boasted. See also Sharp, "Morrison of New Orleans," 30; Millicent (?) to McGuire, September 15, 1955, in McGuire Papers.
47. Wilson to William Sanderson, February 20, 1947, in DSM Papers, NOPL; *Item*, March 3, April 16, 1947; *States*, March 3, April 14, 16, 1947; *Times-Picayune*, March 4, 8, April 15, 16, 1947; Sullivan, interview, March 6, 1971. During a conference with newsmen Mayor Morrison once used the term *mullets*, in reference to the voters. Public Relations Director David R. McGuire quickly interceded and sharply warned the mayor never to use that expression in public again. Jack Dempsey, interview, March 23, 1971; Martin, "New Orleans Has Its Face Lifted," 17; Howard and Friedman, *Government in Metropolitan New Orleans*, 188.
48. DSM to Joseph M. Jones, May 6, 1947, in DSM Papers, NOPL; *States*, April 26, 1947; *Item*, April 26, 1947; *Times-Picayune*, April 26, 1947.
49. *States*, May 9, June 4, 5, July 15, 18, 22, August 26, 1947, January 23, 1948; *Item*, May 10, June 5, 6, July 15, 18, August 24, 1947, January 24, 1948. The CCDA was Morrison's personal political organization. See also DSM to David M. Wood, April 26, 1948, Wood to DSM, October 23, 1947, April 27, 1948, George A. Heft to Zetzmann, June 29, 1948, Heft to DSM, June 29, 1948, Heft to H. A. Sawyer, June 29, 1948, Heft to Ralph P. Nolan, June 29, 1948, Heft to Fred A. Earhart, June 29, 1948, Heft to George Bohn, June 29, 1948, Heft to Clifton L. Ganus, June 29, 1948, DSM and Ott, Joint Statement to the Commission Council, July 6, 1948, all in DSM Papers, NOPL; "Five Stations Combine into One," 37; *States*, June 13, July 30, October 21, 22, 23 November 6, 1947, March 23, 1948; *Item*, June 14, October 22, 23, 1947; *Times-Picayune*, June 14, July 31, October 23, 1947, December 16, 1947, March 23, 1948.
50. Gary A. Bolding, "New Orleans Commerce: The Establishment of the Permanent World Trade Mart," *Louisiana History*, VIII (Fall, 1967), 356-59.
51. DSM, *Latin American Mission*, 55-56.
52. "South to the Future," *Time*, April 1, 1947, p. 44.
53. DSM, *Latin American Mission*, 56-57; DSM, "New Orleans Builds Trade Systematically," *American City*, XLIII (August, 1948), 98; Max K. Gilstrap, "'Hizzoner' Stays Calm," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 1947, p. 7; *Times-Picayune*, November 14, 1946, August 14, December 18, 1947; *Item*, April 7, December 17, 1947; *States*, November 15, 1946. The international trade program also had its critics. In private communications to the mayor, adviser David McGuire called the municipal office of international relations "an internal irritant." The description was appropriate. Many New Orleans officials who otherwise supported the administration resented the attention that Mayor Morrison lavished upon Latin dignitaries while "good voters" cooled their heels in the mayor's outer office. The more jealous City Hall politicians envied the plush carpet and the crystal chandeliers that adorned the office of international relations and outshone the comparatively paltry furnishings of other city departments. McGuire to DSM, September 23, 1947, March 17, 1948, in McGuire Papers. See also "Selling New Orleans," *Business Week*, January 10, 1948, p. 101; "Trade Mart Attracts Latin American Commerce," *American City*, XLIV (July, 1949), 109.
54. DSM to Luis Golindo, December 17, 1947, Merrill C. Meigs to DSM, June 23, 1948, both in DSM Papers, NOPL; *Times-Picayune*, May 24, November 4, 1946, January 16, 26, 1947; *Item*, May 23, 1946; *States*, May 23, November 6, 1946; *New York Times*, May 26, 1946, Martin, "New Orleans Has Its Face Lifted," 19; Many observers who wanted to increase local trade with foreign countries and appreciated the need to treat visiting emissaries graciously found fault with this one aspect of the international relations program. They

- deplored the many journeys to Latin America and other parts of the world that carried the mayor away from his local duties and often brought him in close contact with several totalitarian dictators, Gilstrap, "Hizzoner Stays Calm," 7; "South's Port Trade Booms," *Business Week*, August 21, 1948, p. 24.
55. "New Orleans' Port of Envy," *Business Week*, June 28, 1947, p. 38, 40-42; "Port of Dreams," *Time*, May 12, 1947, pp. 90-91; "New Orleans Makes a Play for Imports," *Business Week*, March 13, 1947, pp. 55-56; "Bid by New Orleans," *Newsweek*, July 26, 1948, p. 64; "New Orleans International Trade Mart Offers a Showcase for World Traders," *Business Week*, July 17, 1948, p. 114; "The Great New Orleans Steal," *Fortune*, XXXVIII (November 1948), 102-103; *States*, December 30, 1947.
56. DSM to Frank Radar Smith, July 23, 1947; DSM to Ralph Falk, October 20, 1948, in DSM Papers, NOPL. See also DSM to Robert F. Kennon, January 3, 1953; DSM to David C. H. Finn, Jr., January 13, 1954, in DSM Papers, TU; *Item*, October 10, 1947.
57. "Old Girl's New Boy," 26. See also McGuire to Higgins, March 10, 1949, in DSM Papers, TU; *Item*, January 8, 21, 1948; *Times-Picayune*, January 7, 21, 1948; Lill, interview, January 28, 1971.

CHAPTER IV

1. Lucius Jones to DSM, January 25, 1950, in DSM Papers, TU; Gillis, interview, March 9, 1971.
2. Robert B. Delahoussaye to DSM, October 1, 1948, in DSM Papers, TU; Sharp, "Morrison of New Orleans," 31; Gillis, interview, March 9, 1971.
3. DSM to Edgar B. Stern, Sr., June 16, 1947, Monte H. Lemann to DSM, July 31, 1947, in DSM Papers, NOPL; Gillis, interview, March 9, 1971.
4. Jacob H. Morrison, interview, September 18, 1970; Pecot, interview, July 8, 1970; Sullivan, interview, March 6, 1971; *States*, September 27, 1948, January 5, 1949; *Item*, January 5, 1949.
5. *Times-Picayune*, November 6, 1947, March 1, 1949; *States*, March 1, 1949; *Item*, March 1, 1949.
6. Doris Cook to DSM, January 14, 1950, in Wilson Papers. See also DSM to Joseph H. Rummel, March 6, 1948, DSM to Nat Marks, March 6, 1948, in DSM Papers, NOPL.
7. DSM to Marshall W. Amis, July 16, 1946, McGuire to Clarence Scheps, April 7, 1947, DSM to Andrew Hershell, November 16, 1954, all in DSM Papers, TU; *Times-Picayune*, August 1, 1946, February 5, March 16, September 18, November 1, 1947; *States*, May 16, September 17, 1947; *Item*, September 18, 1947.
8. Cook to DSM, January 14, 1950, in Wilson Papers; McGuire to DSM, October 6, 1948, in DSM Papers, TU; DSM to Jack Holiday, May 3, 1950, DSM to Mrs. G. V. Kinsom, Jr., May 8, 1950, DSM to Gilbert Thayer, May 3, 1950, DSM to Al Betzer, May 3, 1950, DSM to Malcolm Mundy, May 3, 1950, Robert E. Wall to DSM, May 11, 1950, 1950, DSM to Pontchartrain Park Homes, Inc., February 13, 1954, all in DSM Papers, NOPL; Hirsch and Friedman, *Government in Metropolitan New Orleans*, 49-51; *States*, January 6, April 28, 29, 1950; *Times-Picayune*, January 6, April 29, 1950; *Item*, April 29, 1950. Allen Dowd to DSM, August 13, 1956, in DSM Papers, NOPL. See also New Orleans Urban League, Summary and Recommendations of the Survey on the Economic and Cultural Problems of New Orleans, typescript copy attached to J. Westbrook McPherson to McGuire, June 20, 1950, in DSM Papers, TU.
9. Sharp, "Morrison of New Orleans," 31; *Item*, July 26, 1946; Lautenschlaeger, interview, July 13, 1970.
10. *Item*, September 11, 1947.
11. Delahoussaye to DSM, October 1, 1948; Lucius Jones to DSM, January 25, 1950, in DSM Papers, TU; *Times-Picayune*, October 1, 1948; *States*, September 22, 1948; *Times-Picayune*, September 23, 1948.
12. Delahoussaye to DSM, October 1, 1948, Ernest J. Wright to DSM, May 5, 1948, in DSM Papers, TU; *Times-Picayune*, February 18, 1948.

Assassination Information Bureau Position Paper

The purpose of the Assassination Information Bureau is to politicize the issue of domestic assassinations.

By domestic assassinations we mean to indicate the constellation of gunplay episodes around political leaders over the past dozen years. This, of course, includes the killings of John and Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, whose lives and fates had immediate, deep effects on United States presidential politics. The shooting of George Wallace, the one failure, was just as effective as an assassination from the standpoint of its impact on the results of the 1972 elections. Thus, the shootings of JFK, King, Robert Kennedy, and Wallace form a pattern which we call the constellation of presidential assassinations.

Other domestic assassinations worthy of public attention and concern include the assassinations of Malcolm X, George Jackson, and Fred Hampton. The systematic elimination of these leaders reflects the clandestine use of police informers, frame-ups, and outright murder by federal law enforcement agencies in stopping the rise, in the language of J. Edgar Hoover's 1968 Cointelpro memoranda, of "a black messiah."

By calling these crimes an issue, we mean to say (1) that the presidential assassinations are outstanding public questions and (2) that, even though they are in practical respects downright murder mysteries, the stories of Dallas, Memphis, Los Angeles, and Laurel embody the very real power struggle that began to shake the U.S. presidency in the 1960's. The conflicts that composed the concrete substance of this struggle were the war in Southeast Asia, the worsening economic crunch, the Cuban revolution, and the civil rights movement.

By politicize, AIB means that it is time to try to mobilize for practical political action the emerging national awareness that official explanations of these murders are fundamentally inadequate. Mobilizing this consciousness is the chief purpose of the AIB.

We think that such a mobilization against the politics of conspiracy is especially necessary at the time of the Bicentennial celebration; our nation is again face-to-face with prospects of further economic depression and gathering signs of political repression. In the measure in which this threat arises out of the consequences of the assassinations of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, and the shooting of Wallace, it can only be faced in terms of those assassinations.

We think this mobilization may be possible especially at this time. The revelations of Watergate and Chile and the disclosures of CIA, FBI, and IRS involvement in massive secret domestic espionage operations against organized dissent, as well as the revolutionary Bicentennial occasion itself, have opened people's minds, as never before, to an understanding of the conspiratorial actions behind these events.

This new openness, of course, may have developed too late. To the skeptic, we say that our own attitude is experimental. We do not mean to imply that we can guarantee our analysis. But we think the question, "Who killed JFK?" is the root political question of the current disorder, that it is the question which must be faced first. To face this question, to see into its meanings, is to understand power in American politics for what it really is, and to see clearly how those who command and monopolize it have grown used to operating. It is to see all the shootings as events in a struggle for power, continuous through Watergate and the late CIA, IRS and FBI disclosures.

It is this power struggle of secret elites itself which must be broken up.

The arguments AIB advances in support of this position bear on four points.

1. The critique of the Warren Commission theory of Dallas.
2. The cover-up, especially the role of Gerald Ford.
3. The "Who-dunnit?" question.
4. The argument for conspiracy in the King, Robert Kennedy, and Wallace shootings.

Following a summary of the arguments bearing on the above, AIB offers a larger statement of its views of the strategic political importance of the assassination conspiracy issues.

This includes an outline of a program for putting these ideas into action.

Part I: Assassination/Conspiracy Critique

1. THE WARREN COMMISSION THEORY OF DALLAS

The AIB believes that the evidence accumulated over the years since Dallas makes it impossible for serious people to accept the "verdict" of the Warren Commission.

That "verdict," that out-of-court settlement, was to the effect that one Lee Harvey Oswald, represented as a lone-wolf radical sympathetic to Castro and communist forces, acted alone, in a deranged psychological condition, in the shooting of Kennedy.

Without trying to be exhaustive, for much is discussed on this point elsewhere, the AIB submits that the public doubts of the Warren Commission's theory of Dallas stem, in part, from the following basic areas:

- The Zapruder film, now bootlegged everywhere, strongly suggests to us that the fatal headshot was fired from the front, not the rear. For all the efforts of the Rockefeller Commission to prove otherwise, by citing a "neuromuscular" reaction, the necessary medical evidence to substantiate this point has not been produced. Our conclusion: multiple gunmen.

- The "single-bullet theory" propounded by Warren Commission attorney Arlen Specter is a rickety concatenation of one-sided assumptions promoted expressly to close the door on a "conspiracy" theory. The Warren Commission is obliged to hold that a single bullet, the famous Commission Exhibit 399, fired by Oswald from behind and six stories up, struck Kennedy in the back around the right shoulder blade, ranged upwards, exiting at the front of his throat, nicking the left side of the knot of his necktie, somehow hovering in the air for a second and a half, then with a sharp, angular deviation flying on toward Connally, striking Connally in the back near the right armpit, smashing several ribs, exiting his chest, smashing the inside of his right wrist, and spending itself in

his left thigh. The bullet then apparently worked its way out of Connally and was discovered on a stretcher by a Parkland Hospital attendant. This bullet, its copper jacket intact, showed minimal distortion at its base and an infinitely small loss of weight, was represented as the bullet that had done all the damage listed above. The single-bullet theory is incredible on its face and yet it is essential to the commission position. By the commission's own admission, if more than one bullet was involved in the making of all those wounds, there was more than one person shooting in Dealey Plaza.

- Jack Ruby, a well-known face to much of the Dallas police force and a man with extensive connections to organized crime, was able to silence Oswald with comparative ease in the basement of the Dallas county jail.

- On subsequent investigation, Oswald turns out to have a fairly deep background in U.S. military intelligence. His "defection" to the USSR in 1959, as well as his "support" for the Castro revolution, have the look of the sort of cover stories that Watergate and the late domestic-intelligence disclosures have trained the world to recognize. His U.S. military-intelligence background has been largely suppressed and never explained. The whole question of Oswald's identity, in fact, has been clouded over from the start by official mystifications about "national security."

2. THE COVER-UP AND THE ROLE OF GERALD FORD

We do not know if the Warren Commission was willful in its role in the cover-up of Dallas, or if, on the contrary, it was itself somehow a victim of the cover-up operation. But we are satisfied that there was a cover-up—a willful and basically successful effort, so far, to obstruct justice and suppress the truth.

FBI and CIA files, potentially important to the understanding of Oswald and the conspiracy, are held secret in the archives, the results of critical bullet comparisons and key medical evidence remains incomplete. U.S. representatives, who have systematically refused for years to investigate or attach any significance to the murders of their fellow politicians, have only recently begun to investigate and to meet the growing dissatisfaction with the lone-assassin excuse.

Gerald Ford must be held accountable as a leading figure in the cover-up. He was one of the most aggressive members of the Warren Commission in "selling" the lone-assassin theory. To that end he co-authored *Portrait of the Assassin*, a book utilizing then Top Secret documents of a Warren Commission executive session, contrary to the commission's own established guidelines, and out of context, in a lame attempt to refute the "rumor" of Oswald's role as an FBI informer.

Ford's role in this affair reflects the manner in which he has been called throughout his undistinguished political career to act for the interests of others. (Among other examples are his move to impeach Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, his role as an outspoken proponent of big military spending, and the pardon of Nixon.)

3. THE "WHO-DUNNIT" QUESTION

Members of the AIB believe that for purposes of the public debate, the key question of whether or not Oswald acted alone in the murder of the President is strongly settled in the negative. We always acknowledge that new evidence or arguments might dissuade us of certain particulars. We know that arguments must ultimately be restated in detail before commissions of inquiry and courts of law. But if the bottom line is to be drawn as of this moment, then the evidence binds us to the belief that Oswald could not have acted alone in the shooting, if he acted in it at all.

At the same time, AIB believes that this evidence is of a class apart from the evidence bearing on the actual reconstruction of the crime, the classical who-dunnit exercise. AIB recognizes the powerful individual efforts various investigators have put into the precise reconstruction of the assassination cabal, its technical plan, and, especially, into the political character of the cabal, its organization, and its further activities. AIB encourages, takes part in this work, and strives to synthesize the best of it from a practical political standpoint. AIB defends open speculation on these and related research questions. But AIB does not believe that the question it propounds as its very motto, "Who Killed JFK?" can finally be settled outside the courts.

To put this important point another way: the Warren

The Origins of Clandestinitism and the CIA

by L. Fletcher Prouty

The Central Intelligence Agency has had a brief existence in American history. It was a special product of the early years of the Cold War, a fact reflected in its mode of operation and its organization. During World War II U.S. intelligence was fragmented into a variety of different agencies and armed force branches. The White House sought coordination of these sometimes competing operations. At the same time, the political objectives of U.S. intelligence had shifted from defeating the fascists to "all means short of war" to "induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence" and to "foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system," according to a "Top Secret" National Security Council report (NSC-68) dated April 14, 1950, and released in the spring of 1975. The CIA was created for these ends. Among its first moves was the absorption of "the remarkable Russian anti-Soviet network of General Reinhardt Gehlen, who had offered to serve the Americans at the end of the war as faithfully as he had served Hitler," writes *London Daily Mail* assistant editor, Stewart Steven, in *Operation Splinter Factor*. Gehlen had been head of the Nazis' intelligence operations on the Eastern Front during the war; his alliance with the CIA was an indication of the political drift in the late forties.

The CIA did not develop its independent nature by chance. Its clandestinitism is tied to its bureaucratic integrity, engineered by Allen Dulles. That story and its legal ramifications is the subject of L. Fletcher Prouty's article. Prouty, the former liaison officer for the Defense Department in its contacts with the CIA in all matters pertaining to military support of clandestine operations, is the author of *The Secret Team*.

The dust of the atomic clouds scarcely had settled over Hiroshima and Nagasaki when President Harry S. Truman disbanded the Office of Strategic Services, led by the flamboyant

General William "Wild Bill" Donovan. It was 1946 and the world had no use for clandestine services. One world was what we had sought in World War II, and, after all, that was the way it was going to be. The victorious military services were being disbanded so fast that air force units charged with flying the men home did not have enough maintenance personnel to keep the planes airworthy. The war was over—things were settled and we were going to turn our backs on all of that.

But disturbing questions were still unanswered: "What had really happened at Pearl Harbor?" "Were we really so poorly informed that we could be caught totally unaware by a huge flotilla floating in from Tokyo?" Charges flew back and forth and it became evident that something had to be done about the structure of the national defense establishment. Congress began to debate how the armed forces should be organized. It became clear that there should be a single department over all the armed forces. Instead of the traditional War Department and Navy Department, Congress came to the conclusion that there should be a Department of Defense and that the Secretary of Defense, a civilian, should have the ultimate authority over all forces in peacetime and that the President as Commander-in-Chief should have full authority in time of war.

This brought up another sore spot. During World War II it became apparent that the biggest bang in the military forces had been delivered by the bombers of the air force. Proponents of that new military arm believed that it should be independent and no longer part of the army; if there was going to be a Department of Defense then let there be one that had three equal forces, the army, the navy and the independent air force. A bitter fight ensued.

While all of this was going on, other voices proposed that the United States should have a central intelligence authority. In order to preserve the "assets (undercover agents and their apparatus)" created by the OSS during World War II, President Truman had, by executive order, established a Central Intelligence Group. Some members of the old OSS had escaped this group and its uncertain future by burying themselves in the intelligence section of the Department of State. But there was no long-range plan.

The arguments became heated. Almost every major commander of war-fame declared that intelligence in general had been very poor during the war. It was not so much that ade-

quate intelligence did not exist. The problem was that it had not been properly coordinated and evaluated in order for top commanders from the President on down to know what was actually going on. In Europe, there had been a wide variety of intelligence organizations. Most of them were in some way connected with the Supreme Allied Commander. Yet General Donovan and his OSS had operated with a certain amount of independence because Bill Donovan was disdainful of intelligence as such. He loved the "fun and games" of the clandestine services, which did not interfere or compete with routine intelligence.

In the Western Hemisphere, "Wild Bill" had run up against J. Edgar Hoover, of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Hoover had convinced Roosevelt that anything happening in the Western Hemisphere was more related to domestic affairs than it was to the war and that the FBI should control these operations. To the consternation of Donovan and the OSS, President Roosevelt granted Hoover what he had requested.

Then Donovan turned to the Pacific. Out there General Douglas MacArthur, general of the army in charge of all land operations in the Pacific war theater, ruled with an iron fist, and Donovan and his OSS could not get to first base. The OSS therefore was restricted to the European theater.

In the Pacific, General MacArthur and his navy counterpart had about as much love for each other as they shared with Donovan; whatever intelligence they shared was purely accidental. This led to a firm conviction on the part of everyone with even a little experience that the intelligence community, loose-knit as it was, badly needed coordination more than anything else.

Congress mulled this over as they made big plans for the future of the U.S. military. Behind the scenes, Donovan and his disciples preached the doctrine of the clandestine services' indispensability. They did not care so much about intelligence itself although they felt that the clandestine services were essential. They would not have won many adherents to their side if it had not been for the atomic bomb.

The atomic bomb created a situation unparalleled in the history of warfare. Never before had the spectrum of warfare been broadened so spectacularly as it had been by the terrible power of the atomic bomb. One weapon from one aircraft could annihilate a full division, sink a battleship and a carrier, and wipe out an entire city. The nuclear physicists said

that this was only the beginning. They already knew how to make a bomb a hundred times larger and thought they knew how to make a hydrogen bomb as well.

While Congress debated what this meant for the future of the armed forces, the "clandestine services" crowd argued that if they were not turned loose soon, the Soviet Union, China, or another country might develop the terrible weapon—if we could not find this out, how could we defend ourselves? This was a strong argument coming as it did right in the middle of the new "Red scare." The Soviet Union had been our ally during World War II, but as soon as the war ended it began to be viewed as a deadly enemy. What made the transformation of opinion complete was the fear that the Soviets would have the atom bomb.

Other figures in the debate argued that our military forces had the bomb and the means to deliver it, which had been demonstrated over Japan, and that this was all that was needed for America to maintain its strength. The best intelligence, it was argued, came from a proper blending of the intelligence capability already in existence. We had army intelligence, navy intelligence, a good unit in the State Department and in the Treasury, as well as the FBI. All that was required was leadership and coordination.

Then, on September 28, 1947, the National Security Act was signed into law by President Truman. That law established the Department of Defense much as it is today, creating a single civilian head of the peacetime military forces and three equal services—the army, the navy, and the new air force. At the top of these it created the National Security Council, the highest-level body consisting of the President, the Vice-President (at the President's discretion), the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. These were the primary members; others could be added to the council with the consent of Congress.

The law also created the Central Intelligence Agency to serve under the direction of the National Security Council. In a seldom-noticed section of the law the office of the director, Central Intelligence, was established. This office is actually separate from the CIA because its incumbent is the senior intelligence officer over all intelligence organizations; in addition, he is the senior officer over the CIA as well. The distinction is worth noting. For example, the CIA frequently cites the fact that it is charged by law with the protection of its "sources and methods" as a reason for not releasing certain

documents. Many intense battles have been fought over that phrase and the CIA always wins them because the opposition rarely recalls that it is not the CIA which is charged with protecting "sources and methods" but the director. This is a neat distinction. As the senior official over all intelligence, the director is responsible for seeing that "sources and methods" of one agency do not uncover or confuse those of another. This practical stipulation was not intended to be used as it has been.

It is important to see exactly what Congress intended when it created the CIA. Despite the millions of words that have been written about it, Congress set forth the duty of that agency in clear and simple terms. Under the heading "Powers and Duties," Congress said, and the President signed into law, the following:

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

- (1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
- (2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
- (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities: provided, that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: provided further, that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: and provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
- (4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common

concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

Now that is all that the law says about the "powers and duties" of the CIA and there is no other law conflicting with, amending, adding to, or otherwise broadening this very explicit statement. To put it another way—all other activities in which the CIA becomes engaged are unlawful.

Those who do not know the agency and the law do not understand this. If that is all the law says, then how can it be that the CIA has admittedly become involved in so many other projects? The CIA encourages people to believe that there is a secret charter. The agency would like the public to believe that somewhere there must be some law that says the CIA can do all of these things that it has been doing, admittedly, which seem unlawful. In fact, there is no secret charter. The secret charter syndrome is an invention of the CIA. Unfortunately, no one has chosen to challenge the agency on the simple basis of the law.

There are of course, many other papers and directives. Chief among these are papers written from time to time by the National Security Council and known as National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID or "Non-Skids"). NSCID 10/2 is the most important on the subject of clandestine operations. Many who have heard of that document, but who have never seen it, attribute to it some mythical powers. It is crucial to keep in mind that no matter what the NSC said, or for that matter what any other body has said, their statements cannot supercede the law. All of the NSCID's and National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM's) carry no more weight than the authority which wrote them, and no office or agency, including that of the President, can write a directive superceding or exceeding the law.

Note well that the law says, under the prime subject heading of "coordination," that the CIA may do such things as the NSC may direct from "time to time." Setting down on paper some directives for use on more than one occasion is hardly "time to time," no matter what the subject is. So even the "Non-Skids" have dubious validity. Stated simply and directly: there is no secret charter. The law stipulates all of

the "powers and duties" of the CIA. All the rest of its activities are unlawful.

It is worthwhile to examine this law in closer detail. The primary stipulation of the law is that the CIA is created for the purpose (the sole purpose) of coordinating the intelligence activities of other departments and agencies of the government. The CIA, therefore, is to "coordinate" the intelligence of agencies and departments which already existed and which had intelligence units of their own. Nothing in the law says that the CIA is to be, or is to set up, another intelligence agency. The idea that the CIA is a legal intelligence agency is its biggest cover story. Meanwhile, it continues to act as this government's clandestine service.

Did Congress move precipitously in setting up the CIA? All of our World War II experience told us that we had more than enough intelligence, but a failure of coordination. And to underscore this reasonable conclusion note how Congress set up the agency. The fledgling CIA was placed under the "direction" of a committee—the National Security Council. Obviously, Congress and the President supposed that they were not creating an operational organization. This "coordinating" authority was even carefully placed under a controlling committee.

A key word in the law is the word "direction." The CIA must act under the direction of the National Security Council. The men on that council are the top-ranking men in government. It should stand to reason that they would be the most responsible. Therefore, the CIA was located under their direction. Consider, however, the role of Allen W. Dulles, CIA director from 1953 through 1961. He persuaded his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to allow the NSC to establish a lesser CIA oversight committee. Immediately, this move twice violated the law. This subcommittee—sometimes called the 10/2 Committee, the 5412 Committee, the 303 Committee, the 40 Committee—was not the NSC. It did not carry the legal weight of the NSC, and did not have the legal authority to "direct" the CIA. Nevertheless, this is what it did. Furthermore, once the committee had been established, Allen Dulles periodically appeared before it with proposals for "approval." This too is unlawful. "Approval" and "direction" are not the same. Congress and President Truman did not intend for some subcommittee to grant "approval" in lieu of NSC "direction."

Much has been said about the five sub-paragraphs follow-

ing the statement of duty of the CIA. No matter what those sub-paragraphs say, it must be kept in mind that they are sub-paragraphs and are substantively subordinate to the main paragraph which deals with "coordination" and nothing else. Thus, when the first sub-paragraph states that the CIA should "advise" the NSC, it means that the CIA should advise the NSC, drawing its advice from the "coordinated" intelligence of the government. It does not mean "advise" in any other context. When the sub-paragraph says that the CIA should "make recommendations," this also means that those recommendations are to be derived from the "coordinated" intelligence of the rest of the government.

The same applies to the next two sub-paragraphs. But when Allen Dulles broke out of the strictures of the law, he made liberal use of the next sub-paragraph. When it says that the CIA will "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct" that too means that duties and functions will also be limited to those within the meaning of "coordination." It is Congress had intended the fifth sub-paragraph to be an escape clause, which CIA apologists have made it seem to be. Congress would have articulated its intention in a separate paragraph free from the "coordinating" one. Any parliamentarian, lawyer or scholar knows that, but think of the millions misled by the CIA.

It is pertinent to note, while we are dealing with these duties, that the word "collect" appears in only one usage. It is used with mention of the other intelligence agencies in the fourth sub-paragraph. Congress did not overlook the essential function of intelligence "collection." Congress wanted collection to remain with other departments and agencies and it did not intend the CIA to become involved in it. This, too, is one of the most powerful stipulations of the law.

It might be said that the first big clandestine action of the CIA was to make the American government and people believe that it had been created for purposes for which there had never been any intention of creating it in the first place. How did this happen? By 1948, President Truman wanted to know how the fledgling agency was progressing. He established a three-man committee to study the CIA and report back to him, making recommendations. For reasons that are obscure, Truman appointed former OSS man Allen Welsh Dulles to that committee. The top intelligence expert in the country, William H. Jackson, and a third man, Mathias

Correa, were also named. The Jackson-Dulles-Correa committee set out to review intelligence and to write their report. Allen Dulles was the best writer of the trio so he assumed most of the writing burden. What Truman may not have known when he appointed Allen Dulles to this crucial job was that Dulles was the principal speechwriter for Truman's rival for the presidency in 1948—Thomas E. Dewey. Like most political observers, Dulles was certain that Dewey would beat Truman in the election and that he, Dulles, would step from his committee job to become director of Central Intelligence. Needless to say, he worked hard on the committee report and did not waste much time reading the past record of the CIA. Instead, he wrote a brief for the new CIA of the clandestine services.

Harry Truman, as we know, upset Dewey and his cohorts. As the ballots were being counted, Dulles-Jackson-Correa could do little more than finish their report and submit it to the victorious Truman. The report was very critical of the CIA and its military-oriented leadership. Dated January 1, 1949, the report was handed to the President twenty days before his inaugural. But Truman had little time for the report and he gave it to the very men Dulles had criticized; from there it went into the files.

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa report made the case for the CIA as a fully operational intelligence agency. Truman, on the other hand, felt that the CIA should be no more than the informational arm of the presidency. He believed the CIA, at his request, should provide the information he wanted. In other words, the traditional view of the utilization of intelligence which sees it as a staff service.

The opposing view is that the intelligence agency should put out its feelers, agents, spies, technical gadgets to gather information, prepare reports, and present them to the President. Intelligence works this way most of the time, but the method is fraught with danger. It takes a very strong system to control such an organization. It is only logical that such an organization would eventually want to "operate" itself through its agents and operatives in the field. The Dulles report supported the idea that the CIA should broadcast its agents to all fronts, collect vital information and establish hot contacts, and authorize operational activity. Let us see how this works.

An agent learns that a small cell in a certain country be-

lieves it must overthrow the ruler and that it has the strength to do so. However, they do not want to run afoul of the United States if they do so, or more importantly, they do not want to run the risk of having Soviet agents on their backs. They then make a contact with a "State Department" man, or a "military" man to see if they can win approval. Immediately, this agent, operating under the cover of "State" or the military, reports directly to the CIA. Without delay he is told to go ahead. He is equipped with what he needs, including arms, ammunition, aircraft—whatever it takes. This was the method of operation propounded by Dulles's report. If approved, it would make the CIA the strongest arm of the government of the United States on the international scene.

The Dulles report was vehemently opposed by a number of top leaders who understood what it would lead to. But then came the Korean War. As has happened so many times before and since, the CIA missed the prediction of this war, failing to provide the President with a warning about the immediate possibility of armed conflict. In his direct manner, Truman acted. He removed the incumbent director of Central Intelligence and prevailed upon an old and trusted friend, General Dwight Eisenhower's former wartime chief of staff in Europe and the recently returned ambassador from Moscow, General Walter B. Smith, to take over.

Smith began to clean house. The first call he made was to an old friend, William H. Jackson. He asked Jackson to serve as his deputy director. Jackson, in turn, called Allen Dulles to Washington from his position in the corporate law firm of Sullivan, Cromwell in New York, placing him in charge of clandestine operations. This put the wolf right in the chicken house. Jackson then dusted off the Dulles report and briefed General Smith. Smith gave Jackson and Dulles the green light and they began the reorganization of the CIA. Slowly but surely the clandestine services became the operational "side of the house" and intelligence—the other side of the house—became little more than a keeper of the cover story. Someone, the deputy director, in fact, had to act as though the agency was working on intelligence.

As all of this was underway, Truman's term ended. Eisenhower accepted the Republican nomination and was elected President. John Foster Dulles was selected to be his Secretary of State and Eisenhower prevailed upon old friend Smith to move over to the State Department, becoming Foster Dulles's deputy. At the same time, William H. Jackson concluded that

he wanted to return to his old law practice; he tendered his resignation as deputy director of Central Intelligence to President Eisenhower. The two positions above Allen Dulles were therefore unoccupied. Eisenhower and Foster Dulles discussed this and decided on the obvious choice for CIA director. The Allen Dulles era began.

It is unfortunate that Congress and the American people have never been able to lay their hands on the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report. Few documents in history have been seen by so few and influenced so many. It prepared the ascendancy of the CIA as the single most powerful, feared organization in our government and significantly contributed to holocausts like the war in Indochina.

From the "fun and games" days of the OSS and World War II some of the boys whipped themselves into shape for the CIA in the guerrilla skirmishes of Greece in the late 1940's. They created an infrastructure of special forces in the air force and army in the late 1940's as well, and exercised this force during the Korean War. Then from Korea, the CIA moved its appreciable forces from one nightmare to another. They rustled up trouble in Indonesia, in Laos, and Cuba. After their disastrous mission in Cuba, the CIA moved much of its assets to Indochina. Allen Dulles, of course, had first moved his clandestine forces, under the guise of the Saigon Military Mission, into Vietnam early in 1954; by the time his larger forces were moved in from the Laotian and Cuban debacles the ground work had already been prepared for future events.

Books will be written about all of these events. Many have been written to date. This is no place to duplicate them. But it is worthwhile to explain the working principle behind the CIA.

In the late forties Professor Ross Ashby wrote a small book entitled, *Design for a Brain*. In his book, Ashby finds that it is entirely possible to create a huge "master brain" network from a mix of human beings. The resulting bureaucracy has the capability of receiving inputs of all kinds and responding by itself. The key element is that the "brain" can operate efficiently, without leadership. Punch it and it will respond; yet, because its elements are human, it will respond in superhuman fashion. In brief, there can be a vast "brain machine," composed of humans performing superhuman or nonhuman functions, without leadership.

Norbert Wiener in his book *The Human Use of Human*

Belings elaborated on the Ashby "machine." Wiener, a mathematician at M.I.T. and leading expert in electronic data processing, knew about Ashby and his idea. Wiener coined the word "cybernetics," arguing that vast computers could be constructed which would perform almost any task man could, except that which might generically be termed "bluff." Wiener pointed out that a vast bureaucracy designed like a computer, programmed properly could perform any function more efficiently and thoroughly than a computer. All it would take to make it work would be inputs from the bottom. It would not require leadership. When Allen Dulles assumed command of the CIA, he created the equivalent, an Ashby "machine." The first measure he took was to abolish the function controlled by the position called the Deputy Director, Administration. Dulles sensed that if he turned his agents loose, the last thing he wanted was to keep records. Consider the problems the recent House and Senate probes have been having searching for agency records. They will never find the records because there never were records in the first place. The CIA is embarrassed now to admit it has no records; it has prevailed upon the White House to cover for it by saying that Congress does not have the authority to ask for them.

With all administration banished, except for that retained in each subordinate station, it became possible for each station chief and agent to free-wheel. Every time they came up with anything, all they had to do was call in to Washington to receive support before proceeding on a secret mission. Clandestine operations became so easy and were so invisible that on many occasions it was unclear they were underway until a situation reached the point of general conflagration. With limitless funds and iron-clad secrecy the CIA operated everywhere. It used to ask for permission; it used to brief top echelons until it discovered this was unnecessary etiquette.

The heart of the clandestine services today is a huge Ashby "machine," a vast bureaucratic machine made up of thousands of able operatives with an extraordinary amount of money and power. It will never let up on its own. The clandestine services will continue to exist unless Congress shuts off the flow of funds. If Congress neglects to take this step, democracy will flow down the drain.

HOW THE
WARFARE STATE
RUNS

THE Warfare State had been born. It had used the menace of Russia to draw the rigid lines of the Cold War. It had become, though few persons yet realized it, the new American way of life—a way that had all the elements of fantasy on a national scale. As a people we continued to think of ourselves as the peace-loving nation of our past while at the same time, as a people, we lived off the treacherous bounty that the Warfare State had created. We did this, for the most part, in blissful unawareness that we were doing it, and even when events like Korea jogged us into momentary wakefulness, we bothered not to analyze ourselves or to examine in any detail what this warfare monster we had created might entail. Yet the tremendous economic power, the insidious influence of the Warfare State must be understood if we are ever to understand ourselves; and it goes almost without saying that, unless we can bring to world events this kind of self-understanding we can never hope for peace. For the Warfare State represents a desperate gamble—the gamble that we can keep the

Cold War race going in the name of our own economic status quo and economic prosperity, without destroying ourselves and the world—and if the insanity of this gamble is ever to be reduced, we must appreciate that we, at least as much as Russia, bear the responsibility for its existence.

"Our government," one eminent spokesman has said, "has kept us in a perpetual state of fear—kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor—with the cry of a grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."¹

The spokesman? General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. !?

General MacArthur, a lifelong warrior, the conqueror of Japan and the advocate in Korea of the kind of all-out conflict that almost certainly would have produced World War III, now views our society from the perspective of a corporation executive, the head of Remington Rand; and in this quotation from a speech on the evils of high taxation, made to stockholders of Sperry Rand in mid-1957, he analyzed perceptively the propaganda campaigns of perpetual "fear" and "patriotic fervor" and "grave national emergency" that have dragged the American people willy-nilly into the clutch of the Warfare State.

The unreality of the much-trumpeted alarms, the viciousness of such reiterated propaganda in psychologically conditioning the minds of the American people for the inevitable showdown in the inevitably final crisis, both were illustrated by the Berlin issue of 1961. With a popular President proclaiming in gravest tones that we had just six months before the plunge from the precipice, with National Guards and Reservists mobilized and every man encouraged to dig his own self-survival hole in the ground, the nation was whipped into a ferment of anxiety and dread anticipation. Yet the people on the whole remained more calm and realistic than their leaders, a situation fraught with elements of high tragedy since only the leaders, not the people, have the power to decide all our fates. It would have been hard to find among the public many persons, except among the fanatics of the Far Right, who had

lost all sense of proportion as completely as had some of the war lords of Washington. An anecdote related by Marquis Childs, the Washington columnist, illustrates the point.

"A small incident illumines the atmosphere of this capital," Childs wrote. "At a Georgetown dinner party recently, the wife of a leading Senator sat next to Gen. Curtis LeMay, chief of staff of the Air Force. He told her a nuclear war was inevitable. It would begin in December and be all over by the first of the new year. In that interval, every major American city—Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles—would be reduced to rubble. Similarly, the principal cities of the Soviet Union would be destroyed.

"The lady, as she tells it, asked if there were any place where she could take her children and grandchildren to safety; the general would, of course, at the first alert be inside the top-secret underground hideout near Washington from which the retaliatory strike would be directed. He told her that certain unpopulated areas in the Far West would be safest. The Senator dismissed this as flesh-creeping to which 'Curt' and the other Air Force generals resort at appropriation time.

"But it all contributes to the atmosphere of fatalism. As a student of history, the President must know that out of such atmosphere wars come."²

The year 1962 is here, the Christmas season of 1961 has passed without the atomic gifts General LeMay had predicted with such certainty that we and the Russians would exchange. We have survived, it would seem, despite the generals, but the mere fact that the Chief of the Air Force could look forward with such positivity to the time and manner of ultimate mutual destruction is hardly reassurance for ourselves or the world. For the generals of our Warfare State are still with us, their kind of vision is still with us, and the destiny to which this vision leads is recognized and dreaded abroad, as so often it is not at home. It is the generals who are in great degree responsible for the stark contrast between the image we have of ourselves and the image others have of us. To understand our generals and ourselves, it is sometimes important to look in a foreign mirror.

"It is hard to avoid the feeling," a foreign newspaper wrote

on August 9, 1961, "that there is more danger of the United States applying the fatal spark. Mr. Khrushchev was not exaggerating too much when he spoke of 'war psychosis' in the United States. Over the past 15 years, the American people have been whipped into a state of hatred and fear of Communism reminiscent of the religious wars in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Some U.S. writings and speeches seem to echo the words of the fanatical Austrian Emperor who launched the Thirty Years' War: 'Better a desert than a country full of heretics!' President Kennedy is to a considerable extent a prisoner of this public attitude; his freedom of maneuver is limited. Nor is he entirely the master of his own government. There is always the possibility that in a moment of crisis the wild men in the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence Agency may take matters into their own hands. This is, in fact, the most dangerous of all the potentialities in the present situation."

That editorial appeared, not in *Pravda*, but in the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, one of the largest newspapers in friendly Canada.

Such is one face of the Warfare State, the face of military-inspired propaganda playing callously on the emotions of the people and almost certain in the long run to bring on the doom it trumpets. This face is ominous enough, but it does not stand alone; it is reinforced by a second—the face of self-interest that gives virtually the entire nation a vested stake in the Cold War.

In the same year of 1957 in which General MacArthur warned of the "perpetual state of fear" in which our government has kept us, a second eminent American of decidedly conservative cast was giving Congress a picture almost startling in its frankness of the results produced by the methods MacArthur had described.

"One of the most serious things about this defense business," he said, "is that so many Americans are getting a vested interest in it: properties, business, jobs, employment, votes, opportunities for promotion and advancement, bigger salaries for scientists and all that. It is a troublesome business . . . If you try to change suddenly you get into trouble . . . If you shut the whole business off now, you will have the state of California in trouble because such a big percentage of the aircraft industry is in California."³

These words were uttered by a man who certainly knew intimately, from the inside and from the highest echelons of govern-

ment, the mighty forces and the mighty pressures of which he spoke. He was Secretary of Defense Charles E. (General Motors) Wilson, who in the early days of the Eisenhower administration had created a national uproar when he testified before a Senate committee that "for years I thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors, and vice versa." This remark was almost universally twisted into the flat declaration, "What is good for General Motors is good for the country," and it was widely and passionately discussed on these terms.

One of the most significant aspects of the national debate about this earlier Freudian slip of Secretary Wilson had been the bewilderment of vast sections of the business community, the absolute inability of businessmen to understand what was causing all the shouting. "Of course, he shouldn't have said it," they acknowledged, "but when you come right down to it, what was wrong with it? What's good for General Motors is good for the country."

This, at best, is a highly debatable proposition, but far more important than the semantics of debate is the unconscious blindness of a business ethic that sees nothing wrong with putting the welfare of a private company first, the welfare of the nation second. And this is precisely the kind of self-centered vision that powers the awesome, multibillion-dollar, economic dynamo of the Warfare State.

In such an atmosphere, the ledger of the private war contractor takes precedence over the good of the nation. Profits, jobs, salaries, preferment all are bound up in the continuation of multibillion dollar war contracts; these are the ends to be served first, and after they are, perhaps, if we have time, we may wonder about where it is all leading, to peace or war.

The attitude was illustrated by an adventure that befell a West Coast correspondent for *The Nation* in the fall of 1958. He wandered into a press conference held by the head of the West Coast branch of an Eastern Seaboard company manufacturing instruments vital to rocket and missile production. The president of the firm, which derived 75 per cent of its business from war contracts, was in a jovial mood. He could see no threat, he said, of any cutbacks in government defense appropriations.

"You've got a big future in rockets and missiles," the reporter remarked conversationally.

"Tremendous," the president agreed.

The reporter wondered whether this wasn't an uncertain and risky business. Didn't it depend a lot on politics, on international affairs?

"Well, of course, our business would mushroom in an international crisis," Mr. Big said.

"Like what?" asked the reporter.

"War."

"What would happen to your business in a war between the United States and Russia?"

"As I said," Mr. Big re-explained patiently, "business would mushroom."

"For how many hours?" asked the reporter.

Then, in silence, having asked the unforgivable question, he tip-toed quietly away.⁴

I. Wall Street, it is often said, is the economic barometer of America. Wall Streeters themselves will tell you that "the market" anticipates events by at least six months. If there is to be a recession, the market usually senses it long before anyone else and begins a selloff in anticipation of hard times; similarly, if we have hit bottom and are ready for the upturn, money will suddenly reappear, and buying will send stocks inching up again. The process is not infallible, the market is not always 100 per cent right, and nobody knows with any precision quite how it manages to make up its collective mind. But decide it does, and usually, say the brokers, future events confirm the findings of its mystic economic antennae.

Since this is the reputation of the market, it seems that some

significance should attach to the kind of barometric readings it sends up to measure the pressures of the Cold War. These readings hardly ever vary in form. They are the reverse of mankind's expectations. When the news is good, when there seems to be some chance of easing international tensions, the market plummets. When the news is bad, when it seems as if a Berlin crisis might send us on that final mile of no return at almost any minute, the market bounces with joy.

One has only to study the crises of recent years to detect the pattern. In 1959 it actually looked for one brief period as if the Cold War might be almost ready for the discard. Premier Khrushchev was going to visit the United States; President Eisenhower would reciprocate by going to Russia in mid-1960. All over the world people gave sighs of relief at the thought that it might not, after all, be necessary to annihilate each other. Khrushchev came on schedule; he was cordially received, he and Ike talked, and "the spirit of Camp David" became, if only fitfully, a beacon for the hopes of mankind.

How did Wall Street react to all of this? Just like a spoiled brat who has been deprived of his cookie jar.

Well in advance of Khrushchev's coming, Sylvia Porter, the *New York Post's* economic expert, began to write about the forebodings of Wall Street. In a column on July 24, she pointed out that professionals in the street were discussing the shocking effects on the economy of any "acceptance by the West and the Soviet Union of a plan encouraging both sides to limit defense expenditures." The view on the street was that "the stock market might well shudder at what could happen"; even "minor cutbacks" could send whole areas "into a tailspin"; and "unexpected 'peaceful' developments might be the shocker setting off the slump this time."

When Khrushchev arrived and made his cross continental tour, when he and the Squire of Gettysburg beamed upon each other, the market appropriately shuddered. In September, 1959, with the prospects for an easing of world tensions brighter than they had appeared in years, Wall Street went into that "tailspin" Sylvia Porter had predicted. The selloff was the sharpest in nearly four years, and financial page headlines recorded that electronics espe-

cially were taking a hard pounding. Standard & Poor, the big investment advisory agency, commented in *The Outlook*, its house organ: "Peace jitters, one reason for the recent slump in the stock market, are nothing new. They have broken out at various times as possibilities loomed for some thawing of the cold war, but in each case they came to naught, as did fears about the impact of possible cuts in defense spending on our national economy."

This reassuring prediction that the "peace jitters" would go away and leave us with our unchanged Warfare State was realized within just a few brief months. Ike went off to Paris to meet Khrushchev immediately after having rashly taken full credit for sending the U-2 spy plane flying over Khrushchev's territory. This admission, even more than the fact that the Russians had entangled us in the web of our own "cover story" by producing Francis Gary Powers and the wreckage of the U-2, quite effectively strangled "the spirit of Camp David." It put Khrushchev in the impossible position before the home folks of having been played for a sucker by the kindly old gentleman from Gettysburg whom he had trusted, and the Russian Premier, to restore his own image if nothing else, promptly flew into a tantrum and threatened all kinds of dire performances. The door of the Summit and the door of Russia both were slammed in Ike's startled face; even friendly Japan broke out in a rash of unfriendly riots, and Ike, unable to visit there either, had to come home, licking the wounds of the world's incivility.

Undoubtedly, to most Americans, this series of diplomatic disasters was a grim event, dooming the world again to the treadmill of the ever-escalating arms race. But in Wall Street, the joy was unconfined. "SUMMIT FAILURE A MARKET TONIC," proclaimed a headline on the first page of *The New York Times'* financial section. Subheads assured readers: "BULLISHNESS REVIVES" and "FIREWORKS IN PARIS SHIFT SPOTLIGHT TO SHARES OF MILITARY SUPPLIERS." Across the continent, the reaction of the business world was equally jubilant. *The Los Angeles Mirror-News* carried a rip-roaring, full-page advertisement for a technical school that began: "THE SUMMIT HAS FAILED—WHAT DOES THIS MEAN TO YOU? TREMENDOUS UPSURGE IN ELECTRONICS, BILLION DOLLAR

PAYROLL. 110,000 EMPLOYEE INDUSTRY IN SO. CALIFORNIA BOOMING!"⁵

This far-from-coy embrace of the Warfare State was more than matched in frankness in another advertisement that appeared during this 1960 period of universal rejoicing over the restoration of our familiar tensions. Arthur Wiesenberger & Co., members of the New York and American Stock Exchanges, broke out a four-column advertisement for the Wiesenberger Investment Report. They proclaimed: "As we shed the Welfare State and gird for the Garrison State, many great and far-reaching changes will take place in our society, government, industry and finance. These changes will hurt some and benefit others—as always. You should be prepared for them—psychologically as well as financially." The Wiesenbergers obviously were psychologically prepared; they were completely with it, as the saying is; and it is perhaps significant that, in orienting their minds to the glories of the Garrison State, they already had relegated the Welfare State to history.⁶

In so doing, the Wiesenbergers at least were engagingly frank. They put into bold print the dual theme that has motivated dominant American circles from the speech of General Electric Wilson in 1944 to the present day. It is not accident that the forces in our society that are most eager for war (at least, a cold war) are the same forces that most abhor the Welfare State. In the postwar wedding of the Military and Big Business, it has not mattered to business that free enterprise has become a myth, that to an overwhelming degree the welfare of the nation has become dependent upon the arms race and the federal expenditures that keep it going; all of this is completely preferable to the only other visible alternative—the funneling of comparably fantastic billions into "socialistic" programs for better housing, better highways, better schools, better medical care. In the latter program, of course, mere people benefit; in the war game, there are billions and billions of dollars for business, and if this isn't what matters entirely, it is certainly what matters most.

If this attitude seems too callous for belief, consider the manner in which the theme, "Up with the Warfare State, Down with the Welfare State" has become the dominant credo of our time. The

thinking, the motivation has been revealed nakedly many times in many places. In October, 1949, for example, Professor Sumner Slichter, Harvard economist, was warmly received when he addressed a bankers' convention and asserted that as long as we had a cold war, a severe depression was "difficult to conceive." He explained: "It (the cold war) increases the demand for goods, helps sustain a high level of employment, accelerates technological progress and thus helps the country to raise its standard of living. . . . So we may thank the Russians for helping make capitalism in the United States work better than ever."⁷

David Lawrence, the columnist beloved by Wall Streeters, editor of the influential *U.S. News & World Report*, early became quite vocal in proclaiming what a bonanza we had found in the cold war. In the May 14, 1950, issue, his weekly news magazine informed its readers:

"Government planners figure they have found the magic formula for almost endless good times. They are now beginning to wonder if there may not be something to perpetual motion after all. Cold war is the catalyst. Cold war is an automatic pump primer. Turn a spigot, and the public clamors for more arms spending. Turn another, the clamor ceases. Truman confidence, cockiness, is based on this 'Truman formula.' *Truman era of good times*, President is told, can run much beyond 1952. Cold war demands, if fully exploited, are almost limitless."

A month after this was written came Korea. The cold war had suddenly turned hot for the 33,629 Americans who were to die in it; and when the Democrats, in 1952, tried to sell the American people on the slogan, "You never had it so good," the electorate, as post-election analyses showed, felt twinges of guilt and voted for Ike, who promised to go to Korea and bring peace. But, of course, the cold war continued, and in 1954, after the announcement that we had exploded our first H-bomb, *U.S. News & World Report* saw in this new horror only another stimulus to business in this best of all possible worlds. It wrote: "What H-bomb means to business. A long period . . . of big orders. In the years ahead, the effects of the new bomb will keep on increasing. As one appraiser puts it: 'The H-bomb has blown depression-thinking out the window.'"

It might also blow much else out the window, including all of western civilization. This prospect seems to concern Lawrence not half so much as the horrors he continually sees in "creeping socialism." His record on this is consistent and goes back to the days of Franklin Roosevelt. It would be hard to find a New Deal reform that Lawrence did not denounce as some kind of dangerous foreign "ism," and to him such proposals as Kennedy's medical care for the aged are clearly anathema. Yet he can look with equanimity, as he did in 1959, on the suggestion that the U.S. "might conceivably strike first in what has become known as 'pre-emptive' rather than 'preventive' war."

Sam. This calm acceptance of all the inconceivable horrors of nuclear holocaust, this fighting passion to combat the evils of social legislation are symptoms of a hardening of the arteries of the human conscience for which Lawrence is not alone remarkable. He is merely a symbol of the type of mind that is dominant in the business community and that finds expression at the drop of a new federal budget or the introduction of a new housing bill. Look, for example, at the way this double motif of the Warfare State found expression in 1957, the year in which the Eisenhower boom toppled into deep recession. Even the expenditure of awesome billions for defense couldn't quite guarantee perpetual prosperity, and naturally there was just one solution—a much higher plateau of defense spending.

The controversy began early in the year, when good times were still with us. President Eisenhower proposed a federal budget of \$71.8 billion. Of this amount, \$43.4 billion—61 cents out of every dollar—were allotted for national security. But—and this was the President's cardinal sin—he also called for some \$35 million for federal housing and raised his total requests for "welfare schemes" by some \$200 million. *The Wall Street Journal* promptly expressed the disenchantment of the business community with Ike. "With the international situation more critical than in several years, quibbling over defense spending is pretty much out of the question," it wrote. But it was irked no end that "the President would extend the hand of Uncle Sam into an assortment of welfare schemes ranging from the care of juvenile delinquents to school construc-

tion and providing more houses for the needy aged." Obviously, it was all right to spend \$43.4 billion for munitions; but what was that man thinking of to want to spend a few more millions to help juvenile delinquents or build schools or supply "more houses for the needy aged"?

In September, 1957, with the bloom definitely off the cold-war economy, an eminent spokesman for the ever-larger-military-budget school addressed the American Bankers Association and delivered a eulogy on the "cultural and economic merits" of armament spending. This warrior-statesman was Frank Pace, former Secretary of the Army under Truman, former chairman of General Dynamics (the government-spawned war baby that perennially gets the fattest war contracts), and now, perhaps significantly, a member of President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In 1957, naturally, Pace wanted several additional billions spent on armaments.

So did the cold warrior who perhaps best and most consistently expresses the thinking of the business community on such matters. This oracle is Henry R. Luce, publisher of the powerful Time-Life-Fortune triumvirate and indisputably one of the country's most influential figures in the field of mass communications and the conditioning of the public mind. Luce, it just happened, was on the military panel that prepared the much-debated Rockefeller Brothers Report on national defense. The report took an alarmist's view of our state of preparedness and sounded a call for the expenditure of more billions, many more billions, to make us secure. Luce backed this program all the way. In November, 1957, *Fortune* magazine published an article that made his views clear. In this, Luce called publicly on President Eisenhower to "use every ounce of his executive authority" to cut highway spending, foreign aid and other non-military extravagances. He urged Congress to "begin a massive pruning of non-defense outlays all along the line."

Our economy, said Luce—do these words sound familiar?—"can stand the load of any defense effort required to hold the power of Soviet Russia in check. It cannot, however, indefinitely stand the erosion of creeping socialism and the ceaseless extension of government activities into additional economic fields. If the advent

of man-made satellites serves to reaffirm that truth, it will have accomplished a purpose as important in the long run as the conquest of outer space."

This novel equation that somehow places the conquest of outer space on the same level of importance as the erection of a roadblock against "creeping socialism" stands as a naked revelation of the type of mentality that takes positive delight, in the name of business and profits, in walking the precarious brinks of the cold war.

In this sequence of speeches and articles, the double-edged propaganda of the postwar era becomes self-evident. One purpose, as General MacArthur said, is to keep us "in a perpetual state of fear . . . a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor," so that we shall support without question a munitions budget of ever-expanding billions. At the same time, the other edge of the propaganda sword brands with the label of "radicalism" any proposal that might conceivably siphon off some of those munitions billions—and possibly interfere with the prerequisites of industry—to benefit the people.

No parlay could be more effective with a citizenry that is innately among the world's least volatile and most conservative. We instinctively distrust the strident voice, the rabble-rousing demagogue who even hints of violence. If we listen to him for a moment, the moment is almost always one of emotional strain and delusion; given time, our instinctive sense of balance reasserts itself and we repudiate, either in anger or disgust, the far-out crier of discord. So it has always been. The great mass of the American people has never fully accepted any leader who wore too bright a tinge of radicalism—not William Jennings Bryan, not Fighting Bob LaFollette. Even Franklin Roosevelt came from a wealthy, conservative background and sounded eminently conservative when he was first elected; and his trial-and-error reforms were made possible only by the exigencies of a great domestic crisis. Our history says that against almost any leader, almost any program, two strikes have been called if, in some way, the leader or program can be branded in the public mind with radicalism. At the same time, we are a deeply patriotic people, filled with pride in our own system, in love with the wonders of our own country, conscious of the high

achievement that turned a wilderness continent into a world power in less than two centuries; and so possessed, we react as a people to almost any appeal to keep what we have untarnished, to preserve "our way of life."

These are the two poles—the innate distrust of the radical and his violent solutions, the supreme belief in ourselves and our pride of country—that make the double-edged propaganda of the military-industrial complex so uniquely effective.

We have accepted the propaganda as truth; we have embraced the Warfare State in a trance of seeming economic well-being; and we have not had, as a people, the faintest conception of the magnitude of this military-industrial self-interest that makes peace the antithesis of the new American way of life.

2. The economies of 22 of our 50 states depend in abnormal degree upon the maintenance of military spending. This was a major finding by a panel of economic experts, headed by Professor Emile Benoit, of Columbia University, in a report they presented in January, 1962, to the new U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.⁸ The report was described as the first comprehensive inquiry ever made into the effect on our national economy that major arms cuts might be expected to have; and in an attempt to assess this, it probed deeply into the question of our present dependence on the arms race.

"In some areas of the country the dependence on defense production is already very tangible and a serious source of concern," the committee reported. ". . . Certain States are clearly subject to disproportionately heavy impacts because of the relatively heavy dependence of their manufacturing on major items of procurement."

The committee found that in 14 states war industries ac-

counted for a heavy percentage of total manufacturing employment. In seven states—and in five of these the figures admittedly were incomplete—war industries accounted for more than 20 per cent of all manufacturing jobs. The states and their percentages: Utah, 20.4; Arizona, 20.6; Connecticut, 21.1; California, 23.3; New Mexico, 23.8; Washington, 28.6; Kansas, 30.2.

Startling as these figures are, they were not the whole story. The committee reported that eight other states and the District of Columbia showed "exceptionally heavy dependence on Department of Defense payrolls to sustain their income." Military payrolls at camps, forts, bases and various installations comprised from 10 to 26 per cent of all payroll income in Alaska, Hawaii, the District of Columbia and Virginia. Alaska and Hawaii topped this list with percentages of 26.5 and 18.2 respectively.

"It is disquieting to note," the committee added, "that several of the States with heavy dependence on major procurement for employment are also well above the average for dependence of income on Department of Defense payrolls. This is notably true for New Mexico and Utah, but it is also true to some extent for Kansas, Washington and California."

The committee's figures showed that the Military supplied 9 per cent of all payroll income in New Mexico—this in addition to 23.8 per cent of all manufacturing jobs that depended on procurement. In Utah, military bases accounted for 6.7 per cent of all payrolls, in addition to 20.4 per cent of all manufacturing jobs.

Such heavy concentrations of military spending power spell almost total dependence, especially when one takes into account the multiplier factor—the number of jobs and businesses that are sustained by the military payrolls and the war plant jobs. However, more than the economy of entire states, the economy of the entire nation, is bound up in the same dire equation. Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg has reported that one out of every six jobs in all America is held in three states—Texas, California and Florida.⁹ All of these states rank high on the list of Military dependents. In Texas, 5.5 per cent of all payroll income comes from the Military and 10 per cent of all manufacturing jobs; in Florida, 3.8 per cent of all payrolls, 14.1 per cent of all manufacturing jobs; in Cali-

fornia, 3.7 per cent of payroll income comes from the Military, 23.3 per cent of all manufacturing jobs.

The picture that emerges is the picture of a nation whose entire economic welfare is tied to warfare. Our livelihoods, our homes, our families depend on the jobs that depend on the armament race. And the longer the race continues, the greater will be the dependence; for the Benoit committee estimated that, on the basis of current trends, armament spending will climb to \$60 billion annually by 1965. This would be almost one-third more than the figures of 1959 from which the committee drew its dreary picture of a war-based national economy.

To change this base, to alter this trend, would require the most far-sighted and courageous of political leadership. Even supposing a softening of international tensions should make change possible—a highly unlikely development in an atmosphere in which our weapons maintain tension in Russia, hers maintain tension here—we would have to be prepared to accept the loss of multi-billion dollar war contracts, at least a temporary level of high unemployment, and a decided reduction of the prosperity that comes from high consumer consumption and plant expansion in a burgeoning economy. We would have to be prepared, in other words, to endure hard times unless a well-gearred government program could swing swiftly into action to finance the jobs of peace as the government has financed the tasks of war. Such a program would include, it would have to include, many of the very kind of government-sponsored public works projects that are symbolic of the Welfare State—and that is a prospect to make even a hardy man shudder. Since it is, since one can almost feel the tremors of alarm that course along the spines of the military-industrial caste at the mere suggestion of such heresy, it seems obvious that there is almost no chance that we shall have, within the foreseeable future, the kind of dedicated political leadership that would prepare the people and the country for the uncertainties of peace.

This hard fact of modern political life, in rare and precious moments of utter frankness, is even acknowledged by the politicians themselves. In one unusual "Town Meeting on World Crisis" in York, Pa., early in 1962, Representative George A. Goodling

frankly told his constituents: "No political party can afford to disarm. I'm sorry to say that. I wish we could."¹⁰ He explained that the national economy simply could not stand disarmament, a position that was supported by a former Congressman from the district, Chester H. Gross, who declared that arms cut-backs would bring a wave of unemployment.

Almost as the Congressmen spoke, the accuracy of their analysis was emphasized in a dramatic way. The Navy decided to "phase out" a jet fighter plane, and when it did, a vast section of Long Island was confronted suddenly with the prospect of becoming a depressed area.

The plane was the F-105 D Thunderchief, a 1,400-mile-an-hour fighter-bomber manufactured by Republic Aviation Corp. in Farmingdale, L.I. The Navy decided to switch production to what it evidently considered a better plane, one being manufactured in the Midwest. This meant that Republic, which had virtually all of its production eggs in the Thunderchief basket, wouldn't have any work for its workers. This meant that some 13,000 men might lose their jobs. This meant that a number of sub-contractors making parts for the plane would be out of business. Altogether it meant that perhaps 20,000 men would be thrown out of work; that home owners would be unable to pay their mortgages; that car time payments would lapse, that television sets and appliances of all kinds would have to be repossessed. The only salvation from such disasters was to see that the Defense Department came through with new orders for Republic Aviation.

Justin Ostro, president of Republic Lodge 1987, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, rallied the workers to meet the crisis of the moment. Eight thousand of them gathered in the Levittown Arena and heard Ostro urge a letter-writing campaign to the White House to save their jobs. "The only area we can hope to get any help at all is the White House and the President of the United States," he said. "You must let him [President Kennedy] know you are in trouble; he promised you an expanding economy and full employment."¹¹

Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller charged down to Long Island from Albany to back up the workers' plea. The layoffs, he said,

might make all of Long Island a depressed area, and certainly the federal government could not permit this. Congressmen and U.S. Senators, newspapers and business organizations whose businesses would suffer if the war plant payroll that supported them suddenly dried up, all bombarded the White House with pleas to save the warplane jobs at Republic Aviation. The issue was even injected into one of President Kennedy's televised press conferences. The President assured everyone that the administration didn't want to see any man lose his job; that the layoffs would be considerably less than 13,000; that he had already talked to Secretary McNamara, the Defense Department was already re-examining its production schedules, and he was "hopeful" some other tasks could be found to buoy up Republic, Republic's workers and the economy of all Long Island.

This was the story of just one plane and just one cancelled war contract. Multiply it by the thousands of contracts and the billions of dollars involved in projects much more massive in scope than the construction of a fighter-bomber, and you begin to get some dim idea how completely the seemingly prosperous American economy is dependent on the war race. For the outcry that arose on Long Island over the demise of the Thunderchief is typical of the outcry that arises anywhere and everywhere any time an effort is made to slash any part of the defense budget.

Consider the tempest that was generated throughout the nation when, on March 30, 1961, Secretary McNamara announced plans to close down 52 military installations in 25 states and 21 overseas bases in the next three years. McNamara's order was based upon a sane re-examination of reality in the age of missiles. Some depots were too close to major cities and too vulnerable; some sprawling air bases covering hundreds of acres of flat, sandy soil did not lend themselves to the need of the missile age for concealed launching sites, founded upon and protected by solid rock formations. These were doubtless sound military considerations, but nothing short of economic devastation impended for many local areas to whom the nearby installations represented the only hope of business prosperity. Inevitably, screams of protest resounded across the nation and in Congress.

In Del Rio, Texas, a businessman went to his cash register, punched it open, and took out \$50.00. This was his contribution, based on an assessment of \$1.00 for every foot of business frontage, to the expenses of a four-man delegation that Del Rio hustled off to Washington to fight the scheduled closing of the Laughlin Air Force Base. Del Rio has a civilian population of 18,612, and the Laughlin base is its one big industry. The base payroll, civilian and military, has been running at \$10.5 million a year; some \$42,000 annually has been spent with local businessmen for such odds and ends as office supplies and pest-control services; Laughlin accounted for 20 per cent of the town's electric and telephone services; some 1,700 Laughlin families shopped in Del Rio stores. It takes no imagination to visualize the economic impact on Del Rio if it should suddenly be deprived of Laughlin.¹²

In Tacoma, Washington, the owner of a shoe store fitted three small children for shoes. The father gave him a twenty-dollar bill, and when the proprietor handed back the change, the father presented a small card. It read: "You have just done business with a Mount Rainier Ordnance Depot employee. How much money will you lose when the \$14 million payroll goes to Utah? Write your Congressman, Senator, Governor if you want to protest this move."

In Benicia, Calif., a town of 6,000, officials were aroused by the announcement that the Benicia Ordnance Depot would be closed down by April, 1964. Mayor James Lemos was wroth because the municipality had just constructed a \$1.6 million sewage plant, about three times as large and expensive a project as would have been needed if the depot hadn't been there. He estimated that the town would lose in sales-gas-beverage taxes alone some \$21,500 a year; and it would lose, too, the trade of the 2,400 civilian workers at the depot. In response to the local outcry, Rep. John Baldwin, Republican Congressman from the district, sent a vigorous letter of protest to President Kennedy, contending that the Benicia Depot was just what the nation needed for Kennedy's plan to have "an army trained to meet a limited war crisis."¹³

So it went across the nation. Kansas protested the shifting of a naval air technical training unit from Olathe to Glyngo, Georgia. Olathe sent a delegation to Independence, Missouri, to visit former

President Truman and see what could be done about it. Truman received the delegation graciously, but he was his usual blunt self. "The basis of the shift is political," he told the delegates. "Kansas didn't vote right." Kansas, it may be recalled, had cast its eight electoral votes for Richard M. Nixon; Georgia, on the other hand, had better bargaining power. It is the home state of Senator Richard B. Russell and Rep. Carl Vinson, chairmen respectively of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. Coincidentally, of course, Georgia was crammed with nineteen military installations—so many that an indiscreet general is said once to have remarked, "One more base would sink the state." This prediction, it seemed, was about to be put to the test. Not only was Georgia not to lose any of the bases that she had, but she was to gobble up one more in the shift of the training unit from Olathe.

This entire sequence illustrates the host of problems that arise any time the most gentle of waves rocks the boat of the Warfare State. When a cutback on military bases threatens adjacent towns and cities with economic collapse, it becomes fairly obvious what would happen if violent hands should ever be laid on the fantastic billions that are being poured into military procurement contracts. Then entire states would be prostrated.

Business Week on February 27, 1960, headlined a feature article: "Missile Industry Carries Utah." The article explained that, for generations, Utah's prosperity had been built around two basic industries, steel and copper. In 1959, both of these bellwethers of the Utah economy had been closed down by strikes. "Without missiles," wrote *Business Week*, "these strikes might have put much of the state flat on its back. But the growth of missiles more than offset the strikes and helped to give Utah its biggest year. Today, the industry employs over 10,000 workers—a gain of 5,000 during 1959."

What missiles are to Utah, the whole aircraft-missile-space complex is in an even larger way to the powerful State of California. California, of course, has Hollywood, but Hollywood is a piker beside the ganglion of war industries on which the prosperity of the state has come so much to depend. *The Los Angeles Times* reported in February, 1960, that in the Los Angeles metropolitan

area alone twenty-seven out of every hundred manufacturing workers were employed in aircraft, missiles or space. The area had a backlog of military contracts exceeding \$3 billion.

Still, there was serious concern. It was obvious to everyone that missiles rapidly were making the warplane obsolete—and a heavy cutback on plane orders would make things very, very bad. The Southern California area had had a taste of this kind of hardship in 1957, when federal orders for the huge sky birds were cut back some 40 per cent. Plants had shut down, thousands of workers had been laid off. California had snapped back smartly from this period of temporary trial. Most of its airplane manufacturers had had the foresight to see the handwriting on the wall; they were already shifting their production to missiles, the weapon of the future, and soon missile contracts took up the slack of lost plane contracts. By November, 1958, aircraft-missile payrolls on the West Coast had mounted to about \$42.4 million a week, with more than half of this—\$23.1 million—concentrated in the Los Angeles area. Still, there was unhappiness. The plane cutback had struck a severe blow at Douglas Aircraft: there were heavy layoffs in the Santa Monica and El Segundo-Torrance plants. Alarmed, the International Association of Machinists bombarded California's Congressional delegation with telegrams of protest and demands for an investigation to discover what had caused this unjust cutback of war orders at Douglas.

Such agitation and alarm in the midst of still-flowing plenty give but a faint idea of the utter chaos that inevitably would result from any serious de-emphasis of the military staff of life. A few years ago, the Southern California Research Council, a private association of prominent businessmen and academicians, drew up a widely circulated report entitled, "The Effect of a Reduction of Defense Expenditures Upon the Los Angeles Area." It concluded that if "a 50 per cent cut in defence expenditures should occur . . . [while] business conditions and investment remain high, the estimate would be for total unemployment of about 200,000 or 12 per cent of the entire labor force. Or, if business conditions and investments are lower, unemployment might approximate 350,000

or 20 per cent." This, remember, is the kind of disaster that a cut of just one-half, *not* a total cut, would bring down on the Los Angeles area. Obviously, it cannot be allowed to happen.¹⁴

3. The battle to preserve "our way of life" in this age of ever more swift, ever more deadly and ever more costly weaponry is waged on many fronts, but nowhere is it carried on with such zest for the good things of life as in those golden fields of lobbying and propaganda where contractors and generals and admirals take off their shoes and gambol in the high grass together. This is the apex; this is the point of juncture, the end and the purpose, of more than \$50 billion annually; and the lobbying, the propaganda, the influence that result flow from it on a scale that staggers the limited imagination of man. And who foots the bill? The American taxpayer, of course. He pays for everything; his is the money used for his own brainwashing; and in the end he becomes like the poor dumb beast on the treadmill, shoveling out ever more billions for ever more brainwashing for ever more costly armaments of ever more horrible potential and ever less security, a process that continues *ad infinitum*.

A few lone, articulate voices have been raised in Congress in protest against the process, but the lone voice, after a few headlines, is always drowned in the roar of the \$50 billion juggernaut that is powered by the Pentagon and that enlists the undying loyalty of all good American businessmen from the Madison Avenue publicity expert to the fat-cat executive. Nevertheless, it is so often only the lone voice that seems to make sense. And so it seems that the American people should pay more attention to what voices like those of Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D., Ill.) and Rep. F. Edward Hébert (D., La.) have to say.

In a Senate speech in July, 1959, Senator Douglas charged that the Air Force was spending \$1 million a year to ferry im-

portant civilians, key Congressmen and influential Brass to air shows designed to glorify the Air Force. Senator Douglas gave the figures on two such exhibitions held at the Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas, Nev., in early April and May, 1959. The Air Force, he said, flew 1,917 civilians (influential businessmen, community leaders, local officials) and 774 military passengers to the shows. The ferrying task required 177 military planes, which were flown "a total of 2,338 flying hours at a total flying hour cost of \$626,074.75," Senator Douglas declared. He charged that the intent was "to help build up a body of permanent lobbyists for the Air Force and its appropriations." An Air Force spokesman, in effect, pleaded guilty to the charge, though naturally he put the emphasis quite differently. Such free displays, he said, were "a necessary part of keeping the American people informed of what their Air Force is capable of doing."¹⁵

What the Air Force cannot do openly for itself, its contractors do for it. Representative Hébert, who heads an investigating subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, has conducted a years-long running probe into the question of who influences whom and how much. In his 1959 investigation, he turned a critical spotlight on an organization known as the Aerospace Industries Association. This outfit, Hébert charged, existed only to lobby, and it was financed by contributions from seventy-nine airplane and missile manufacturers. Dues and assessments ranged from a low of \$100 to the high figure of \$75,000 paid by North American, Boeing, Curtiss-Wright, Douglas, Lockheed and United. But this \$75,000 bite was not even being felt by the bitten corporations, for most were charging it off as expense items on government contracts. This added up, Representative Hébert said, to "the taxpayer paying to fight against himself." Retired Air Force General Orval R. Cook, president of Aerospace, conceded that all of Representative Hébert's complaints were true, but he bridled sensitively at one assertion—that the primary purpose of association witnesses appearing before Congress was to "advance the interests of the contractors."¹⁶

It stands to reason, however, that when the federal banquet board is garnished by fantastic billions in war-industry goodies,

the scramble is going to be to see who can get the largest serving; and if nobody actually says, "to hell with the public interest," certainly nobody says, "Well, let's see if our conscience will let us take this extra \$100 million to keep building this antiquated plane." That would be expecting just too much of human nature.

With war contracts that make a million dollars look like pin money up for grabs, the mutual admiration society of Big Business and retired Brass and active Brass frequently coalesces into a positively rapturous togetherness. The Hébert committee subjected at least one such blissful merger to sharp scrutiny when it delved into the activities of the Martin Company of Baltimore (patriotic duty: airplanes and missiles; patriotic reward at the time: some \$800 million in defense contracts). Martin had decided, as its board chairman, George M. Bunker, explained in his testimony, that it was essential for the greater national good to establish "an intimate relationship" with the Pentagon Brass because obviously you couldn't perfect weapons systems unless you could bring together "the major capacities of the people that of necessity have to work closely together."

Seeing its patriotic duty, Martin had done it. It had flown twenty-seven of the highest-ranking Brass on Uncle Sam's payroll to expense-paid, fun-in-the-sun outings on the Bahaman Island of Eleuthera. The list of distinguished Martin guests was topped by Gen. Nathan F. Twining, at the time Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who fell so in love with Martin togetherness that he sampled the company's hospitality on three weekend calls at Eleuthera's Cotton Bay Club. Significantly, it would seem, Martin's selected guest list of high-staffers included, besides General Twining, the choicest Brass of Army, Navy and Air Force in the fields of planning and procurement. When the Hébert committee tried to learn just what the "togetherness" at the Cotton Bay Club involved besides playing a few rounds of golf with Bunker, everybody chorused that, oh, there was nothing to it really. All of the togetherness boys were absolutely certain that they did not participate in any contractual negotiations; they did not even *discuss* contractual negotiations; they had *no* direct business relationship with the Martin Company; and only a few, in key offices dealing with procurement,

acknowledged that they had heard some briefings and arguments made by contractors wanting to supply a particular weapon, but these briefings definitely had not been devoted to drumming up trade for Martin exclusively—they had covered *all* contractors in the field, certainly a most noble display of impartiality on Martin's part.¹⁷

Later, on the House floor, fighting in vain for a stiff measure that would put an end to such jolly gatherings of innocents, Representative Hébert lashed out angrily at the Martin-High Brass fraternization.

"A subcommittee uncovered what was going on in the Bahamas whereby the Martin Company of Baltimore was entertaining on a lavish scale both active and retired officers, among whom were some who within thirty days would appear before the Appropriations Committee in support of contracts which included parcels for the Martin Co.," he said.

"I can only give you the facts. I can only say to you that when Dr. Bunker became president of the Martin Co. it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Today Martin Co. is No. 2 on the defense contract list, and paid a dollar more per share, while the Douglas Aircraft was losing \$93 million. The Martin Co. does not do a dime's worth of work for private business. Every nickel comes from the government in subsidies. Why should they entertain their only customer, the people they do business with?"¹⁸

The plain implication is that, in such cozy private arrangements, the public interest gets fractured. The implications are fundamental to our whole society. The Air Force uses taxpayers' funds to propagandize for the Air Force; the air and missile manufacturers use taxpayers' funds, by assessing the cost of their operations to government, to propagandize for the air and missile manufacturers; huge corporations involved in every facet of the munitions business spend millions of dollars (obtained from the government) in entertainment and lobbying to promote good will and insure more contracts—and against this overwhelming, conjunctive force there stands quite literally not even the shadow of a counterforce. A lone voice or two in Congress, like those of Senator Douglas and Representative Hébert, is occasionally raised—but, beyond this,

nothing. No democratic society, it seems safe to say, was ever more over-balanced in one direction.

The brashness with which the partying and the influence-peddling was conducted probably was best illustrated by the fact that, even as the Hébert committee was looking into it, more entertainments were being scheduled in Washington right under its nose. One affair that attracted considerable attention was a scheduled private testimonial to commemorate the promotion of Lt. Gen. Bernard S. Schriever, the Air Force's Chief of Research and Development. The invitations were sent out by Frank Pace, Jr., then chairman of the board of General Dynamics and more recently a Kennedy adviser; William B. Bergen, president of the Martin Company; and Dan Kimball, president of Aerojet-General Corp., a former Secretary of the Navy and one of the gay celebrants on Martin's earlier Eleuthera junket.

The invitations sent out by these three prominent war industry warriors contained this suggestive sentence: "This will be a small, off-the-record party and we think Gen. Schriever would like to tell you of his plans and some of his problems at the Air Research and Development Command."

When the off-the-record party became a matter of page-one record, General Schriever was much concerned. He had been invited orally, he said; he hadn't seen the invitations; and he was much disturbed by that not very veiled suggestion some hot tips might be forthcoming. The general, an aide declared, had "no intention of engaging in any off-the-record discussion of his plans and problems at the party."¹⁹ With everyone red-faced from the disclosure, the party was swiftly canceled.

A little later in this same summer of the Hébert investigation, fifty major companies doing business with the Pentagon showed how some of that \$100 million Editor Coughlin estimated is spent annually for partying and influence gets itself spread around. The Army Association was holding its convention in Washington in the first week of August, and the fifty war suppliers rented fifty "hospitality suites" in Washington's best hotels, just to make certain that procurement and contract officers could enjoy some of the finer things of life. General Electric reserved the Madison Room

at the Sheraton Park and in addition scheduled a big cocktail party in the Burgundy Room. General Motors also engaged the Burgundy Room for a reception and dinner. Hughes Aircraft threw another cocktail party in the Burgundy Room. Sperry Gyroscope and United Aircraft hurled competing cocktail parties; Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone, a subsidiary of the huge A.T.&T. system, threw a big dinner and reception. And so it went. Patriotic sacrifice was unconfined.²⁰

Though no editor was moved to report on the "booze, blondes and bashes" aspects of these affairs, the fraternization of the loftiest Brass and the loftiest corporation executives, which such parties symbolize, has produced over the years some highly curious results. Not the least curious is the suave influence wielded by those 1,400 high-ranking officers who have crossed the street and found retirement cushioned by lush salaries ladled out by the top 100 war contractors. Hardly anyone in the nation is so naive as to believe they are all industrial geniuses. Some, of course, may have expert knowledge of advanced weaponry that makes them technically useful to weapon manufacturers; but most of them are hired, not for what they know, but for whom they know—for their contacts inside the Pentagon. As Senator Douglas once phrased it, "When companies with defense contracts hire former officers of high rank to negotiate with their former fellow officers, some of whom they have promoted, the potential and actual abuses are magnified."²¹

The Hébert committee documented the point. Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, the maverick of the services and the father of the atomic submarine, testified that the jobs those 1,400 retired officers had had were now filled "by people who are their dear friends, or even by people whom they have been influential in appointing, and naturally they will be listened to." The way this works was illustrated in the testimony of Admiral William M. Fechtler, retired, former Chief of Naval Operations and later a consultant to General Electric's Atomic Products Division. The Admiral told of arranging appointments for a G.E. vice-president in the Pentagon.

"I took him to see Mr. Gates, the Secretary of the Navy." Admiral Fechtler testified. "I took him to see Admiral Burke. He

had not met Admiral Burke before. And then I made appointments with him with the Chief of the Bureau of Ships. But I did not accompany him there, because those are material bureaus which make contracts. And I studiously avoid even being in the room when anybody talks about a contract."

Such studiousness is laudable, but does anyone doubt that there is a certain leverage working for the businessman who can walk into the Navy Department and meet everyone of consequence, from the Secretary down, under the aegis of an Admiral who was formerly Chief of Naval Operations? And does anyone believe, in this chummy atmosphere, that the only element determining vital decisions is the national interests?

Certain incidents in the past have cast a harshly illuminating light upon this question. There was, for example, the case of General Joseph T. McNarney, top-ranker in the Air Force who became General Manager of the entire Defense Department under Louis Johnson in pre-Korean days. In 1950, when Johnson set out to decimate the Navy's carrier fleet in the name of economy, the Navy and the Air Force clashed over what the Air Force succeeded in billing as "the revolt of the admirals." But the Navy, as Walter Millis has pointed out, was not entirely self-centered; it was genuinely concerned with the national interest, and it advanced some cogent strategic criticism that deserved serious consideration instead of what was merely clever propaganda ridicule.

A key target of the Navy attack was the Air Force's pride of the moment, the long-range B-36 bomber. As Colonel Neblett, a mere Reservist, had tried to tell Congressional committees the previous year (only nobody much was listening), planes were rapidly becoming a weapon of the past, outmoded by the rocket and the proximity fuse; and probably no plane more perfectly illustrated what he meant than the B-36. The Navy attacked it as too slow, too vulnerable, too antiquated for modern war. The B-36, indeed, had gone on the drawing boards in 1941, even before we got involved in World War II, and the Navy's criticism of it in the age of jets and missiles would seem well-justified. But McNarney led the Air Force in outraged defense of the B-36 as the best weapon in our arsenal until more modern planes could come off

the drafting boards. The result: we continued to pour out more millions to build a plane that was already obsolete. What happened next seems instructive.

In February, 1952, General McNarney retired. As he later testified before the Hébert committee, he then picked up a telephone and dialed a number in Indio, Calif. The number was that of Floyd B. Odium, who headed Consolidated Vultee, now the Convair Division of General Dynamics, manufacturer of the B-36. The simple phone call worked a positive miracle. In March, 1952, General McNarney went on the payroll of the maker of the plane he had so vigorously defended. He became president of Convair at \$75,000 a year, and he told the Hébert committee, when he testified in March, 1956, that he had drawn \$324,500 in salary and expenses (plus, of course, his regular Air Force pension of \$16,000 annually) in the four short years since his retirement. The General had a five-year, \$75,000-a-year contract with Convair; and when that expired, he had another contract waiting—one that would run for ten years and would pay him \$30,000 annually as a consultant. All of this, General McNarney told the committee, had just happened; none of it had been planned. When he was defending the B-36, he had had no offer from Odium to head the company that made the B-36.²² Commented *Business Week*: "McNarney knows Convair's best customer, the Pentagon, as few others do. . . . In business circles, the word has gone out: Get yourself a general. What branch of government spends the most money? The Military. Who, even more than a five-percenter, is an expert on red-tape? A general or admiral. So make him Chairman of the Board."

A comparable case involved Rear Admiral Lloyd Harrison, chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. The Navy had awarded McDonnell Aircraft and Westinghouse contracts to build the F3H jet fighter. In test flights, eleven of the planes crashed, causing the deaths of several pilots. But Admiral Harrison insisted F3H contracts should be continued because, he said, the record of the contractors had previously been good. The Navy continued the program at an eventual outlay of \$302 million, virtually all of it wasted; and one day after Admiral Harrison retired in September,

1955, he took a job as vice-president of McDonnell Aircraft Company. He subsequently admitted to a Congressional committee that the job had been offered him as early as March, 1955, some five months before his retirement, but this, he insisted, had had nothing to do with his advocacy of the F3H jet. Congress could find no proof of misconduct or of anything but an "honest mistake."

The result of all this clubbiness between war manufacturers seeking contracts and the men in uniform who award the contracts has been pointed up by the Hébert committee investigation. The truth is simple and should be plainly stated: the multibillion-dollar war-gamesmanship of today has resulted in the outright looting of the pockets of the American taxpayer on a colossal, almost inconceivable scale. Oh, the looting may stay carefully within the bounds of technical legality, but there is no other word to describe the spirit that has animated some of the largest corporations in the nation.

Time and again, as a result of the Hébert probe and careful checking by the General Accounting Office, some of the country's most holy corporate names have been compelled to disgorge millions of dollars which they had over-charged Uncle Sam in the cause of patriotism and the defense of homes and firesides. On July 17, 1959, Navy witnesses admitted to the Hébert Committee that Navy procurement officers had made fourteen contract "mistakes" costing a total of \$12 million. That was almost a million dollars a "mistake," by the Navy's own admission, and the Hébert Committee, in its continuing probe, showed that these weren't the only errors that had been committed, not by a long shot.²³

Hébert focused a sharply critical eye on the manner in which two of the nation's mightiest automotive corporations had met the challenge of defending the free world. General Motors, he said, had indulged in practices "bordering on fraud" in its handling of a \$375 million contract. Hébert accused the huge auto firm of pocketing excess profits of \$17,459,000. The government, he declared, had been charged \$4.5 million for unnecessary overhead, and General Motors by some oversight had neglected to inform

the government of \$1.7 million it had managed to save on the prices of parts obtained from sub-contractors.

Chrysler hadn't performed much better. In its July, 1957 report, the Hébert Committee noted that Chrysler had been given "a blank check" by the government to build T-43 tanks in a hurry. The report continued: "In the government's name and with government funds Chrysler bought production machinery for a multi-million-dollar plant. For additional amounts of money negotiated with the government, it engineered the tanks, then produced and tested them." The tanks turned out to be incredibly faulty, fortunately for Chrysler. For this meant that Chrysler got another luscious contract for fixing them. "Chrysler was in a sense the beneficiary of its own (or the government's) mistakes," the committee reported, "for it received contracts to correct the deficiencies.

"When the production was completed, the facilities were laid away and the plant rehabilitated and made available for Chrysler's own use (production of commercial autos), all at government expense . . .

"The whole development and production enterprise was virtually a risk-free proposition for Chrysler. The only company investment was for the 'bricks and mortar' of the tank plant, and even here the government granted the company quick tax write-off privileges."

Such bonanzas speak of the incredibly loose financial practices of the Warfare State, but they weren't the only nor, indeed, the most startling practices. In September, 1961, the Hébert Committee made a discovery that, despite its years-long indoctrination into the fiscal irresponsibility of the Military, left it positively nonplussed. The Army, the Navy and the Air Force, it learned, had, during World War II and Korea, erected literally millions of dollars worth of buildings and installations on land they didn't own—on land that was owned by some of their favored contractors. The deed might have continued to go undiscovered for years except that the Defense Department had begun to consider the possibility of selling off some of these facilities. At once, of course, the elemental dilemma arose: How was it ever going to sell the installa-

tions to anybody except the corporations who owned the land—and so could dictate their price?²⁴

This was no penny-ante chisel, as the records of the fabulous millions expended in the facility-building spree clearly showed. The Navy, especially, had been a most generous Big Brother. It had constructed \$19,160,887 worth of ship propulsion equipment on the Lester, Pennsylvania, property of Westinghouse Corporation. It had installed \$39 million worth of its own shipbuilding equipment on the property of Bethlehem Steel Corporation. It had bestowed upon Todd Shipyards \$35 million worth of installations. The Air Force had entered the competition by placing \$27,899,000 worth of buildings on property owned by Hughes Aircraft. The Army, not to be outdone by the other two branches, had practically bequeathed Chrysler \$4 million worth of Army tank assembly equipment and improvements on property in Delaware. And finally the Navy had made Aerojet, the producer of the Polaris missile, the beneficiary of \$4.8 million worth of buildings and equipment installed on its California property during 1946–52.

The Aerojet arrangement especially intrigued investigators. Dan Kimball, of Martin junket and Schriever party fame, had been the vice president of Aerojet before he left private business to become successively Assistant-Secretary of the Navy for Air, Under-Secretary of the Navy and finally Secretary of the Navy. It was during the very years that he occupied high rank in the Navy's hierarchy that the Navy favored Aerojet with \$4.8 million worth of installations. In fact, Kimball was Navy Secretary in 1952 when, the Navy acknowledged, it "built buildings and facilities" on Aerojet property in Sacramento. And almost the minute he left government service in 1953, after the Eisenhower administration came in, Dan Kimball went back to Aerojet and became its president. In all the intervening years, as he made clear when he was questioned by the Hébert committee in 1960, he had retained his stock in General Tire and Rubber, the parent company of Aerojet.

"Were you required to divest yourself of any stock in General Tire and Rubber?" Hébert asked.

"No, sir," Kimball replied.

"You got off lucky," Hébert commented.

The Congressional investigation showed that 65 admirals, generals and other high-ranking former officers were loaded on the payroll of Aerojet, and 26 of them, Hébert said, gave identical evasive answers in replying to questionnaires sent them by the committee. At that time, in 1960, Hébert had no idea, however, that the Navy in which Kimball had been so influential had practically bequeathed Kimball's Aerojet nearly \$5 million worth of installations it would never be able to sell to anyone else.

"It looks like Uncle Sam is going to get an awful bad rooking," Rep. William Bray (R., Ind.) remarked after the building spree disclosures. "As far as the contractors are concerned, this is like 'heads I win, tails you lose.' The government has no way of forcing them to pay its price."

"They can take government facilities for a nickel on the dollar, or any other price they are willing to offer," exclaimed Rep. Clyde Doyle, California Democrat.

They can indeed. For this is the Warfare State, and good, old-fashioned free enterprise never offered such opportunities.

4. There is hardly an area in our lives today in which the military influence is anything less than supreme. As President Eisenhower said, it is "felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government." The extension of the long arm of the Military into previously sacrosanct civilian bureaus and areas of civilian decision has been quite literally fantastic. The process began in World War II, continued under Truman and, ironically enough, came to full flower under Eisenhower, who was finally to warn of its dangers.

In 1953, only nine Army generals and 58 colonels were assigned to civilian agencies. By 1957, about 200 generals or admirals were on assignment to various departments of the government, international or interservice agencies; similarly employed

were some 1,300 colonels or naval personnel of comparable rank, and some 6,000 officers on the lower levels. Rep. (now Senator) Lee Metcalf (D., Mont.) was one of those lonely dissenters in Congress who raised a voice in protest against this trend. In March, 1956, Metcalf declared: "Already we have a general in the first echelon of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Already we have a general in the second echelon. It seems to me that civilians should show up in here somewhere."²⁵

But civilians were rapidly becoming the vanishing Americans. They were becoming, if not extinct, at least a rare and subdued species in the departments that had formerly been their natural habitat. In no department was this more true than in State, where it soon became the fashion to regard the Military as the absolute seers of foreign affairs. In February, 1947, the *Washington Star* reported: "Ten of the twenty men ranking as executive officers in the State Department have been brought in during recent months from the military services." A few months later, *The New York Times*, reporting that General John H. Hildring had been named an Assistant Secretary of State, added that he had "brought with him to the State Department twenty-six of his assistants in the War Department." Even before this revealing development, in January, 1947, the *Army and Navy Bulletin* had expressed the reality of the day in pithy terms. "Today," it wrote, "the Army has virtual control of foreign affairs . . ." ²⁶ It was a verdict that was soon to be ratified by no less an authority than Walter Lippmann.

Commenting on a Truman move to bring Averell Harriman into the White House as a special adviser on foreign affairs, Lippmann wrote:

"Mr. Truman has been learning the hard way that the President cannot delegate the conduct of foreign affairs . . . Foreign affairs, though deposited in the State Department, did not stay there. The Secretary of State was not powerful enough to keep control of them, and so the control disintegrated and large bits and pieces of it have been moved to the Treasury and to the Department of Commerce and the largest piece of all to the Pentagon. In the Pentagon a very good, and a rather serious imitation of what in any other country but this free-wheeling democracy would

be militarism—namely, the military control of foreign policy—developed. . . .”²⁷

The free-wheeling democracy was now becoming, of course, no longer quite so free-wheeling. The witch-hunt that had begun in 1948 in Republican desperation to elect Dewey became magnified to the proportions of a nationwide pathological disease on the snarling bellow of Joe McCarthy. The State Department, the target of the most reckless charges of sell-out and appeasement, was demoralized and terrorized, and there remains today a serious question whether it has ever really recovered. In this atmosphere, any suggestion of diplomatic negotiation, any attempt to compromise to obtain a common meeting-ground for a reduction of world tensions, became a self-proclaimed deed of treason; and the only official who was safe and above suspicion was the one who stood ever shoulder-to-shoulder with the Military, rock-ribbed and unyielding.

The result was diplomatic disaster world-wide in its magnitude. Every move we made was a war-like move that seemed calculated to draw an ever hardening response from Russia. We ringed Russia with air bases; our air generals proclaimed that with 70 bombs we could destroy 70 Russian cities, there would be no more Russia; we remilitarized West Germany. This last deed by any sober judgment must rank as one without peer in increasing the tensions of the Cold War. For a militarized Germany twice had all but dismembered Russia, and a remilitarized Germany represented Russia's greatest dread in the future. Now we, the one-time Russian ally, were arming the German hordes again for just one purpose, possible future use against Russia. John Foster Dulles was even trying to remilitarize Japan—a goal he could not attain because, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the once warlike Japanese had become for some inexplicable reason a strangely peace-loving people.

Our official line was the Military's line: we must hold firm everywhere, we must not even consider one backward step—not though the “prizes” for which we risked world destruction were the rocky pinpoints of Quemoy and Matsu, or the jungle fiefs of a primitive people like the Laotians. Vital interests of the nation and

the world became subordinated to the nation's posture; the gesture assumed the substance of the deed. Any suggestion that we might even discuss a mutual drawback in Central Europe to lessen the world's tensions, any hint that we must some day acknowledge that the continent of Asia contains a power called Red China—the mere whisper of such proposals was labeled with the dirty name of “appeasement,” and even recent Kennedy appointees who might have wished to demonstrate some rudiments of common sense by espousing them have been forced to proclaim that nothing could be further from their intentions. So have we wrought. Our foreign policy has become a Maginot Line manned by our Military, cheered on by the breast-thumpings of those mighty warriors of whom the whole world stands in awe—our industrial barons and our one-sided press.

The contrast between blind military rigidity and a foreign policy based on a recognition of practical realities as they affect the national interest shows clearly in a perceptive interview with Adlai Stevenson in Theodore H. White's *The Making of the President, 1960*. Just before the Democratic Convention, White went to see Stevenson, and he found the two-time Democratic standard-bearer in a talkative mood, his mind ranging boldly over our complex foreign problems. To Stevenson, not just strength but “moral leadership” was the issue. He recalled how, in the shock after sputnik, Eisenhower had called him to Washington to draft foreign-policy suggestions. Stevenson said he had written “reams of copy” for Eisenhower and Dulles to use, calling on the NATO nations “to put their top priority not on launching pads and missiles, but on the concert of our resources to help the emerging nations. . . . This should have, at least, the urgency of national defense—but they couldn't envision it, didn't want it.”

Stevenson remarked that he had probably talked with “more heads of state than any other American, and when you hear them talk of American foreign policy, it's a thing of wonder and mirth to them.” Stevenson criticized the “linear thinking” of American foreign policy and contrasted this with the strategic necessity of trying to work on the Russians for the mutual withdrawal of forces in Europe. He lashed out at our living in Asia “with this mythology

of Chiang Kai-shek's return to China," and he called our refusal to recognize, even to talk with, the rulers of modern China "one of the greatest political crimes of our times, for in 1955 we had a chance to talk to them, to begin to resolve some of the problems there." Stevenson denounced "that whole program of stupidity starting with the 'unleashing' of Chiang Kai-shek to the collapse of the Summit."

In briefest outline, these were some of the thoughts of a first-class intelligence devoting itself intelligently to the tremendous complexities of recurring crises, and the difference between this kind of vision and the "linear" mentality of the Military is quite plain: it is the difference between devoting the mind to the attempt to achieve solutions that just possibly might avert war on the one hand and, on the other, striking a statuesque military stance with atomic lance ever at the ready, backing up a no-parleys-with-the-heathen attitude—the posture that in the long run can only insure holocaust.

If and when the holocaust comes, mere common folk will not, of course, have anything to say about the manner of their immolation or their chances of survival. The Military will decide all these matters for them. Anyone who doubts this need only consider the experience of Tucson, Ariz., the pleasant resort city that the Military has converted into one of the prime nuclear targets in all America.

Tucson's experience with some of the more grim realities of the nuclear age began on April 19, 1960, when local newspapers broke out into bold headlines: "\$80 MILLION DOLLAR TITAN BASE COMING HERE." At first the joy was unconfined. Just think of it! The federal government was going to pour \$80 million into the economy of Tucson. "It will be a fine thing for the community," Mayor Don Hummel commented proudly. The President of the Chamber of Commerce disclosed his most cherished dreams had been realized. "It's something we've been working for—and hoping for—for a long time," he said.²⁸

At the University of Arizona, however, there were scientists who had some sober second thoughts. Though the Air Force had not yet announced where the sites for the Titans would be located, the scientists suspected that they would ring Tucson, as similar

bases were ringing other cities. The implications to the scientists were clear.

With nuclear-capped intercontinental engines of destruction crouched in concrete silos dug 165 feet into the ground, Tucson would become a prime target. Any enemy attacking America would have to knock out its Titan silos at the very first strike or they would knock him out in the second. Now it takes a force of between 20 and 30 megatons, exploded at ground level, to blast a single hardened Titan in its deep-dug silo; and ground-level bursts of this magnitude eject literally tons of radioactive dirt, dust and debris into the atmosphere, creating a lethal fog that is carried downwind and effectively eliminates all living matter in its path. With the Tucson area being blasted by a number of 20 and 30 megaton bombs, the fallout would be far worse than anything ever contemplated by Civil Defense in its plans for two-week fallout shelters.

What all this meant was quite clear to the scientists. Prevailing winds over Tucson are from the west, and if the Air Force placed Titan silos west of the city, Tucson would never have a chance of survival in any nuclear encounter. Why not put the Titan base east of the city where, if worst came to worst, radioactive fallout would be carried away from Tucson instead of directly over it?

This idea seemed to make sense to the University of Arizona scientists; and so, under the leadership of J. E. McDonald, university professor of atmosphere physics, they formed a Committee Against Ringing Tucson With Titans. This committee, it should be noted, did not adopt any radical stance. It did not demand that the Air Force go away and put its Titans somewhere else. It simply suggested that the Air Force, by a slight alteration in its suspected plans, could dig its Titans in to the east of the city, in the virtually unpopulated San Pedro Valley. This would give Tucson the benefit of the \$80 million project; it would give the Air Force its Titan base approximately where it wanted it; and at the same time it would avoid, for Tucson, the terrible hazard of downwind fallout. Everybody would be happy.

This line of reasoning appeared so sensible that, within a few weeks, some 1,200 signatures were obtained to petitions urging

downwind missile sites. The Air Force went into evasive action. First, it said it hadn't finally decided on the Titan sites. Secondly, it pointed out that Tucson was already a prime target because a large Strategic Air Command base was already located there. Thirdly, it argued that, if Vandenberg Air Force Base near Los Angeles should ever be blasted by an enemy, radioactive fallout borne east by the prevailing westerly winds would blanket Tucson anyhow. University physicists contended that this last statement simply was not true, and they kept hammering at the issue until finally even an Air Force Colonel was compelled to admit that Tucson, with Titan bases on its upwind side, must expect 100 per cent fatalities in the event of an attack.

With this admission to back them up, the professors went before the Tucson City Council and urged passage of a resolution expressing concern for civilian safety. The Council, after listening to the committee, voted unanimously to take such action. Almost the instant that it did, things began to happen. Word was passed along through the office of Senator Barry Goldwater, the handsome Air Force Reserve general, that if Tucsonians did not show a more "constructive response" both the Titans and the SAC base would be located elsewhere. Business and political leaders in smaller adjacent communities began to snipe at Tucson. They deplored Tucson's "lack of patriotism" and proclaimed that their more dedicated municipalities would be simply delighted to welcome the Air Force's Titans. This kind of pressure was too much for the Tucson City Council. It did a complete back-flip and, with only one dissenting vote, passed a resolution humbly expressing complete confidence in any decision the Air Force might choose to make.

The Committee Against Ringing Tucson With Titans was stubborn. It continued its campaign. It rallied such support that an independent group of 105 mothers published a large advertisement entitled, "The People Deserve an Answer." The people certainly did, but just as certainly they weren't getting it. Tucson newspapers suddenly lost interest in the subject. When they mentioned Titans, they mentioned what wonderful weapons they were; hardly any attention was paid to the main issue, where the Titans might be located. By early June, the Air Force had used its muscle

so well that Tucson was under control. Then it announced its plans for the Titan missile sites. Just as the scientists had suspected all along, the sites ringed Tucson. Construction was begun at once.

Tucson had learned its lesson—the lesson that all America has yet to learn. In the Warfare State, the only word that counts a tinker's damn is the word of the Military.

fatten up and get lazy at the age of about 25 years. In addition to obesity, other important risk factors such as hypertension and hyperlipidemia also begin to show their effects at this time.

Recently, it has been shown that the distinction between high- and low-density lipoproteins (HDL and LDL) helps to assess the risk of coronary heart disease in patients with hypercholesterolemia. High serum levels of HDL, in proportion to LDL, seem to be inversely related to coronary risk. However, a person with serum cholesterol greater than 220 mg (AutoAnalyzer method) at any age probably has an increased risk for heart attack.

Principles of exercise prescription

Before any program of exercise is prescribed, the following steps should be taken:

1. Determine the individual's functional capacity (cardiorespiratory) through graded exercise testing. This will help to establish exercise intensity limits and rule out existing coronary disease.
2. Assess the individual's cardiovascular status, as well as any other medical problems through consultation with the patient's personal physician.
3. Determine the type, frequency, duration, and intensity of the exercise that will achieve the desired training effect.
4. Evaluate the individual's orthopedic status to see if there are any limiting musculoskeletal factors.
5. Record heart rate, blood pressure, ECG changes, weight, and endurance.
6. Establish exercise performance limits and targets.

The Committee on Exercise of the American Heart Association has published guidelines for ex-

ercise testing and fitness training of healthy individuals and those at high risk for or with a clinical history of coronary heart disease. They have also made available concise and informative guidelines for

The exercise period

Each exercise period should include 5 minutes of warm-up exercises, such as calisthenics and stretching exercises; 20 to 30 minutes of aerobic (using oxygen) exercise at the individual's target heart rate; and 5 minutes of cool-down exercises. Both warm-up and cool-down exercises include toe touches, wall push-ups, floor push-ups, sit-ups, knee-chest pull-ups, and thigh stretches and may be performed similarly. Also, if the person has been jogging, swimming, or cycling, walking for 5 minutes is an appropriate cool-down activity. Individuals should be warned that abrupt cessation of exercise may trap blood in large muscle groups and produce symptoms of dizziness or syncope. In addition, people who exercise should learn to count their carotid or radial pulse accurately. The most important goal of this kind of physical fitness program is to achieve an alteration of the patient's life style.

There are four factors to consider in any exercise prescription: (1) type, (2) frequency, (3) duration, and (4) intensity.

Types of exercise

Acceptable types of exercise for cardiorespiratory fitness (aerobic) include walking, jogging, swimming, outdoor and indoor cycling, rope jumping, and long-distance running (Table 2). Weight lifting and isometric ex-

ercises are not acceptable for this purpose. Anaerobic conditioning is useful for training competitive runners, but not for long-term heart and lung conditioning. Contact sports for sedentary individuals are not recommended.

Common everyday activities such as walking, climbing stairs, and gardening should also be encouraged. Golf is relaxing, but inadequate for aerobic conditioning. Tennis requires 7 hours of singles per week to produce an adequate training effect. While facilities for racketball, squash, and handball are not always available, these sports can produce an adequate training effect if participation is regular. Selection of the type of exercise should take into consideration the individual's personal preference, his time schedule and life style, and any limiting physical factors.

Frequency and duration

Individuals initiating an exercise program should limit the number of sessions to 3 times per week on alternate days for the first 4 months of participation. Beyond the first 4-month period, the number of exercise sessions may be increased to 5 or 6 days per week. Then, after they have achieved their physical fitness goals, they can maintain their level of fitness with three exercise sessions per week. Physical fitness cannot be stored. Achieving and maintaining cardiorespiratory fitness requires a lifetime commitment to regular exercise and "caloric training."

The duration of exercise required to achieve a cardiovascular training effect varies from 15 to 20 minutes of exertion at the individual's target heart rate (70% to 85% of maximal heart rate). Shorter durations are often

prescribed at the initiation of an exercise program to develop muscular strength.

Intensity

Intensity of the exercise performed is probably one of the most important items to be considered. Prescribed exercises must be both conservative and aggressive. It must not push a person beyond 85% of his maximal performance capability. Yet, it must be adequate to produce a cardiopulmonary conditioning effect.

Graded exercise testing using a treadmill or bicycle ergometer will help you to determine what the individual's performance capability is. The appropriate level of intensity can be determined by heart rate response, oxygen consumption, or physical work performed. The physician should pay close attention to this factor, particularly when highly competitive, "type A," executives are involved. During the beginning phases of an exercise program, intensities of more than 75% of a person's work capacity should be avoided. Exercise should be reduced or curtailed in the presence of active infection or injury to the extremities. Aching joints and muscles and early fatigue may be the result of excessive exertion and should be evaluated appropriately. High altitude and extremes in temperature also require modification of activity. Another note of caution is that hot showers taken immediately after exercising may sometimes cause syncope or myocardial infarction.

Supervision

An exercise program designed to achieve cardiorespiratory fitness requires supervision. The ideal combination of supervisory personnel would be an exercise

physiologist and a physician, but this is not always practical. If supervision of exercise is not available, a program of longer duration at low intensity is advisable with slow progression to

Treadmill or bicycle ergometer exercise testing is important prior to vigorous aerobic exercise in sedentary individuals over 35 years of age. However, a physician and registered nurse should be in attendance and de-

Relative merits of various exercises

Energy Range	Activity	Comment
1.5-2.0 Mets* or 2.0-2.5 Cals/min. or 120-150 Cals/hr.	Light housework such as polishing furniture or washing small clothes	Too low in energy level and too intermittent to promote endurance.
	Strolling 1.0 mile/hr.	Not sufficiently strenuous to promote endurance unless capacity is very low.
2.0-3.0 Mets or 2.5-4.0 Cals/min. or 150-240 Cals/hr.	Level walking at 2.0 miles/hr.	See "strolling".
	Golf, using power cart	Promotes skill and minimal strength in arm muscles but not sufficiently taxing to promote endurance. Also too intermittent.
3.0-4.0 Mets or 4-5 Cals/min. or 240-300 Cals/hr.	Cleaning windows, mopping floors, or vacuuming	Adequate conditioning exercise if carried out continuously for 20-30 minutes.
	Bowling	Too intermittent and not sufficiently taxing to promote endurance.
	Walking at 3.0 miles/hr.	Adequate dynamic exercise if low capacity.
	Cycling at 6 miles/hr.	As above.
	Golf—pulling cart	Useful for conditioning if reach target rate. May include isometrics depending on cart weight.
4.0-5.0 Mets or 5-6 Cals/min. or 300-360 Cals/hr.	Scrubbing floors	Adequate endurance exercise if carried out in at least 2 minute stints.
	Walking 3.5 miles/hr.	Usually good dynamic aerobic exercise.
	Cycling 8 miles/hr.	As above.
	Table tennis, badminton and volleyball	Vigorous continuous play can have endurance benefits but intermittent, easy play only promotes skill.
	Golf—carrying clubs	Promotes endurance if reach and maintain target heart rate, otherwise merely aids strength and skill.
	Tennis—doubles	Not very beneficial unless there is continuous play maintaining target rate—which is unlikely. Will aid skill.
	Many calisthenics and ballet exercises	Will promote endurance if continuous, rhythmic and repetitive. Those requiring isometric effort such as push-ups and sit-ups are probably not beneficial for cardiovascular fitness.

*Met= multiple of the resting energy requirement; e.g. 2 Mets require twice the resting energy cost, 3 Mets triple, etc.

fibrillation equipment should be readily available. Physicians may prescribe unsupervised exercise in coronary heart disease patients at about 60% to 75% of functional capacity, but this is not without some risk. The pa-

tient should start at low levels and progress slowly.

In most fitness programs, exercise prescription will be used for apparently normal individuals with sedentary many of

and in poor physical condition. Many will also have abused food and certain chemicals to varying degrees.

While appropriate supervised exercise is probably a valuable part of any heart disease prevention program, it is unlikely to prove beneficial unless contained within a broader program of risk factor intervention and life style change. Unsupervised vigorous exercise for sedentary individuals over 40 years of age is hazardous and should not be encouraged. However, any person, regardless of age, may exercise if given an appropriate exercise prescription.

Monitoring progress

Progress may be monitored by serial determination of weight, skinfold thickness (percentage of body fat), blood pressure, serum cholesterol, HDL cholesterol, triglyceride, and exercise tolerance. Those individuals engaged in a regular program of walking, jogging, or cycling should be advised that an increase in distance covered 3 times weekly is important. However, the time in which distance is covered is not important since athletic competition is not our immediate goal. The patient should be reminded of his individual goals and cautioned against "overdoing it."

Exercise for the coronary patient

Those persons who have had a myocardial infarction or coronary bypass surgery should participate in progressive exercise under proper medical supervision and preferably as part of a cardiac rehabilitation group. While there are a few postcoronary marathon runners, the majority of coronary heart disease patients should not expect to progress to this level of activity. The following precautions are

in inducing cardiovascular fitness

Energy Range	Activity	Comment
5.0-6.0 Met or 6-7 Cals/min. or 360-420 Cals/hr.	Walking 4 miles/hr.	Dynamic, aerobic and of benefit.
	Cycling 10 miles/hr.	As above.
	Ice or roller skating	As above if done continuously.
6.0-7.0 Mets or 7-8 Cals/min. or 420-480 Cals/hr.	Walking 5 miles/hr.	Dynamic, aerobic and beneficial.
	Cycling 11 miles/hr.	Same.
	Singles tennis	Can provide benefit if played 30 minutes or more by skilled player with an attempt to keep moving.
	Water skiing	Total isometrics; very risky for cardiacs, pre-cardiacs (high risk) or deconditioned normals.
7.0-8.0 Mets or 8-10 Cals/min. or 480-600 Cals/hr.	Jogging 5 miles/hr.	Dynamic, aerobic, endurance building exercise.
	Cycling 12 miles/hr.	As above.
	Downhill skiing	Usually ski runs are too short to significantly promote endurance. Lift may be isometric. Benefits skill predominantly. Combined stress of altitude, cold and exercise may be too great for some cardiacs.
	Paddleball	Not sufficiently continuous but promotes skill. Competition and hot playing areas may be dangerous to cardiacs.
8.0-9.0 Mets or 10-11 Cals/min. or 600-660 Cals/hr.	Running 5.5 miles/hr.	Excellent conditioner.
	Cycling 13 miles/hr.	As above.
	Squash or handball (practice session or warmup)	Usually too intermittent to provide endurance building effect. Promotes skill.
Above 10 Mets or 11 Cals/min. or 660 Cals/hr.	Running 6 miles/hr.=10 Mets 7 miles/hr.=11.5 8 miles/hr.=13.5	Excellent conditioner.
	Competitive handball or squash	Competitive environment in a hot room is dangerous to anyone not in excellent physical condition. Same as singles tennis.

Note: Energy range will vary depending on skill of exerciser, pattern of rest pauses, environmental temperature, etc. Caloric values depend on body size (more for larger person). Table provides reasonable "relative strenuousness values" however.

Reprinted from Beyond Diet . . . Exercise Your Way to Fitness and Heart Health, by Lenore R. Zohman, M.D. Copyright CPC International, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

recommended for those coronary patients and individuals at risk who undertake a prescribed exercise program:

- No patient who has suffered a myocardial infarction should participate until 3 months have elapsed since his coronary event
- No patient with uncontrolled and/or untreated hypertension, arrhythmias, or congestive heart failure should be permitted to participate
- Participation in a postmyocardial exercise group should be limited to three sessions per week
- A physician, nurse, and technician should be present during all sessions
- Electrocardiograph, defibrillator, emergency drugs, and oxygen should be readily available during all sessions.

A word about diet

There are four principal types of dietary restriction that are important in a preventive medicine program. They are (1) salt restriction for hypertension, (2) caloric restriction for obesity, (3) special diets used in the treatment of hyperlipidemia, and (4) general limitation of saturated fat intake for the prevention of atherosclerosis and possibly colon cancer. All of these should be carried out under a physician's supervision. The most generally applicable approach is to try to get adults to decrease their excessive caloric intake, reduce the amount of saturated fat and free sugar in their diets, and to burn up excesses by regular exercise. In practice, types IIa, IIb, and IV are the commonest disturbances of lipid metabolism seen in an adult population. Table 3 summarizes the principal recommended approach to the treatment of hyperlipidemia.

Table 3—A lipid lowering regimen for Type II hyperlipidemia

Low-cholesterol, modified fat diet

Foods to avoid

Butter, lard

Foods to substitute

Safflower oil, corn oil, and

Sauces unless made with allowed nonfat and skim milk

Whole milk, cream Most cheeses	Skim milk, dried nonfat milk Skim milk cheese
Egg yolk Cold cuts, hot dogs, sausages, bacon	Lean beef, lamb, veal, tongue, pork, ham
Goose, duck Poultry skin Shellfish, fish roe Organ meats such as heart, liver, brains, kidneys Fatty meats Fried meats and fish unless fried with allowed fat Corned beef Regular hamburger Spareribs, pork and beans Meats canned or frozen in sauces or gravies Frozen packaged dinners	Chicken, turkey Dried or chipped beef Fish except those excluded Egg white
Biscuits, muffins, sweet rolls, corn bread, pancakes, waffles, French toast, hot rolls, corn and potato chips, flavored crackers	Whole wheat, rye, or white bread; saltines; graham crackers; baked goods containing no whole milk, excluded fat, or egg yolk
Buttered, creamed, or fried vegetables prepared with excluded fats	Any vegetable, fresh, frozen, or cooked with allowed fats
Cream soups	Bouillon, clear broth, fat-free vegetable soup, cream soups made with skim milk, broth-base dehydrated soups
Avocado except in small amounts	Most fresh, frozen, or canned fruits or juices; dried fruits
Pies, cakes, cookies, other desserts containing whole milk, excluded fats, or egg yolk Ice cream, ice milk, sherbet, whipped toppings	Angel food cake; puddings or frozen desserts made with skim milk; gelatin desserts Water ices
Chocolate, coconut, cashew and macadamia nuts, most candies	Olives, pickles, salt, spices, herbs, cocoa, nuts other than those excluded, hard candies, jam, jelly, peanut butter, honey, sugar

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at even if Ray did kill King—there is a reasonable
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the cover-up or important facts in the slaying and a failure by the FBI and
Memphis police to investigate thoroughly the possibility of a conspiracy.

To understand those two things, we must begin with Martin Luther
King. King was in Memphis to lead a protest march in support of Local
1733, the nearly all-black union of garbage and sewer workers. The thir-
teen hundred men had gone on strike in February, asking for a fifty-cent-
an-hour raise, workmen's compensation and an insurance program. Mem-
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hate. Memphis' black leaders called for King, the Nobel apostle of nonvio-
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On March 18, King arrived from Anaheim, California, where he'd given
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a work stoppage. It happened, but the agent was a freak snowstorm, not
aggrieved citizens. One plan frustrated, King consented to lead a march
on March 28.

It was a disaster. Militant youths, the Invaders, broke King's nonviolent
rules and some windows. They looted stores, touched off a riot in which
police killed a seventeen-year-old boy. Cops moved in, plucked King and
Ralph Abernathy and others out of the melee and took them to the fash-
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harassment of King, we found that the Bureau discussed leaking the news
that King was staying in a white establishment, to embarrass him. In turn,
one of Ray's attorneys speculated that the FBI really wanted to drive King
out of the Rivermont to the Lorraine, where he could be more easily
killed.) Anyway, things were more volatile than ever. Could King come
back for a second march if they'd cool off the kids? King again agreed.
They'd march on Friday, April 5. Thus it was that King returned to Mem-
phis from Atlanta on April 3, and checked into the black-owned Lorraine
Motel. Lots of people knew it, what with the TV and radio coverage. In
room 306 he worked, unaware that a bullet awaited him the next day.

Did James Earl Ray fire it? The physical evidence proves no more than
that Ray was involved in King's assassination—something he has admitted,
asserting, "I personally did not shoot Dr. King, but I believe I may be

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criminal escaped convict and lifelong loser variously called Eric Starvo Galt, Harvey Lowmyer, John Willard, John L. Rayns, Paul Bridgman, Ramon George Sneyd, but known to us soon and ever since as James Earl Ray.

Second, we know that even if Ray did kill King—there is a reasonable doubt that it could be proved—he was victimized by judicial irregularities, the cover-up of important facts in the slaying and a failure by the FBI and Memphis police to investigate thoroughly the possibility of a conspiracy.

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DEFENSE SPENDING

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The 'SMIC' Boondoggle

It is commonplace in evaluating candidates for public office to examine the nature of their sources of organizational strength, financial support, and political backing. In the most general sense we assume that if a candidate is very closely tied to the fortunes of a single narrow economic group, special political interest, or clique, his latitude for action may become unduly circumscribed.

In some measure, of course, it may be argued that organized "interests" are at the heart of the democratic process: that in representing organized "lobbies" lawmakers are, in fact, giving voice to the groups which comprise the political infrastructure of the society of which they are a part.¹

Because of the essential ambiguity of the enterprise drawing the line between legitimate political representation and simple interest-mongering has become the perennial pastime of election-year politics — especially for the party out of power.

The present Administration is without peer in the care and feeding of its political associates — and as such it deserves special scrutiny. By even the most easy-going standards there seems to be massive porkbarrelling going on between Lyndon Johnson's government and Lyndon Johnson's friends. The personal fortunes of various key-Texas business leaders depend very heavily on the maintenance and expansion of military spending.

To chart the rise of defense-related industry in Texas one need only examine the shifts in defense spending since LBJ came to power. In a gushy political chronicle published by a company affiliated with Johnson's interests,² McKay and Faulk describe the onslaught of the New Millennium as follows:

"Another chapter was beginning in the story of Texas, truly a chronicle of greatness. Few, however, expected the era to begin on notes so discordant as declining political influence at the national level, a rush of scandals, and a presidential assassination in Texas."³

Hardly an auspicious start — but with some very dramatic results. In the spring of 1965, at the beginning of President Johnson's major escalation in Vietnam, the net value of military procurement in Texas was \$316 million, or 4.1% of the total spending for the quarter (April-June, 1965).⁴ This represented a rise of a full

percentage point from the last fiscal quarter under a Kennedy budget; the previous year's quarter in Texas had been \$224 million, or 3.1% of total spending. Texas ranked eleventh in the last quarter of fiscal 1964 and eighth in fiscal 1965.⁵

Two years later, in the last quarter of fiscal 1967, the corresponding figures for Texas were \$1,500 million and 10.7% of the total. Texas had soared to rank two, behind California. During the 1964-67 period total prime contract spending rose by 55%. Yet defense spending in Texas rose by 460% between the last quarter of fiscal 1964 and the last quarter of fiscal 1967.⁶ And this increase excludes expenditures on NASA's Houston Space Center!

No state has risen even half as dramatically as Texas, though thanks to the 55% general rise in defense spending, few have lost in the absolute value of government contracts. Such states as New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California have thus lost relative to Texas but have not declined sharply. It is fair to conclude that Texas has been getting the lion's share of the increase in defense spending since the 1965 escalation of the Vietnam war.

STOCK PRICES SKYROCKET How this dramatic change came about — in all its details, ramifications and effects — is a long and complex story. It can best be summarized as follows:

Since the beginning of the Second World War, Texas politicians have been unusually active on military appropriations committees in Congress. Lyndon Johnson was foremost among these, beginning with his days in the House. As a result, Texas became a center for military training and manufacturing during the Second World War and Korea — and at the same time, the locus of scandals involving misappropriation of government funds.⁷

During the Eisenhower years, things were a little less plush and curtailments in spending, especially in conventionally deployed forces, were felt especially hard in Texas. Johnson continued to fight for higher defense appropriations.⁸ Although he was to some extent successful at this, the post-war contracts did not compare with wartime boondoggling. Training camps and other military installations in Texas were undermanned. During the Kennedy years things weren't much better.

With Lyndon Johnson's succession to the Presidency in 1963 things began to change radically. The stock prices of leading corporations based or controlled in Texas began to rise almost immediately after Ken-

1. The line of analysis that holds American democracy to be the interplay of interest groups was developed systematically by Arthur Bentley, one of the pioneers of American political science, at the beginning of this century. See his major work, *The Process of Government*, especially pp. 204-206 in the 1935, Evanston, Illinois edition.

2. McKay, Seth S., and Faulk, Odie B., *Texas after Spindletop*, Stock-Vaughn Co., 1965. This book, published by the Stock-Vaughn Company of Austin, is one of several "histories" inclined to be somewhat effusive about Mr. Johnson and his friends. The chairman of the board of Stock-Vaughn Co. is Jack C. Vaughn, a business associate of Edward Clark, an old Johnson friend.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

4. The United States Department of Defense, *Defense Industry Bulletin*, October, 1965, p. 22.

5. *Ibid.*

6. For comparative figures see *Defense Industry Bulletin*, November, 1967, p. 28.

7. United States General Accounting Office Reports on Brown-Raymond-Walsh, (1960-1963).

8. Sherrill, Robert, *The Accidental President*, New York, Grosman, 1967, pp. 220-224.

nedy's assassination.⁹ This, in turn, enabled them to acquire further funds for capital expansion. The largest and most characteristic of these companies, Ling-Temco-Vought, nearly quadrupled its assets during 1967 — reaching \$1.8 billion.¹⁰

Corporate mergers among enterprises involving Johnson associates have been frequent. For example, the Greatamerica Company, a conglomerate of insurance companies that controls Braniff Airways, is in turn, being acquired by LTV.¹¹ Braniff, which received numerous lucrative war-related contracts, enjoyed an increase in the price of its common stock by a factor of sixteen in the 31 months following the Kennedy assassination.¹²

Extensive interlocking between banks and insurance companies — which has always been unusually characteristic of Texas finance¹³ — has intensified significantly. New holding companies have arisen which have the effect of coordinating activities of diverse financial institutions. For instance, the Texas Capital Corporation, which is most closely connected to the Capital National Bank of Austin,¹⁴ has direct links to more than 40 other financial institutions¹⁵ within the region and to several Texas-dominated investment firms elsewhere.¹⁶

Such developments now make it possible to speak of a new power center in America. Some analysts, perhaps with tongue in cheek, have called it SMIC (rhymes with SNCC), the Southwestern Military-Industrial Complex. Current trends suggest that Austin, despite its small size, may become the central city in the emerging complex. It has long occupied a strategic political location in Texas, and its leading citizens are well-placed nationally. One local notable, who appears to control a powerful holding company called Brazos-10th Street, is President of the United States. Martin Waldron, in an extensive New York Times article,¹⁷ has written:

"The offices and the television studio of the Texas Broadcasting Company [owned by the

- | | Nov. '63 price | "recent high" |
|---|----------------|---------------|
| 9. Texas Gulf Sulphur | 16 | 160 |
| Gulf & Western | 8 1/2 | 85 |
| LTV | 10 | 169 1/2 |
| Litton | 34 | 120 |
| 10. Texas Magazine, "Ling-Temco-Vought," October 9, 1967, p. 71. | | |
| 11. The Wall Street Journal, Monday, Jan. 8, 1968, p. 28. ("Ling-Temco says '67 profits rose to \$1,003,000'") | | |
| 12. Trend Cycle Graphs, Securities Research Co., April 1967, p. 19. For further discussion of this phenomenon, see James W. Diamond, "Concentration in Texas Banking," University of Houston Business Review, Fall, 1965, pp. 56-58. The article, which based its argument on loan and stockholder links between banks, argues that there are eleven large banks which dominate the Texas financial structure. The history of banking legislation in Texas has worked to make concentration more common in that state than elsewhere. | | |
| 13. The Texas Capital Corporation is headquartered in Georgetown, Texas. Its Secretary-Treasurer is Franklin W. Denius, (Edward Clark's law partner), also a member of the Board of Directors of the Capital National Bank of Austin. Edward Clark, who is chairman of the Board of the Capital National Bank, is also a member of Texas Capital's Board — as is Howard T. Cox, president of the bank. James P. Nash, who is also a member of Texas Capital's Board, is the "honorary chairman" of the bank's board. Grogan Lord, who is chairman of the Board and president of the Texas Capital Corporation, also sits on the bank's board. | | |
| 14. This discussion is confined purely to cases in which institutions have one or more officers or directors in common. (One could also look for extensive stock ownership in common). On this basis, some of the financial institutions with interlocks to Texas capital are: The Moore St. Bank of Dallas, The Johnson City Bank, The American State Bank, The American National Bank, The First National Bank of San Antonio, First National Bank Center, San Antonio Bank and Trust, National Bankers Life Insurance, Former St. Bank (Center), Texas National Bank of Commerce, Citizens St. Bank of Woodville, the Vaughn Capital Corporation, the Franklin Life Insurance Company, and the Fort Worth National Bank. | | |
| 15. Murchison Bank Investments, Inc. insurance. | | |
| 16. Martin Waldron, New York Times, ("Johnson's Holdings in the Hill Country Increase To 14,000 Acres"), December 26, 1968, p. 24. | | |

Johnson family] are in a building at the intersection of Brazos and 10th Streets in downtown Austin. . . . Brazos-10th Street was started by R. Max Brooks, an Austin architect, and other friends of Mr. Johnson. Bank tax records show that the corporation bought stock in seven banks in Austin and nearby towns through last year [1965]. . . . Although Mr. Johnson is [officially] said not to have any interest in the Brazos-10th Street Corporation, many people believe that the bank stock will be transferred to him after he leaves office as President."

Major holdings in three or more large banks in a city the size of Austin are probably sufficient to insure *de facto* economic control. Brazos-10th Street, moreover, reportedly holds a large block of stock in Greatamerica. If this is the case, it means that the Johnson family has a direct economic interest in Braniff, and in three months, will have a direct economic interest in Ling-Temco-Vought, a major defense contractor¹⁸ and the fastest growing billion dollar company in America. Thus may the sundry pieces of SMIC gradually fall into place under the Johnson family crest.

AUSTRALIAN HOLDINGS

Other leading citizens of Austin are doing wondrous things around the globe. For example, in mid-1965 Edward Clark, chairman of the board of the Capital National Bank of Austin and a long-time personal friend of the President, was appointed American Ambassador to Australia. The Austin firm of Clark, Thomas, Harris, Denius, and Winters has handled Johnson family business for many years.¹⁹ Among the responsibilities of Clark's partner, Donald S. Thomas, is the presidency of Brazos-10th Street.²⁰ While they are minding the Presidential store, Clark, Thomas, Harris, Denius and Winters also have time for other things. Franklin W. Denius sits on the board of directors of the Delhi Australian Petroleum, Ltd., with Perry Richardson Bass — nephew and successor to Johnson's old friend Sid W. Richardson.²¹ Delhi Australian Petroleum, substantially controlled by Johnson's friends, the Murchisons, is becoming increasingly important in the development of Australian oil resources. The Klebergs — owners of the gigantic tri-continental King Ranch complex and first political employers of the President²² — have not been inactive either: their "King Ranch Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd." has been buying up leases all over Australia.²³

Thanks to special attention from the Administration, investors in Australia have been spared some unpleasant moments. The New York Times Magazine on October 8, 1967, noted that: "Clark is known to have

18. As of January, 1968 LTV ranked 10th in Defense Contracting. This represents its place during the fiscal year ending July 30th, 1967. Its contracts for that period totalled \$34.7 million — with LTV Aerospace accounting for 310.7 million of the total. Cf. DFR for January, 1968, p. 32.
19. Sherrill, op. cit., p. 132.
20. Waldron, loc. cit., p. 34.
21. Sherrill, op. cit., pp. 142-145.
- 22a. "In 1931, twenty-three-year-old Lyndon Johnson came to Washington (preceding Franklin Roosevelt by well over a year) as secretary to newly elected Congressman Richard Kleberg, partner-owner of the fabulous King Ranch. Kleberg was an ardent Texas plutocrat with political views to match. Yet Johnson spent four apparently happy years working for reactionary Kleberg before returning to Texas to work for radical William in the NIA (National Youth Administration). This was no hill-country boy hewing to doctrine. Populist defiance of the moneyed classes." Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power, The New American Library, New York, 1966, p. 6.
22. Much of Australia's land is not purchased "fee-simple" or "freehold," but is leased from the government on leases ranging up to 99 years. A "leasehold" in the government is, thus, quite useful.

intervened on Australia's behalf when U.S. Government authorities were discussing capital outflow restraints and possible restrictions on American investments overseas; several U.S. corporations were being questioned about programs involving the investment in Australia of sums of between \$15 million and \$250 million (italics added).²³

Clark, the *Times* related, came to the rescue: "That's when I got into the act," Clark confesses. "The authorities who were doing the questioning backed off . . . maybe just to get rid of me."²⁴

Small wonder, then, that when the Johnson Administration announced a belt-tightening restriction on foreign investments at the beginning of January, 1968, Australia was exempted from the restrictions imposed on investment in Europe.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The Clark appointment is not — with all its crassness — atypical. Another Johnson advisor, Justice Fortas, served as director of various SMIC-related corporations. Before ascending to the Supreme Court, Justice Fortas was part of the highly successful New Deal law firm of Arnold, Fortas and Porter, a Washington firm specializing in lobbying and tax law. He defended Johnson — subsequent to the Texas Senatorial election of 1948 — against charges of election fraud in a case taken to the United States Supreme Court. In 1963 he undertook the defense of Bobby Baker, another chore presumably of the utmost political importance to Mr. Johnson.

Fortas, then, is more than simply a "Johnson advisor"; he is a trusted political ally. So when Fortas acted as the President's envoy in settling the details of the Dominican crisis, he carried with him at least the aura of Johnson's personal endorsement.

It is therefore particularly distressing that at the time of the Dominican mission Fortas was a member

²³ Gordon, Harry, "When a Texas-Style Diplomat Hits Australia," *The New York Times Magazine*, October 8, 1967, p. 117.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

of the Board of Directors of the SuCrest Corporation,²⁵ a major purchaser of Dominican sugar. That Johnson sent him into so obviously compromising a situation is evidence of the President's almost incredible insensitivity to the issues raised by conflict of interest.

Fortas and Clark are merely representative personalities. Throughout the last thirty years, people who have played ball with Johnson have found that he plays ball with them. As President, he has elevated this habit into a new style of administration, "cronyism," in the furtherance of which public spending is distributed like private largesse.

Clever exploitation of political power for personal gain has, of course, many precedents in American history. But this ought not obscure the effects of the Johnson-SMIC combine on America and the future course of its foreign policy. The recent trends described above are not simply a matter of mink or vicuna coats. A powerful segment of the national leadership, perhaps including the President himself, is deriving enormous economic benefits from the prolongation of the war in Asia. The result is a conflict of interest of grave proportions and worldwide significance.

When President Eisenhower left office, he indicated the inherent danger in the relationship between government and the defense industry, and he has noted that a rapid expansion of military spending tends to undermine democratic institutions, much as the influence of Congress has been reduced in the past four and a half years.

It need hardly be added that the reelection of Lyndon Johnson in 1968 will increase the influence of SMIC in the White House and cause a commensurate loss of independent judgment in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. Surely, Mr. Johnson's cronyism will be and should be an issue in the coming campaign.

—A.E.I.

²⁵ Cf. *Poor's Directory of American Corporations*, 1967, p. 1508.

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From The Fish Is Real

"Plausibly Deniable"

21

scratched by President Johnson after John F. Kennedy's assassination. LBJ's objections to another Cuban invasion seem to have been prompted more by his well-known lack of love for Robert Kennedy—whose pet project it was—than an inordinate concern for the territorial integrity of Cuba.

To mollify Johnson, the Secret War plotters in the mid-1960s turned their sights to Haiti. They formulated a plan to overthrow the dreaded Papa Doc Duvalier, the witch doctor-dictator, with a combination of Haitian and Cuban exiles and then to allow the Cubans to invade their homeland from Haiti across the narrow Windward Passage separating the two islands. The scheme came to an end that was not without irony when Papa Doc beefed up his military defenses by a Faustian lend-lease pact with the Mafia, the long-range planners of which saw Haiti as a potential casino-paradise to replace the lost crown jewel of Havana.

Richard M. Nixon, as Vice President, in 1959 helped create the Cuba Project. It was President Nixon, in 1969, who rekindled the Secret War from the dead coals of the Kennedys. He modernized the plotting against Castro with the addition of biological warfare (introducing African swine flu to Cuban cattle) and weather warfare (cloud seeding to precipitate rains out of Noah to ruin Cuba's agricultural economy). The most up front of the anti-Castro presidents, Nixon posed for newspaper photographs personally congratulating anti-Castro raiders.

Throughout this history of the Secret War a recurring theme is how the small triumphs and large tragedies of the faceless men the CIA sent off to its paramilitary expeditions affected the lives of the great and the near great entwined in the war. Not the least of the lives so affected was that of Richard Nixon. It was the war heroes of the Cuba Project who broke into Watergate.

The history of Richard Nixon's creation—the Cuba Project—is the story of a prohibition failed and a warning come true. The prohibition, in the 1947 legislation establishing the CIA, restricted it to foreign intelligence gathering. The warning from the CIA's founders was that domestic undertakings by a secret intelligence agency would take a Frankenstein turn. But no one thought the turn would be toward the Mafia.

While the nation was making light of President Dwight Eisenhower's cautions about the dangers of a military-industrial complex, its more nasty kid brother, the intelligence-industrial complex, was growing up unnoticed. The Cuba Project's concentric circles of domestic intelligence operations, organized crime, and cooperating businessmen whose bottom line was blessed by the CIA are to be delineated in this book, a chain linking Howard

*before the election.
He also
knew that
the whole
Bay of Pigs
was set up &
in operation
before JFK.*

operation. The CIA deputy said that if Maheu was "approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba." When contacted by the bureau, Edwards declared that the CIA would oppose any prosecution because sensitive information about the invasion might come out. The agency subsequently briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who agreed that the case should be dropped in the "national interest."³¹

As word of the impending invasion spread through the executive suites of American corporations the properties of which had been expropriated by Castro, there was more cautious optimism. The president of the Francisco Sugar Company, B. Rionda Braga, told *The Wall Street Journal* on February 9, 1961, that it was "reasonable to hope that the present Cuban government will fall and American companies will be able to resume operations there."

Francisco Sugar exemplified the interlock between the business world and the netherworld of intelligence. Braga's brother, George A. Braga, a Francisco director, sat on the board of Schroder's Limited, a British merchant bank that long had been the repository of a CIA contingency fund—estimated at \$50 million—which was controlled by Allen Dulles. Gerald F. Beal, the president of Schroder's New York branch, where the fund was on deposit, also was a Francisco director. The Schroder's connection dated from 1937, when Dulles, then a member of the prestigious Sullivan & Cromwell law firm that represented Schroder's, was named a bank director. When Dulles joined the CIA, other Sullivan & Cromwell partners sat in his well-warmed seat on the board.

The interests of the CIA and Schroder's had coincided before. The 1953 CIA-engineered coup in Iran benefitted the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the board of directors of which had been graced by a Schroder's executive for thirty years. And the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala made it possible for the Schroder's-funded International Railways of Central America, of which Gerald Beal was board chairman, to resume profitable business as usual.³²

When the White House gave the final green light for the Cuban invasion, a number of CIA insiders began buying the stocks of Francisco and other sugar companies the earnings of which had been depressed by the loss of Cuban plantations. Stockbrokers became curious about the sudden influx of orders as friends were cut in on the tip that cheap sugar shares might prove a sweet gamble. One astute broker called the manager of a mutual fund believed to cater to CIA types of investors. The manager revealed that the fund was very bullish on sugar stocks. The broker recommended the

Sullivan
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Sight" how
Firms "

Cuba. He described his job as "putting the American genius to work" to destroy Fidel Castro. The general was liberal enough to realize that, as he put it, Castro "had aroused considerable affection for himself personally with the Cuban population." The Bay of Pigs invasion had solidified support for Castro. JFK's draconian move to turn the island into an economic leper colony had provoked the premier into expropriating all American capital in Cuba, enabling him to play Santa Claus. "Castro's bringing of Havana's poor into the Sears & Roebuck [sic] store to select the clothes and necessities they needed was the best political public relations gimmick since Boss Hague commandeered Christmas turkeys from the Teamsters to give to Jersey City voters," Lansdale wrote.

Lansdale's idea was that the Cuba Project "take a very different course" from the "harassment" operations of the past and try to crack the Castro regime from within. The Lenin of counterinsurgency suggested developing leadership elements among the exiles as "a very necessary political base" while putting together the "means to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and organize "cells and activities inside Cuba." The objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S.-engineered efforts from outside Cuba."¹² Cuba was to become another Vietnam, 1960s version. The bottom line in this strategy meant reversing Castro's popularity, although this was something Lansdale hadn't yet figured out just how to do. It was a task fit for *The Quiet American*.

Lansdale's quiet approach fit in with Kennedy's rock-and-hard-place predicament over the Berlin Wall; he had to avoid tweaking the Russian Bear's nose. As badly as he wanted Castro out of the way, he could not at that point be up front about it. On November 30, a memorandum to all concerned instructed that the Lansdale program "use our available assets . . . to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime."¹³ It was to be called, in Lansdale-like language, Operation Mongoose. The mongoose is a ferretlike mammal noted for its ferocity in killing poisonous snakes.

On November 28, two days before the Mongoose directive, Allen Dulles was chauffeured away from the CIA's spanking new headquarters on the banks of the Potomac River at Langley, Virginia, fired after eight years as director. There was special irony for Dulles in John Kennedy's words as he dedicated the huge mausoleum of a building that afternoon. "Your successes are unheralded," the President told the assembled CIA employees, "your failures are trumpeted." Dulles's most trumpeted failure had been the Bay of Pigs; the "something else" he had counted on hadn't happened.

Dulles had had signals that he was on the way out. His access to the Oval

and it was shown on maps as the South Campus. In turn, the university obligingly gave the CIA squatter's rights. The colonnaded white frame headquarters building was refurbished and became the "home office" of Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc., the dummy front that had been created for the invasion.

No effort was spared to give Zenith, which supposedly was engaged in electronics research, the touch of authenticity. Army Captain Bradley Earl Ayers, who was at JM/WAVE on detached duty, recalled:

I saw that they had missed no detail in setting up the false front of Zenith Technical Enterprises. There were phony sales and production charts on the walls and business licenses from the state and federal governments. A notice to salesmen, pinned near the door, advised them of the calling hours for various departments. The crowning touch was a certificate of award from the United Givers' Fund to Zenith for outstanding participation in its annual fund drive."

Zenith was listed in the white pages of the telephone directory.

The University Inn, close to the University of Miami campus, became the CIA's transient headquarters. Some senior agents, however, preferred other accommodations, such as the more uptown DuPont Plaza Hotel, at the mouth of the Miami River, the circular lines of which gave it a resemblance to the Watergate in Washington. A network of apartments and motel suites was rented for agents moving in for the duration. The CIA encouraged its personnel to "nest" together for security reasons. They tended to socialize together as well. Among the CIA watering holes of legend were the Stuft Shirt Lounge at the Holiday Inn on Brickell Avenue, the lounge in ITT's Three Ambassadors Hotel, the Waverley Inn, and the 27 Birds, which agents liked because it sounded like a code name.

The JM/WAVE station chief was Theodore Shackley, a promising young (thirty-four) protégé of future CIA Director William Colby. Tall, with a polished Boston accent, Shackley had been station chief in Laos and Saigon, the stamping grounds of General Lansdale, then was attached to the Berlin base (under William Harvey) during the crisis there. He was recalled to headquarters shortly after the Bay of Pigs to lead a team making a "vulnerability and feasibility study" of the Castro regime. In February 1962 Shackley arrived at JM/WAVE.

The deputy station chief was Gordon Campbell, a tall man with close-cropped silvering hair and a military bearing. Campbell oversaw the maritime branch which was vital to operations against the Cuban island. He lived appropriately enough on a yacht berthed at the Dinner Key Marina in south Miami. A big, vile-tempered New Mexico Indian named Dave ran

"consultants," came into being. Radio Swan also vanished, to reappear as the Vanguard subsidiary Radio Americas.¹⁵

The CIA was rather awkward about it. Vanguard retained Gibraltar's office suite and telephone number, although there was a changeover in staff and management. Well-known Florida businessman William H. West, Jr., became president, to be shortly succeeded by Roosevelt C. Houser, director of the large Miami National Bank. Manager Roger Butts described Radio Americas as "a privately owned commercial station operating on Swan Island" that was supported "by income from sponsors." But the station broadcast no commercials and was not even licensed by the FCC.

A new front, Paragon Air Service, was incorporated in Delaware for the stated purpose of engaging in air and sea commerce and research and development. Bradley Ayers, using the cover identity Daniel B. Williams, was one of those assigned to Paragon. He disclosed that its activities:

... were international in scope and were channeled into South Florida and the Caribbean through a complicated network of other CIA paper corporations and false contractual relationships with actual business firms. The firm had a Miami office, phone number and mailing address, bank accounts, lawyers, accountants and all the other tangible characteristics of a legitimate business. The Paragon Air Service phone actually rang in the cover branch [at JM/WAVE] and was answered by one of the station's staff. My alias of D. B. Williams included an employment record, social security number, character references and credit record.

Ayers used his real and cover identities interchangeably. "To remember who I was in any particular situation would take practice," he said.¹⁶

To transport commando and infiltration teams to Cuba, the CIA acquired a fleet of specially modified boats that were based at the Homestead Marina, not far from JM/WAVE, and other marinas throughout the Florida Keys. The boats were registered to Ace Cartography, Inc., which was chartered in July 1962 as a "marine survey" firm. The Ace address given on the articles of incorporation turned out to be the office of a Miami lawyer who was listed as vice-president. However, the names of the registered agents required by Florida law were more revealing. They were none other than William A. Robertson, Jr., and Grayston L. Lynch—"Rip" and "Gray"—the first Yanks ashore at the Bay of Pigs.

Since Operation Mongoose called for continuous sabotage raids, the CIA recruited exiles as frogmen with UDT (underwater demolition team) capabilities. The men were "employed" by a front called Marine Engineering and Training, which was incorporated shortly after Ace with an address

V

The Punta del Este daily, *El Día*, had an interesting item that had readers letting their soft-boiled eggs get cold on a February morning in 1962: "Ambassador Morrison has turned in his expense account for the day: Breakfast, \$1.50; Taxi in the morning, \$2; Lunch, \$2.50; Afternoon taxis, \$3; Dinner with the foreign minister of Haiti, \$5,000,000."

The ambassador was the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, DeLesseps S. Morrison. The rather dear dinner was actually a pledge to Haiti to build an airport in Port-au-Prince sufficient to bring Haiti into the jet age. The pledge was, in fact, a bribe, in return for Haiti's voting to oust Cuba from the OAS. DeLesseps Morrison was the Kennedy administration's point man for the not inconsiderable task of cutting off Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere. This involved both a diplomatic offensive and some skulduggery that were carried out in coordination with the Secret War.

Morrison was the ideal man to lead the Kennedy administration's diplomatic offensive. A handsome reform mayor of New Orleans, Chep Morrison was a stereotype New Frontiersman in style and politics. A. J. Liebling once described him as "a mélange of Jimmy Walker for looks and manner, Fiorello La Guardia for energy and probity, and Big Bad Bob Moses, the builder, for getting things done." His great-granduncle was Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French engineer who built the Suez Canal and tried to build the Panama Canal. A dashing widower, Morrison was frequently seen in nightclubs with ladies of the dazzle of Zsa Zsa Gabor. His politics were Kennedy politics: On domestic issues he was a liberal, one of the original voices of the New South, but when it came to communism, Morrison could have been mistaken for a John Bircher.

Although Morrison carried the title of Ambassador to the Organization of American States, he was in fact a roving JFK troubleshooter. After the Trujillo assassination he became JFK's Johnny-on-the-spot in Ciudad Trujillo to make sure that Trujillo's son kept communist fingers out of the power-sharing pie. Ambassador Morrison waterskied, drank, and danced aboard the Trujillo family yacht *Angelita*. He was not told that *el jefe's* body was stored in the refrigerator compartment belowdecks for fear of a Mussolini type of desecration.

In August 1961, Morrison led the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Economic and Social Conference at the Uruguayan seaside resort of Punta

Buenos Aires ran a long article accompanied by photocopies of the documents.

The article whipped up a storm of protest against Cuba, which claimed that the documents had been forged by Cuban exiles working in collusion with the CIA. That is exactly what had happened. The forgery was the opening shot in a campaign aimed at "proving" that Castro was "exporting" the revolution by subverting OAS nations. The goal was to help Morrison get Cuba kicked out of the OAS.

The Cuban exile magazine *Avance* inadvertently told too much. It reported that de la Torre had gone into asylum rather than comply with instructions from Havana to meet with Che Guevara at an upcoming Punta del Este conference. De la Torre was said to have gone to the consulate the day he quit and taken the documents, which he gave to the CRC's Tony Varona, who just happened to be staying in a Buenos Aires hotel. The real tipoff was *Avance's* boast that de la Torre had been collaborating with Cuban exile groups in Argentina for more than a year. If the consul had been a double agent for that long, his defection with the damning documents on the eve of a crucial conference hardly seemed coincidental.

The argument quickly escalated into an international *affaire d'honneur*. The U.S. State Department announced that it had exhaustively questioned de la Torre and was satisfied that the documents were genuine. Argentina, which had been trying to steer a neutral course since the Bay of Pigs, was skeptical. It wanted to examine the documents scientifically. The CRC sent photocopies but refused to make the originals available. Argentina insisted on the originals in order to make a conclusive examination. The CRC finally handed over what it said was a pertinent group of thirty-three documents.

Argentine documents experts were amazed at the crudity of the forgery. Only one of the thirty-three matched the photocopies previously sent, and that one had a forged signature and did not even relate to affairs of state. Tony Varona lamely explained that the CRC had not released all the documents to Argentina because it lacked faith in the Foreign Ministry and looked unfavorably on the continued diplomatic relations between Buenos Aires and Havana.

At the same time Cuba produced its own evidence of forgery. On October 9, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Olivares, whose "signature" appeared on many of the documents, met with the chiefs of a number of foreign diplomatic missions in Havana to point out that it was not he, but the head of the Foreign Ministry, who normally signed correspondence. And, Olivares said, when Foreign Minister Raúl Roa or he signed a document, a special wax seal would be impressed on their signatures. In addition,

he pointed out, the registration numbers were out of sequence, as the ministry's general registration book demonstrated.

Argentina closed its books on the affair. There was a familiar ring to it all, like a similar fast shuffle in Peru the previous year when an anti-Castro group "stole" a letter from the Cuban Embassy in Lima "proving" that Havana was fomenting a revolt. (It was this phony letter that William Pawley exploited to draw a commitment of Peruvian marines for the Bay of Pigs invasion. It has since been speculated that E. Howard Hunt had a hand in manufacturing the fake letter—one of his CIA specialties.)

To U.S. Ambassador Morrison, however, the suspect Argentine documents were as real as gold teeth. On October 13, Peru, acting for the United States, proposed that the OAS foreign ministers meet to consider expelling Cuba because of its subversive actions. Morrison addressed a letter to the OAS secretary-general in support of the Peruvian position, attaching two exhibits to "prove" his case. The exhibits were the bogus documents.

The conference began in the Uruguayan resort on January 30, 1962. It was clear from the start that Morrison would gain no easy victory. He was palpably upset when the Brazilian delegate "began by talking 'coexistence,'" putting the analogy "Why do we not consider Cuba to us as Finland is to the Soviet?" Mexico and Argentina—with Brazil, the three countries representing two-thirds of the people of Latin America—felt the same way. Morrison, who had been selling democracy, found himself having to woo such repressive regimes as Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Haiti to get the necessary two-thirds majority to oust Cuba.

That was when Morrison had his \$5 million dinner with the foreign minister of Haiti. Democratic Haiti cast the deciding vote that ousted Cuba.

It was an emotional moment for Chep Morrison. Dean Rusk gave the closing speech replete with such lines as "Wherever Communism goes, hunger follows." Tears welled up in Morrison's eyes.

"I confess I was never prouder to be an American," he said.

VI

At precisely ten-thirty on the night of August 24, 1962, two low-riding motorboats carrying the most unruly stepchildren of the CIA, the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE), slipped under the radar screen guarding Havana Bay and past two Czech-built patrol craft. Their target was the Hotel Icar near the water's edge in suburban Miramar. The DRE underground in Cuba had reported that every Friday evening newly arrived

Political trustworthiness was as much a job requirement as seamanship, and the crew was subjected to polygraph tests designed to ferret out any creeping Castro sentiments. The CIA could not afford any mutinies on its own *Bounty*.

At sea between West Palm Beach and Miami, the Cuban crew brought up the guns from belowdecks and secured the *Rex*'s heavy artillery—two 40 mm naval cannon, a .57 recoilless rifle, two 20 mm cannon, and two .50-caliber machine guns—in their topside mounts. The oceanographic research vessel was now a man-of-war.

Captain Brooks stood on the bridge under the black canopy of the Caribbean night. He opened the sealed orders that his landlubbing CIA commander had taken from his briefcase and handed to the Cuban with a flip salute. He used a flashlight to read them. What he read did nothing to ease the nervousness he had felt that afternoon. The *Rex*'s normal run was to stand off a mile and a half from the Cuban coast and dispatch landing parties in launches. Tonight, October 21, 1963, the *Rex* had a special mission which would bring it a dangerous half mile from the Cuban shore, well within the red zone of Castro's coastal defenses.

Off Elliot Key, an insignificant speck in the Caribbean below Miami, the *Rex* throttled back its twin screws. It had a date at sea. The captain strained to make out the rafts that were but a darker dark on the water. Suddenly there were two of them, stubby fingers extending from the hand of the night. The rafts were of black rubber; the men in them were dressed in black; they wore black stockings over their faces. They boarded the *Rex* in silence.

There were twelve of them. They were members of the Commandos Mambises, the elite of the CIA's anti-Castro commandos. They took their name from the determined guerrillas who had fought in Cuba's war of independence against Spain. Their emblem was the Lone Star of Cuba. They were the Green Berets of the Secret War.

The Commandos Mambises numbered fewer than fifty, mostly men without families to miss them. Their leader was Major Manuel Villafana, a Cuban General Patton known for his spit-and-polish sternness, who had commanded the Bay of Pigs air force. Major Villafana insisted that the CIA pay his men little; he wanted them motivated by hate, not money.

The Mambises' target was a half mile off to port when Captain Brooks ordered the *Rex* engines stopped in choppy seas. Cuba lay like a long brown cigar on the dim horizon. He looked at the luminous dial of his CIA-issue Rollex; it was four minutes before midnight. As his eyes searched the night, he gradually made out the alligator's tail of Pinar del Rio Province at the western end of the island. The Cape Corrientes light, normally flashing its

was registered out of Honduras, and Coast Guard records listed the owner as Exploration, Inc., with a Miami Shores address. "There is no telephone listing for the firm," Buchanan wrote, "and what's more, the address is not in Miami Shores." Canvassing the waterfront, Buchanan found out that the ship "slipped out of the harbor two or three times a month, returning in several days as quietly as she departed."

One night Buchanan went down to the ship and questioned the man on deck watch. "He replied he didn't know who owned the ship and just shook his head when asked the name of his employer." Returning in daylight with a camera, she found herself being photographed in return by a crewman. "The camera-wielding crewman claimed association with Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton," she said. "In heavily-accented English, he said the *Explorer* is 'an oceanographic ship,' gathering samples for the college. Asked what they do, he explained that they 'test water salinity and gather samples of sea life.'"

The pier owner who collected the ship's dockage fees was tight-lipped. "We handle her for an agent in Jacksonville," he said. "That's all I want to say about it." In Jacksonville the trail led to the Southeastern Shipping Corporation, the business of which, in papers filed with state regulatory agencies, was stated succinctly as "research." It was the standard cover for the Navy nobody knew. For her efforts, Buchanan was rewarded by her editors with a question mark. CIA SHIP? was the headline they tagged on her article.¹⁰

The smaller vessels of the CIA fleet included the heavy-duty, fifty-foot Swift boats the Navy employed in Vietnam. They were used for everything from landing frogmen off Cuba to dumping huge wads of foil to foul up Cuban coastal radar. One of the CIA Swift boats was registered to a firm called Ace Marine Survey, the president of which was a New Orleans public relations man who did work for such CIA-sponsored groups there as Friends of Democratic Cuba. Anyone checking Ace Marine Survey's Miami address found it to be smack in the middle of the Miami River. This odd situation so fascinated a local newspaper columnist that he dialed the number listed for the company in the telephone directory. The conversation, which may be apocryphal but was a longstanding source of amusement in soldier-of-fortune circles, began when the Miami columnist told the secretary who answered that she was underwater and asked, "What is your address?"

SECRETARY: Why do you want to know?

COLUMNIST: Well, where are you located?

Henry Luce believed that a morally slanted press was a responsible press. The manner in which the Lucepress carried out this precept led the cartoonist Herbert Lawrence Block, known more familiarly as Herblock, to observe that "it is Mr. Luce's unique contribution to American journalism that he placed into the hands of the people yesterday's newspaper and today's garbage homogenized into one neat package." *Life*, the flagship picture book of the Luce fleet, afforded photojournalism some of its finest moments, while the text accompanying the pictures that were worth thousands of words was slanted with an ideological warp sufficient to stir Caxton in his grave.

Claire
Booth
Luce's
telephone
call.

Lucepress executives were so anxious to do the bidding of their patriarch that their editorial commitment overspilled the printed pages of their publications, and they became spear carriers for the CIA. An instructive example of this interlocking of the free press and the espionage establishment is *Life*'s perennial publisher, C. D. Jackson. At a time shortly after the Dallas events of November 22, 1963, when the agency urgently desired to establish certain parameters of free speech for Lee Harvey Oswald's wife, Marina, Mrs. Oswald received a \$25,000 advance for a book never to be published. The advance came from a New York publisher but was actually arranged by Jackson and *Life*'s Edward K. Thompson, through their Dallas representative, one Isaac Don Levine, the dean of American anticommunist writers.³³

I'll bet that
they signed her
to an "exclusive"
contract to
publish a
book but
never published
it.

Jackson was president of the CIA's Free Europe Committee in the 1950s and was also special assistant to President Eisenhower for psychological warfare working on anticommunist propaganda for Eastern Europe. (In this capacity he worked with the same Isaac Don Levine, who was then with the CIA's Liberation Committee.)

Drew Pearson wrote in his *Diaries 1949-1959*, a book chock-full of the raw stuff of the fifties:

Life magazine is always pulling chestnuts out of the fire for the CIA; and I recall that C. D. Jackson of the Life-Time empire was the man who arranged for the CIA to finance the Freedom Balloons. C. D. Jackson, Harold Stassen and the other boys who went with me to Germany spent money like money while I paid my own way. I always was suspicious that a lot of dough was coming from unexplained quarters and didn't learn until sometime later that the CIA was footing the bill.³⁴

Reinhold Niebuhr, the theologian who shared Luce's Protestant faith, although not its temporal application, has remarked the dangers of the tendency to claim God as an ally for our partisan values as a source of

section of the anti-Castro movement: Gerry Hemming; members of the action group Student Revolutionary Directorate, which was under CIA supervision; Eddie Bayo; and John Martino. CIA foul-ups were discussed, but the question of the Russian missile officers was not brought up.

A second meeting was held a few weeks later in the office of Jack Gore, editor of the Fort Lauderdale *News*. Racoosin was there, along with Davis, Hemming, and Bayo. This time Frank Sturgis and a sidekick in his International Anti-Communist Brigade were invited. Sturgis was unhappy with the way things were going. After the *Baku* incident he had planned his own attack on a Russian ship, but British marines and Bahamian police had pounced on his men as they assembled on Norman's Cay. The Bahamian authorities, Sturgis was certain, had been tipped off by the FBI.

It was this meeting that brought William Pawley into the picture. The aging millionaire was working on his memoirs with author Nathaniel Weyl, the right-wing ghostwriter whose books in his own name included *Red Star over China* and *Red Star over Cuba*. At the same time the prolific Weyl was commissioned to ghostwrite John Martino's account of his three years in a Cuban prison entitled *I Was Castro's Prisoner*. Through Weyl, Martino arranged for two ex-CIA agents on Pawley's payroll to attend. And through Weyl's good offices he invited two Florida conservative leaders, Congressman William Kramer and Mrs. John H. Perry, Jr., wife of the publisher of the Palm Beach *Post-Times*.

Once again the discussion concentrated on the shortcomings of the CIA. When it was over, the participants broke up into small groups. Martino had Bayo show Kramer and Mrs. Perry his report from the underground and tell how he proposed to bring out the Russian officers. Hemming, who was listening, advised caution. "The Russians might have made up some remark about wanting to see the night life of Miami that was overinterpreted," he said. "And it might be an elaborate trap." Hemming noted that the report had been sent in the open mail via Mexico and Spain and that any area where Russians were stationed would be under extremely tight security.³⁹

But Bayo's tantalizing story apparently struck a responsive chord with someone who heard it. A short time later Pawley received a phone call from Washington that would set in motion Operation Red Cross.

Pawley's caller was Senator James O. Eastland, chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, before which the ambassador had testified in 1959 about the danger of a communist takeover in Cuba. A man named John Martino had been recommended to him, Eastland said, and had briefed him on the Russian officers project. The powerful Mississippi Demo-

Guy
Bennett
went to
work for
Eastland
right after
"freedom by
Harrison"
Also Eastland's office
has called here before.

VII

During World War II the Germans counterfeited tons of Bank of England notes with which they planned to wreck the British economy. Hostilities ended before the notes could be put in circulation. Mario García Kohly, a first-class extremist, was confident that he could undermine the Cuban economy with the same technique.

The short, wiry Kohly had bulldozed his way into the anti-Castro picture through the good offices of Richard Nixon. In October 1960 he had a memorable round of golf. The foursome was Vice President Nixon, Deputy CIA Director General Charles Cabell, Kohly, and Ed Kendricks, Kohly's CIA case officer. They talked politics down the fairways of the Burning Tree Golf and Country Club, Ike's favorite golf course.

The game had been arranged by Kohly's attorney, Marshall Diggs, through the intercession of the ultramontane former senator from Maine, Owen Brewster, a longtime Nixon ally. Kohly considered it a presidential game. He fully expected that Nixon would be the next President of the United States, and he saw himself as the next president of Cuba. He had organized a De Facto Government of Cuba in Exile, which, Kohly told Nixon, had the multitudes as followers. Nixon listened as Kohly outlined his own invasion plan called Operation Lake.⁴⁷

The Vice President was sufficiently impressed to ask the CIA to cooperate with Kohly. At age fifty-nine, Kohly had a checkered career behind him. His father had served as ambassador to Spain during the presidency of his good friend Carlos Prío. Kohly himself had contested Fulgencio Batista for a seat in Congress, and when Batista took power, Kohly wound up in jail for inflammatory speech making. Then Kohly reflexively opposed Fidel Castro as well. He told Nixon that Castro had put a \$1 million price tag on his head; this was largely Kohly's inflationary view of his own worth.

The CIA had previously dismissed Kohly as a blowhard whose only deep commitment was to himself. But with Nixon's intercession the agency felt compelled to hold a round of meetings with him. As a result, Kohly said he "had reason to believe that because of his large and well-organized underground in Cuba" and his status among the exiles, the agency would install him as number one among the exile leadership. It never happened. Kohly was unmanageable, a CIA no-no; besides, his Operation Lake was at cross purposes with the CIA's original Trinidad Plan for the invasion. Kohly bitterly complained that the CIA had "picked his brains" on Opera-

before the election!

Kohly's underground in Cuba to buy arms and supplies. Kohly thought it was a capital idea. His CIA case officer, Ed Kendricks, checked and reported that although federal laws would be violated, "clearance" had been obtained to proceed. A few months later Morrow proudly showed Kohly a flawless-looking batch of ten-peso notes he said had been run off on plates made with the assistance of engravers at the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing.⁵⁰

Shortly after, Morrow and Kendricks were called in by General Charles Cabell, the lame-duck CIA deputy director who, just prior to the 1960 election, had attended the conference between Kohly and Richard Nixon on the Burning Tree golf links. Cabell, according to Morrow, confided that the CIA was locked in a "feud" with the White House, so that it was necessary to act independently at times.

The general gave Morrow and Kendrick a carbon copy of a handwritten memo by the President which he said had been passed on by one of the Secret Service bodyguards. Morrow claims to have remembered almost its exact words:

Memorandum to the Attorney General:

JFK to his brother

If possible, try to apprehend all Cuban and American personnel currently engaged in manufacturing bogus Cuban currency. As you know, in its efforts to overthrow the Castro regime, the CIA has disregarded our direct orders and placed us in a politically embarrassing position. The names of all parties involved in the conspiracy should be in the agency's files.

Also, you might consider leaking to the Cuban authorities that a massive counterfeiting scheme may be launched against them that could jeopardize the Cuban economy.

Cabell said that he had sufficient forewarning to thwart the arrests, but that the same morning word was received from an agent in Havana that Castro had ordered new currency printed in Czechoslovakia. (On August 6, 1961, the Cuban government did, in fact, order all pesos to be exchanged at par for new ones, saying the measure was to remove inflationary pressures from the "hundreds of millions of pesos" held outside Cuba.) They would have to start over. "The job has to be done to perfection in order to fool the Banco Nacional de Cuba's new Russian currency validators," Cabell said. "Then the printing operation begins. My guess is it'll be September of 1963 before we'll have enough currency printed for a sizable operation."

"What if the president or attorney general finds out?" Morrow asked.

"Who's going to tell them?" Cabell replied. "We want Cuba's economy

*past-
election
Kennedy was
in the
White House.*

added to the project as a contact. According to González, Cubela "could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which permitted a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. government gave such equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions."⁶⁸

From FitzGerald's standpoint, it was a legitimate complaint. He instructed the Technical Services Division to invent such a device.

XI

Something big was in the works. Bradley Ayers could sense it at JM/WAVE. He tried to guess what was up as he rode along the Tamiami Trail deep into the Everglades. The CIA Cuban at the wheel wasn't talking. The agency seemed to be going to elaborate precautions to keep him in the dark. His instructions had been only to go to the Kendall Flying School at the Tamiami Airport. He was to wait until a car with a certain license plate drove up. That was his Cuban driver. In two hours on the road he hadn't said a word.

The late-afternoon shadows were closing in on the trees when the driver pulled off the highway onto a dirt road bordering a canal. An airboat was waiting. For the next half hour Ayers skimmed over saw grass. The plane landed at a run-down dock with a sign: WALOOS GLADES HUNTING CAMP. PRIVATE PROPERTY. NO TRESPASSING.

There was a clearing with two small Quonset huts. Two helicopters sat in the shadows. One was a military Bell H-13 with its registration numbers taped over; the other, a civilian model with the name of a West Palm Beach air service on the tail boom. Two men emerged from a Quonset into the flickering light of a campfire. One was Gordon Campbell, the JM/WAVE assistant CIA station chief in Miami. The other was the attorney general of the United States.⁶⁹

Ayers had met RFK once before, at a JM/WAVE cocktail party at a posh Key Biscayne home just after the stepped-up program had been authorized in June. Kennedy had apparently hopped over from the family compound in West Palm Beach to inspect preparations at the Everglades camp. He grasped Ayers's hand and wished him good luck on his mission. Ayers didn't yet know what it was. Then the younger Kennedy got in the civilian helicopter and flew off.

Campbell waved Ayers into a Quonset, which was brightly lit with Coleman lanterns. There were charts, maps, and papers on a table. "We just got

1ST

ICATION FOR
ST CARD
IN EXHIBIT 2481)

UNION MEXICANA
DE GOBERNACION
Nº 24085
POR 15 DIAS
NOMBRE POR 2 DIAS
HARVEY OSWALD
CRAFC
C3 Estado Civil S P
C 10
D. P.
OZIZAS LA. MEX.
LEONES DE 1963
1963
ALVARO JARAMILLO GUAN
NOMBRE LEON, 25 años
OCT 1963

Mexico City

what "evidence"?

an "in-transit" Cuban visa to permit him to enter Cuba on September 30 on the way to the Soviet Union. Marina Oswald has testified that these statements were deceptions designed to get him to Cuba.⁵²⁶ Thus, although it is possible that Oswald intended to continue on to Russia from Cuba, the evidence makes it more likely that he intended to remain in Cuba.⁵²⁷

Oswald departed from New Orleans probably about noon on September 25 and arrived in Mexico City at about 10 a.m. on September 27.⁵²⁸ In Mexico City he embarked on a series of visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies, which occupied most of his time during the first 2 days of his visit. At the Cuban Embassy, he requested an "in-transit" visa to permit him to visit Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union.⁵²⁹ Oswald was informed that he could not obtain a visa for entry into Cuba unless he first obtained a visa to enter the U.S.S.R.,⁵³⁰ and the Soviet Embassy told him that he could not expect an answer on his application for a visa for the Soviet Union for about 4 months.⁵³¹ Oswald carried with him newspaper clippings, letters and various documents, some of them forged or containing false information, purporting to show that he was a "friend" of Cuba.⁵³² With these papers and his record of previous residence in the Soviet Union and marriage to a Soviet national, he tried to curry favor with both Embassies.⁵³³ Indeed, his wife testified that in her opinion Oswald's primary purpose in having engaged in Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities was to create a public record that he was a "friend" of Cuba.⁵³⁴ He made himself especially unpopular at the Cuban Embassy by persisting in his demands that as a sympathizer in Cuban objectives he ought to be given a visa. This resulted in a sharp argument with the consul, Eusebio Azque.⁵³⁵


By Saturday, September 28, 1963, Oswald had failed to obtain visas at both Embassies.⁵³⁶ From Sunday, September 29, through Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mexico City on a bus bound for the United States, Oswald spent considerable time making his travel arrangements, sightseeing and checking again with the Soviet Embassy to learn whether anything had happened on his visa application.⁵³⁷ Marina Oswald testified that when she first saw him after his return to the United States he was disappointed and discouraged at his failure to reach Cuba.⁵³⁸

The general outlines of Oswald's activities in Mexico, particularly the nature and extent of his contacts at the Cuban Embassy, were learned very early in the investigation. An important source of information relating to his business at the Cuban Embassy was Senora Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national employed in the visa section of the Cuban Embassy, who was questioned intensively by Mexican authorities soon after the assassination.⁵³⁹ An excerpt from the report of the Mexican Government summarized the crucial portion of Senora Duran's recollection of Oswald. In translation it reads as follows:

*** she remembered *** [that Lee Harvey Oswald] was the name of an American who had come to the Cuban Consulate to

Never questioned by Warren Commission (after being arrested twice)

obtain a visa to travel to Cuba in transit to Russia, the latter part of September or the early part of October of this year, and in support of his application had shown his passport, in which it was noted that he had lived in that country for a period of three years; his labor card from the same country written in the Russian language; and letters in that same language. He had presented evidence that he was married to a Russian woman, and also that he was apparently the leader of an organization in the city of New Orleans called "Fair * * * [Play] for Cuba," claiming that he should be accepted as a "friend" of the Cuban Revolution. Accordingly, the declarant, complying with her duties, took down all of the information and completed the appropriate application form; and the declarant, admittedly exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian consulate, with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. However, they told her that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case, which annoyed the applicant since, according to his statement, he was in a great hurry to obtain visas that would enable him to travel to Russia, insisting on his right to do so in view of his background and his loyalty and his activities in behalf of the Cuban movement. The declarant was unable to recall accurately whether or not the applicant told her he was a member of the Communist Party, but he did say that his wife * * * was then in New York City, and would follow him. * * * [Senora Dufan stated] that when Oswald understood that it was not possible to give him a Cuban visa without his first having obtained the Russian visa, * * * he became very excited or angry, and accordingly, the affiant called Consul Ascue [sic], * * * [who] came out and began a heated discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Ascue telling him that "if it were up to him, he would not give him the visa," and "a person of his type was harming the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it," it being understood that in their conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Oswald maintained that he had two reasons for requesting that his visa be issued promptly, and they were: one, that his tourist permit in Mexico was about to expire; and the other, that he had to get to Russia as quickly as possible. Despite her annoyance, the declarant gave Oswald a paper * * * in which she put down her name, "Silvia Durán," and the number of the telephone at the consulate, which is "11-28-47" and the visa application was processed anyway. It was sent to the Ministry of [Foreign] Relations of Cuba; from which a routine reply was received some fifteen to thirty days later, approving the visa, but on the condition that the Russian visa be obtained first, although she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she gave him.⁵⁴⁰



...the latter part of this year, and in 1963, in which it was closed for three years; the Russian language and presented evidence and also that he was in the city of New Orleans claiming that he was a member of the Revolution. Accuties, took down the appropriate application for her responsibility, with the insurance of the Russian. They told her that processing the case, to his statement, would enable him to view of his back half of the Cuban recall accurately a member of the * * * was then * [Senora Duran as not possible to obtained the Russian, and accord- * [who] came out Oswald, that con- to him, he would type was harming it being under- about the Rus- Oswald main- that his visa be tourist permit in he had to get to annoyance, the de- he put down her telephone at the lication was pro- [Foreign] Rela- tions received some- , but on the con- although she does phoned her at the

OSWALD'S APPLICATION FOR A VISA FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA AND THE REPLY OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT

(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2564)



OSWALD'S APPLICATION



TRANSLATION



CUBAN REPLY



TRANSLATION

BOTH DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA

With the dates of Oswald's entry into and departure from Mexico, which had been obtained from the records of the Mexican Immigration Service very shortly after the assassination, the Government of Mexico initiated a thorough investigation to uncover as much information as possible on Oswald's trip.⁵⁴¹ Representatives of U.S. agencies worked in close liaison with the Mexican law enforcement authorities. The result of this investigative effort was to corroborate the statements of Senora Duran and to verify the essentials of Oswald's activities in Mexico as outlined above.

Senora Duran is a well-educated native of Mexico, who was 26 years old at the time of her interrogation. She is married to Senor Horacio Duran Navarro, a 40-year-old industrial designer, and has a young child. Although Senora Duran denies being a member of the Communist Party or otherwise connected with it, both Durans have been active in far left political affairs in Mexico, believe in Marxist ideology, and sympathize with the government of Fidel Castro.⁵⁴² and Senor Duran has written articles for El Dia, a pro-Communist newspaper in Mexico City.⁵⁴³ The Commission has reliable evidence from a confidential source that Senora Duran as well as other personnel at the Cuban Embassy were genuinely upset upon receiving news of President Kennedy's death. Senora Duran's statements were made to Mexican officials soon after the assassination,⁵⁴⁴ and no significant inaccuracies in them have been detected. Documents fitting the description given by Senora Duran of the documents Oswald had shown her, plus a notation which she said she had given him, were found among his possessions after his arrest.⁵⁴⁵

The Cuban Government was asked to document and confirm the essentials of Senora Duran's testimony. Its response, which has been included in its entirety in this Report, included a summary statement of Oswald's activities at the Cuban Embassy,⁵⁴⁶ a photograph of the application for a visa he completed there,⁵⁴⁷ and a photograph of the communication from Havana rejecting the application unless he could first present a Soviet visa.⁵⁴⁸ (See Commission Exhibit No. 2564, p. 306.) The information on these documents concerning Oswald's date of birth, American passport number and activities and statements at the Embassy is consistent with other information available to the Commission.⁵⁴⁹ CIA experts have given their opinion that the handwriting on the visa application which purports to be Oswald's is in fact his and that, although the handwritten notations on the bottom of the document are too brief and faint to permit a conclusive determination, they are probably Senora Duran's.⁵⁵⁰ The clothes which Oswald was wearing in the photograph which appears on the application appear to be the same as some of those found among his effects after the assassination, and the photograph itself appears to be from the same negative as a photograph found among his effects.⁵⁵¹ Nothing on any of the documents raises a suspicion that they might not be authentic.

By far the most important testimony, however, is the high reliability of the information from the United States.

The investigation of Oswald's journey to Mexico City, where he stayed in Mexico City, All known persons including passengers of the hotel where he stayed, witnesses has been while in Mexico City, to and from Mexico City, where he frequented he sat down at a table was available language barrier bus to Mexico City, has been identified Osborne denies other passengers not previously revealed no further responses to Federal have proved inconsistent contrary evidence mission has attached him on the bus. ever, disclose no assassination.⁵⁵²

Investigation uncover any evidence late to Oswald's there is no indication or revolutionary the hotel where he was staying, thing creating suspicion him to Mexico City, lined Office in Mexico City, Mexican authorities a confidential check that Oswald visited.

Allegations of conspiratorial contamination have been made were alleged.

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Probably the same "experts"
that wrote the letter

departure from Mexico, the Mexican Immigration Service, the Government of Mexico, and the Government of the United States. The Government of the United States has as much information as the Government of Mexico. The Government of the United States has as much information as the Government of Mexico. The Government of the United States has as much information as the Government of Mexico.

Mexico, who was 26 years old, is married to Senora Duran, a designer, and has a daughter, a member of the Communist Party, both Durans have been known to believe in Marxist ideology. Senora Duran, a pro-Communist, has reliable evidence that Senora Duran as well as her husband are genuinely upset upon the assassination of Senora Duran after the assassination. Senora Duran has been detected. Senora Duran of the assassination which she said she had no possessions after his

assassination and confirm the evidence, which has been a summary statement of a photograph of the assassination. A photograph of the assassination unless he could not be Exhibit No. 2564, concerning Oswald's activities and statements available to the Commission. The Commission has the opinion that the handwriting is Oswald's in the bottom of the envelope. The clothes which appear on the application and among his effects appear to be from the effects. Nothing appears to be from the effects.

The clothes which appear on the application and among his effects appear to be from the effects. Nothing appears to be from the effects.

By far the most important confirmation of Senora Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States in Mexico. The information from these sources establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects. The identities of these sources cannot be disclosed without destroying their future usefulness to the United States.

The investigation of the Commission has produced considerable testimonial and documentary evidence establishing the precise time of Oswald's journey, his means of transportation, the hotel at which he stayed in Mexico City, and a restaurant at which he often ate. All known persons whom Oswald may have met while in Mexico, including passengers on the buses he rode,⁵⁵² and the employees and guests of the hotel where he stayed,⁵⁵³ were interviewed. No credible witness has been located who saw Oswald with any unidentified person while in Mexico City; to the contrary, he was observed traveling alone to and from Mexico City,⁵⁵⁴ at his hotel,⁵⁵⁵ and at the nearby restaurant where he frequently ate.⁵⁵⁶ A hotel guest stated that on one occasion he sat down at a table with Oswald at the restaurant because no empty table was available, but that neither spoke to the other because of the language barrier.⁵⁵⁷ Two Australian girls who saw Oswald on the bus to Mexico City relate that he occupied a seat next to a man who has been identified as Albert Osborne, an elderly itinerant preacher.⁵⁵⁸ Osborne denies that Oswald was beside him on the bus.⁵⁵⁹ To the other passengers on the bus it appeared that Osborne and Oswald had not previously met,⁵⁶⁰ and extensive investigation of Osborne has revealed no further contact between him and Oswald. Osborne's responses to Federal investigators on matters unrelated to Oswald have proved inconsistent and unreliable, and, therefore, based on the contrary evidence and Osborne's lack of reliability, the Commission has attached no credence to his denial that Oswald was beside him on the bus. Investigation of his background and activities, however, disclose no basis for suspecting him of any involvement in the assassination.⁵⁶¹

Investigation of the hotel at which Oswald stayed has failed to uncover any evidence that the hotel is unusual in any way that could relate to Oswald's visit. It is not especially popular among Cubans, and there is no indication that it is used as a meeting place for extremist or revolutionary organizations.⁵⁶² Investigation of other guests of the hotel who were there when Oswald was has failed to uncover anything creating suspicion.⁵⁶³ Oswald's notebook which he carried with him to Mexico City contained the telephone number of the Cuban Airlines Office in Mexico City;⁵⁶⁴ however, a Cuban visa is required by Mexican authorities before an individual may enplane for Cuba,⁵⁶⁵ and a confidential check of the Cuban Airlines Office uncovered no evidence that Oswald visited their offices while in the city.⁵⁶⁶

Allegations of conspiracy.—Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated by the Commission. Among the claims made were allegations that Oswald had made a previous trip to

Alleged attempt "to get to Cuba"

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Marina Oswald testified that her husband engaged in Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities "primarily for purposes of self-advertising. He wanted to be arrested. I think he wanted to get into the newspapers, so that he would be known." 379 According to Marina Oswald, he thought that would help him when he got to Cuba. 380 He asked his wife to help him to hijack an airplane to get there, but gave up that scheme when she refused. 381

During this period Oswald may have practiced opening and closing the bolt on his rifle in a screened porch in his apartment. 382 In September he began to review Spanish. 383 He approved arrangements for his family to return to Irving, Tex., to live with Mrs. Ruth Paine. 384 On September 20, 1963, Mrs. Paine and her two children arrived in New Orleans from a trip to the East Coast 385 and left for Irving with Marina Oswald and June and most of the Oswalds' effects 3 days later. 386 While Marina Oswald knew of her husband's plan to go to Mexico and thence to Cuba if possible, 387 Mrs. Paine was told that Oswald was going to Houston and possibly to Philadelphia to look for work. 388

Oswald left for Mexico City on September 25, 1963, and arrived on September 27, 1963. 389 He went almost directly to the Cuban Embassy and applied for a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia. 389 Representing himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the "organization called 'Fair Play for Cuba,' he stated his desire that he should be accepted as a 'friend' of the Cuban Revolution." 390 He apparently based his claim for a visa in transit to Russia on his previous residence, his work permit for that country, and several unidentified letters in the Russian language. The Cubans would not, however, give him a visa until he had received one from the Soviets, which involved a delay of several months. When faced with that situation Oswald became greatly agitated, and although he later unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a Soviet visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, he insisted that he was entitled to the Cuban visa because of his background, partisanship, and personal activities on behalf of the Cuban movement. He engaged in an angry argument with the consul who finally told him that "as far as he was concerned he would not give him a visa" and that "a person like him [Oswald] in place of aiding the Cuban Revolution, was doing it harm." 391

Oswald must have been thoroughly disillusioned when he left Mexico City on October 2, 1963. In spite of his former residence in the Soviet Union and his Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities he had been rebuffed by the officials of both Cuba and the Soviet Union in Mexico City. Now there appeared to be no chance to get to Cuba, where he had thought he might find his communist ideal. The U.S. Government would not permit travel there and as far as the performance of the Cubans themselves was concerned, he was "disappointed at not being able to get to Cuba, and he didn't have any great desire to do so any more because he had run into, as he himself said—into bureaucracy and red tape." 392

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The next word about Oswald's location was a communication from the CIA to the FBI on October 10, advising that an individual tentatively identified as Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in early October of 1963.⁹⁸ The Bureau had had no earlier information suggesting that Oswald had left the United States. The possible contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico intensified the FBI's interest in learning Oswald's whereabouts.⁹⁹ The FBI representative in Mexico City arranged to follow up this information with the CIA and to verify Oswald's entry into Mexico.¹⁰⁰ The CIA message was sent also to the Department of State where it was reviewed by personnel of the Passport Office, who knew from Oswald's file that he had sought and obtained a passport on June 25, 1963.¹⁰¹ The Department of State did not advise either the CIA or the FBI of these facts.¹⁰²

On October 25, the New Orleans office of the FBI learned that in September Oswald had given a forwarding address of 2515 West Fifth Street, Irving, Tex.¹⁰⁵ After receiving this information on October 29, Agent Hosty attempted to locate Oswald. On the same day Hosty interviewed neighbors on Fifth Street and learned that the address was that of Mrs. Ruth Paine.¹⁰⁶ He conducted a limited background investigation of the Paines, intending to interview Mrs. Paine and ask her particularly about Oswald's whereabouts.¹⁰⁷

Having determined that Mrs. Paine was a responsible and reliable citizen, Hosty interviewed her on November 1. The interview lasted about 20-25 minutes.¹⁰⁶ In response to Hosty's inquiries, Mrs. Paine

*** readily admitted that Mrs. Marina Oswald and Lee Oswald's two children were staying with her. She said that Lee Oswald was living somewhere in Dallas. She didn't know where. She said it was in the Oak Cliff area but she didn't have his address.

I asked her if she knew where he worked. After a moment's hesitation, she told me that he worked at the Texas School Book Depository near the downtown area of Dallas. She didn't have the exact address, and it is my recollection that we went to the phone book and looked it up, found it to be 411 Elm Street, and

Mrs. Paine told Hosty also that Oswald was living alone in Dallas because she did not want him staying at her house, although she was willing to let Oswald visit his wife and children.¹⁰⁸ According to Hosty, Mrs. Paine indicated that she thought she could find out where Oswald was living and would let him know.¹⁰⁹ At this point in the interview, Hosty gave Mrs. Paine his name and office telephone number on a piece of paper.¹¹⁰ At the end of the interview, Marina Oswald came into the room. When he observed that she seemed "quite alarmed" about the visit, Hosty assured her, through Mrs. Paine as interpreter, that the FBI would not harm or harass her.¹¹¹

On November 4, Hosty telephoned the Texas School Book Depository and learned that Oswald was working there and that he had given

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in greater detail in chapter VIII. She did not then know Oswald's address in Dallas.³⁶⁷ She was not asked for, nor did she volunteer, Oswald's telephone number in Dallas, which she did know.³⁶⁸ She advised the Bureau agent to whom she spoke of Oswald's periodic weekend visits, and she informed him that Oswald was employed at the Texas School Book Depository Building.³⁶⁹

On November 10, Ruth Paine discovered a draft of Oswald's letter written the day before to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, in which he indicated that he had journeyed to Mexico City and conferred with a "comrade Kostine in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico."³⁷⁰ (This letter is discussed later in this chapter.) Mr. and Mrs. Paine testified that although they initially assumed the letter was a figment of Oswald's imagination, the letter gave Mrs. Paine considerable misgivings.³⁷¹ She determined that if the FBI agents returned she would deliver to them the copy of a draft of the letter which, unknown to Oswald, she had made.³⁷² However, the agents did not return before the assassination.³⁷³ On November 19, Mrs. Paine learned that Oswald was living in his Dallas rooming-house under an assumed name.³⁷⁴ She did not report this to the FBI because, as she testified, she "had no occasion to see them, and * * * did not think it important enough to call them after that until the 23d of November."³⁷⁵

The Commission has thoroughly investigated the background of both Paines. Mrs. Paine was born Ruth Hyde in New York City on September 3, 1932. Her parents moved to Columbus, Ohio, in the late 1930's.³⁷⁶ They were divorced in 1961.³⁷⁷ Ruth Paine graduated from Antioch College in 1955.³⁷⁸ While in high school she first became interested in Quaker activities; she and her brother became Quakers in 1951.³⁷⁹ In 1952, following completion of her sophomore year at Antioch College, she was a delegate to two Friends conferences in England.³⁸⁰

At the time the Paines met in 1955, Mrs. Paine was active in the work of the Young Friends Committee of North America, which, with the cooperation of the Department of State, was making an effort to lessen the tensions between Soviet Russia and the United States by means of the stimulation of contacts and exchange of cultures between citizens of the two nations through "pen-pal" correspondence and exchanges of young Russians and Americans.³⁸¹ It was during this period that Mrs. Paine became interested in the Russian language.³⁸² Mrs. Paine participated in a Russian-American student exchange program sponsored by the Young Friends Committee of North America, and has participated in the "pen-pal" phase of the activities of the Young Friends Committee.³⁸³ She has corresponded until recently with a schoolteacher in Russia.³⁸⁴ Although her active interest in the Friends' program for the lessening of East-West tensions ceased upon her marriage in December 1957, she has continued to hold to the tenets of the Quaker faith.³⁸⁵

Michael Paine is the son of George Lyman Paine and Ruth Forbes Paine, now Ruth Forbes Young, wife of Arthur Young of Phila-

Ripley
in Oswald's wallet did not exhibit a great deal of skill, pointing out various errors that had been committed.⁶¹⁵ Oswald's supervisor at Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall has stated that Oswald seemed unable to perform photographic work with precision, which was one of the main reasons for which he was ultimately discharged.⁶¹⁶ The retouched negatives used to make Oswald's counterfeit certificate of service identification were found among Oswald's personal effects after his arrest, as was a rubber stamping kit apparently employed to produce his spurious international certificate of vaccination.⁶¹⁷ There is strong evidence, therefore, that Oswald himself made the various pieces of counterfeit identification which he carried, and there is no reason to believe that he received assistance from any person in establishing his alias.

Oswald also used incorrect names other than Hidell, but these do appear unconnected with any form of conspiracy. Oswald's last name appears as "Lee" in three places in connection with his trip to Mexico City, discussed above. His tourist card was typed by the Mexican consulate in New Orleans, "Lee Harvey Oswald."⁶¹⁸ However, the comma seems to have been a clerical error, since Oswald signed both the application and the card itself, "Lee H. Oswald." Moreover, Oswald seems originally to have also printed his name, evenly spaced, as "Lee H Oswald," but, noting that the form instructed him to "Print full name. No initials," printed the remainder of his middle name after the "H." The clerk who typed the card thus saw a space after "Lee," followed by "Harvey-Oswald" crowded together, and probably assumed that "Lee" was the applicant's last name. (See Commission Exhibit 2481, p. 300.) The clerk who prepared Oswald's bus reservation for his return trip wrote "H. O. Lee." He stated that he did not remember the occasion, although he was sure from the handwriting and from other facts that he had dealt with Oswald. He surmised that he probably made out the reservation directly from the tourist card, since Oswald spoke no Spanish, and, seeing the comma, wrote the name "H. O. Lee."⁶¹⁹ Oswald himself signed the register at the hotel in Mexico City as "Lee, Harvey Oswald,"⁶²⁰ but since the error is identical to that on the tourist card and since he revealed the remainder of his name, "Harvey Oswald," it is possible that Oswald inserted the comma to conform to the tourist card, or that the earlier mistake suggested a new pseudonym to Oswald which he decided to continue.

In any event, Oswald used his correct name in making reservations for the trip to Mexico City, in introducing himself to passengers on the bus, and in his dealings with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.⁶²¹ When registering at the Beckley Avenue house in mid-October, Oswald perpetuated the pseudonym by giving his name as "O. H. Lee,"⁶²² though he had given his correct name to the owner of the previous roominghouse where he had rented a room after his return from Mexico City.⁶²³ Investigations of the Commission have been conducted with regard to persons using the name "Lee," and no evidence

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has been found that Oswald used this alias for the purpose of making
any type of secret contacts.

Oswald is also known to have used the surname "Osborne" in order-
ing Fair Play for Cuba Committee handbills in May 1963.⁶²⁴ He also
used the false name D. F. Drittel as a certifying witness on the mail-
order coupon with which he purchased his Smith & Wesson revolver.⁶²⁵
He used the name Lt. J. Evans as a reference on an employment ap-
plication in New Orleans.⁶²⁶

Oswald's repeated use of false names is probably not to be disasso-
ciated from his antisocial and criminal inclinations. No doubt he
purchased his weapons under the name of Hidell in attempt to prevent
their ownership from being traced. Oswald's creation of false names
and fictitious personalities is treated in the discussion of possible
motives set forth in chapter VII. Whatever its significance in that
respect may be, the Commission has found no indication that Oswald's
use of aliases was linked with any conspiracy with others.

*Dial
Ryder* *Early
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Ownership of a second rifle.—The Commission has investigated a
report that, during the first 2 weeks of November 1963, Oswald had
a telescopic sight mounted and sighted on a rifle at a sporting goods
store in Irving, Tex. The main evidence that Oswald had such work
performed for him is an undated repair tag bearing the name "Oswald"
from the Irving Sports Shop in Irving, Tex. On November 25,
1963, Dial D. Ryder, an employee of the Irving Sports Shop, presented
this tag to agents of the FBI, claiming that the tag was in his hand-
writing. The undated tag indicated that three holes had been drilled
in an unspecified type of rifle and a telescopic sight had been mounted
on the rifle and boresighted.⁶²⁷

As discussed in chapter IV, the telescopic sight on the C2766 Mann-
licher-Carcano rifle was already mounted when shipped to Oswald,⁶²⁸
and both Ryder and his employer, Charles W. Greener, feel cer-
tain that they never did any work on this rifle.⁶²⁹ If the repair tag
actually represented a transaction involving Lee Harvey Oswald,
therefore, it would mean that Oswald owned another rifle. Although
this would not alter the evidence which establishes Oswald's owner-
ship of the rifle used to assassinate President Kennedy, the possession
of a second rifle warranted investigation because it would indicate that
a possibly important part of Oswald's life had not been uncovered.

Since all of Oswald's known transactions in connection with fire-
arms after his return to the United States were undertaken under an
assumed name,⁶²⁹ it seems unlikely that if he did have repairs made at
the sports shop he would have used his real name. Investigation has
revealed that the authenticity of the repair tag bearing Oswald's name
is indeed subject to grave doubts. Ryder testified that he found the
repair tag while cleaning his workbench on November 23, 1963.⁶³⁰
However, Ryder spoke with Greener repeatedly during the period be-
tween November 22-28 and, sometime prior to November 25, he dis-
cussed with him the possibility that Oswald had been in the store.
Neither he nor Greener could remember that he had been. But despite
these conversations with Greener, it is significant that Ryder never

called the repair tag to his employer's attention. Greener did not learn about the tag until November 28, when he was called by TV reporters after the story had appeared in the Dallas Times-Herald.⁶³¹ The peculiarity of Ryder's silence is compounded by the fact that, when speaking to the FBI on November 25, Ryder fixed the period during which the tag had been issued as November 1-14, 1963, yet, from his later testimony, it appears that he did so on the basis that it must have occurred when Greener was on vacation since Greener did not remember the transaction.⁶³² Moreover, the FBI had been directed to the Irving Sports Shop by anonymous telephone calls received by its Dallas office and by a local television station. The anonymous male who telephoned the Bureau attributed his information to an unidentified sack boy at a specified supermarket in Irving, but investigation has failed to verify this source.⁶³³

Neither Ryder nor Greener claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald had ever been a customer in the Irving Sports Shop. Neither has any recollection of either Oswald or his Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, nor does either recall the transaction allegedly represented by the repair tag or the person for whom the repair was supposedly made.⁶³⁴ Although Ryder stated to the FBI that he was "quite sure" that he had seen Oswald and that Oswald may have been in the store at one time, when shown a photograph of Oswald during his deposition, Ryder testified he knew the picture to be of Oswald, "as the pictures in the paper, but as far as seeing the guy personally, I don't think I ever have."⁶³⁵

Subsequent events also reflect on Ryder's credibility. In his deposition, Ryder emphatically denied that he talked to any reporters about this matter prior to the time a story about it appeared in the November 28, 1963, edition of the Dallas Times-Herald.⁶³⁶ Earlier, however, he told an agent of the U.S. Secret Service that the newspaper had misquoted him.⁶³⁷ Moreover, a reporter for the Dallas Times-Herald has testified that on November 28, 1963, he called Ryder at his home and obtained from him all of the details of the alleged transaction, and his story is supported by the testimony of a second reporter who overheard one end of the telephone conversation.⁶³⁸ No other person by the name of Oswald in the Dallas-Fort Worth area has been found who had a rifle repaired at the Irving Sports Shop.⁶³⁹

Possible corroboration for Ryder's story is provided by two women, Mrs. Edith Whitworth, who operates the Furniture Mart, a furniture store located about 1½ blocks from the Irving Sports Shop, and Mrs. Gertrude Hunter, a friend of Mrs. Whitworth. They testified that in early November of 1963, a man who they later came to believe was Oswald drove up to the Furniture Mart in a two-tone blue and white 1957 Ford automobile, entered the store and asked about a part for a gun, presumably because of a sign that appeared in the building advertising a gunsmith shop that had formerly occupied part of the premises. When he found that he could not obtain the part, the man allegedly returned to his car and then came back into the store with a woman and two young children to look at furniture, remaining in the store for about 30 to 40 minutes.⁶⁴⁰

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Upon confronting Marina Oswald, both women identified her as the woman whom they had seen in the store on the occasion in question, although Mrs. Hunter could not identify a picture of Lee Harvey Oswald and Mrs. Whitworth identified some pictures of Oswald but not others. Mrs. Hunter purported to identify Marina Oswald by her eyes, and did not observe the fact that Marina Oswald had a front tooth missing at the time she supposedly saw her.⁶⁴¹ After a thorough inspection of the Furniture Mart, Marina Oswald testified that she had never been on the premises before.⁶⁴²

The circumstances surrounding the testimony of the two women are helpful in evaluating the weight to be given to their testimony, and the extent to which they lend support to Ryder's evidence. The women previously told newspaper reporters that the part for which the man was looking was a "plunger," which the Commission has been advised is a colloquial term used to describe a firing pin.⁶⁴³ This work was completely different from the work covered by Ryder's repair tag, and the firing pin of the assassination weapon does not appear to have been recently replaced.⁶⁴⁴ At the time of their depositions, neither woman was able to recall the type of work which the man wanted done.⁶⁴⁵

Mrs. Whitworth related to the FBI that the man told her that the younger child with him was born on October 20, 1963, which was in fact Rachel Oswald's birthday.⁶⁴⁶ In her testimony before the Commission, however, Mrs. Whitworth could not state that the man had told her the child's birthdate was October 20, 1963, and in fact expressed uncertainty about the birthday of her own grandchild, which she had previously used as a guide to remembering the birthdate of the younger child in the shop.⁶⁴⁷ Mrs. Hunter thought that the man she and Mrs. Whitworth believed was Oswald drove the car to and from the store;⁶⁴⁸ however, Lee Harvey Oswald apparently was not able to drive an automobile by himself and does not appear to have had access to a car.⁶⁴⁹

The two women claimed that Oswald was in the Furniture Mart on a weekday, and in midafternoon. However, Oswald had reported to work at the Texas School Book Depository on the dates referred to by the women and there is no evidence that he left his job during business hours.⁶⁵⁰ In addition, Ruth Paine has stated that she always accompanied Marina Oswald whenever Marina left the house with her children and that they never went to the Furniture Mart, either with or without Lee Harvey Oswald, at any time during October or November of 1963.⁶⁵¹ There is nothing to indicate that in November the Oswalds were interested in buying furniture.⁶⁵²

Finally, investigation has produced reason to question the credibility of Mrs. Hunter as a witness. Mrs. Hunter stated that one of the reasons she remembers the description of the car in which Oswald supposedly drove to the furniture store was that she was awaiting the arrival of a friend from Houston, who drove a similar automobile.⁶⁵³ However, the friend in Houston has advised that in November 1963, she never visited or planned to visit Dallas, and that she

told no one that she intended to make such a trip. Moreover the friend added, according to the FBI interview report, that Mrs. Hunter has "a strange obsession for attempting to inject herself into any big event which comes to her attention" and that she "is likely to claim some personal knowledge of any major crime which receives much publicity."⁶⁵⁴ She concluded that "the entire family is aware of these 'tall tales' Mrs. Hunter tells and they normally pay no attention to her."⁶⁵⁵

Another allegation relating to the possible ownership of a second rifle by Oswald comes from Robert Adrian Taylor, a mechanic at a service station in Irving. Some 3 weeks after the assassination, Taylor reported to the FBI that he thought that, in March or April of 1963, a man he believed to be Oswald had been a passenger in an automobile that stopped at his station for repairs; since neither the driver nor the passenger had sufficient funds for the repair work, the person believed to be Oswald sold a U.S. Army rifle to Mr. Taylor, using the proceeds to pay for the repairs.⁶⁵⁶ However, a second employee at the service station, who recalled the incident, believed that, despite a slight resemblance, the passenger was not Oswald.⁶⁵⁷ Upon reflection, Taylor himself stated that he is very doubtful that the man was Oswald.⁶⁵⁸

Rifle practice.—Several witnesses believed that in the weeks preceding the assassination, they observed a man resembling Oswald practicing with a rifle in the fields and wooded areas surrounding Dallas, and at rifle ranges in that area. Some witnesses claimed Oswald was alone, while others said he was accompanied by one or more other persons. In most instances, investigation has disclosed that there is no substantial basis for believing that the person reported by the various witnesses was Oswald.⁶⁵⁹

One group of witnesses, however, believed that they observed Lee Harvey Oswald at the Sports Drome Rifle Range in Dallas at various times from September through November of 1963. In light of the number of witnesses, the similarity of the descriptions of the man they saw, and the type of weapon they thought the individual was shooting, there is reason to believe that these witnesses did see the same person at the firing range, although the testimony of none of these witnesses is fully consistent with the reported observations of the other witnesses.

The witnesses who claimed to have seen Oswald at the firing range had more than a passing notice of the person they observed. Malcolm H. Price, Jr., adjusted the scope on the individual's rifle on one occasion;⁶⁶⁰ Garland G. Slack had an altercation with the individual on another occasion because he was shooting at Slack's target;⁶⁶¹ and Sterling C. Wood, who on a third date was present at the range with his father, Dr. Homer Wood, spoke with his father and very briefly with the man himself about the individual's rifle.⁶⁶² All three of these persons, as well as Dr. Wood, expressed confidence that the man they saw was Oswald.⁶⁶³ Two other persons believed they saw

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Moreover, unknown per have been in events testifying describing the also, describing he saw the man is persuasive home in Irving the man who a 1940 or 194 not drive at access to such aliases was Drome Rifle register.⁶⁶⁴ portedly consistent among tion ascertain bearded man there, although the bearded connection w

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Although the testimony of these witnesses was partially corroborated
by other witnesses,⁶⁶⁵ there was other evidence which prevented the
Commission from reaching the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was
the person these witnesses saw. Others who were at the firing range
remembered the same individual but, though noting a similarity to
Oswald, did not believe that the man was Oswald.⁶⁶⁶ Others either
were unable to state whether the man was Oswald or did not recall see-
ing anybody who they feel may have been Oswald.⁶⁶⁷ Moreover, when
interviewed on December 2, 1963, Slack recalled that the individual
whom he saw had blond hair,⁶⁶⁸ and on December 3, 1963, Price
stated that on several occasions when he saw the individual, he was
wearing a "Bulldogger Texas style" hat and had bubble gum or chew-
ing tobacco in his cheek.⁶⁶⁹ None of these characteristics match those
known about Lee Harvey Oswald.

Moreover, the date on which Price adjusted the scope for the
unknown person was September 28, 1963, but Oswald is known to
have been in Mexico City at that time;⁶⁷⁰ since a comparison of the
events testified to by Price and Slack strongly suggests that they were
describing the same man,⁶⁷¹ there is reason to believe that Slack was
also describing a man other than Oswald. In addition, Slack believed
he saw the same person at the rifle range on November 10⁶⁷² and there
is persuasive evidence that on November 10, Oswald was at the Paine's
home in Irving and did not leave to go to the rifle range.⁶⁷³ Finally,
the man whom Price assisted on September 28 drove an old car, possibly
a 1940 or 1941 Ford.⁶⁷⁴ However, there is evidence that Oswald could
not drive at that time, and there is no indication that Oswald ever had
access to such a car.⁶⁷⁵ Neither Oswald's name nor any of his known
aliases was found in the sign-in register maintained at the Sports
Drome Rifle Range, though many customers did not sign this
register.⁶⁷⁶ The allegations pertaining to the companions who re-
portedly accompanied the man believed to be Oswald are also incon-
sistent among themselves⁶⁷⁷ and conform to no other credible informa-
tion ascertained by the Commission. Several witnesses noticed a
bearded man at the club when the person believed to be Oswald was
there, although only one witness thought the two men were together;⁶⁷⁸
the bearded gentleman was located, and he was not found to have any
connection with Oswald.⁶⁷⁹

It seems likely that the identification of Price, Slack, and the Woods
was reinforced in their own minds by the belief that the man whom
they saw was firing a rifle perhaps identical to Oswald's Mannlicher-
Carcano. The witnesses agreed that the man they observed was firing
a Mauser-type bolt-action rifle with the ammunition clip immediately
in front of the trigger action, and that a scope was mounted on the
rifle.⁶⁸⁰ These features are consistent with the rifle Oswald used for
the assassination.⁶⁸¹ The witnesses agreed that the man had accurate
aim with the rifle.⁶⁸²

However, the evidence demonstrated that the weapon fired by the man they observed was different from the assassination rifle. The witnesses agreed that the barrel of the gun which the individual was firing had been shortened in the process of "sporterizing" the weapon.⁶⁸⁵ In addition, Price and Slack recalled that certain pieces were missing from the top of the weapon,⁶⁸⁶ and Dr. Wood and his son, and others, remembered that the weapon spouted flames when fired.⁶⁸⁷ None of these characteristics correspond with Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano.⁶⁸⁸ Price and Slack believed that the gun did not have a sling, but the assassination weapon did have one. Sterling Wood, on the other hand, recalled that the rifle which he saw had a sling.⁶⁸⁷ Price also recalled that he examined the rifle briefly for some indication as to where it had been manufactured, but saw nothing, whereas the words "MADE ITALY" are marked on the top of Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano.⁶⁸⁸

The scope on the rifle observed at the firing range does not appear to be the same as the one on the assassination weapon. Price remembered that the individual told him that his scope was Japanese, that he had paid \$18 for it, and that he had it mounted in a gunshop in Cedar Hills, though apparently no such shop exists in that area.⁶⁸⁹ The scope on the Mannlicher-Carcano was of Japanese origin but it was worth a little more than \$7 and was already mounted when he received the rifle from a mail-order firm in Chicago.⁶⁹⁰ Sterling Wood and Slack agreed that the scope had a somewhat different appearance from the scope on the assassination rifle.⁶⁹¹

Though the person believed to be Oswald retained his shell casings, presumably for reuse,⁶⁹² all casings recovered from areas where it is believed that Oswald may have practiced have been examined by the FBI Laboratory, and none has been found which was fired from Oswald's rifle.⁶⁹³ Finally, evidence discussed in chapter IV tends to prove that Oswald brought his rifle to Dallas from the home of the Paines in Irving on November 22, and there is no other evidence which indicates that he took the rifle or a package which might have contained the rifle out of the Paine's garage, where it was stored, prior to that date.⁶⁹⁴

Automobile demonstration.—The testimony of Albert Guy Bogard has been carefully evaluated because it suggests the possibility that Oswald might have been a proficient automobile driver and, during November 1963, might have been expecting funds with which to purchase a car. Bogard, formerly an automobile salesman with a Lincoln-Mercury firm in Dallas, testified that in the early afternoon of November 9, 1963, he attended a prospective customer who he believes was Lee Harvey Oswald. According to Bogard, the customer, after test driving an automobile over the Stemmons Freeway at 60 to 70 miles per hour, told Bogard that in several weeks he would have the money to make a purchase. Bogard asserted that the customer gave him name as "Lee Oswald," which Bogard wrote on a business card. After Oswald's name was mentioned on the radio on November 22, Bogard assertedly threw the card in a trash can, making the comment

to coemployees a car.⁶⁹⁵

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have been in New Orleans as late as September 23, 1963, the date on which Mrs. Paine and Marina Oswald left New Orleans for Dallas.⁷²¹ Sometime between 4 p.m. on September 24 and 1 p.m. on September 25, Oswald cashed an unemployment compensation check at a store in New Orleans;⁷²² under normal procedures this check would not have reached Oswald's postal box in New Orleans until at least 5 a.m. on September 25.⁷²³ The store at which he cashed the check did not open until 8 a.m.⁷²⁴ Therefore, it appeared that Oswald's presence in New Orleans until sometime between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. on September 25 was quite firmly established.

Although there is no firm evidence of the means by which Oswald traveled from New Orleans to Houston, on the first leg of his Mexico City trip, the Commission noted that a Continental Trailways bus leaving New Orleans at 12:30 p.m. on September 25 would have brought Oswald to Houston at 10:50 p.m. that evening.⁷²⁵ His presence on this bus would be consistent with other evidence before the Commission.⁷²⁶ There is strong evidence that on September 26, 1963, Oswald traveled on Continental Trailways bus No. 5433 which left Houston at 2:35 a.m. for Laredo, Tex. Bus company records disclose that one ticket from Houston to Laredo was sold during the night shift on September 25-26, and that such ticket was the only one of its kind sold in the period of September 24 through September 26. The agent who sold this ticket has stated that Oswald could have been the purchaser.⁷²⁷ Two English passengers, Dr. and Mrs. John B. McFarland, testified that they saw Oswald riding alone on this bus shortly after they awoke at 6 a.m.⁷²⁸ The bus was scheduled to arrive in Laredo at 1:20 p.m. on September 26, and Mexican immigration records show that Oswald in fact crossed the border at Laredo to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. on that day.⁷²⁹ Evidence set out in appendix XIII establishes that Oswald did not leave Mexico until October 3, and that he arrived in Dallas the same day.

The Commission noted that the only time not strictly accounted for during the period that Mrs. Odio thought Oswald might have visited her is the span between the morning of September 25 and 2:35 a.m. on September 26. The only public means of transportation by which Oswald could have traveled from New Orleans to Dallas in time to catch his bus from Houston to Laredo, would have been the airlines. Investigation disclosed no indication that he flew between these points.⁷³⁰ Moreover, it did not seem probable that Oswald would speed from New Orleans, spend a short time talking to Sylvia Odio, and then travel from Dallas to Mexico City and back on the bus. Automobile travel in the time available, though perhaps possible, would have been difficult.⁷³¹ The Commission noted, however, that if Oswald had reached Dallas on the evening of September 25, he could have traveled by bus to Alice, Tex., and there caught the bus which had left Houston for Laredo at 2:35 a.m. on September 26, 1963.⁷³² Further investigation in that regard indicated, however, that no tickets were sold, during the period September 23-26, 1963 for travel from

In spite of the fact that it appeared almost certain that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the time Mrs. Odio thought he was, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct further investigation to determine the validity of Mrs. Odio's testimony.⁷³⁶ The Commission considered the problems raised by that testimony as important in view of the possibility it raised that Oswald may have had companions on his trip to Mexico.⁷³⁷ The Commission specifically requested the FBI to attempt to locate and identify the two men who Mrs. Odio stated were with the man she thought was Oswald.⁷³⁸ In an effort to do that the FBI located and interviewed Manuel Ray, a leader of JURE who confirmed that Mrs. Odio's parents were political prisoners in Cuba, but stated that he did not know anything about the alleged Oswald visit.⁷³⁹ The same was true of Rogelio Cisneros,⁷⁴⁰ a former anti-Castro leader from Miami who had visited Mrs. Odio in June of 1962 in connection with certain anti-Castro activities.⁷⁴¹ Additional investigation was conducted in Dallas and in other cities in search of the visitors to Mrs. Odio's apartment.⁷⁴² Mrs. Odio herself was reinterviewed.⁷⁴³

The Commission has also noted the testimony of Evaristo Rodriguez, a bartender in the Habana Bar in New Orleans, to the effect that he saw Oswald in that bar in August of 1963 in the company of a

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try.²⁸⁷ Passports were granted to people who the Department might have anticipated would go abroad to denounce the United States, and to a prior defector.²⁸⁸ State Department officials believed that in view of the Supreme Court decisions, the Department was not empowered to deny anyone a passport on grounds related to freedom of speech or to political association and beliefs.²⁸⁹

Since Oswald's citizenship was not in question and since there was no indication that he would be involved in illegal activity abroad, the only grounds upon which a passport might have been denied Oswald would have fallen within the area of speech or political belief and association. The Commission therefore concludes that the Department was justified in granting a passport to Oswald on June 25, 1963.

VISIT TO THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

In October 1963, the Passport Office of the State Department received a report from the Central Intelligence Agency that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.²⁹⁰ The report said nothing about Oswald's having visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, a fact which was not known until after the assassination. Upon receipt of the information the passport file on Lee Harvey Oswald was reviewed by the Passport Office.²⁹¹ The CIA communication and the passport file were read by an attorney and a supervisory attorney in that office who found no basis for revoking Oswald's passport or for notifying the FBI or CIA that Oswald had been issued a new passport in June 1963.²⁹² The Department has informed the Commission that, "since the report indicated no grounds for determining Oswald was ineligible for a passport, a determination was made that no action by the passport office was required."²⁹³ Travel to Russia was not proscribed in 1963. Moreover, the Soviet Union was one of the countries Oswald had listed on his passport application. Hence, the Commission agrees that Oswald's taking steps to enter the Soviet Union in 1963 was not a sufficient reason to revoke his passport.

Later, on November 14, 1963, the FBI sent the Department a report on Oswald's arrest in New Orleans, La. during August in connection with a fistfight in which he became engaged when passing out pamphlets entitled "Hands Off Cuba." No action was taken on the basis of the Bureau's report.²⁹⁴ The Commission agrees that this incident was not grounds for revoking Oswald's passport.

CONCLUSION

Investigation of Oswald's complete dealings with the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service reveals no irregularity suggesting any illegal actions or impropriety on the part of government officials. The Commission believes, however, that in ap-

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Commission, Klaus disclosed Surrey's identity.⁵¹³ He explained that
no record of the transaction had been made because "he saw a chance
to make a few dollars on the side."⁵¹⁴

Klaus's testimony receives some corroboration from Bernard Weiss-
man's testimony that he saw a copy of one of the "Wanted for Treason"
handbills on the floor of General Walker's station wagon shortly after
November 22.⁵¹⁵ Other details of the manner in which the handbills
were printed have also been verified.⁵¹⁶ Moreover, Weissman testified
that neither he nor any of his associates had anything to do with the
handbill or were acquainted with Surrey, Klaus, Lettercraft Print-
ing Co., or Johnson Printing Co.⁵¹⁷ Klaus and Surrey, as well as
General Walker, testified that they were unacquainted with Lee Har-
vey Oswald and had not heard of him prior to the afternoon of Novem-
ber 22.⁵¹⁸ The Commission has found no evidence of any connection
between those responsible for the handbill and Lee Harvey Oswald or
the assassination.

Contacts With the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City and the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Eight weeks before the assassination, Oswald traveled to Mexico
City where he visited both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.* Os-
wald's wife knew of this trip before he went,⁵¹⁹ but she denied
such knowledge until she testified before the Commission.⁵²⁰ The Com-
mission undertook an intensive investigation to determine Oswald's
purpose and activities on this journey, with specific reference to re-
ports that Oswald was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet Governments.
As a result of its investigation, the Commission believes that it has
been able to reconstruct and explain most of Oswald's actions during
this time. A detailed chronological account of this trip appears in
appendix XIII.

Trip to Mexico.—Oswald was in Mexico from September 26, 1963,
until October 3, 1963.⁵²¹ (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 2478, 2481, p.
300.) Marina Oswald testified that Oswald had told her that the pur-
pose of the trip was to evade the American prohibition on travel to
Cuba and to reach that country.⁵²² He cautioned her that the trip and
its purpose were to be kept strictly secret.⁵²³ She testified that he had
earlier laid plans to reach Cuba by hijacking an airliner flying out of
New Orleans, but she refused to cooperate and urged him to give it up,
which he finally did.⁵²⁴ Witnesses who spoke with Oswald while he
was on a bus going to Mexico City also testified that Oswald told
them he intended to reach Cuba by way of Mexico, and that he hoped
to meet Fidel Castro after he arrived.⁵²⁵ When Oswald spoke to
the Cuban and Soviet consular officials in Mexico City, he repre-
sented that he intended to travel to the Soviet Union and requested

*The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City includes consular as well as diplomatic personnel
in a single building. The Cuban Embassy and Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, though in
separate buildings, are in the same compound. Both the Soviet and the Cuban establish-
ments will be referred to throughout the report simply as Embassies.

baby. Marina and Mrs. Paine toured Bourbon Street while Oswald stayed home and did some packing for Marina's return to Texas.¹⁰⁹⁷ On Sunday, September 22, Oswald and Mrs. Paine finished loading the station wagon with the Oswalds' household belongings.¹⁰⁹⁸

MEXICO CITY *(— thru p. 736)*

Marina Oswald testified that sometime in August her husband first told her of his plan to go to Mexico and from there to Cuba, where he planned to stay; he had given up a plan to hijack an airplane and fly directly to Cuba, which plan Marina consistently opposed.¹⁰⁹⁹ On September 17, he obtained from the Mexican consulate general in New Orleans a "Tourist Card," FM-S No. 24085, good for one journey into Mexico for no longer than 15 days. Typed in the blank, "Apelidos y nombre," was "Lee, Harvey Oswald," "Fotografio"; the intended destination was shown as Mexico City.¹¹⁰⁰ (The comma between "Lee" and "Harvey" seems to have been an error.)¹¹⁰¹ On the application Oswald stated that he was employed at "640 Rampart"; he was in fact unemployed.¹¹⁰² (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 2478, 2481, p. 300.)

Marina and June departed with Mrs. Ruth Paine for Irving on the morning of September 23.¹¹⁰³ Before she left, Oswald told Marina that she should not tell anyone about his impending trip to Mexico.¹¹⁰⁴ Marina kept this secret until after the assassination.¹¹⁰⁵ On the previous day, Oswald's landlord had seen Mrs. Paine's car being packed and had asked Oswald, whose rent was about 15 days overdue, whether he was leaving. Oswald told him that Marina was leaving temporarily but that he would remain.¹¹⁰⁶ A neighbor testified that on the evening of September 24, he saw Oswald, carrying two pieces of luggage, hurriedly leave the Magazine Street apartment and board a bus.¹¹⁰⁷ Though uncertain of the exact date, a city busdriver recalls that at the same time of day and at the same location he picked up a man who was carrying two suitcases of different sizes and helped him place them so that they would not disturb the other passengers. The driver remembers that the man asked directions to the Greyhound bus station. He discharged the passenger at an intersection where he could board a Canal Street car and transfer to another bus which would go past the Greyhound and Continental Trailways stations.¹¹⁰⁸ The landlord found Oswald's apartment vacant on September 25.¹¹⁰⁹

Oswald appears to have taken with him a Spanish-English dictionary;¹¹¹⁰ his address book;¹¹¹¹ his 1963 passport and old passport;¹¹¹² his correspondence with the Communist Party and with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, some of which was in Russian;¹¹¹³ proof of his marriage;¹¹¹⁴ newspaper clippings concerning his arrest and his interest in the activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee¹¹¹⁵ (activities which, Marina testified, he had undertaken because he thought that they would help him when he got to Cuba);¹¹¹⁶ evidence that he

was the "Director" and various of Russia.¹¹¹⁸ He written a summary intended Mexico City to he had record of his enlistment the diplomat also were noted Communist list of the New Committee speaker and luggage which and a large, the smaller, Nuevo Laredo destination.¹¹²⁰

Oswald remained whereabouts of his limited after checking inexpensive he September 25, he for \$33 at his between 8 a.m. on Magazine Mexico.¹¹²⁴

He left New Bus No. 5121, and scheduled one on which September 25¹¹²⁶ in the evening member of the from the part its official public answered the before 10 p.m. stop on the route made in Houston told Mrs. Two Committee an evening before Twiford had Oswald that happy to see

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was the "Director" of the New Orleans chapter of the Committee;¹¹¹⁷
and various other cards, such as a work card, which he had obtained in
Russia.¹¹¹⁸ He took also several sheets of notepaper on which he had
written a summary of important events in his life which he presum-
ably intended to call to the attention of Cuban and Soviet officials in
Mexico City to convince them to let him enter Cuba. On these sheets
he had recorded facts about his Marine service, including the dates
of his enlistment and discharge, the places where he had served, and
the diplomas that he had received from military school. Recorded
also were notes on his stay in the Soviet Union, his early interest in
Communist literature, his ability to speak Russian, his organization
of the New Orleans chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee,
his contact with police authorities in connection with his work for
the Committee, and his experience in "street agitation," as a "radio
speaker and lecturer," and as a photographer.¹¹¹⁹ The two pieces of
luggage which Oswald took with him were a small, blue, zipper bag¹¹²⁰
and a large, olive-colored bag,¹¹²¹ both made of cloth. He carried
the smaller bag with him throughout the trip, but, at least from
Nuevo Laredo to Mexico City, checked the larger one through to his
destination.¹¹²²

Oswald remained in New Orleans until September 25. His precise
whereabouts on the night of September 24 are uncertain, but in view
of his limited finances, he probably returned to the apartment to sleep
after checking his luggage at a bus station or spent the night at an
inexpensive hotel or roominghouse. Some time after 5 a. m. on Sep-
tember 25, he collected a Texas unemployment compensation check
for \$33 at his New Orleans post office box. He cashed the check be-
tween 8 a.m. and noon at a store about six blocks from his apartment
on Magazine Street.¹¹²³ This gave him about \$200 for the trip to
Mexico.¹¹²⁴

He left New Orleans by bus,¹¹²⁵ probably on Continental Trailways
Bus No. 5121, departing New Orleans at 12:20 p.m. on September 25,
and scheduled to arrive in Houston at 10:50 p.m.; that bus is the only
one on which Oswald could have left New Orleans after noon on Sep-
tember 25¹¹²⁶ and arrived in Houston before midnight.¹¹²⁷ Sometime
in the evening he called the home of Horace Elroy Twiford, a
member of the Socialist Labor Party who had received Oswald's name
from the party's headquarters in New York and sent him a copy of
its official publication, the "Weekly People."¹¹²⁸ Mrs. Twiford, who
answered the telephone,¹¹²⁹ believes that the call was made locally,
before 10 p.m. It may have been made from Beaumont or some other
stop on the route; however, in view of the bus schedule, it probably was
made in Houston later than Mrs. Twiford remembered.¹¹³⁰ Oswald
told Mrs. Twiford that he was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee and that he hoped to see her husband for a few hours that
evening before he flew to Mexico. He wanted also to find out how
Twiford had obtained his name and address. Mrs. Twiford told
Oswald that her husband, a merchant seaman, was at sea but would be
happy to see him at some other time; she offered to take a message.

Oswald said that he could not await her husband's return because he was flying to Mexico.¹¹⁵¹ The Twifords have stated that they had no other contact with Oswald.¹¹⁵²

An employee of the U.S. Selective Service System has stated that an individual calling himself "Harvey Oswald" appeared at her office in Austin, Tex., immediately after lunch on September 25, and discussed with her the possibility of rectifying his undesirable discharge from the Marine Corps.¹¹⁵³ Despite the employee's reputation and apparent sincerity, all of the information which she furnished with respect to Oswald's appearance and conversation could have been derived from news media, consciously or unconsciously, by the time she told the FBI her story. Other persons in Austin who, according to the employee's testimony, should also have observed Oswald failed to corroborate her testimony.¹¹⁵⁴ No other evidence tending to show that Oswald was in Austin at this time has been discovered.

The telephone call which Oswald made to the Twifords on the evening of September 25, indicates that he was either in Houston or on his way there when he made it, since the purpose of the call was to make an appointment to see Twiford in Houston that evening. Oswald could not have left New Orleans on September 25, been in Austin 521 miles away by early afternoon, and returned 162 miles to Houston by night unless he traveled by air; airline records contain no indication that Oswald was on such flights.¹¹⁵⁵ It is very unlikely that he had with him enough money beyond what he needed for the trip to Mexico City to take such flights, and the poor state of his finances at this time plus his well-established frugality make it extremely unlikely that he would have considered it worthwhile to do so even if he could. There is no evidence that Oswald was in such a hurry to reach Mexico that he would have felt it necessary to travel by airplane rather than a less expensive means of travel. He took a bus from Houston to Mexico City, lived very inexpensively there, and took a bus back to Dallas; there is no apparent reason why he would have interrupted such an inexpensive trip to fly to Austin and then to Houston. He told a passenger whom he met on the next leg of his trip that he had come from New Orleans, and made no reference to Austin.¹¹⁵⁶

On September 26, Oswald boarded Continental Trailways bus No. 5133 in Houston and departed at 2:35 a.m. for Laredo, Tex., via Corpus Christi and Alice.¹¹⁵⁷ Two British tourists, Dr. and Mrs. John B. McFarland, who boarded No. 5133 in Houston, noticed Oswald when they awoke at about 6 a.m. Oswald told them that he was going to Cuba via Mexico City, and they inferred from conversation with him that he had left New Orleans early in the afternoon of September 25 and that he was going to Cuba via Mexico City. He said also that he was secretary of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and that he hoped to see Fidel Castro in Cuba. The bus was scheduled to arrive in Laredo at approximately 1:20 p.m.¹¹⁵⁸

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Oswald crossed the border from Laredo to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, between 1:30 and 2 p.m.¹¹³⁹ From Nuevo Laredo, he traveled to Mexico City aboard bus No. 516 of the Flecha Roja Bus Line, which departed at 2:15 p.m. and was scheduled to arrive in Mexico City at 9:45 a.m. on the following day; he held baggage claim check No. 320435.¹¹⁴⁰ He was seen on the bus by the McFarlands and by two Australian girls who boarded the bus on the evening of September 26 at Monterrey.¹¹⁴¹ He occupied the seat next to an elderly Englishman, who told the girls that the young man sitting next to him apparently had been to Mexico before.¹¹⁴² The man next to Oswald was probably Albert Osborne, a native of the British Isles who has worked as an itinerant preacher in the Southern United States and Mexico for many years. Osborne denied that he sat beside Oswald; but in view of his inconsistent and untrue responses to Federal investigators concerning matters not directly related to Oswald, the Commission believes that his denial cannot be credited. It appeared to the other passengers on the bus that Osborne and Oswald had not previously met; extensive investigation has revealed no other contact between them.¹¹⁴³

In the course of the 20-hour bus trip, Oswald initiated two conversations with the Australian girls, during which he mentioned his visit to Russia and recommended the Hotel Cuba in Mexico City as a "clean and cheap" hotel; he told them, apparently falsely, that he had stayed there on previous occasions. He said that when he had seen them board the bus with their heavy suitcases, he had been under the impression that they were Mexican and had therefore asked the man next to him how to say "How can I help you?" in Spanish. From this they inferred that Oswald did not speak Spanish, an impression which is shared by every witness who met Oswald on his trip and is supported by notations which he made on documents that he carried.¹¹⁴⁴ He got off the bus at every stop and ate large meals, always eating by himself; the girls thought he ate so much because he could not make himself understood in Spanish and had to order by pointing at the menu.¹¹⁴⁵ The bus arrived in Mexico City 15 minutes late, at 10 a.m.¹¹⁴⁶ Oswald left the bus station by himself and had no known further contact with any of the people with whom he had spoken on the bus.¹¹⁴⁷

Oswald registered at the Hotel del Comercio within an hour of his arrival in Mexico City. He stayed there throughout his visit.¹¹⁴⁸ The hotel, located not far from the commercial heart of the city and within four blocks of the bus station, is one of a group of hotels located near the intercity bus terminals and has perhaps the best appearance of the group.¹¹⁴⁹ It is known by personnel in other hotels that the owner of the Hotel del Comercio can understand and speak a little English.¹¹⁵⁰ Oswald registered as "Lee, Harvey Oswald," and gave his occupation as "photo."¹¹⁵¹ He had room 18 which cost \$1.28 per day.¹¹⁵²

After he had registered, Oswald turned promptly to the task of obtaining permission to enter Cuba. Mexican officials would not permit a U.S. citizen without a Cuban visa to board a plane for Cuba

even if he had an American passport, but would permit passage if he had a visa even though the passport proscribed travel to Cuba.¹¹⁵² Oswald had a 1963 American passport (stamped invalid for travel to Cuba)¹¹⁵⁴ but had neither a regular Cuban visa nor an intransit visa which would permit a short stay in Cuba on his way to Russia or some other country. His address book contained the telephone number and address of a Cuban airline, but there is evidence that he never visited its office.¹¹⁵⁵

He visited the Cuban Embassy on Friday, September 27 and spoke with Senora Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican citizen employed there. Senora Duran later made a signed statement to the Mexican police that Oswald:

*** applied for a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia and based his application on his presentation of his passport in which it was recorded that he had been living in the latter country for a period of three years, his work permit from that same country written in the Russian language and letters in the same language, as well as proof of his being married to a woman of Russian nationality and being the apparent Director in the city of New Orleans of the organization called "Fair Play for Cuba" with the desire that he should be accepted as a "friend" of the Cuban Revolution ***¹¹⁵⁶

He apparently also stated that he was a member of the Communist Party and displayed documents which he claimed to be evidence of his membership.¹¹⁵⁷ He said that he intended to go to Cuba on September 30 and to remain there for 2 weeks, or longer if possible, and then go on to Russia.¹¹⁵⁸ Senora Duran took down the relevant date and filled out the appropriate application. Oswald left the Embassy but was to return in the afternoon.¹¹⁵⁹

Then, or possibly even before his initial visit to the Cuban Embassy Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy where he spoke with either Pavel Antonovich Yatskov or Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov.¹¹⁶⁰ They are both consular officials serving also as agents of the KGB.¹¹⁶¹ Oswald later said that he had dealt with "Kostin,"¹¹⁶² undoubtedly a reference to Kostikov. He was unable to obtain a Soviet visa then. Marina said that the officials at the Soviet Embassy "refused to have anything to do with him."¹¹⁶³

Oswald returned to the Cuban Embassy later that afternoon, this time bringing with him passport photographs which he may have obtained in the United States.¹¹⁶⁴ Senora Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy to inquire about the status of Oswald's Russian visa and was told that there would be a delay of about 4 months.¹¹⁶⁵ Oswald became "highly agitated and angry," particularly when he learned that he could not obtain an intransit visa to Cuba before he acquired a Russian visa. Senora Duran called the Cuban consul, then Eusibio Azque, to speak to him. The discussion between Oswald and Azque developed into a heated argument, which ended when Azque told Oswald that in

his opinion passport photographs were not necessary and that so far as a visa was concerned, the Embassy would issue one if he wished to. He then showed him his address book. In connection with his trip to Havana on October 16, 1963, Oswald obtained a Russian visa (p. 303.)

Oswald continued his stay in Mexico before. Marina was convinced that he had been unable to compose a letter to his mother, ascribed his father to the Cuban Embassy, and was not at fault.

The hotel where she arrived at about midnight, which Mexico City at a small restaurant she had seen in the menu, appeared to be 40 and 48 cent, either meat or fish. Oswald included other people in the group. He stated that on the other hand, there was no other person included.

Although the two were not together, the other, therefore, had more than one occasion to see a bullfight, and that he had seen it. He apparently had Spanish notations in his notebook, Mexico City, game, but he had not seen it.

He purchased a pair of binoculars, which he had used on the trip to Havana.

permit passage if he travel to Cuba.¹¹⁵³ Oswald was invalid for travel to or an intransit visa to Russia or some phone number and but he never visited

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his opinion people like Oswald were harming the Cuban Revolution and that so far as Azque was concerned, he would not give Oswald a visa.¹¹⁶⁵ Senora Duran wrote her name and the phone number of the Embassy on a piece of paper which she gave to Oswald in case he wished to contact her again. He copied this information into his address book.¹¹⁶⁷ Senora Duran forwarded the Cuban visa application to Havana;¹¹⁶⁸ the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replied on October 15 that the visa could be issued only after Oswald had obtained a Russian visa.¹¹⁶⁹ (See Commission Exhibit No. 2564, p. 303.)

Oswald contacted the Russian and Cuban Embassies again during his stay in Mexico.¹¹⁷⁰ He had no greater success than he had before. Marina testified that when he returned to Texas, he was convinced that his trip had been a failure and disappointed at having been unable to go to Cuba.¹¹⁷¹ A month later, in a painstakingly composed¹¹⁷² letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Oswald ascribed his failure to "a gross breach of regulations" on the part of the Cuban Embassy. "Of course," he wrote, "the Soviet Embassy was not at fault, they were, as I say unprepared."¹¹⁷³

The hotel maid said that Oswald generally was gone by the time she arrived at 9 a.m. The night watchman said he usually returned at about midnight,¹¹⁷⁴ which is not unusual, in view of the late hour at which Mexico City's evening activities begin. He ate several lunches at a small restaurant immediately adjacent to the hotel, coming to the restaurant shortly after 2 p.m., and ordering food by pointing to the menu, apparently with some consideration of cost; he spent between 40 and 48 cents for each meal. He ate the soup of the day, rice, and either meat or eggs, but refused dessert and coffee; the waitress concluded that Oswald did not realize that the items which he refused were included in the price of the lunch.¹¹⁷⁵ He was seen with no other person either at his hotel or at the restaurant.¹¹⁷⁶ A hotel guest stated that on one occasion he sat down at a table with Oswald because there was no empty table in the restaurant, but that neither spoke to the other because of the language barrier.¹¹⁷⁷

Although the Soviet and Cuban Embassies are within two blocks of each other, they are some distance from Oswald's hotel.¹¹⁷⁸ He must, therefore, have traversed a substantial portion of the city on more than one occasion. Marina testified that he told her that he had seen a bullfight,¹¹⁷⁹ which would normally have been on Sunday afternoon, and that he had visited museums¹¹⁸⁰ and done some sightseeing.¹¹⁸¹ He apparently also saw one or more motion pictures, either American with Spanish subtitles or Mexican with English subtitles.¹¹⁸² From notations in his Spanish-English dictionary and on his guide map of Mexico City, it appears that Oswald intended to attend a jai alai game¹¹⁸³ but he almost certainly did not do so.¹¹⁸⁴

He purchased several postcards depicting bullfights and tourist attractions, which he brought back to Marina.¹¹⁸⁵ She had told him be-

fore he left that she would like Mexican silver bracelets as a souvenir, and he brought her a silver bracelet inscribed with her name.¹¹⁸⁰ Marina suspected, almost certainly correctly, that the bracelet, of Japanese origin, did not come from Mexico.¹¹⁸⁷ No such jewelry is known to be sold in or around Mexico City, because of a high duty¹¹⁸⁸ but the bracelet is of a type commonly sold in 5-and-10-cent stores in Dallas.¹¹⁸⁹ Oswald did not buy the Mexican phonograph records which Marina had requested, despite the notation, "records," which he had placed in his dictionary.¹¹⁹⁰

On Monday, September 30, Oswald began to prepare for his return to the United States. He appeared at the Agencia de Viajes, Transportes Chihuahenses,¹¹⁹¹ and purchased international exchange orders costing \$20.30 for travel on a Transportes del Norte bus from Mexico City to Laredo and by Greyhound bus directly from Laredo to Dallas. The travel agency made a reservation for him on Transportes del Norte bus No. 332, departing Mexico City at 8:30 a.m. on October 2. The seat, No. 12, was reserved in the name of the travel agency, which recorded the reservation in the name of "H. O. Lee."¹¹⁹² The employee who made the reservation testified that he probably wrote the name that way because he was copying from Oswald's tourist card, which read "Lee, Harvey Oswald."¹¹⁹³ (The manifest for Transportes Frontera bus No. 340, leaving Mexico City for Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo at 1 p.m. on Wednesday, October 2, 1963, contains the name "Oswld" [sic], which apparently was added to the manifest after the trip;¹¹⁹⁴ in any event, Oswald did not take bus 340.)¹¹⁹⁵

On October 1, Oswald paid his hotel bill through that night.¹¹⁹⁶ The hotel night watchman remembers helping Oswald obtain a taxicab at about 6:30 or 7 on the following morning.¹¹⁹⁷ Transportes del Norte bus No. 332 left as scheduled at about 8:30 a.m.; at Monterrey the passengers were shifted to a relief bus, No. 373, scheduled to depart for Laredo at 10 p.m. that evening.¹¹⁹⁸ Fellow passengers recall that Oswald was pulled off the bus by Mexican officials at the border, because of some alleged irregularity in his Mexican tourist papers; one passenger overheard him mumbling complaints about the Mexican immigration officials when he returned to the bus.¹¹⁹⁹ They remember also that Oswald was hurriedly "gulping" down a banana after the bus reached customs, perhaps because he believed that he could not take fruit into the United States.¹²⁰⁰ (Marina has testified that her husband liked bananas and frequently ate them.)¹²⁰¹ One of the passengers testified that Oswald annoyed him by keeping his overhead light on to read after 10 p.m.¹²⁰² He may have conversed with an elderly woman on the bus, but he was not traveling with her.¹²⁰³

At about 1:35 a.m. on October 3, Oswald crossed the International Bridge from Nuevo Laredo into Texas.¹²⁰⁴ He traveled from Laredo to Dallas via San Antonio, on Greyhound bus No. 1265, substantially following Interstate Route 35 for the entire trip,¹²⁰⁵ leaving Laredo at 3 a.m. and arriving in Dallas at about 2:20 p.m. on the same day.¹²⁰⁶

Oswald did not go to Dallas. He was filed an unemployed man. He was again looking for a job where he registered. He had a membership fee, a typesetter trainee impression on the called Jaggars. Of the unfavorable that day, Oswald pick him up in Paine home.¹²¹¹ testified that he treated her better with him, because "to be with a woman day, October 7, returned to Dallas."

Oswald thought intended to rent Beckley, where he was. He was at 621 Marsalis weekly rent of \$5 immediately received by the employment. He was not looking daily.¹²²¹ She health and about Mrs. Mary Bled would return the for another week.

Oswald spent during which that he had read and that it had testified that Oswald expecting a ball had any source.

On Monday, other business roominghouse Beckley Avenue entered as O. H. this room was

Mexico City in early September to receive money and orders for the assassination,⁵⁶⁷ that he had been flown to a secret airfield somewhere in or near the Yucatan Peninsula,⁵⁶⁸ that he might have made contacts in Mexico City with a Communist from the United States shortly before the assassination,⁵⁶⁹ and that Oswald assassinated the President at the direction of a particular Cuban agent who met with him in the United States and paid him \$7,000.⁵⁷⁰ A letter was received from someone in Cuba alleging the writer had attended a meeting where the assassination had been discussed as part of a plan which would soon include the death of other non-Communist leaders in the Americas.⁵⁷¹ The charge was made in a Cuban expatriate publication that in a speech he delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under the influence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said, "The first time Oswald was in Cuba," thereby giving away the fact that Oswald had made one or more surreptitious trips to that country.⁵⁷²

Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as part of a bargain with some illicit organizations who would then supply them with firearms as payment.⁵⁷³ Other rumors placed Oswald in Miami, Fla., at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban activities there.⁵⁷⁴ The assassination was claimed to have been carried out by Chinese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans.⁵⁷⁵ Oswald was also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in a Mexico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador's car for a private talk.⁵⁷⁶ Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after the assassination called for the files relating to Oswald's dealings with two members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union; the inference drawn was that the "dealings" had occurred and had established a secret subversive relationship which continued through Oswald's life.⁵⁷⁷ Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, in some cases the product of mistaken identification.

Illustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations is the case of "D," a young Latin American secret agent who approached U.S. authorities in Mexico shortly after the assassination and declared that he saw Lee Harvey Oswald receiving \$6,500 to kill the President. Among other details, "D" said that at about noon on September 18, waiting to conduct some business at the Cuban consulate, he saw a group of three persons conversing in a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed; who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English, and another was a man he said was Lee Harvey Oswald. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed some currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to Oswald in English, "I want to kill the man." Oswald replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do." Oswald replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The

Negro then gave Oswald \$6,500 in large-denomination American bills, saying, "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, "D" said that he telephoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several times prior to the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

"D" and his allegations were immediately subjected to intensive investigation. His former employment as an agent for a Latin American country was confirmed, although his superiors had no knowledge of his presence in Mexico or the assignment described by "D." Four days after "D" first appeared the U.S. Government was informed by the Mexican authorities that "D" had admitted in writing that his whole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never seen Oswald anyplace, and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to telephone the American Embassy in September and that his first call to the Embassy was after the assassination. "D" said that his motive in fabricating the story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could there participate in action against Fidel Castro. He said that he hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up would be believed and would cause the United States to "take action" against him.

Still later, when questioned by American authorities, "D" claimed that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the Mexican police and that the retraction, rather than his first statement, was false. A portion of the American questioning was carried on with the use of a polygraph machine, with the consent of "D." When told that the machine indicated that he was probably lying, "D" said words to the effect that he "must be mistaken." Investigation in the meantime had disclosed that the Embassy extension number "D" said he had called would not have given him the person he said he spoke to, and that no one at the Embassy—clerks, secretaries, or officers—had any recollection of his calls. In addition, Oswald spoke little, if any, Spanish. That he could have carried on the alleged conversation with the red-headed Negro in the Cuban Embassy, part of which was supposed to have been in Spanish, was therefore doubtful. "D" now said that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw "someone who looked like Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and upon reconsideration, he now thought it was on a Tuesday, September 17, rather than September 18. On September 17, however, Oswald visited the Louisiana State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also cashed a check from the Texas Employment Commission at the Winn-Dixie Store No. 1425 in New Orleans. On the basis of the retractions made by "D" when he heard the results of the polygraph examination, and on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, it was concluded that "D" was lying.²⁸

The investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence that Oswald's trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assassination of President Kennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the

Cuban Government the contrary, that secretaries Duran in all no relationship Senora Duran after the assassination as to whether that might be

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Cuban Government had any involvement in the assassination. To the contrary, the Commission has been advised by the CIA and FBI that secret and reliable sources corroborate the statements of Senora Duran in all material respects, and that the Cuban Government had no relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald other than that described by Senora Duran. Secretary of State Rusk also testified that after the assassination "there was very considerable concern in Cuba as to whether they would be held responsible and what the effect of that might be on their own position and their own safety."⁵⁷⁵

Contacts with the Soviet Embassy in the United States.—Soon after the Oswalds reached the United States in June 1962 they wrote to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Oswald requested information about subscriptions to Russian newspapers and magazines and ultimately did subscribe to several Russian journals. Soviet law required Marina Oswald, as a Soviet citizen living abroad, to remain in contact with her nation's Embassy and to file various papers occasionally.⁵⁸⁰ In 1963, after Oswald had experienced repeated employment difficulties, there were further letters when the Oswalds sought permission to return to the Soviet Union. The first such request was a letter written by Marina Oswald on February 17, 1963. She wrote that she wished to return to Russia but that her husband would stay in the United States because "he is an American by nationality."⁵⁸¹ She was informed on March 8, 1963, that it would take from 5 to 6 months to process the application.⁵⁸² The Soviet Union made available to the Commission what purports to be the entire correspondence between the Oswalds and the Russian Embassy in the United States.⁵⁸³ This material has been checked for codes and none has been detected.⁵⁸⁴ With the possible exception of a letter which Oswald wrote to the Soviet Embassy after his return from Mexico City, discussed below, there is no material which gives any reason for suspicion. The implications of all of this correspondence for an understanding of Lee Harvey Oswald's personality and motivation is discussed in the following chapter.

Oswald's last letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., dated November 9, 1963, began by stating that it was written "to inform you of recent events since my meetings with Comrade Kostin in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico."⁵⁸⁵ The envelope bears a postmark which appears to be November 12, 1963.⁵⁸⁶ Ruth Paine has testified that Oswald spent the weekend at her home working on the letter and that she observed one preliminary draft.⁵⁸⁷ A piece of paper which was identified as one of these drafts was found among Oswald's effects after the assassination. (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 15, 103, p. 311.) According to Marina Oswald, her husband retyped the envelope 10 times.⁵⁸⁸

Information produced for the Commission by the CIA is to the effect that the person referred to in the letter as "comrade Kostin" was probably Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov, a member of the consular staff of the Soviet Union in Mexico City. He is also one of the KGB officers stationed at the Embassy.⁵⁸⁹ It is standard Soviet pro-

cedure for KGB officers stationed in embassies and in consulates to carry on the normal duties of such a position in addition to the undercover activities.⁵⁰⁰ The Commission has identified the Cuban consul referred to in Oswald's letter as Senor Eusebio Azque (also "Ascue"), the man with whom Oswald argued at the Cuban Embassy, who was in fact replaced. The CIA advised the Commission:

We surmise that the references in Oswald's 9 November letter to a man who had since been replaced must refer to Cuban Consul Eusebio Azque, who left Mexico for Cuba on permanent transfer on 18 November 1963, four days before the assassination. Azque had been in Mexico for 18 years and it was known as early as September 1963 that Azque was to be replaced. His replacement did arrive in September. Azque was scheduled to leave in October but did not leave until 18 November.

We do not know who might have told Oswald that Azque or any other Cuban had been or was to be replaced, but we speculate that Silvia Duran or some Soviet official might have mentioned it if Oswald complained about Azque's altercation with him.⁵⁰¹

When asked to explain the letter, Marina Oswald was unable to add anything to an understanding of its contents.⁵⁰² Some light on its possible meaning can be shed by comparing it with the early draft. When the differences between the draft and the final document are studied, and especially when crossed-out words are taken into account, it becomes apparent that Oswald was intentionally clouding the true state of affairs in order to make his trip to Mexico sound as mysterious and important as possible.

For example, the first sentence in the second paragraph of the letter reads, "I was unable to remain in Mexico indefinitely because of my Mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only." The same sentence in the draft begins, before the words are crossed out, "I was unable to remain in Mexico City because I considered useless * * *" As already mentioned, the Commission has good evidence that Oswald's trip to Mexico was indeed "useless" and that he returned to Texas with that conviction. The first draft, therefore, spoke the truth; but Oswald rewrote the sentence to imply that he had to leave because his visa was about to expire. This is false; Oswald's tourist card still had a full week to run when he departed from Mexico on October 3.⁵⁰³

The next sentence in the letter reads, "I could not take a chance on requesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States." The fact is that he did use his real name for his tourist card, and in all dealings with the Cuban Embassy, the Russian Embassy and elsewhere. Oswald did use the name of "Lee" on the trip, but as indicated below, he did so only sporadically and probably as the result of a clerical error. In the opinion of the Commission, based upon its knowledge of Oswald, the letter constitutes no more than a clumsy effort to ingratiate himself with the Soviet Embassy.

CIA Conspired Kill President K

by Mark Lane

OCTOBER 10, 1963, the CIA sent a teletype to the Department of State, the FBI, the immigration authorities and the Department of the Navy regarding the "possible presence of Subject [Lee Harvey Oswald] in Mexico City." Two weeks later the CIA asked the Navy to "forward to the office as soon as possible two copies of the most recent photographs you have of Subject. We will forward them to our representative in Mexico who will attempt to determine if the Lee Oswald in Mexico City and Subject are the same individual."

A little over one month later, the subject of the cables, Lee Harvey Oswald, was shot dead in the basement of the Dallas Police and Courts Building. Shortly before he was murdered, Oswald had been charged with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Five days after Oswald's death, President Lyndon B. Johnson, by Executive Order No. 11130, created the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, popularly called the Warren Commission.

A recently disclosed document, secured under the Freedom of Information Act through the cooperative effort of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Citizens Commission of Inquiry, provides the crucial data in determining why the Warren Commission issued a false report.

The October 10, 1963 CIA memorandum about Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City was the first evidence developed by the CIA to frame Oswald for the murder.

Subsequently, the CIA used the episodes surrounding Oswald's visit to Mexico City to threaten to implicate the Soviet Union in the assassination, and to assert that Fidel Castro planned the murder. Ultimately, the CIA used its allegations about Oswald in Mexico City to terrorize the Warren Commission, and to compel the Commission to issue a false report.

Soon after the Commission was created, the CIA informed Earl Warren, its chairman, that Oswald had been in Mexico from September 26 to October 3, 1963, and that he had spent most of that time in Mexico City. According to the CIA, Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on September 27 and the Soviet Embassy on October 1. Proof that Oswald had been in the Cuban Embassy, the CIA reported, came from Señora Silvia Duran, a Mexican employed at the Cuban Embassy. Proof that Oswald had been to the Russian Embassy, the CIA claimed, came from its own agents' observations.

The CIA implied to the Warren Commission that Oswald had had a continuing relationship with the personnel at the Soviet Embassy, and that when he called the embassy he identified himself as "Lee Oswald" and asked "Are there any messages for me?"

No doubt the most frightening moment for the members of the Commission came when the CIA, through Top Secret dispatches, informed them that Oswald had met with Valeriy V. Kostikov

"But nobody reads. Don't believe people professors that will read the record..."

— Allen Dulles
Warren Commission

at the Soviet Embassy.

One CIA document, a memorandum to the Warren Commission designated CD928, stated that Kostikov "functioned overtly as a consul in the Soviet Embassy" but was "known to be a staff officer of the KGB [Soviet Secret Police]." The memorandum continued, "He is connected with the 13th or 'Liquid Affairs' department, whose responsibilities include assassination and sabotage."

The CIA also reported that Oswald had sought a visa to Cuba while at the Cuban Embassy.

The commissioners had been assured by the FBI and CIA that Oswald had killed President Kennedy. It seemed reasonable to conclude that Oswald planned to flee to Cuba after carrying off the murder, which may have been planned or at least encouraged by the KGB. Earl Warren and his colleagues were likely held in the grip of terror. The awful truth, the Top Secret informant they had secured from the CIA, could not be shared with the American people. Certainly detente with the Russians, perhaps even world peace, was in a precarious position.

26 September 1963 - OSWALD again

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The CIA cable traffic between the agency's
Mexico City office and its home base in Langley,
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a CIA concentration upon Oswald's visit to
Mexico City. It reveals that the CIA placed
Kostikov under surveillance, met with the Amer-
ican ambassador to Mexico, and almost desper-
ately sought proof that Oswald had been in
Mexico City on September 27 and October 1.

The Warren Commission ultimately accepted
the CIA's conclusions, and decided to suppress
the CIA directive that contained the most relevant
data about Kostikov's area of responsibility and
his relationship with Oswald.

The CIA had been unable to come up with
much information establishing Oswald's pres-
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On March 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin, the
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26 September 1963 - OSWALD again visited the Soviet Embassy. He spoke

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sabotage.

On January 22, 1964, the CIA warned the Warren Commission of Oswald's alleged
relationship with a Soviet KGB staff officer. This information was sent to the
Commission before the first witness testified. The document (above) describes
Kostikov, the staff officer, as a man "whose responsibilities include
assassination and sabotage."

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other members of his staff met with Richard Helms, then the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) for the CIA. The DDP is responsible for the covert operations or "dirty tricks" section of the agency. The recently released minutes of that meeting reveal that Helms, later indicted for committing perjury while testifying before the United States Senate, told Rankin that "the Commission would have to take his word for the fact that Oswald had not been an agent" of the CIA.

Immediately after Helms offered that light note, the CIA minutes of the meeting disclose, "a considerable part of the meeting from this point forward consisted of a review by Mr. Rankin and his staff of the gaps in the investigation to date. They noted that the most significant gap appeared in the Mexican phase."

"For example, they had no record of Oswald's daily movements while in Mexico City, nor could they confirm the date of his departure or his mode of travel." Rankin then challenged the CIA statement that Oswald had left Mexico by bus. According to the minutes, the Commission was worried because "the original assumption that he [Oswald] had returned by bus could not be proven."

The Commission also wondered if the CIA had been frank in releasing documents to its members. "They questioned the sanitized extracts which they had been shown and wondered if there were not more." Helms admitted that the CIA had "sanitized" or censored the evidence before allowing the President's Commission to view it. According to the minutes, "Mr. Helms then explained that as a matter of practice we did not release actual copies of our messages because they contained code words and digraphs which would be unintelligible to a person not familiar with them."

Four months after the Warren Commission had been assured by the CIA that Oswald had been to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City, the CIA was still refusing to show the evidence to the Commission.

The Commission representatives were at last suspicious. They asked why no action was taken by other agencies of the government after their receipt of CIA information that Oswald was in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City. The minutes reflect that "Mr. Rankin and members of his staff clearly felt that this was a crucial question which needed careful review. They appeared to believe that the information on Oswald was unusual enough to have caused recipients to take special measures which might conceivably have led to a closer scrutiny of Lee Harvey Oswald and his movements." The CIA's response was deleted from the minutes before they were released.

This portion of the minutes ended in this fashion:

"At the conclusion of his remarks on the subject, Mr. Helms specified that the information he had given Mr. Rankin was extremely sensitive [CENSORED] [CENSORED]."

The CIA had refused to show its cables, dispatches and other written documents to the Warren Commission. It offered instead the unsupported statement of Silvia Duran, who was said to have identified Oswald as the man who had entered the Cuban Embassy, and assurances that certain unnamed CIA personnel knew that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy as well.

Señora Duran, a 26-year-old Mexican, had secured her job at the Cuban Embassy one month before Oswald allegedly arrived there. Her predecessor at the embassy had recently been killed in an odd automobile accident.

The day after the assassination the CIA was anxious to prove Oswald had been to the Cuban

Page one of the FBI report, November 23, 1963

President John F. Kennedy was shot and killed by an unknown assailant at approximately 10:00 a.m. in Dallas, Texas. Investigation effort to identify and apprehend assassin.

At approximately 2:00 p.m. that a suspicious person had been located about six tenths of a mile East 10th Street in Dallas where Department patrolman had been

Pages four and five of the FBI report

The Central Intelligence Agency had an extremely sensitive source had identified himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted

inquiring as to any messages. Special Agent conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas. Individual referred to above and has been identified as Lee Harvey Oswald. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the person was not Lee Harvey Oswald.

When the FBI released 40,001 pages of pages of the November 1977, it released the Bureau's records. However, the FBI blanked out all of the relevant information on the top of page five.

The FBI so completely sanitized the documents that the recording remained in the censored documents.

Embassy. The CIA knew Señora Duran's arrest and interrogation might raise questions about the embassy. The CIA needed room to maneuver regarding its efforts to blame the assassination on Fidel Castro. On the very day of her arrest, a cable from the director of the CIA stated: "Arrest of Silvia Duran is extremely serious matter which could prejudice U.S. freedom of action on entire question of Cuban responsibility."

In the cable, recently declassified and released, the director of the CIA ordered that Silvia Duran be isolated and silenced in a Mexican prison, and that the Mexican police see to it that the fact of her arrest be withheld from various Mexican officials. This almost incredible cable reveals the extent of CIA control over Mexican police officials, many of whom had been trained by the CIA, and many of whom were engaged by the CIA while they ostensibly work for the Mexican government. The CIA's willingness to order Mexican police officials to make false statements to their own superiors and to mislead the "circles in the Mexican government" provides an insight into the CIA's desperation to secure some evidence to prove to the Warren Commission that Oswald had gone to the Cuban Embassy.

The cable sent by the director of the CIA reads: "With full regard for Mexican interests, request you ensure that her [Duran's] arrest is kept absolutely secret, that no information from her is published or leaked, that all such info is cabled to us, and that fact of her arrest and her statements are not spread to leftist or disloyal circles in the Mexican government."

That cable was not shown to the Warren Commission. There appear to be no code words or digraphs in that cable which might have confused or confused them. Instead, the cable, if revealed to the members of the Warren Commission, might have provided some insight in the lengths that the CIA was prepared to go in order to manufacture evidence to support the CIA's manufactured story that Oswald had been

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Page one of the FBI report, November 23, 1963

President John F. Kennedy was shot and killed by an unknown assailant at approximately 12:30 p.m., November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. Investigation was immediately instituted in an effort to identify and apprehend the person responsible for this assassination.

At approximately 2:00 p.m., information was received that a suspicious person had entered the Texas Theater which is located about six tenths of a mile from the four hundred block of East 10th Street in Dallas where J. D. Tippitt, a Dallas Police Department patrolman had been shot and killed about 1:13 p.m.

Pages four and five of the FBI report

The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identified himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of this Bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald.

When the FBI released 40,001 pages of previously classified material during November 1977, it released the Bureau's five-page report of November 23, 1963. However, the FBI blanked out all of the relevant material from the bottom of page four and the top of page five.

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After Señora Duran ultimately yielded and identified Oswald as the visitor, she was released from prison. Once free she began to speak of her experience. The CIA was anxious to silence her out of fear that Warren Commission members might learn the truth about the CIA's role in extracting a false statement from her. On November 27, soon after her release, the CIA directed Mexican authorities to rearrest her. In a cable marked "Priority," the CIA ordered that "to be certain that there is no misunderstanding between us, we want to insure that Silvia Duran gets no impression that Americans are behind her rearrest. In other words we want Mexican authorities to take responsibility for whole affair" (their emphasis).

The message from the director of the CIA ordered CIA personnel in Mexico City not to confront Duran directly "or to be in contact with her" in order to provide cover for the CIA effort. CIA agents were told they could "provide questions to Mexican interrogators."

Silvia Duran was rearrested and was thereafter silent.

Mr. Rankin did not question her. She was not called as a witness by the Warren Commission. No Commission member, Commission lawyer or staff employee associated with the Commission ever talked with her in person or by telephone, or even sent her a letter.

The Commission never learned that Silvia Duran had been arrested or rearrested. The Commission never learned that the CIA had choreographed the entire episode to deceive them.

The Commission concluded in its Report: "By far the most important confirmation of Señora Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States or Mexico

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Page one of the FBI report, November 23, 1963

President John F. Kennedy was shot and killed by an unknown assailant at approximately 12:30 p.m., November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. Investigation was immediately instituted in an effort to identify and apprehend the person responsible for this assassination.

At approximately 2:00 p.m., information was received that a suspicious person had entered the Texas Theater which is located about six tenths of a mile from the four hundred block of East 10th Street in Dallas where J. D. Tippitt, a Dallas Police Department patrolman had been shot and killed about 1:13 p.m.

Pages four and five of the FBI report

The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identified himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

Inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of this Bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald.

When the FBI released 40,001 pages of previously classified material during November 1977, it released the Bureau's five-page report of November 23, 1963. However, the FBI blanked out all of the relevant material from the bottom of page four and the top of page five.

The FBI so completely sanitized the document that no reference to the CIA tape recording remained in the censored document.

Embassy. The CIA knew Señora Duran's arrest and interrogation might raise questions about the embassy. The CIA needed room to maneuver regarding its efforts to blame the assassination on Fidel Castro. On the very day of her arrest, a cable from the director of the CIA stated: "Arrest of Silvia Duran is extremely serious matter which could prejudice U.S. freedom of action on entire question of Cuban responsibility."

In the cable, recently declassified and released, the director of the CIA ordered that Silvia Duran be isolated and silenced in a Mexican prison, and that the Mexican police see to it that the fact of her arrest be withheld from various Mexican officials. This almost incredible cable reveals the extent of CIA control over Mexican police officials, many of whom had been trained by the CIA, and many of whom were engaged by the CIA while they ostensibly worked for the Mexican government. The CIA's willingness to order Mexican police officials to make false statements to their own superiors and to mislead the "circles in the Mexican government" provides an insight into the CIA's desperation to secure some evidence to prove to the Warren Commission that Oswald had gone to the Cuban Embassy.

The cable sent by the director of the CIA reads: "With full regard for Mexican interests, request you ensure that her [Duran's] arrest is kept absolutely secret, that no information from her is published or leaked, that all such info is cabled to us, and that fact of her arrest and her statements are not spread to leftist or disloyal circles in the Mexican government."

That cable was not shown to the Warren Commission. There appear to be no code words or digraphs in that cable which might have confounded or confused them. Instead, the cable, if revealed to the members of the Warren Commission, might have provided some insight into the lengths that the CIA was prepared to go in order to manufacture evidence to support the CIA's manufactured story that Oswald had been

to the Cuban Embassy.

After Señora Duran ultimately yielded and identified Oswald as the visitor, she was released from prison. Once free she began to speak of her experience. The CIA was anxious to silence her out of fear that Warren Commission members might learn the truth about the CIA's role in extracting a false statement from her. On November 27, soon after her release, the CIA directed Mexican authorities to rearrest her. In a cable marked "Priority," the CIA ordered that "to be certain that there is no misunderstanding between us, we want to insure that Silvia Duran gets no impression that Americans are behind her rearrest. In other words we want Mexican authorities to take responsibility for whole affair" (their emphasis).

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The Commission concluded in its Report: "By far the most important confirmation of Señora Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States or Mexico. The identities of these sources cannot be dis-

continued on page 11

closed without destroying their future usefulness to the United States.

Without examining the relevant evidence surrounding the methods used by the CIA to extract a statement from Señora Duran, and without even talking to her, the Warren Commission ultimately decided to accept the advice of Richard Helms to "take his word."

The Commission was then compelled to deal with the even more serious charge that Oswald had been to the Soviet Embassy and had spent some time with Kostikov, the alleged Soviet KGB assassination squad leader for the Western hemisphere.

In this instance the CIA could find no frightened young woman employed by the embassy to coerce into a false accusation. Left to construct a tale entirely on its own, the CIA went to its agents. The Warren Commission was told the CIA knew that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy and had met with Kostikov. The CIA said it had photographed Oswald entering the embassy and had heard his conversations with embassy personnel, including his opening remarks, in which he identified himself as Lee Oswald.

The Warren Commission again decided to take Helms' word. Here the Commission was even less eager to explore the facts, for the Commission itself had entered into a conspiracy with the CIA to suppress all of the information it had been given about Kostikov and his assignments in terror, espionage and assassination.

The Commission merely reported as fact that Oswald had been to the Soviet Embassy and had met with Kostikov. There is no proof and no credible evidence that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy. An examination of the material furnished the Warren Commission by the CIA leads to the conclusion that there is no proof that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy either. The CIA knew Oswald had not visited either the Soviet or Cuban Embassy. If Oswald visited neither embassy, the CIA plan to frighten the Warren Commission into suppressing all relevant evidence of a conspiracy emerges as a cruel hoax. The CIA, through its Mexico City charade, terrorized the Commission into abandoning any desire for a real investigation into the murder of President Kennedy.

The proof of the CIA plot against the Warren Commission has been a long time coming. However, that proof is now available.

At the end of 1976, just after the Select Committee on Assassinations was established by the House of Representatives, David A. Phillips was summoned to testify before that body. He was questioned by Richard A. Sprague, then general counsel of the Select Committee. Although that testimony remains classified, we have discovered exactly what Phillips stated under oath. At the time of the assassination Phillips was stationed in Mexico City. He was then in charge of the Western hemisphere for the Central Intelligence Agency. Phillips testified that the CIA had monitored and tape-recorded Oswald's conversations with the Soviet Embassy. He admitted the CIA had not told the Warren Commission they had tape-recorded Oswald's exchange with the people in the Soviet Embassy. Since the CIA wanted to prove to the Commission that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy, why had the Agency not given the tapes to the Warren Commission, Phillips was asked. He responded that the tapes had been routinely destroyed approximately one week after they were made. They were destroyed, he said, because Oswald was not considered an important character on October 8, 1963, when the tapes were burned. Why had the Warren Commission not been told that such proof had existed? Phillips had no

at the University of Southern California some time after this testimony before the House Select Committee. At that time I confronted him with what I had learned of his testimony, and he confirmed that he had made the statements I had attributed to him.

The matter might have rested there — all of us wondering why the CIA had destroyed the historic tape recordings on October 8 and why the CIA had refused to tell the Warren Commission it had done so.

However, we were able to secure an order from the Federal District Court in Washington, D.C. to compel the United States Secret Service to deliver to me all of the documents in its files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Among the materials I secured was a letter from J. Edgar Hoover, then the director of the FBI, to James J. Rowley, then the Chief of the United States Secret Service. Enclosed with the letter was a five-page document which Hoover referred to as "the results of our inquiry into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and background information relative to Lee Harvey Oswald."

This first comprehensive FBI report on the Kennedy assassination, completed the day following the murder, was never made available to the Warren Commission. In fact, until we received this crucial document recently it had been seen only by employees of spy and police organizations.

The first FBI report reveals that the director of the CIA, the deputy director for plans for the CIA and the director in charge of the Western hemisphere had all conspired to lie to the Warren Commission. It reveals that David Phillips committed perjury before the newly established House Select Committee on Assassinations, and it reveals that there is no evidence that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy.

After Oswald's arrest at 1:51 P.M. on November 22 he was questioned for more than 12 hours between 2:30 P.M. that day and 11:00 A.M. on November 24. Shortly thereafter, he was murdered in the Dallas Police and Courts Building while an army of FBI agents and local police officers watched. Seven FBI agents had participated in interrogating Oswald.

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Oswald were then advised by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency that "an individual identified
himself as Lee Oswald [and that that person]
contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
inquiring as to any message."

The FBI report reveals that "special agents
of the Bureau" then "listened to a recording
of his voice." The CIA had not destroyed the
tape recording on October 8. They had kept the
tape and then gave it to the FBI as proof that
Oswald had been to the Soviet Embassy. On the
tape a man's voice was heard. He was speaking
to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He identi-
fied himself as Lee Oswald and asked if there
were any messages for him. That historic tape,
in existence on November 23, 1963, had not been
destroyed on October 8. Since it had survived
until November 23 it could not have been
destroyed in "a routine manner." By then the
name Lee Oswald had entered American history.

Why had the CIA lied to the Warren Commis-
sion in 1964? Why had Phillips lied to the House
Select Committee 12 years later?

Answers to those questions may be found in
the FBI report of November 23. After the FBI
agents had spent two days interrogating Oswald
examining a CIA photograph of a man at the
Soviet Embassy and listening to the tape record-
ing, they reported to the bureau. The FBI sum-
marized the matter in a sentence: "These special
agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-
to individual was NOT Lee Harvey Oswald."

The reason the CIA could not tell the Warren
Commission or the American people about its
tape recording is now apparent. The man who
identified himself as Lee Oswald to the Soviet
Embassy was an imposter and the CIA knew it.

The CIA required proof of Oswald's visit to
the embassies to frighten the Warren Commission
into submission. Unable to secure such proof, the
CIA invented it. It then became necessary for the
CIA, upon which the Warren Commission relied
for many of its conclusions, to hide from the
Commission the agency's deeds.

The terrifying aspects of this CIA misconduct
can only be fully understood when the conspiracy
to cover up is traced to its origin. For the CIA
charade, which evidently included employing an
imposter for Oswald, began on October 1, 1963.

One month and 22 days before President Ken-
nedy was assassinated the CIA had set into
motion a series of events apparently designed
to prevent any American institution from ever
daring to learn the truth about the assassination
which had not yet taken place. One month and
22 days before President Kennedy was assas-
sinated the CIA was dramatically and falsely
linking Lee Harvey Oswald and a Soviet diplomat
whom the CIA would later designate as the KGB
authority on assassinations in the United States.

Almost two months before the assassination
the CIA was establishing a false plan relating the
assassination which had not yet taken place to
Fidel Castro. Almost two months before the
assassination, the CIA was establishing, through
an imposter for Oswald, a plan for his escape
to Cuba after the murder of the President.

Through these charades the CIA, almost two
months before the assassination, was establish-
ing links between an imposter for Oswald and
the Cuban and Russian governments.

The documents now available answer many
of the questions about the conduct of the
frightened little men who ran the Warren Com-
mission. They were afraid to search for the truth
because they thought, incorrectly, that they knew
where it would lead.

Yet the documents do leave one question
unanswered: If CIA personnel did not plan the
assassination of President Kennedy, why did they
link Oswald to the assassination — falsely, as it
turns out — almost two months before it
took place? *

Re: Gehlen apparatus

and eject from the plane. It would then explode, so were told. But Allen Dulles was aware that some of the pilots were worried about the workings of this ing and delicate destructor mechanism. They were fully sure how many seconds they had to get out. Senate hearing¹⁷ after his release by the Russians, testified: "My first reaction was to reach for the switches . . . but I thought that I had better can get out of here before using this. I knew that as a seventy-second time delay between the time of nation of the switches and the time that the in would occur."¹⁸

He testified that he was unable to use the automatic seat because he had been thrown forward in the He said he then decided just to climb out. But did, he testified, he was unable to reach back into "so that I could actuate these destructor switches."

A report issued after Powers had been held for our days and secretly interrogated by the agency, substantially the same story and stated that "the switches . . . take four separate manipulations The CIA report said Powers lived up to his con- d his "obligations as an American" and would get pay.¹⁸

friendly Senate Armed Services Committee hear- one asked Powers whether he had been under a ry order to destroy his plane. It was obvious that did not relish any close scrutiny of the fascinating of the destructor mechanism.

of the weightier political analyses of the confusion ington during the U-2 affair have failed to pay attention to the vital business of the destructor e cover stories were based on the assumption that

ys after his Senate testimony, however, Powers seemed less this. In a radio interview at his home in Pound, Virginia, Clarke, then of WGH, Norfolk, he said he thought he y seconds on that particular U-2. It was an uncertainty other U-2 pilots. The fact is the pilots did not know ow much time they had before the explosion.

Francis Gary Powers had actuated those destructor switches. He had not.

Only the CIA knows what would have happened had he done so.

1963: Trouble for General Gehlen

Any casual newspaper reader knows that 1963 was a banner year for spy cases, but one of the most significant received the least attention in the United States, considering that it deeply involved the CIA. On July 11, in a Karlsruhe courtroom, Judge Kurt Weber sentenced three former West German intelligence agents to prison terms for spying for the Soviet Union.

Heinz Felfe, forty-five, drew fourteen years. Hans Clemens, sixty-one, got ten years. Erwin Tiesel, sixty, their courier, got off with three years. The trio had confessed to delivering 15,000 photographs of top-secret West German intelligence files and twenty spools of tape recordings to Soviet agents in East Berlin.

All three had been employed by the West German Federal Intelligence Agency (FIA), better known as the "Gehlen organization" for its founder and chief, the mysterious ex-Nazi general, Reinhard Gehlen. The defendants confessed they had systematically betrayed state secrets from 1950 until their arrest in 1961.

Ironically, their work was so pleasing to both sides, that shortly before their arrest Felfe and Clemens received citations for ten years of meritorious service from both of their employers. From General Gehlen they received a plaque bearing an illustration of St. George slaying the dragon. From Alexander N. Sholepin, then Chairman of the Soviet KGB,* they got a letter of commendation and a cash bonus.

* KGB stands for Komitat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security). It is one arm of the Soviet espionage apparatus, the other being the GRU, or Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravlenie, the Soviet Military Intelligence. The KGB is the successor to the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, MVD and other initials used over the years to designate the often reorganized, purged and renamed Soviet secret police and espionage network.

As Judge Weber summed it up succinctly: "For ten years the Soviet intelligence service had two experienced spies sitting right in the center of the enemy's organization."

Since the Gehlen organization was financed and controlled by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the Felte-Clemens-Tiebel case meant nothing less than that the CIA's most vital European subsidiary had been penetrated at the top, virtually from its inception.

The CIA poured millions into the Gehlen apparatus, but the 1963 case raised grave questions about the effectiveness and worth of the whole operation. It also raised moral and political questions in West Germany, where some newspapers were asking why ex-Nazis were running the Bundesrepublik's intelligence service in the first place.

Gehlen, a member of the German General Staff under Hitler, was placed in charge of wartime intelligence for Foreign Armies East. This meant that he ran Germany's espionage against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He is said to have surrendered his organization and files to the United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps when the Nazi empire collapsed in 1945.

With his knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it was not long before Gehlen was back in business, this time for the United States. When the CIA was casting about for a network in West Germany, it decided to look into the possibility of using Gehlen's talents. And while they were making up their mind about the ex-general, Henry Pleasants, the CIA station chief in Bonn for many years, moved in and lived with Gehlen for several months.

Pleasants, once the chief music critic of the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, and a contributor to the music pages of the *New York Times*, was a highly literate and respected musicologist. His wife Virginia was one of the world's leading harpsichordists. He also probably had the distinction of being the only top U.S. spy to become the center of a literary storm. He had continued to write books after joining the CIA, and in 1955 his *Agony of Modern Music* (Simon & Schuster, New York) caused considerable

controversy for its attacks on all except jazz.*

Gehlen had named his price and some months before the CIA said it consolidated an intelligence network under secrecy—as far as the West German side was concerned—from a heavily guarded villa of Munich. Officially, the Gehlen was of the Bonn Government.

The mystery general reportedly lived in a lakeside villa at Starnberg, Bavaria, west of Munich; a sign on the house said: *Warnung vor dem Hun*. No outsider has ever seen Gehlen. He has been taken since 1944—and bemedaled in his Wehrmacht uniform.

The evidence indicates that Gehlen worked with many former SS and Wehrmacht officers. During the war Felte ran the Reich security service, and Gehlen was his assistant.

Felte, while awaiting possible war crimes trial, suddenly was given a clean bill of health by a West German court and was hired by the CIA in 1951. He testified he had been approached by an SS colonel who asked if he was interested in his "old trade."

That trade was also being plied by the CIA to Otto John, chief of West Germany's Office for the Disarmament of the Armed Forces. Dr. John disappeared in 1954. Since John was the head of the official counter-intelligence organization, it was as if J. Edgar Hoover had been in Minsk. Otto John chose the role of a spy in an unsuccessful bomb plot against Hitler. He had been active in the plot.

* As recently as April 15, 1962, while John was chief in Bonn, Pleasants had a byline article in the *Tribune*, filed from Zurich. It told of the plot to assassinate Meyerbeer's *Le Prophète*.

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Gehlen had named his price and his terms, but it took
some months before the CIA said yes. After that Gehlen
consolidated an intelligence network that operated in
utter secrecy—as far as the West German public was con-
cerned—from a heavily guarded villa in Pullach, outside
of Munich. Officially, the Gehlen network was not part
of the Bonn Government.

The mystery general reportedly lived in a two-story
lakeside villa at Starnberg, Bavaria (fifteen miles south-
west of Munich); a sign on the fence surrounding the
house said: *Warnung vor dem Hunde* (Beware the Dog).
No outsider has ever seen Gehlen. No picture of Gehlen
has been taken since 1944—and that one shows him
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The evidence indicates that Gehlen staffed his organiza-
tion with many former SS and Wehrmacht intelligence
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of the Reich security service, and Clemens and Tiebel
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SS colonel who asked if he was interested in returning to
his "old trade."

That trade was also being plied by Dr. Otto John, head
of West Germany's Office for the Protection of the Con-
stitution. Dr. John disappeared into East Berlin on July
20, 1954. Since John was the head of West Germany's
official counter-intelligence organization, it was as astound-
ing as if J. Edgar Hoover had suddenly turned up in
Minsk. Otto John chose the tenth anniversary of the
unsuccessful bomb plot against Hitler to do his vanishing
act. He had been active in the plot himself and managed

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to escape afterwards; his brother Hans was executed. On the day of his disappearance he had attended memorial services at the site of the executions.

Washington, stunned by the news, described John as one of the "two or three best-informed persons in West Germany" on intelligence operations. But the tail end of a *New York Times* dispatch from Berlin gave the most tantalizing reason for John's action:

"Dr. John's organization also was believed to have been in serious competition and difficulties with a more extensive German organization headed by Reinhard Gehlen, a former high-ranking Wehrmacht intelligence officer."²⁰

On July 20, 1955, again on the anniversary of the bomb plot, West Germany announced that it was taking over the Gehlen organization, henceforth to be known as the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*,* or Federal Intelligence Agency (FIA).

With John's defection and the official recognition of the FIA by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Gehlen was the unchallenged spymaster of West Germany.† The Gehlen *Apparat* was now part of the Bonn Government (although it nowhere appears in any official government table of organization). The relationship between the CIA and the FIA remained intimate. That is why the 1963 trial meant, not only trouble for Gehlen, but trouble for the CIA.

During the trial the three defendants admitted that they supplied the Soviet Union with the names of West German agents of the FIA (ninety-five in all) as well as other secret information that was smuggled out in canned baby food, trick suitcases and on special writing paper. Felfe and Clemens testified they were paid about \$40,000 each during the ten-year period.

At the time of his arrest, Felfe was the director of the East Division of the Gehlen agency, in charge of spying in Eastern Europe.

In asking for long prison terms for the trio, the West

* Literally, Federal news service.

† John returned to West Berlin on December 13, 1955. He was tried, convicted of treasonable conspiracy and served nineteen months of his four-year sentence.

German prosecutor said it was "without doubt espionage case ever experienced in the Federal Felfe and Clemens, he said, had done "serious the Federal Republic and to American organiza

He did not have to spell out the initials CI. his meaning clear.

The extraordinary growth of the clandestine in the United States in all parts of the world pointed up in this brief review of the important of the Invisible Government in Germany, as Bogota, Korea, Communist China, Formosa, Costa Rica and the Soviet Union. Other opera more fascinating and sometimes disturbing, conducted in Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Vie Guatemala.

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From Dallas to Watergate

by Peter Dale Scott

To say that the Watergate affair consisted of Richard Nixon's attempt to cover up the Democratic National Committee break-in by several intelligence operatives is to reduce the events around Nixon's demise to a one-dimensional quality. Watergate illuminated the world of clandestine government as it never had been before. The connections of the principals (and even minor characters) in the affair linked the Syndicate, big business, CIA, FBI, Cuban exiles, and police department "Red Squads," with the White House acting as the center of intrigue. The men of the Nixon presidency were not suddenly catapulted to power. Watergate was the ultimate expression of all of their personal political histories. But if the scandal was part of a chain of events, to what can its origins be traced? Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat, professor of English at the University of California at Berkeley and author of *The War Conspiracy*, takes the boldest leap by tying Watergate to the mysteries around the assassination of President Kennedy.

The discovery of the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972, has led slowly but irreversibly to wider revelations about the government's use of crime, past and present. At first glance, it might seem the burglars' long record of covert activities would have made such revelations inevitable. Most of those arrested in the Democratic National Committee offices had been employed by the CIA in anti-Castro activities, and one of them—Eugenio Martinez—was still on a CIA retainer. Another, Frank Sturgis alias Fiorini, had defied President Kennedy's ban on U.S.-based raids against Cuba, and continued them with the support of former Havana casino operators with strong links to organized crime. His activities immediately before and after the Kennedy assassination had

made Sturgis suspicious in the eyes of some private assassination buffs, long before Watergate made him a public figure.

E. Howard Hunt, the man chosen by Nixon's reelection team to mastermind the Watergate break-ins, had served as a political officer in the CIA's Bay of Pigs operation, which Richard Nixon had almost single-handedly pressed on the Eisenhower Administration, and for which Nixon was the White House Action Officer. In connection with the Bay of Pigs, Hunt had proposed the assassination of Castro to CIA superiors, and, according to some sources, continued to propose similar assassination projects, the latest of which was against the president of Panama in 1971.

Yet the Watergate cover-up almost succeeded—not even the exotic records of the defendants, such as the burglary against Dan Ellsberg's psychiatrist—and who knew who else—left the Nixon Administration with little alternative but to obstruct justice in the case of the Watergate Seven. In 1972 the chain leading from crime to cover-up to new crime was becoming a major preoccupation at the White House. But the establishment consensus necessary for a successful cover-up had been so eroded during the past ten years that the cold warriors could no longer keep their conspiratorial cure.

In my opinion it is no coincidence that the key figures in Watergate—Liddy, Hunt, Sturgis, Krogh, Caulfield—have been drawn from the conspiratorial world of government and intelligence enforcement, a shady realm in which the operations of organized crime, counterrevolution, and government intelligence have traditionally overlapped. Nor is it a coincidence that one of these men—Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis—played a minor role in the cover-up of the Dallas assassination ten years ago. On the contrary, I believe that a full exposure of the Watergate conspiracy will help us to understand what happened in Dallas, and also to understand the forces which later mired America in a criminal war in Southeast Asia. Conversely, an analysis of the cover-up in Dallas will do much to illuminate Watergate and its ramifications, including that Miami demimonde of exiles, drug investments, and Syndicate real estate deals with which Sturgis and his friend Bebe Rebozo have been involved.

I hope to show that what makes this Miami connection so dangerous, and what links the scandal of Watergate to the assassination in Dallas, is the increasingly ominous synthesis

between U.S. intelligence networks and the forces of organized crime.

Cover-Up in Dallas

The experience of the Ervin Committee suggests a new approach to the Kennedy assassination: to focus on the cover-up rather than on the crime itself. Although many vital records of the Watergate break-in were successfully destroyed, the cover-up actions themselves became new evidence of an on-going conspiracy. Thus the Ervin Committee has learned more about the mechanics of the cover-up than of the original break-in. In Dallas, too, the actual circumstances of the three shootings—of Kennedy, Oswald and Officer Tippit—have been largely obliterated. But if we focus only on the ensuing Dallas cover-up, the evidence of conspiracy and the identity of some of the principals are unmistakable—as is the central presence of criminal and intelligence networks also evident in the politics of Watergate and Vietnam.

The Watergate investigations revealed that many men in government will conspire against the law when two justifications are offered—whether or not these justifications are credible or are actually believed. The first is the possibility of a national security threat (as when Ellsberg's revelation of the Pentagon Papers was alleged to have threatened current peace negotiations, or to have involved a leak to the Soviet embassy). The second is the alleged involvement of a governmental intelligence network or operation (as when on May 22, Nixon justified his participation in the cover-up by explaining that he had believed, erroneously, that the CIA was implicated).

The second justification flows from the first. E. Howard Hunt was no fool when he used a CIA Minox camera to photograph G. Gordon Liddy in front of the office building of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although the photograph was irrelevant to the ensuing burglary, by implying CIA involvement it insured that Hunt and Liddy would be protected by an Administration cover-up—and that, if the cover-up ever collapsed, it could be credited to national security instead of political expediency. By the same logic it was not oversight, but foresight, that Bernard Barker had CIA-veteran Hunt's name and White House phone number in his notebook at the

time of the break-in (*New York Times*, June 24, 1972, p. 24), and that Frank Sturgis was allegedly "carrying a false passport prepared by the CIA at Hunt's request" (*New York Times*, January 14, 1973, p. 38).

In Dallas, allegations both of a security threat and an intelligence involvement were available to justify federal intervention into the investigation, and thus also to justify a post facto cover-up. Following the assassination, a large number of rumors linked Oswald (and sometimes Ruby) to a left-wing conspiracy extending to Castro's Cuba and possibly the Soviet Union. Some of these rumors seemed to be based on evidence; one, interestingly enough, was "corroborated" by Frank Sturgis.

The Secret Service in Dallas intercepted a letter to Oswald postmarked Havana, November 28, 1963, and signed by Pedro Charles. The letter indicated that "Oswald had been paid by Charles to carry out an unidentified mission which involved accurate shooting" (CE 2763, 26 H 148).^{*} Meanwhile the FBI possessed a letter from Havana to Robert Kennedy, "written by one Mario del Rosario Molina [who] alleged that Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated President Kennedy at the direction of Pedro Charles, a Cuban agent." According to the writer, Oswald met with Charles in Miami, Florida, several months ago [i.e., in early 1963] and was paid \$7,000 by Charles" (26 H 148).

By now this story seems absurd: the elaborate FBI chronology of Oswald's movements gave no indication that he ever visited Miami. But at the time the letters arrived, a reporter in the Miami area named James Buchanan was publishing stories (attributed to Frank Sturgis alias Fiorini) that Oswald had been in Miami and also had been in contact with Cuban intelligence (CD 59.2-3, CD 395.2; cf. CD 1020.6). Later reports from James Buchanan's brother Jerry that Oswald in Miami in March, 1963 (CD 1020.7). The concatenating pieces of misinformation from Miami and Havana suggest, in retrospect, a conspiracy to mislead.

* Citations to the Warren Commission's twenty-six volumes of testimony (H) and one-volume Report (R) follow the Commission's instructions in this instance, to Commission Exhibit 2763, *Hearings*, Vol. 26, p. 1. † Citations from the Warren Commission's unpublished chronology available in the U.S. National Archives, Washington, will follow the format in this instance, Commission Documents 59, pp. 2-3, 302. Cf. Commission Document 1020.

The stories today are much less important than Buchanan's sources for them, all of whom came from two Miami-based anti-Castro groups. The first group (CD 49.26), the DRE (Student Revolutionary Directorate), was Cuban, and the CIA used it to infiltrate Cuba in connection with the Bay of Pigs; the DRE was named in Oswald's notebook (16 H 67), since Oswald had been in contact with them in New Orleans (R 728), and perhaps in Dallas (CD 205.646). The second, American group—which included both James Buchanan and his brother Jerry—was the International Anti-Communist Brigade. It was a small band of mercenaries headed by a named source of Buchanan's articles—Frank Sturgis alias Fiorini, the future burglar of Watergate.

Sturgis, like the DRE, had been employed by the CIA in connection with the Bay of Pigs invasion. But after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Kennedy had begun to crack down on anti-Castro raids launched from the continental United States. Jerry Buchanan had been arrested by the British in the Bahamas in April, 1963, on board a boat formerly used in CIA missions, and now being used (with presidential authorization) for an intended raid against a Soviet tanker (*New York Times*, April 2, 1963, pp. 1, 9; April 3, 1963, p. 3). In September, the federal government had issued "strong warnings" to six Americans for their anti-Castro activities, including Frank Fiorini (Sturgis) and Alexander Rorke, the owner of Jerry Buchanan's boat (*New York Times*, September 16, 1963, p. 39). As for James Buchanan, the brigade's secretary and propaganda director, Sturgis allegedly broke with him in December, 1963, because of his "excessive" attacks on the FBI and the CIA, "even going so far as to describe former President John F. Kennedy as a communist" (CD 1020.6).

Similar anti-Kennedy sentiments were allegedly expressed by Carlos Bringuier, Oswald's contact with the DRE in New Orleans, and a right-winger who later headed up the Cuban-Americans for Nixon-Agnew. Another witness told the Warren Commission that Bringuier, because "the United States didn't help overthrow Castro ... hates the United States almost as much as he hates Russia" (11 H 353). Because these sentiments were so widely held among Cuban exiles, many students of the Dallas assassination have theorized that a group of anti-Castro terrorists (Cuban and/or American) may have killed Kennedy in revenge for having been abandoned by the CIA in 1963.

THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

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CONTENTS

1. Background	
1.1. The assassination	105
1.2. The investigation and the official findings	106
1.3. The major areas of doubt involving medical evidence	107
2. Origin of the medical evidence	
2.1. The immediate medical treatment	109
2.2. Circumstances of the autopsy	110
2.3. The autopsy findings	110
2.4. The autopsy materials and restrictions on access	112
3. Observations of the autopsy materials	
3.1. The available materials	113
3.2. The missing evidence	113
3.3. The author's observations	114
4. Interpretation of the data	
4.1. The basic medical data	116
4.2. Relevant collateral data	126
4.3. Evaluation and judgment	124
5. Summary and conclusions	
5.1. Autopsy conditions and procedures	127
5.2. Governmental handling and disclosure of evidence	128
5.3. Present state of knowledge of the details of the shooting	128

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. The assassination

Ten years ago, during a motorcade in Dallas, Texas, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated by gunfire before hundreds of horrified onlookers. The President was first seen to clutch at his throat, and then, a few seconds later, his skull was seen to burst. Reports of post-mortem examination later indicated that he was struck by two bullets, the first entering the upper right side of his back and the second entering the back of his head.

Five other persons were seated in the Presidential limousine, which was uncovered at the time. Mrs Kennedy was to the left of the President in the rear seat. John Connally

then Governor of Texas, was directly in front of the President, and Mrs Connally was seated at his left. Two Secret Service agents occupied the driving compartment. Several other vehicles were behind the Presidential car in the procession, the immediate follow-up car containing eight Secret Service agents.

Governor Connally was severely wounded during the same gunfire. He sustained wounds through the right side of the chest and through his right forearm near the wrist, plus a less severe wound of his left thigh. One of his ribs was shattered, and the radius of his right arm suffered a comminuted fracture. The other occupants of the Presidential car were not hit.

Several photographs and some motion picture films were taken during the assassination sequence, as well as shortly before or after. These, along with the many eye-witness reports and the presence at the scene of numerous federal agents and local law enforcement officers, made the crime one of the most thoroughly observed in history.

1.2. The investigation and the official findings

Investigation by the Dallas Police and the FBI led to an early belief that there was only a single assassin, a man named Lee Harvey Oswald. Oswald was arrested about an hour and a half after the assassination in a theater several miles from the scene, after having purportedly slain a police officer. Oswald himself was murdered two days later while in the custody of the Dallas Police, without ever having admitted any role in either killing.

Several months later, after extensive investigation by the FBI and other government agencies under the direction of a special commission known as the "Warren Commission", the official findings and conclusions were reported to the new President, Lyndon Johnson, and to the American public. In essence, these boil down to a restatement of the early belief reached by the Dallas Police and the FBI. Oswald was the assassin, he had acted alone and unaided, and there had been no conspiracy of any kind, either in the assassination of the President or in the killing of Oswald.

The investigation was massive in scope, and it produced a huge volume of documentation. In addition to its Report, the Warren Commission published 26 volumes of exhibits and the testimony of more than 500 persons. Easily ten times more such materials remain unpublished at the National Archives. Most of them are accessible to the public, although some portions are still withheld.

Yet today, despite the massiveness of the investigation, the precise details of the shooting are still far from clear, and there remain legitimate grounds for doubt that the crime was correctly or fully solved. The Warren Commission itself found it necessary to hedge on some of its most fundamental findings, a fact sometimes overlooked or forgotten by its defenders. In reference to such matters as the number of shots fired, their sequence, and the precise manner in which Governor Connally was wounded, the Commission repeatedly resorted to language expressing uncertainty. Some examples (with emphasis supplied by the authors of this paper) are as follows:

"The weight of the evidence indicates that there were three shots fired."

"Two bullets probably caused all the wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally."

"...it was *not possible* to determine whether the two bullet fragments were from the same bullet or from two different bullets." (This statement is in reference to two mutilated but sizable bullet fragments found in the front of the Presidential car.)

"...there is very *persuasive* evidence from the experts that the same bullet which pierced the President's throat also caused Governor Connally's wounds. However, Governor Connally's testimony and certain other factors have given rise to some difference of opinion as to this probability..."

Are such uncertainties significant? The answer is that every one of them has an important bearing on the Commission's reconstruction of the shooting and, in conjunction with other evidence, on the crucial question of whether or not it was physically possible for one man to have fired all the shots. The Commission's lone-assassin conclusion cannot logically be more certain than its findings in respect to these details.

Questions of this kind do not arise in the majority of murder cases. Complex plots with multiple participants and contrived deception do not usually merit serious consideration, and the available evidence ordinarily rules them out anyway. But the assassination of a President, with its high stakes for the participants, is a different situation and demands the most careful scrutiny to ensure that "the evidence fits".

The Commission's defenders have tended to be more certain of the official findings than the Commission itself, while its critics have found additional areas of doubt not acknowledged by the Commission. Several of these questioned findings involve medical evidence, or a combination of medical evidence with ballistic, photographic, or other forms of evidence. They relate to the questions of whether or not one person could have committed the assassination and from where the shots were fired. It is with these questions alone, and the medical evidence bearing on them, that this paper is concerned.

1.3. *The major areas of doubt involving medical evidence*

The question of whether the Governor was wounded by a bullet which had previously struck the President or by an entirely separate bullet was of crucial importance to the lone-assassin conclusion. Although the Commission acknowledged some uncertainty on this point, it also claimed, too glibly, that its theory in this regard was "not necessary to any essential findings of the Commission". The fact is that a motion picture film of the assassination (the so-called Zapruder film) shows convincingly that the initial wounding of the President and the wounding of Governor Connally occurred within a very brief time span, of the order of 1½ seconds at most. This interval is too short by about a second for the firing of two consecutive shots with the particular rifle found at the scene. Tests conducted by the Army and the FBI demonstrated this fact beyond doubt with the actual rifle, and cannot be overcome by tests made with replica rifles.

Hence if the non-fatal wounds of the President and the Governor were *not* caused by the same bullet, another rifle besides the one found at the scene is necessarily implicated. A bullet and two fragments recovered after the assassination matched the found rifle, but another whole bullet was lost entirely, as the Commission conceded. Therefore the possibility that another rifle was used is not refuted by the ballistic evidence. With another

rifle in use, a second assassin would necessarily have been involved, and the failure to find that other rifle might raise the specter of a still larger conspiracy.

Moreover, the Commission's reconstruction required that a certain nearly whole bullet, designated as Commission Exhibit 399, had inflicted all the non-fatal wounds on the President and on Governor Connally. This bullet was found under puzzling circumstances* at Parkland Hospital in Dallas, where the President and Governor had been taken immediately after the shooting. Its history and chain of possession are far from clear, but the Commission accepted its authenticity and theorized that it had fallen out of Governor Connally's thigh wound at some stage. It is a 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano bullet manufactured by the Western Cartridge Co., consisting of a lead core fully covered, except at the cartridge end, by a substantial copper jacket. In its found state, it weighed 158.6 grains, as compared to an average weight of 161 grains for undamaged test bullets of the same manufacture. Its copper jacket is still fully intact, except for a small notch near the nose end where the FBI removed a sample for spectroanalysis. In appearance, it is exactly like a cotton-tube test bullet, except for a slight flattening and small loss of lead at its base. Yet by the Commission's reconstruction of the shooting, this bullet is required to have penetrated the upper right portion of the President's body, traversed the right side of Governor Connally's chest (removing several inches of his right fifth rib), pierced the Governor's right arm near the wrist (shattering the distal radius and leaving several particles of lead), and finally to have entered the Governor's left thigh (leaving another metallic particle embedded in his femur), after which, at some unknown time, it fell out. Several years after the assassination, when the photographs and X-rays of the President's autopsy became accessible, other metallic particles were seen in the X-rays of the upper right side of the President's body (unknown to the Commission). There is also some indication of metallic particles in the X-rays of the Governor's chest. While the cumulative weight of all these particles may be less than the weight missing from Commission Exhibit 399**, the larger problem is to explain how an essentially undamaged, fully copper-jacketed bullet could have left them at all, and how the bullet could have caused so much bone damage without suffering substantial surface markings or distortion of shape.

The Commission's findings postulated that all the shots were fired from a certain window on the sixth floor of a building known as the Texas School Book Depository. This building was behind and somewhat to the right of the Presidential car at the time the shots were fired, the distance and angle varying with the position of the car as it moved down the street. The sixth-floor window looked down upon the car at an angle which varied from roughly 20 degrees to 15 degrees over the shooting interval. The street itself curved appreciably and sloped downward from the Depository by a few degrees, making

* The bullet was reportedly found under a stretcher in a remote part of the hospital in the afternoon of the assassination. It was never conclusively determined whether the President or the Governor (or either) had occupied the stretcher.

** The weight of the bullet was no more than 2.5 grains below the average of several unutilized test bullets. One fragment, from Governor Connally's wrist, alone weighed 0.5 grain.

the calculation of trajectories somewhat involved. Because of the effect of the car's movement on the possible trajectories, the calculations also depend on the times of the shots, and these are not precisely known in the case of the non-fatal wounds of the President and the Governor. Nevertheless, they are known approximately (over a range), and it thus becomes important to determine if the locations and apparent pathways of the wounds can be reconciled with the postulated location of the assassin.

The Commission purported to carry out this calculation with considerable precision, reporting distances to tenths of a foot and angles to minutes of arc, ultimately claiming consistency with the medical data. Closer examination, however, shows this alleged agreement to be specious. There is so much confusion, contradiction, and general vagueness about the locations of the wounds, as known to the Commission, that this part of their calculation is almost meaningless. Lacking accurate data, the Commission relied on an artist's sketch as its authority for the angle of the declination through the President's back/throat wound, reporting that an angle of $17^{\circ}43'30''$ was "approximately" the angle shown in the sketch, when in fact the sketch angle measures less than 10 degrees. The Commission also claimed satisfactory alignment of this wound with the Governor's chest wound (about 25 degrees downward). Simultaneously, the Commission entirely ignored the problem of reconciling the assumed flight path of the bullet with the angles through the wounds in the horizontal plane.

2. ORIGIN OF THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE

2.1. The immediate medical treatment

Immediately after the last shot was fired, the Presidential car was driven to Parkland Hospital in Dallas where the President and Governor were given emergency treatment. The effort to save the President was unsuccessful in the face of the extensive damage to his brain. However, it produced a significant change in the character of one of his other wounds and led to much confusion later.

When the President was examined at Parkland Hospital, he was seen to have a massive head wound, with profuse bleeding and loss of brain tissue, and a much smaller wound in the anterior neck below the Adam's apple. The latter wound was thought to be an entry wound in view of its small size and other characteristics, an interpretation which led to a number of erroneous early news stories about the source of the shots. No other external wounds were noted by the doctors at Parkland, reportedly because the President's body was not turned over for examination of his back.

In an effort to restore the President's breathing, an endotracheal tube was inserted through the neck wound and connected to a respirator. When this proved ineffectual, a tracheotomy was performed to ensure a clear airway. The Parkland doctors also reported the insertion of chest tubes through surgical incisions in the chest.

* The commission's purported measurement of angles to minutes and seconds of arc is absurd. At the supposed range of fire (about 200 feet), one minute of arc corresponds to less than one inch in the position of the rifle.

The tracheotomy incision was made through the anterior neck wound, thus changing its appearance completely and preventing its recognition as a missile wound during the autopsy later that night.

Concurrently, Governor Connally was examined and given surgical treatment for wounds in the right side of his chest, his right arm, and left thigh. Observations of these wounds later played an important role in the Warren Commission's reconstruction of the shooting.

2.2. Circumstances of the autopsy

The President was pronounced dead about one-half hour after admission to Parkland Hospital. An hour or two later, after a dispute in which the Texas authorities were refused their lawful right and duty to perform the autopsy in Texas, the President's body was flown back to Washington, D.C. An autopsy was performed by military doctors that evening at the U.S. Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland.

The circumstances of this autopsy were unusual. At least 30 persons are known to have been present in the autopsy room at one time or another, most of them military. Five were agents of the Secret Service or the FBI.

The members of the autopsy team had had only limited forensic experience at that stage of their careers. Some years afterwards, it was revealed that an Army General, not otherwise identified, had claimed to be in overall charge of the autopsy and that orders had been given not to dissect the President's back/throat wound.

Moreover, it is now known that one roll of film taken during the autopsy was seized from a medical corpsman by a Secret Service agent who then deliberately ruined the film by exposing it to the light. This incident is not mentioned by the Warren Commission, and there has never been any official explanation for the act.

Under these circumstances, we should not be surprised that a thorough and accurate autopsy was not performed. The decision of the military authorities to rely exclusively on military pathologists, acting under military orders, appears to have been grounded on their concept of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces rather than as Chief Executive of the United States. It produced a seriously defective autopsy.

2.3. The autopsy findings

As ultimately published in the Warren Report, the essential autopsy findings were that the President had been struck by two bullets and that both had been fired from behind and "somewhat" above the President. One of these bullets was reported to have entered the upper right posterior thorax just above the scapula and to have exited from the anterior neck at the midline. The other was said to have entered the skull about 2.5 cm to the right of and "slightly" above the external occipital protuberance, then to have fragmented and erupted through the right parietal region of the skull, carrying with it substantial portions of skull, scalp, and cerebral tissue.

The locations and pathways of these wounds were not precisely reported, and in some instances the reference points for measurements were inept. For example, the vertical

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Source?

position of the wound in the upper back was measured from the right mastoid process, which is both vague in extent and, relative to other points on the body, subject to variation with changes in posture. The horizontal position of this wound was referred only to the right acromion process, no measurement being given for the distance from the midline of the spine, which was both shorter and more precise. No measurements at all were reported from the top of the head, a commonly used reference point.

During the autopsy examination, the missile wound in the anterior neck was not recognized as such because of the tracheotomy incision. It was discovered only through a telephone call the following day to one of the attending physicians in Dallas. While the failure to recognize the presence of this wound may be rationalized on the basis of the surgical incision, the failure to consult the Dallas physicians before or during the autopsy cannot. Moreover, the failure to dissect and track the back wound is incomplete, particularly when the outlet for this wound was not then known.

Inasmuch as the X-rays did not show a whole bullet anywhere in the President's body, and the exit path was not known, the autopsy team resorted to sheer speculation. It was thought that the bullet must have "worked its way out" of the back wound during external cardiac massage. That opinion was noted and reported by the attending FBI and Secret Service agents, who were (not present) during the telephone conversations and subsequent revisions of the findings on the following days. The FBI agents reported that the bullet which struck the President's back entered at a point "below the shoulders" along a path which was "45 to 60 degrees" downward, and had "no point of exit". Indeed, FBI Headquarters continued to make such assertions as facts for almost two months in its reports to the President and to the Warren Commission, apparently without ever being notified of the corrections. For these and other reasons, serious questions have been raised as to when the final version of the autopsy report was actually written and what its predecessor versions might or might not have contained. The report itself is undated, although the doctors testified that it was completed on the morning of November 24, 1963.

Several other findings were also reported, including the sizes and appearances of the wounds, descriptions of certain skull fragments, and the disposition of various metallic fragments in the skull as disclosed by the X-rays. In a supplemental report dated December 6, two weeks after the autopsy, the results of microscopic examination of various sections through the formalin-fixed brain are described, as well as sections through the skin at the wounds of entry.

However, certain procedures that would have been invaluable in fully locating and characterizing the wounds were not carried out, or carried out only partially. The wound in the upper back, as already noted, was not dissected. Coronal sections through the fixed brain were not made, although this is a routine procedure in cases of gunshot wounds of

* At least one draft of the autopsy report appears to have been burned. One of the pathologists testified that he destroyed his "preliminary draft notes" in the fireplace of his home on the morning of November 24.

the head in order to track the pathway of a bullet or bullet fragment. The left side of the brain is described only superficially in the autopsy report, as though the X-ray findings alone were enough to guarantee that no bullet or fragment had traversed it.

As a result, the autopsy failed to provide the detailed and unequivocal findings necessary to settle beyond any dispute the number and general directions of the bullets which struck the President. Nor did it provide the investigative team with any but the most superficial assistance in determining the locations of possible assassins. Instead, the investigation was forced to rely on assumptions and on the recollections of various eye- and ear-witnesses many of which were contradictory and required careful selection. Today, some of the Warren Commission's assumptions and witness selections appear to be wrong in a way which vitiates the Commission's central conclusion that there was only one assassin. A thorough autopsy would almost certainly have avoided this situation.

The autopsy report omits all reference to the adrenal glands. Although this information would not have had any bearing on the assassination whatever, its omission is a clear indication of the degree of control exercised over the autopsy team by the military authorities.

One further illustration of the quality of the autopsy is worth pointing out, although again it is not relevant to any of the Commission's findings. Several of the Parkland Hospital doctors testified that surgical incisions were made into the President's chest. They were quite positive about this, describing in some detail the insertion of chest tubes and connection to equipment. There seems to be no reason for them to have imagined or fabricated these statements. Yet the autopsy doctors testified that the incisions did *not* enter the chest cavity and that the pleural lining was completely intact. If the Parkland Hospital doctors were correct, what are the implications for the capacity of the autopsy team to find and characterize wounds?

2.4. The autopsy materials and restrictions on access

Numerous photographs and X-rays were taken in the course of the autopsy. The Warren Commission declined to examine these, relying instead on the testimony of the autopsy pathologists and a few artist's sketches drawn from oral descriptions of the wounds. The materials were held to be the property of the Kennedy family prior to their donation to the United States Government in late 1966. They are now at the National Archives, but access to them is subject to restrictions imposed by the Kennedy family as a condition on the gift.

Following a rash of public controversy engendered by various books critical of the Warren Report, the photographs and X-rays were reviewed by the autopsy team in early 1967. They reported that the materials corroborated their original findings in all respects.

In early 1968, a second review of the materials was made, this time by a team of four prominent physicians (three pathologists and one radiologist) appointed by Attorney General Ramsey Clark. The report of this review disclosed several observations not previously reported and provided important new details. Chief among these are:

- (1) The entry wound in the President's skull was located 25 mm to the right of the

midline and about 100 mm above the external occipital protuberance, a difference of some three to four inches from its location as reported by the original autopsy team:

(2) A gray brown rectangular structure measuring approximately 13 mm X 20 mm was visible in photographs of the right cerebral hemisphere (the panel was unable to establish its identity);

(3) Locations of the President's back and throat wounds are given with some precision and in relation to reasonably well-defined reference points, thus permitting, for the first time, approximate determination of the trajectory of the bullet path;

(4) A large metallic fragment measuring 6.5 mm in diameter, embedded in the outer table of the skull at the lower edge of the entry hole, was seen on the X-rays of the President's head; and

(5) Several small metallic fragments and some subcutaneous emphysema were seen in the lower neck region just to the right of the cervical spine on the X-rays of the upper thorax.

In late 1971, the restrictions on access to the autopsy photographs and X-rays relaxed somewhat to permit non-government pathologists to examine them if approved by the Kennedy family representative. One individual, not a pathologist and not the first to apply for such access, was granted permission in early 1972. One of the authors of this article is the first non-government pathologist given permission to examine these materials, and he conducted his examination on August 23 and 24, 1972.

3. OBSERVATIONS OF THE AUTOPSY MATERIALS

3.1. The available materials

The materials examined consist of X-rays, photographs and film negatives from the autopsy, the President's clothing, medical sketches, the bullet and bullet fragments recovered after the assassination, the rifle, the X-rays of Governor Connally, photographs and a diagram of the Presidential car, the Zapruder film and its individual frames, the Nix and Muchmore motion pictures, photographs from the FBI re-enactment of the assassination, and various documentary materials. With the exception of the autopsy X-rays, photographs, film negatives, and clothing of the President, these materials are also accessible to the public.

The X-rays and photographic materials give every indication of being authentic. Their numbers and general descriptions are in agreement with the corresponding data reported by the Ramsey Clark panel, for example, and the facial features, where they can be seen, are consistent with the examining author's recollections of the President.

3.2. The missing evidence

Unfortunately, some of the autopsy materials, including some of the most important from the forensic standpoint, are not at the National Archives. We know, for example, that the President's brain was preserved and that several sections were prepared for

microscopic examination. Moreover, certain sections were taken through the skin at the supposed wounds of entry in the scalp and in the upper back of the President. The preserved brain and these various brain and skin tissue sections were examined by the autopsy team about two weeks after the original autopsy, and additional photographs were then made. All of these are described in the supplemental autopsy report published in the Warren Report. Yet, these items — the brain, the microscopic sections, and the supplemental photographs — are all missing from the National Archives.

We also know from the testimony of the original autopsy team that color photographs were taken of the interior of the President's chest cavity. These photographs are important to the determination of the path of the bullet which struck the President's upper back. They are missing also.

All these items had been turned over to the National Archives by Admiral George Burkley on April 26, 1965, according to a memorandum of that date. However, they are not included in the inventory of items officially transferred to the United States Government by the Kennedy family on October 29, 1966. There has been no accounting for these missing items, and there are no known reports of re-examination of them since the original autopsy team examined them in December, 1963.

3.3. The author's observations

The most important of the author's observations are depicted in the accompanying illustrations, with additional details provided in the legends. No attempt has been made, however, to depict the massive head wound of the President in these illustrations. Its appearance is consistent with other verbal descriptions which have been published.

Generally speaking, the author's observations and measurements of the wounds and locations of bullet fragments are in agreement with the findings of the Clark Panel in 1968. However, certain additional observations, not reported by the Clark Panel, are worthy of note:

(1) The unidentified "rectangular structure" seen by the Clark panel in the photographs of the right cerebral hemisphere is perhaps better described as parallelogram-shaped. The precise configuration cannot be ascertained inasmuch as the margins are concealed by overlying brain tissue. It has a slight focal shimmering effect in some pictures, which could be due to photographic artifacts or to light reflection from materials contained within the object. There are no metallic densities visible in the corresponding X-rays which can be readily associated with it, suggesting that its nature is most probably organic.

(2) Color photographs of the back of the head disclose a little flap of skin or other tissue, not easily identifiable, just above the hairline at the base of the skull and slightly to the left of the midline. It has a pale, pinkish red, slightly glistening appearance and is shaped like a small foot with the toes pointing toward the vertex. In one of the photographs, a black line is also visible running from the midportion of the flap to the right occipital-parietal region. It is not possible to determine whether this is a thread of some kind or a line drawn by some person on the negative. The flap itself does not appear to be




Fig. 1. The Dealey Plaza area in Dallas, scene of President Kennedy's assassination (courtesy, J. Cablock). North is to the top of the picture in this view. The Texas School Book Depository, location of a lone assassin according to the Warren Commission, is the building with the Hertz sign on top. The street curving downward and leftward from the building is Elm Street, along which the President's car traveled at the time of the assassination. The so-called "grassy knoll" is the area near and to the left of the "pergola", the curved structure overlooking Elm Street. The shots were fired while the President's car was on a path corresponding roughly to the portion of Elm Street directly opposite the pergola. Note that at this location of the car, the Depository building was behind and somewhat to the right of the car. The westerly portions of the building were substantially more to the right of the car than the extreme eastern corner where the Warren Commission placed the assassin.

associated with any underlying wound, and its location does not correspond with any X-ray features or any previous observations by other examiners of these materials.

(3) The wound in the upper back is slightly elliptical, with the longer axis in the horizontal direction, measuring about 5 mm X 7 mm. A darkened, abraded rim around the upper and right margins adds about 2 mm to each of these measurements. The medial margin is between 4 and 4.5 cm from the midline of the back, and the superior margin about 5.7 cm below the lowest crease in the neck. X-rays of this region disclose densities at the right lateral margin of the sixth and seventh cervical vertebrae. The clavicles, ribs, and other bones appear intact. (These observations differ from those of the Clark panel only in respect to slight variations in the measurements.)

(4) The tracheotomy incision is about 1.5 cm wide at the widest part of the gap. There




Fig. 2. Photograph of the south face of the Texas School Book Depository Building (courtesy, Mr. Tom Dillard). This photograph, according to the man who took it, was taken within a few seconds after the final shot. The window believed by the Warren Commission to have been the location from which the shots were fired is the partly open window on the extreme right of the floor below the top floor. Note the many other open windows. (Some others off the left edge of the picture are also known to have been open at the time.) Measurements and calculations by the authors indicate that at least two shots were fired from locations substantially further west (leftward in the photograph) of the window specified by the Commission.

is an irregular notch at the midpoint of its lower margin, possibly caused by the endotracheal tube used by the Parkland Hospital doctors. Lack of sharp focus in the photographs showing the tracheotomy prevented the author from identifying and locating the alleged exit wound of the bullet.

(5) X-rays of Governor Connally's chest reveal a number of small particles suggestive of metallic fragments. Although very small, they appear to be metallic. (The report of the Clark Panel gives no indication that these X-rays of Governor Connally were examined by them.)

4. INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA

4.1. The basic medical data

Photographs of the President's back wound indicate that its center is located about




Fig. 3. Approximate locations of metallic fragments seen in lateral X-ray of President's head (skull damage not depicted). Note the sizable fragment at the rear of the skull (A). The location is at the lower margin of the hole of presumed bullet entry. Another sizable fragment is seen in the supraorbital region (B). A fragment from this location is reported to have been removed surgically and later subjected to spectrographic analysis. Smaller particles are very numerous and appear, from this view, to lie along a track in the parietal and frontal regions. This "track" may be somewhat illusory (see sketch of A-P view, Fig. 4). At the time of bullet impact, the President's head was tilted distinctly forward and leftward. Moreover, the exit point of the bullet or its larger fragments cannot be determined because of the large loss of skull bone in the right parietal and frontal regions. The bullet trajectory therefore cannot be determined, although it is clear that the bullet entered from the rear of the President.

4.5 cm to the right of the midline of the spine and about 6 cm below the lowest crease in the back of the neck. Accepting that this wound lines up with an exit hole in the midline of the throat at the level of the third or fourth tracheal ring, the path length of this wound is approximately 15 cm. Adopting also the Clark Panel's measurement of the vertical position of the exit hole, namely 9 cm below the same crease (although the author was unable to corroborate this measurement from his own observations), we are able to compute the trajectory of the bullet relative to the horizontal and sagittal planes through the President's body at the time he was struck.

The downward angle works out to be 11½ degrees, and the lateral angle (from right rear to left front) is 17½ degrees. Allowing for a potential 0.5 cm error in the measurements of these wound locations, the possible variation in these calculated angles is about 2 degrees, either plus or minus. Thus the bullet which struck the President's back entered at an angle of from 9½ to 13½ degrees downward relative to the horizontal plane, and from 15½ to 19½ degrees right-to-left relative to the sagittal plane. The corresponding angles relative to the fixed surroundings would, of course, depend on the orientation of the car and the posture of the President's body at the time he was struck.



Fig. 4. Approximate locations of metallic fragments seen in A-P X-ray of the President's head (skull damage not depicted). The sizable fragments (A' and B') seen above the right orbit appear to correspond to those noted in the lateral X-ray at the rear and front of the skull. In this view, the smaller particles appear widely dispersed laterally, suggesting that the "track" seen in the lateral X-ray may be somewhat of an illusion caused by lack of depth perception. This shows the need for sectioning of the brain. Note that a few very small particles are visible even on the left side of the President's head. There is the appearance of a very small particle on the right side of the mandible near the midline. No density corresponding to this location is seen on the lateral X-ray. Its location could be in the region of the spinal column and thus relate to the President's back wound.

The pathway of the bullet which struck the President's head is not amenable to the same kind of calculation. This bullet fragmented, and the point or points of exit of the fragments are not known with any precision. Nor, because of the bone impact and fragmentation, is it likely that the bullet fragments followed a course in line with the original flight path. Because of the extensive loss of skull, it cannot be absolutely ascertained that no more than one bullet struck the President's head, at least from the available autopsy photographs and X-rays. However, one entry wound is definitely identifiable, and its location high on the rear of the skull points to a rearward location for the source of the shot.

The data on the wounds of Governor Connally establish that he was struck by a bullet which entered the far right side of his back near the axilla, the corresponding exit wound being in the right chest just below the nipple. Photographs of the Governor's suit coat show a hole in the back, corresponding to the entry wound location, which is appreciably elongated in the horizontal direction. Angular measurements on this wound as reported by witnesses before the Warren Commission estimate that the bullet was on a downward angle of 25 degrees and a right-to-left angle of 20 degrees relative to the appropriate planes through the Governor's body. A portion of the fifth rib on the right side was shattered by this bullet.

*entry wound
near the
head*




Fig. 5. Approximate location of the wound in the President's back. The insert shows an enlarged view of the wound with its approximate dimensions. The border of the wound shows a darkened, abraded rim, varying from 0 to 2 mm wide, most noticeably along the lateral margin. This abraded rim is typical of a bullet striking at an appreciable angle off the perpendicular at the point of entry. In this case, the implied direction is primarily from right to left. This direction is also consistent with the reported location of the exit wound at the midline of the anterior throat and the fact that the knot of the President's tie was apparently grazed along the left side as the bullet emerged. X-rays of this region of the President's body disclose metallic particles to the right of the sixth and seventh cervical vertebrae.

The Governor's right arm was penetrated near the wrist, the bullet or missile entering the back side 5 cm above the wrist joint and exiting from the palm side about 2 cm from the crease of the wrist. The right radius suffered a comminuted fracture with deposition of several particles of lead.

The Governor's left thigh received a puncture wound in the medial aspect of the distal third, with a small metal fragment revealed by X-rays to be embedded in the femur.

As noted previously, metallic fragments were also seen in X-rays of the President's upper back and neck region and in X-rays of Governor Connally's chest, although they are not reported by the Warren Commission.

4.2. Relevant collateral data

In addition to the nearly whole bullet recovered at Parkland Hospital and subsequently designated as Commission Exhibit 399, numerous bullet fragments were recovered. Two large fragments, Commission Exhibits 567 and 569, were found late on the night of the assassination in the front seat of the Presidential car. These weighed 44.6 and 21.0 grains respectively, the larger fragment consisting of both lead and copper while the smaller consisted of copper alone. The two together aggregated less than one-half of a whole bullet, and it was never determined whether they originated from one bullet or from two separate bullets.

Other, much smaller, fragments were removed from the President's brain, from Governor Connally's wrist, and from the carpet on the floor of the Presidential car near where Governor Connally and Mrs Connally were seated. In addition, metallic smears were noted on the inner surface of the windshield of the car and on a street curb in the general vicinity where the assassination took place. All of these smaller fragments and smears together aggregated only about 5 grains. All were identified spectrographically as lead.

The nearly whole bullet and the two large fragments were examined microballistically and found to have been fired by the same rifle, a 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano reported to have been found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository, a building near the scene of the assassination. Three cartridge cases found near a window of the same floor were also determined to have been fired in this rifle.

Motion pictures taken during the assassination show that when the President received his head wound, his head was momentarily driven forward about two inches. About one-ninth of a second later (two frames of the film), his head begins a backward and leftward movement, along with the upper part of his body, until he has fallen over to the left side of the car. The moment of bullet impact is clearly visible on the film because of the eruption of brain tissue and fluid in that particular frame. A kind of pinkish mist is visible near the President's head for several frames of the film, ultimately fading away. No such impact or eruption is evident in any other frame of the film.

Reactions to other wounds of the President and Governor Connally are also evident in the films, but the precise times when the wounds were inflicted do not appear to be determinable. However, Governor Connally's reaction is clearly seen to occur later than that of the President by an interval of at least one-half of a second, and possibly as long as one and a half seconds. Tests of the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found at the scene have established that it cannot be fired twice consecutively in less than 2.3 seconds, even without allowing for the time required to reposition and re-aim the rifle at a moving target.

Governor Connally was seated directly in front of President Kennedy in the Presidential car. Diagrams of the car show the separation between the seats, back to back, to be about






Fig. 6. Schematic representation of the locations of the wounds in the President's back and throat. The presumed entry wound is about 6 cm below the lowest crease in the back of the neck. The tracheotomy incision (see insert) is at about the level of the third and fourth tracheal rings (the thyroid gland is not shown in the sketch). The indicated pathway of the bullet is downward (about 3 cm over a distance of 15 cm), yielding an angle of 11 or 12 degrees, whereas the Warren Commission, without actual measurement of the wound itself, postulated a flight angle of about 18 degrees (after correcting for a 3-degree slope of the street).

30 inches, so that the horizontal distance from the President's throat to the Governor's back would be of the order of 24 inches. The Governor's seat was three inches lower than the President's at the time of the assassination, according to Secret Service agents who examined the car, but this difference is partially canceled out by the fact that the Governor was about two inches taller.

On-site measurements and re-enactment tests by the FBI established that during the interval when the President and Governor could have received their non-fatal wounds, the



suspected assassin's site (sixth-floor window) looked down on the Presidential car at an angle which varied from 22 to 20 degrees as the car receded; the corresponding right-to-left lateral angle, relative to the longitudinal axis of the car, varied from about 12 to 8½ degrees. The street over this interval slopes downward (away from the suspect window) by about 3 degrees.

Motion pictures and still photographs taken just before or during the early portion of the interval when the President and Governor could have received their non-fatal wounds show both men to have turned their heads to the right, but that the upper parts of their




Fig. 7. Three views of Commission Exhibit 399 (courtesy, National Archives). The Warren Commission postulated that this bullet penetrated the President's upper back and lower neck, traversed Governor Connally's chest (shattering a rib), then pierced his right arm near the wrist (shattering the radius), and finally entered his left thigh, depositing a metal particle in the femur. Metal particles have been seen in X-rays of all these wound sites, one in the Governor's wrist having been removed and found to be lead weighing half a grain. Yet the bullet is undeformed except for the flattening of the base, and its weight is at most only 2½ grains less than that of undamaged test bullets fired from the same gun. Aside from artifacts (inscription of initials by FBI agents and the removal of a specimen for spectrographic analysis), the surface of the bullet is unmarked. Its copper jacket is still intact, showing that the only place where lead could have been lost is from the base of the bullet. The authors reject the Commission's theory as to the wounds caused by this bullet.

bodies are not turned or tilted from their normal erect positions. Turning of the head alone does not change the positions of the wound sites involved.

The President's tie showed a distinct abrasion of the outer fabric where the knot had been tied. Photographs and reports establish that the abrasion was on the left side of the knot as worn by the President.

4.3. Evaluation and judgment

Commission Exhibit 399, the bullet which was believed by the Commission to have caused all the non-fatal wounds in President Kennedy and Governor Connally, shattering two bones in the process, shows no deformity (other than an FBI artifact) on its nose or anywhere in the upper two-thirds of its length. The lower third, though it shows some flattening and a small loss of lead at the base, has no impact marks on its surface. Moreover, the completely intact copper jacket of the bullet is entirely inconsistent with the observation that all four wound sites show depositions of metallic fragments. This is not the appearance of a bullet which has struck and fractured two bones, particularly Governor Connally's right radius. A bullet that had caused such damage would have been much more deformed and mutilated, would have shown clearly visible surface markings, and would have lost substantially more substance than the 2 to 2½ grains estimated by the FBI.

On these grounds, we reject the Commission's hypothesis as incompatible with experience. It should be pointed out, however, that these grounds do not entirely eliminate the possibility that some lesser combination of wounds (not including the wrist wound of Governor Connally) might have been caused by the bullet in question, or that some different bullet (not recovered or possibly not recognized among the fragments) may have caused them.

When we examine the indicated trajectories of the wounds and the bullet flight paths required by the Commission's hypothesis, other major obstacles arise. According to the Commission's theory, a bullet entered the upper right side of the President's back and emerged at the midline of the anterior throat, grazing the left side of the knot of the President's tie as it emerged. Thereafter, this bullet is said to have entered the far right side of Governor Connally's back near the axilla and then to have traversed his chest, exiting just below the right nipple.

Governor Connally was seated directly in front of the President. Motion pictures and still photographs taken at the time or just before these body wounds were inflicted show no indication that either man's body was appreciably turned, tilted, or displaced relative to the car or each other*. The lateral angle of the wounds, relative to the longitudinal axis

* The Governor's body is turned when he first emerges from behind a sign as seen in the Zapruder film, and he makes further turns in subsequent frames, exactly as he testified to the Commission. But by this time the film clearly shows that the President has already been hit and is making voluntary movements in response to his wounds.

of the car as the men were seated, is approximately the same for both men, $17\frac{1}{2}$ degrees for President Kennedy and 20 degrees for Governor Connally, the bullet moving from right to left as it traversed forward. The Commission's theory therefore requires that the bullet, just after leaving the President's throat and grazing the *left* side of the knot of his tie, make an acute angular turn to the right in mid-air in order to enter the *far right* side of Governor Connally's back. Bullets have been known to take inexplicable pathways in bodies, but they do not make spontaneous sharp turns in mid-air. The theory that one bullet caused both the President's back/neck wound and the Governor's chest wound is therefore untenable.

It should also be pointed out that the indicated pathways of these wounds are in considerable disagreement with the calculated trajectories from the postulated firing position of the assassin. The supposed assassin's site looked down on the car at an angle which varied from 22 to 20 degrees in the vertical plane and from 12 to about 8 degrees (right to left) in the horizontal plane, during the time interval over which these wounds might have been inflicted. The slope of the street, about 3 degrees, might perhaps be deducted from the vertical angle if we assume that the men's seating posture was determined by the slope of the car rather than their own sense of balance. (The Warren Commission made this correction although it is open to some question.) However, the vertical angle through the President's back/neck wound measures only about $11\frac{1}{2}$ degrees, while that through the Governor's chest is larger, namely about 25 degrees. The indicated lateral angles (right to left in the horizontal plane) are about the same for both men, namely about 20 degrees*. While these angular measurements are subject to error of a few degrees either way, the discrepancies seem too large to explain away in this fashion.

We now have three major objections to the Commission's "single-bullet theory", namely the near-pristine condition of Exhibit 399, the impossibility of the bullet flight path from the President's throat to the right side of the Governor's back, and the large discrepancies between the wound angles and the postulated firing trajectories. To these could be added the visible difference in the times of reaction by the two men as seen in the Zapruder film and Governor Connally's own testimony that he believes he was hit by a separate shot.

However, it is clear that both men were hit within a very short time interval, not over $1\frac{1}{2}$ seconds. Since the rifle found at the scene could not be fired twice consecutively in less than 2.3 seconds, another rifle is required to account for one of the shots. Presumably the ballistic evidence from that other rifle was not recovered, nor was the rifle itself. This is not at all implausible, considering the confusion that ensued at the scene immediately after the assassination. The Warren Commission itself, having concluded that three shots were fired, was forced to concede that one whole bullet was lost, since the bullet and bullet fragments recovered aggregated only $1\frac{1}{2}$ bullets altogether. The Commission

* The fact that both wounds were inflicted at substantial lateral angles is also supported by the horizontal elongation of the President's back wound and of the hole in the back of Governor Connally's suit coat.




Fig. 8. Locations of Governor Connally's wounds.

postulated that the missing bullet missed the Presidential car and its occupants entirely. In the absence of that bullet, there can be no microballistic examination to determine what rifle fired it.

The wound angle data from the President's back/neck wound and Governor Connally's chest wound suggest very strongly that both guns were fired from a position considerably further west in the Texas School Book Depository than was thought to be the location of the assassin. The size and position of this building, relative to the Presidential car at the time of the assassination, is entirely compatible with this judgment. Moreover, the angles of the wounds in the vertical plane suggest that President Kennedy's wound was inflicted by a bullet fired from a low or intermediate floor, while Governor Connally's was inflicted by a bullet fired from a high floor or possibly the roof.

The available evidence, assuming it to be valid, gives no support to theories which postulate gunmen to the front or right-front of the Presidential car. The wound in the President's head, as evidenced in the autopsy photographs and X-rays, can only have been fired from somewhere to the rear of the President. However, it cannot be determined whether this shot was fired from the same location or locations as the shots which caused the non-fatal wounds. If any other bullet struck the President's head, whether before, after, or simultaneously with the known shot, there is no evidence for it in the available autopsy materials.

The absence or unavailability of certain evidence in this case leaves a number of residual doubts and unexplained mysteries. The missing evidence includes several autopsy items — the preserved brain tissue slides, including sections of brain and of skin at the wounds of supposed entry, and several photographs of the chest cavity — and the analytical data from the FBI's laboratory examination of the bullet and bullet fragments. All of these items are known to exist, or to have existed at one time. Their continued withholding leaves important questions unanswered and is a disservice to the nation.

For example, the detailed data from the spectrographic analysis and from the neutron activation analysis of the bullet, Commission Exhibit 399, and the various bullet fragments and lead particles recovered, could settle a number of questions important in reconstructing the shooting. For example, is the lead fragment removed from Governor Connally's wrist of the same composition as the lead in Commission Exhibit 399 or is it not? Does its composition match that of any other fragment recovered, e.g. one of the large fragments found in the front of the car? Is the copper in the two large fragments found in the front of the car from the same bullet or from two different bullets? From what bullet or fragment did the lead found on the inside of the windshield originate? Or the lead smear found on the street curb in the vicinity? Are there any fragments or particles whose composition indicates a different manufacturer from the others? Such questions *can* be answered by good analytical work, and in a case so fraught with difficulties in explaining the shooting, there can be no legitimate excuse for not providing the results of the tests already performed and for not conducting other appropriate scientific tests which might well resolve these questions conclusively.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Autopsy conditions and procedures

The autopsy of President Kennedy was deficient in failing to report a number of important facts about the nature of the President's wounds and in neglecting to make accurate measurements of the locations of the wounds. At least one serious oversight occurred in respect to a wound in the President's throat, which oversight was not corrected until the following day, after belated consultation with doctors who treated the President in Dallas.

The autopsy was completely dominated by military personnel under military orders.

Instructions were given to the autopsy doctors which prevented the performance of important procedures, such as dissection of an observed wound in the upper back and the sectioning of the brain.

Too many extraneous personnel were in attendance, while highly qualified civilian forensic pathologists, who might have ensured a thorough autopsy, were deliberately not invited.

5.2. Governmental handling and disclosure of evidence

The Government's handling of the evidence in the case created much unnecessary confusion and skepticism. The FBI itself was unaware, for almost two months as reflected in their official reports, that the autopsy team had corrected itself the day after the autopsy and concluded that a bullet had exited from the President's throat. Photographs and X-rays of the President's body were not examined by the Warren Commission, and instead reliance was placed on artist's sketches and verbal descriptions which were later found to be in error.

After the Warren Report was published, the Government continued to withhold fundamental medical and other evidence. The autopsy photographs and X-rays have been kept secret from the public and, until recently, they have even been withheld from qualified, independent, non-government pathologists.

Important analytical data concerning the bullet and bullet fragments continue to be withheld. The data could settle a number of critical questions about the details of the shooting; the data are known to have been acquired by the FBI laboratory, but there is no indication that the Warren Commission ever saw them or even asked for them.

Certain important autopsy materials, including the preserved brain, certain tissue and skin sections, and several photographs are unavailable and unaccounted for.

5.3. Present state of knowledge of the details of the shooting

The Warren Commission's "single-bullet theory" is untenable, and the Commission's conclusion that there was only one assassin cannot be reconciled with available evidence. Medical and photographic data, including measurements of wound angles and calculations of bullet trajectories, strongly suggest that there were two rifles used. The indicated locations are in the same building concluded by the Warren Commission to be the site of a lone assassin, but at points further west in this building and on two different floors.

So far as the available medical evidence shows, all shots were fired from the rear. No support can be found for theories which postulate gunmen to the front or right-front of the Presidential car. The medical evidence indicates that the President's back was hit by one bullet and that his head was hit by one other bullet only.

Residual doubts exist about the details of the shooting. At least some of these can be cleared up by making all of the autopsy materials available, and by releasing the detailed FBI laboratory data on the spectrographic and neutron activation analyses of the bullet and bullet fragments recovered.

The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: A Model for Explanation

Vincent J. Salandria, Attorney
Philadelphia, Pa.

"While the researchers have preoccupied themselves with how the assassination was accomplished, there has been almost no systematic thinking on why President Kennedy was killed."

(Based on an address at the conference of the New England Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Cambridge, Mass., Oct. 23, 1971.)

For almost eight years the American people have failed to address themselves to the crucial issue of why President John F. Kennedy was killed. Much valuable time has been lost; it is becoming increasingly clear that our delay has cost mankind dearly. I urge that no one drop this question, for to do so is to abandon the serious search for peace internationally and for domestic tranquility.

Not "How?" but "Why?"

Since November 22, 1963, when President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, there has been a great deal of research into the micro-analytic aspects of the assassination. I have been among the earliest and quickest of the researchers in my protracted analyses of the shots, trajectories and wounds of the assassination. The ransacking of the facts of the assassination is not a source of pride for me but rather of quilt. While the researchers have involved themselves in consuming preoccupation with the micro-analytic searching for facts of how the assassination was accomplished, there has been almost no systematic thinking on why President Kennedy was killed. We have neglected this essential work of constructing a model of explanation which fits the data of the assassination and explains the why of it.

Government Evidence Cries Conspiracy

One who takes the trouble to study the micro-analytic material provided by the federal government must immediately conclude that there was a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. How foolish it was of us to dwell so long on these governmentally supplied pacifiers, rather than to put them aside and undertake the serious work of constructing a model of explanation. In this connection it is important to take note that the very organization which made that mass of detailed microanalytic evidence available to us — the federal government — contended from the first that there was no conspiracy. But, the federal government's intelligence agencies must have known that the material which the government issued would indicate a conspiracy existed. Then why did we get the evidence?

This question presents a serious theoretical problem. Why would the federal government on the

one hand wish to provide us with data which prove a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy and simultaneously contend on the other hand that there was no conspiracy?

So overwhelming and voluminous is the evidence of conspiracy provided for us by the government that we are compelled to conclude that if not the, at least a number of possible plots, were meant by the conspirators to be quasi-visible. The federal government has deluged us with evidence that cries out conspiracy.

New Rulers Timed Diffusion of Evidence

Another theoretical problem confronts us. If the killers were positioned in the highest echelons of the federal governmental apparatus, and by the assassination they had finally usurped the pinnacle of governmental power, then why did they not conceal the conspiracy? For, if they had accomplished a coup, they could have exercised their control by concealing evidence of conspiracy. But this coup was covert. The people would not have tolerated an overt coup against such a beloved man as President John F. Kennedy. Because of the covertness of the coup, I propose the explanatory thesis that the new governmental rulers were eager to reveal their work at differing levels of certainty to diverse people and at different times. In this way, they could avert a concerted counter thrust to their illegitimate seizure of power. Democratic forces could not unite against the new illegitimate governmental apparatus because of timing. The insights of what had occurred dawned in the minds of the decent citizens at different times and with different degrees of clarity. The transparent aspects of the conspiracy were permitted to flash signals to various elements of our population, much in the fashion of spot ads slanted at different times for selected audiences. The new rulers carefully and selectively orchestrated revelations of their bloody work, so as to gain therefrom the deference to which they felt they were entitled by their ascendancy to absolute power. I have long believed that the killers actually preempted the assassination criticism by supplying the information they wanted revealed and also by supplying the critics whom they wanted to disclose the data. Does it not make sense that if they could perpetrate a coup and could control the

press, they would have endeavored to dominate likewise the assassination criticism? But the full explanation of this thesis must await another occasion.

Lone Assassin Myth Suggests Governmental Guilt

Let us examine this thesis of a transparent conspiracy. (This thesis was in large part inspired by and formulated with the invaluable assistance of my friend, Professor Thomas Katen of Philadelphia.) Anyone who has seen the Zapruder film knows that it provides powerful evidence to support a hit on the President by an assassin positioned in front of Kennedy and not behind him, where Oswald was at the time of the shooting. Anyone who studies this film more carefully learns that the strike on Governor John B. Connally of Texas was accomplished by a separate bullet from any which impacted on the President. Even more careful analysis of the Zapruder film reveals four separate (and horrible) bullet strikes on Kennedy. Now, the federal government was in possession of that film on the day of the assassination. The federal government was in a better position than you or I to know what the film revealed. Yet, despite this evidence and other most impressive data indicating a conspiracy, the government seized upon Oswald and declared him to be the lone assassin. At the official public level the government, in its adherence to the lone-assassin cover story, strained logic. The federal government even refused to take seriously the Newtonian laws of motion and forces. But, at a more sophisticated level, the same government knew that anyone who accepted the Newtonian laws of motion would eventually have to conclude that President Kennedy was killed by a multi-assassin ambush.

Where evidence of a conspiracy with respect to the Kennedy assassination surfaced, — and much did — thanks in the main to the government's disclosures, that same government from the very first and continuously to date has publicly refused to act on that evidence. Wherever any data appeared to be thoroughly ludicrous and incredible — and much of the lone-assassin evidence did violence to common sense — the federal government publicly and solemnly declared those data veracious. The unvarying governmental pattern of consistently and publicly supporting the lone-assassin myth, and equally uniformly rejecting the irrefutable conspiracy evidence, was too studied to be the function of mere bureaucratic stupidity or accident. I propose the thesis that this uniform governmental pattern did not speak to official ignorance or ignorance but rather to the guilt of the government at the very highest echelons.

A Warning to Opponents

This systematic behavioral pattern persisted in by the government in a reckless and apparently unskeptical manner. I believe, was meant to communicate a message to the citizens: (1) about what really happened to their President; (2) about what was in store for any quixotic citizens who saw fit to oppose the new rulers of our land.

Those who saw the Zapruder film know that the government could not have been innocent of knowledge of a conspiracy. If you are tempted to want to believe that our leaders are just ignorant and capable of unremitting blundering, I urge that you abandon any such illusion.

The movement for peace in Vietnam has learned the hard way that it is naive to imagine that our government is capable of unrelieved error. Some of us in the peace movement thought that the U.S. course in Vietnam could be altered by pointing out to our ru-

lers the mistake of becoming increasingly involved militarily in that unhappy land. But our rulers would not alter their course because their intentions were fixed — not responsive to the public will. To represent our government as always well-intentioned but consistently misinformed, does not fit with reality.

Those of us who had taken care to study the assassination know too well and immediately that the Tonkin Gulf incident never happened except in the vivid imaginations of our governmental incident arrangers. So, too, it would be naive for the assassination researchers to think that we caught the government again and again with its guard down, and that we had outsmarted the Commission and all of the investigating agencies of the government which aided it. It should have occurred earlier to the assassination researchers that the government never wanted its guard up. It had a need to exercise a certain amount of exhibitionism in order for the coup to be recognized as a coup in the proper quarters. In my judgment, the assassination critics came up by and large with the evidence of assassination conspiracy which our new rulers wanted us to discover. We should have broken early and cleanly from the microanalytic — or nit-picking — approach in the assassination inquiry. We should have immediately undertaken the vital work of developing an adequate model of explanation, an adequate hypothesis, in order to pursue the reasons for the assassination. We here and now belatedly begin this vital work.

Silence of Kennedys Points to Top-Level Coup

I have heard it argued that the silence of the Kennedy family supports the lone-assassin myth. But the Kennedy family knows how overwhelming and transparently clear the conspiracy evidence is. Can there be any explanation for this silence other than that the assassination was the act of the very highest pinnacle of American governmental power? The taciturnity of the Kennedy family does not and cannot speak to the lack of conspiracy evidence. Rather that evidence stands on its own merits — massively and indestructibly. If we were to posit for purposes of argument a low-level conspiracy, then the Kennedy family silence would indeed be inexplicable. But, that silence of the Kennedys — when juxtaposed against the irrefutable conspiracy evidence — is plainly their mute acknowledgement that the assassination was perpetrated by our new rulers, who possess awesome power which dwarfs the power of the Kennedy family. So the silence of the Kennedy family, rather than refuting a conspiracy, tends to reinforce the feeling that all Americans entertain at some level of consciousness — what we sense and what the rest of the world knows — that the killing of Kennedy represented a coup d'état.

A. Which Group Was Responsible?

Once we are compelled to the conclusion that the American government destroyed its own chief of state, we are led to the specific question, "Which segment of the federal government was involved?"

To answer this question we must raise still other questions. Which agency would have thought to touch every ideological base in order to intimidate all ideologists in America, thereby dissuading all of them from delving too deeply into the meaning of the assassination? Which agency would think of structuring into the assassination cover story ideological elements which would tend to have the society

divide against itself? Which agency would derive benefit from making the Dallas police, and by extension all local police forces, look bad? Which agency would get pleasure out of having the Secret Service criticized? Which agency would benefit from having the FBI placed in the silly position of turning in reports to the Warren Commission which contradicted the findings of the Warren Report while at the same time illogically conceding that those same findings were correct? Which agency was itself non-ideological enough, and yet ideologically so sophisticated, as to interweave into the Oswald assassination fabric all possible features of the American political left and right? Which agency could have arranged for Oswald to establish membership or contact with the Communist Party and the FBI — the anti-Communist Socialist Labor Party and the Soviet Union — the ACLU and the ultra right in Dallas — Fair Play for Cuba Committee and General Edwin Walker — the Socialist Workers Party and the American oil interests — the Cuban Government and United States Marines — and finally the American Friends and the Soviet secret police?

1. J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI?

Let us enumerate the agencies who are candidates for having accomplished this brilliant charade.

How about J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI? It is not plausible that the Federal Bureau of Investigation — if it had been involved in the assassination planning — would have chosen as a patsy a person who Attorney General Waggoner Carr of Texas would indicate immediately after the killing was a paid FBI informer. And if J. Edgar Hoover had effectuated the coup, then how could we explain that immediately after the assassination, and persisting through today, there has been a yelping in the land for Mr. Hoover's scalp? If J. Edgar Hoover were the new ruling tyrant, there would be far more reluctance on the part of our cowardly government officials and the media to take him on. No, I think that we can say with surety that the FBI did not kill President Kennedy.

2. The Left?

Could the Left have killed our President? Is it possible to believe that our militarists, our anti-communist politicians, and our communications media, would have concealed the evidence of a conspiracy to kill Kennedy if such a conspiracy had been (or had the slightest chance of having been) inspired by Communists?

3. The Right?

Could the Right have killed John Kennedy? Would Earl Warren have covered for and surrendered his credentials for the political non-governmental Right and/or the oil interests? There were liberals on the Commission and its staff. Liberals have been known to play the game in covering for state crimes, but for them to cover for the extra-governmental Right in matters of assassination is for them to sign their own death warrants.

It would also make no sense for the Right to kill Kennedy in an ultra-right city such as Dallas. To do so would be to impute blame to the Right.

4. President Johnson and Friends?

Were President Johnson and his friends the killers? Again, it would be impossible to conceive of President Johnson and his Texas cronies arranging to have the President killed in their own bailiwick where

the world's suspicions would at once be directed against them. No, many careful studies show absolutely no evidence that President Johnson was involved in producing the assassination.

5. President Kennedy's Own Estimate of a Possible Military Takeover

Was the American military on its own capable of this degree of sophistication? It does seem rather beyond the intelligence of the American military to have accomplished this crime alone. But it is not inconceivable to imagine the American military as having been involved in a plot to eliminate Kennedy, in order to ensure the continuation of the Cold War. Kennedy himself did not regard a military take-over as implausible. We have an excellent articulation of his feeling on this matter in a discussion with Paul B. Fay, Jr.¹ This colloquy occurred one summer weekend in 1962 on the Honey Fitz, the Kennedy yacht. The President was asked what he thought of the possibility of a military take-over in the United States. The discussion grew out of the book Seven Days in May by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey.

President Kennedy said: "It's possible. It could happen in this country, but the conditions would have to be just right."

The conditions outlined by the President were as follows:

1. The country would have to be led by a young President.
2. There would be a Bay of Pigs.
3. Military criticism of the President would follow.
4. Then, if there were another Bay of Pigs, the military would consider overthrowing the elected establishment, and finally,
5. "...if there were a third Bay of Pigs, it could happen."

Mr. Fay concluded this episode by describing how the President "pausing long enough for all of us to assess the significance of his comment, ...concluded with an old Navy phrase, 'But it won't happen on my watch.'"

These conditions were approximated during the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy was in fact a young President. There was a Bay of Pigs. The missile crisis which followed resulted not in the bombing of Cuba — as the military advisors had urged upon the President — but rather in a detente with Russia. This was followed by a nuclear test ban treaty which "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared themselves opposed to under almost any terms."²

The American University speech of President Kennedy following his reexamination of the Vietnamese policy, completely fulfilled the conditions set forth by President Kennedy for a take-over to happen on his watch.

Evidence for Military Involvement in the Assassination

There is much evidence to indicate military involvement in the assassination. There was the startling and incriminating action of the then Commander James J. Humes, the head of the Navy Bethesda autopsy team, who took the original autopsy notes —

and then burned them.³ The autopsy was under the control of an army general who was not trained in medicine.⁴ The autopsy was never completed.⁵ The findings of the autopsy were contrary to the findings of the non-military physicians at Parkland Hospital. The pathologists were directed not to look at the Kennedy neck wound.⁶ The x-rays were never turned over to the Commission by the military.⁷ The burning of the notes by Commander Humes did not deter the military from promoting him to Captain.

Military-CIA Interests Coincided

Although at the time of the assassination the interests of the CIA and the military coincided, now evidence of a CIA-military rift abounds. The Boston Globe of July 20, 1971 stated that the Pentagon Papers revealed that "one agency...comes out...with a record for calling its shots correctly." So Ellsberg did not do badly by his "ex" employer. The Boston Globe of July 3 offered an item which indicates the "ex"-Pentagon people are hitting back at the "ex"-CIA Ellsberg. "A former Pentagon liaison officer with the Central Intelligence Agency said in London that President Kennedy engendered the hate of the CIA by trying to curb the agency's power. He also said he did not think Lee Harvey Oswald 'by himself killed President Kennedy.'"

"L. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force colonel and the director of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 and 1963, said Kennedy issued two directives in 1961 to limit the CIA's power but the documents never surfaced and were not implemented."

Jack Anderson on April 21, 1971 said:

"International espionage is seldom as efficient as the inter-departmental spying that goes on in Washington.

"...the Central Intelligence Agency never makes a move without the Defense Intelligence Agency keeping close surveillance.

"...Government agencies, in the best cloak-and-dagger tradition, snoop upon one another."⁸

I view the American military's motive for involving itself in the killing of Kennedy as perversely patriotic in nature. But at that period of time, there was, as we will demonstrate, a congruence of interests between the American military and the CIA. Kennedy was the enemy of both power groups at the time he was killed.

The Pentagon Papers — a CIA Jab at Military?

Of late, with the issuance of the Pentagon Papers by a long-standing CIA agent, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, this alliance between the CIA and the military seems to have become strained. Dr. Ellsberg was one of the exclusive Society of Fellows at Harvard with McGeorge Bundy and his brother William.⁹ When Ellsberg leaked the documents, he was employed at MIT's Center for International Studies and numbered among his colleagues Mr. William Bundy. In my assassination research I learned that ex-CIA people who undertook work to assist the research on the Kennedy assassination almost invariably turned out to be present CIA people. I would recommend that the public remain skeptical about Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, the ex-marine, ex-CIA, ex-hawk, ex-Kissinger aide and present fellow researcher of Mr. William Bundy at MIT.¹⁰

In fact, I would urge that the public hold open the hypothesis that the Pentagon Papers are designed as a thrust against the military by the CIA. I suggest that there has been a falling out between these two anti-democratic power blocs. The military is still determined to defeat Communism abroad, while the CIA is now primarily concerned with maintaining its power domestically.

How can we accept the Pentagon Papers as an honest and complete peering into the inner workings of our government? These papers predate and postdate November 22, 1963. Yet, these papers make no reference to the assassination and the enormous power and policy shift which occurred on that historical day when the republic expired.

Can the purpose of the disclosures of the Pentagon Papers really be to aid the CIA non-ideological elements in our government against the right wing, military, virulently anti-communist elements? Does not the evidence offered to support the existence of a present rift between the CIA and the military also support the concept that the Pentagon Papers were the offerings of the CIA to enlist assistance in its intra-governmental struggle against the military? And should decent, freedom-loving constitutionalists join either power bloc? or should they rather use this fortuitous rift to benefit freedom in this society and in the rest of the world by denouncing both cliques as the enemies of humankind?

6. Did the CIA Kill President Kennedy?

Well, then, we are reduced by the process of elimination to the question, "Was the CIA the prime mover in the killing of Kennedy?" Was the CIA sophisticated enough to have run Oswald across the whole gamut of political ideology in America in order to place all ideologists on the defensive as possible suspects? and in order to insure that the nation would be so divided ideologically that there could be no coalescence of forces which would seek retribution for the killing?

We will now examine the question of whether the CIA was the specific federal agency which was the prime mover in the killing of President Kennedy.

After the assassination of President Kennedy, the government which had refused to act on conspiracy evidence resorted to amazingly fast action in an area where one might have anticipated a slow and tentative feeling of the way. The fact is that after the assassination key foreign policy changes were put into effect immediately.

CIA Opposed Kennedy Anti-Cold War Policy

Before the assassination, thanks to President Kennedy, we were on a course which could have ended the Cold War. That course was described by D.F. Fleming as follows:

"Fortunately, we had in President Kennedy at a new turning point in history a leader with both vision and courage. He had made certain that there were no missile gaps against us. He had won the acclaim of the West by the way he successfully played showdown nuclear politics in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. He had faced the last of man's ultimate decisions on earth.

"Then, in the summer of 1963, Kennedy turned his face resolutely toward life and unmistakably signaled the end of the Cold War.

Behind the patriotic facades of nuclear militarism, he saw the death of his own children and of all children. In a series of magnificent addresses, he urged us to reconsider our attitudes toward peace, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. He won a treaty ending atomic testing above ground and then paused to wait a little for the more embattled of his cold-war compatriots to catch up with the times.

"At that moment, he was struck down..."¹¹

"President Kennedy today faces his greatest opportunity to negotiate a permanent peace, but because of division inside his own Administration he may miss the boat.

"That is the consensus of friendly diplomats long trained in watching the ebb and flow of world events..."

President Kennedy knew that his efforts to end the Cold War were dangerous to his life. In this regard I quote Arthur Schlesinger:

...when he saw Nixon after the Bay of Pigs he said, "If I do the right kind of a job I don't know whether I am going to be here four years from now... If someone is going to kill me," he would say, "they are going to kill me."¹²

President Kennedy saw the danger to his efforts to end the Cold War which lay in the power of the CIA. So the New York Times quoted him as saying, that he wished "to splinter the CIA into 1,000 pieces and scatter it to the winds..."¹³

But that purpose was never accomplished by President Kennedy. The CIA is a policy-making body still. Eugene McCarthy is of this opinion. I quote him as follows:

"The general evidence is that in addition to gathering and interpreting information, the CIA does play an important part in influencing foreign policy, and certainly has become an important operating arm of the executive branch in this area of government responsibility."¹⁴

Andrew Tully states the position of the Kennedy administration with respect to the CIA after the Bay of Pigs:

"The official concern, then, was not so much that the CIA had bungled in the past, but that it either had been entrusted with or had seized the broad responsibility for making policy which belonged to the State Department."

"...during most of Eisenhower's tenure, his Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles, and John Foster relied much more heavily on brother Allen's estimates than he did on the reports from his ambassadors. In effect, brother John Foster made of brother Allen's CIA a kind of super Foreign Service and apparently found nothing incongruous in the fact that in some embassies CIA personnel outnumbered Foreign Service employees. It was small wonder that the average citizen was confused, after Cuba, as to who was making foreign policy for the United States. Some top drawer members of the Washington diplomatic community were just as confused..."¹⁵

Kennedy Fired Dulles as CIA Head

After the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy accepted the resignation of the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles. He had called in Dulles, Cabell and Bissell and told them that the three would have to be replaced. "Under the British system," he said, "I would have to go. But under our system I'm afraid it's got to be you."¹⁶ But Allen Dulles was to return to government service immediately after the killing of President Kennedy. He appeared as one of the Warren Commissioners. Let us see whether the father of the CIA served the people and the search for truth concerning the death of the departed President, or whether he served the interests of the intelligence communities not only in the United States but in the Soviet Union as well.

Dulles Suppressed Evidence of Oswald's Soviet Intelligence Connections

On January 21, 1964, in a secret executive session, the Warren Commission had to deal with the problem of Marina Oswald giving evidence that Oswald was a Soviet agent.¹⁷ Senator Richard Russell said: "That will blow the lid if she testifies to that."¹⁸ And so it would have. How did the Commission deal with that problem? Well, we learn from the transcript of the secret executive session that Isaac Don Levine was helping Marina Oswald write a story for Life Magazine, which never got published. Allen Dulles, the original director of the Central Intelligence Agency who was fired from his position by President Kennedy, decided to see Levine. Dulles said simply: "I can get him in and have a friendly talk. I have known him."¹⁹ Does that not sound as if Allen Dulles was contemplating suppression of information?

Isaac Don Levine had a central role in the Hiss case. I quote Whitaker Chambers as he described in his book, Witness, how Levine nursed him through his uncertainty about launching into his allegations against Mr. Alger Hiss. I quote:

"The meeting was arranged by Isaac Don Levine... For years he has carried on against Communism a kind of private war which is also a public service. He is a skillful professional journalist and a notable 'ghost.' It was Levine who led Jan Valtin out of the editorial night and he was working with General Krivitsky on I was in Stalin's Secret Service when, sometime in 1938 I met both men.

"From the first, Levine had urged me to take my story to the proper authorities. I had said no. ...When he proposed that he arrange a meeting at which I might tell my story directly to President Roosevelt, I was reassured."²⁰

And why was a Cold War warrior like Isaac Don Levine not interested in raising the specter of a political assassination by the left? Why was the idea of a leftist conspiracy unthinkable in the Cold War America where for twenty-five years a virtual paranoia concerning communist plotting had prevailed? Yet there was — as we have seen — some evidence of a leftist conspiracy, and it was not acted upon. Why not? What caused our government at the public level to be so immediately and permanently wedded to the lone-assassin myth?

We are introduced through the transcript of this secret executive session to a new ghostly role for

the literary ghost, Isaac Don Levine. Levine, as a result of the intervention of his friend, Allen Dulles, apparently was successful in erasing from the prospective testimony of Marina Oswald any references to Soviet intelligence connections with Oswald. The intelligence communities across iron curtain lines apparently cooperate to keep the truth from their peoples.

Did Soviet and American Intelligence Agencies Cooperate?

Is it irrational to suggest that the Soviet and American intelligences cooperated in the American governmental game of killing the President? Could an intelligence assassination have been perpetrated against the head of the American state unless the Soviet intelligence services could have been counted on to remain silent?

How did the Soviet government respond to the assassination of President Kennedy? Khrushchev, with whom Kennedy was working to effectuate the end of the Cold War, was later deposed. I submit that, if the Cold War had been genuinely adversary in nature, there could not have been an intelligence assassination of Kennedy by either the American or the Soviet intelligence agencies. I don't see the Cold War as authentic. Rather I view it as a cooperative effort to foist on both the American and Russian civilian populations an enormous military-intelligence budget.

Senator Richard Russell was correct in being disturbed by Marina Oswald's prospective revelations about possible Soviet intelligence connections with Oswald. And therefore Allen Dulles quieted the matter with a discussion with Isaac Don Levine, a writer on intelligence and a Cold War warrior par excellence. Levine was the author of *The Mind of An Assassin*, a book that described the killing of Leon Trotsky by Stalin's intelligence. It is interesting that Levine's name, which has been so much associated with the study of political assassinations, was never mentioned by the American press as having been associated with Marina Oswald. It is also interesting that this expert on political assassinations never, to my knowledge, wrote for publication a single article on the Kennedy assassination. Was his function something other than that of a literary ghost? Was Levine assigned to Marina by the government to provide whatever testimony suited the political exigencies? Allen Dulles did not tell how he had come to know Levine. Was it through intelligence work?

Now, let us shift our attention from Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster, to McGeorge Bundy, and his brother, William Bundy. For McGeorge Bundy's roles in the governmental apparatus before and after the assassination are worthy of study, and William Bundy's services in and out of the CIA are also of interest to us.

Kennedy Adviser McGeorge Bundy's Ties to the CIA

With the Kennedy Administration, McGeorge Bundy was in foreign policy a hard-liner who had little use for Adlai Stevenson's idealistic approach to foreign relations.²¹ McGeorge Bundy was one of the planners of the Bay of Pigs invasion.²² Allen Dulles was in Puerto Rico, so Richard Mervin Bissell, Jr., was the CIA's man in charge of the planning.²³ As happenstance would have it, McGeorge Bundy, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, had been a student of Bissell's at Yale. He also had worked for Bissell on the Marshall Plan in 1948.²⁴ Also in on that planning, as coincidence would have it, was Gen-

eral Charles P. Cabell, the CIA's deputy director, who is brother of Mayor Earle Cabell, the Mayor of Dallas at the time of the assassination. McGeorge Bundy was — in the Kennedy and early Johnson Administration — the presidential representative and key man on the Special Group which makes the key intelligence decisions for the country. It has operated as the hidden power center of the government.²⁵

As one of the planners for the Bay of Pigs, McGeorge Bundy must take some blame for not serving President Kennedy well and participating in the betrayal of the President in the Bay of Pigs planning operation. Schlesinger discusses that betrayal as follows:

"Moreover, if worst came to worst and the invaders were beaten on the beaches, then," Dulles and Bissell said, "they could easily 'melt away' into the mountains." ... But the CIA exposition was less than candid both in implying that the Brigade had undergone guerrilla training... and in suggesting the existence of an easy escape hatch. ... The Escambray Mountains lay eighty miles from the Bay of Pigs, across a hopeless tangle of swamps and jungles... the CIA agents in Guatemala were saying nothing to the Cubans about this last resort of flight to the hills..."²⁶

Bundy Also a Vietnam Hawk

But, despite Bundy's complicity with the CIA, which resulted in misleading the President in the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy turned over the direction of Vietnam policy largely to Bundy, along with Rusk, McNamara and Rostow. The best we can say for McGeorge Bundy's handling of Vietnam for President Kennedy was that he botched. Here is what Schlesinger said about Kennedy's feeling concerning the Vietnamese policy:

"He was somber and shaken. I had not seen him so depressed since the Bay of Pigs. No doubt he realized Viet Nam was his great failure in foreign policy, and that he had never really given it his full attention."²⁷

The announced intention of Kennedy as stated on October 2, 1963 by McNamara and Taylor was to withdraw most U.S. forces from South Vietnam by the end of 1965.²⁸ But that was not McGeorge Bundy's policy — and President Kennedy was soon to die — and McGeorge Bundy would be carrying on his hawkish concepts in playing a key role in shaping the aggressive foreign policy of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Bundy Issued the First "No Conspiracy; Lone-Assassin" Statement

What was McGeorge Bundy doing on the day President Kennedy was dispatched? Theodore H. White in his book, *The Making of the President, 1964*, tells us that the Presidential party on its flight back to Washington on the afternoon of that fateful day "learned that there was no conspiracy, learned of the identity of Oswald and his arrest."²⁹ This was the very first announcement of Oswald as the lone assassin. In Dallas, Oswald was not even charged with assassinating the President until 1:30 A. M. the next morning. The plane landed at 5:59 P. M. on the 22nd. At that time the District Attorney of Dallas, Henry Wade, was stating that "preliminary reports indicated more than one person was involved in the shooting... the electric chair is too good for the killers."³⁰ Can there be any doubt that for any gov-

ernment taken by surprise by the assassination — and legitimately seeking the truth concerning it — less than six hours after the time of the assassination was too soon to know there was no conspiracy? This announcement was the first which designated Oswald as the lone assassin. Who was responsible for that announcement?

That announcement came from the White House Situation Room. Under whose direct control was the White House Situation Room? The Situation Room was under the personal and direct control of McGeorge Bundy.

I do readily concede that Mr. McGeorge Bundy is a most intelligent man. Joseph Kraft, a well known American political writer, said of Mr. Bundy in 1965 in *Harper's*:

"His capacity to read the riddle of multiple confusions, to consider a wide variety of possibilities, to develop lines of action, to articulate and execute public purposes, to impart quickened energies to men of the highest ability seems almost alone among contemporaries..."³¹

John F. Kennedy shared this view of Bundy's intelligence for in speaking of him he said, "You just can't beat brains."³² McGeorge Bundy himself is not known for his modesty on the question of his intelligence. He was reported to have been "mildly miffed" when a Kennedy aide quoted the President as remarking that Bundy was the smartest man he knew next to Ormsley Gore, a British diplomat.³³

So, then, Mr. Bundy — this man of brains — this coordinator of intelligence for President Kennedy — had reason to know that his Situation Room's announcement of Oswald as the lone assassin on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, before there was any evidence against Oswald, was premature. Make no mistake about it. Bundy, who had been in the Pentagon³⁴ when the announcement of the assassination was issued, spent that fateful afternoon in the Situation Room. Jim Bishop tells how President Johnson was — while on Air Force One flying back to Washington — "...phoning McGeorge Bundy in the White House Situation Room every few minutes."³⁵

Was Bundy's Statement a Warning from the 'New Rulers'?

I propose the thesis that McGeorge Bundy, when that announcement was issued from his Situation Room, had reason to know that the true meaning of such a message when conveyed to the Presidential party on Air Force One was not the ostensible message which was being communicated. Rather, I submit that Bundy, with "his capacity to read the riddle of multiple confusions, to consider a wide variety of possibilities" was really conveying to the Presidential party the thought that Oswald was being designated the lone assassin before any evidence against him was ascertainable. As a central coordinator of intelligence services, Bundy in transmitting such a message through the Situation Room was really telling the Presidential party that an unholy marriage had taken place between the U.S. Governmental intelligence services and the lone-assassin doctrine. Was he not telling the Presidential party peremptorily, "Now, hear this! Oswald is the assassin, the sole assassin. Evidence is not available yet. Evidence will be obtained, or in lieu thereof evidence will be created. This is a crucial matter of state that cannot await evidence. The new rulers have spoken. You, there, Mr. New President, and therefore dispatchable stuff, and you

the underlings of a deposed President, heed the message well." Was not Bundy's Situation Room serving an Orwellian double-think-function?

And, so, it came to pass that Bundy's Situation Room knew well whereof it spoke. For the federal government remained wedded to the lone-assassin myth in spite of the absence of evidence to support the proposition, and in the face of irrefutable proof which would demolish it as a rational idea.

The Presidential Party Got the Message

The Presidential party, which also numbered among it men of brains, apparently got the message. None, to my knowledge, of that Party has undertaken to express a single public doubt as to the veracity of the lone-assassin theory. Yet seeds of doubt have grown to mountainous dimensions among the less intimidated elements of the population who did not seek to hold or retain trappings of power. The lack of expressed skepticism among the Presidential party is not to be interpreted as evidence of their stupidity. On the contrary, their silence speaks more of their strong instincts of self-preservation and their penchant for governmental careers, rather than lack of intelligence.

Some among that Presidential party had no need to see the Zapruder film. They had on that fateful day witnessed first hand the bloody horror of the multi-assassin ambush. Doubts as to the veracity of the single-assassin story were more likely to give way to certainty of conspiracy in their minds. The message from Bundy's Situation Room was necessary to dispel other doubts. Perhaps some of the Presidential party leaned toward misreading the situation and were laboring under the belief that some sharp-shooting nuts had gotten lucky in Dealey Plaza and that punishment was in order. Bundy's Situation Room was putting them straight. Through that announcement it became clear to all in that Presidential party who could think, that the assassins, if madmen they were, were highly placed in the pinnacle of power of the intelligence community of the United States government and that punishment of them was out of the question.

Important Foreign Policy Changes Immediately Followed the Assassination

McGeorge Bundy was quite busy on November 22, 1963. After having spent a good deal of time on the telephone with President Johnson as Johnson was flying to Washington, he managed to be at the new President's side when Air Force One landed.³⁶ He was seen with Lyndon B. Johnson when the President emerged from the South Lawn of the White House.³⁷ History records that Bundy remained with President Johnson to be designated by him as one of the leading hawkish advisers of the Johnson Administration.³⁸

What was the future to hold for the United States following the assassination of President Kennedy? What changed? The most important and immediate change following the assassination of President Kennedy occurred precisely in the area of foreign policy. The Cold War warriors of the Bundy brothers' stripe gained a stranglehold on the foreign policy of the nation, much in the same fashion that Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles had in Eisenhower's administration. Of course, to note such a change is not to prove it was a deliberate consequence of the assassination. Yet, a careful examination of foreign policy following the killing of Kennedy is required to see whether the change might have been related to the killing of the President.

U.S. Promised Help
to New Saigon Government

The book The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam has the following to say about the change:

"Three weeks after the assassination, on December 19 and 20, 1963, McNamara and CIA Chief John A. McCone visited Saigon to evaluate the war efforts of the new Saigon government. McNamara told the junta leaders that the United States was prepared to help as long as aid was needed."³⁹

"...the United States had made the crucial decision to reverse the policy, announced during the last day of President Kennedy's administration, of gradually withdrawing U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Was it all a coincidence that a change in leadership in Washington was followed by a change in policy, and a change in policy by a corresponding change in Saigon's government?"⁴⁰

That there should have been a change in Vietnamese policy so immediately after the murder of Kennedy when the external situation in Vietnam did not evoke it, raises serious questions about what caused it in our internal situation. What is at stake here is the issue not of how the assassination was accomplished, but the fundamental question concerning why it was done and which elements were and are behind it. At issue are questions of war and peace that involve the whole of humanity. For the movement for peace in Vietnam not to raise these questions is and has been irresponsible.

Militarization of the U.S.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the definite and deliberate policy of militarization of this country was quickly put into action immediately after the death of President Kennedy. There was no evidence of governmental traumatization, but rather a most efficient and abrupt movement to military policies.

Bundys Continued to Shape Hawkish Policies

McGeorge Bundy and his brother, William, continued to help shape the foreign policy of the Johnson Administration. McGeorge Bundy became part of Johnson's Tuesday lunch arrangement which was in fact the National Security Council, Johnson style.⁴¹ Bundy did most of the foreign policy coordinating for Johnson in the early part of his administration.⁴² It was McGeorge Bundy who by happenstance was in South Vietnam when Pleiku was shelled. After an inspection of the Pleiku base, he recommended to President Johnson instant retaliation. He urged upon the President a steady program of bombing the North, which recommendation was followed with horrendous consequences to peace.⁴³

In the Gulf of Tonkin farce, Bundy was full of admiration for Johnson's decisiveness. Bundy said to friends that he had "...never seen a man who knew so clearly what he wanted to do or so exactly how to go about it."⁴⁴

Ultimately, the Bundy brothers gave up their titular positions in government. McGeorge Bundy became President of the Ford Foundation. William Bundy joined the Center for International Studies at MIT.

Interconnections of the CIA and
Foundation-Dominated Scholarship

Let us not imagine that these two architects of the Vietnamese War by taking on these new positions abandoned their penchant for power. Nor were the Bundy brothers retreating far from government in assuming these positions. David Horowitz said the following about the interlocking aspects of the CIA and the private foundations:

"It should be noted in passing that the congeniality of foundation-dominated scholarship to the CIA reflects the harmony of interest between the upper-class captains of the CIA and the upper-class trustees of the great foundations. The interconnections are too extensive to be recounted here, but the Bundy brothers (William, CIA; McGeorge, Ford) and Chadbourne Gilpatrick, OSS and CIA from 1943 to 1949, Rockefeller Foundation from 1949 on, can be taken as illustrative. Richard Bissell, the genius of the Bay of Pigs (and brother-in-law of Philip Mosely of Columbia's Russian Institute), reversed the usual sequence, going from Ford to the CIA."⁴⁵

As for William Bundy's respite from the CIA and his State Department career, David Horowitz feels that the MIT Center is not in the least removed from the grip of the CIA:

"MIT's Advisory Board on Soviet Bloc Studies, for example, was composed of these four academic luminaries: Charles Bohlen of the State Department, Allen Dulles of the CIA, Philip E. Mosely of Columbia's Russian Institute and Leslie G. Stevens, a retired vice admiral of the U.S. Navy.

"If the MIT Center seemed to carry to their logical conclusion the on-campus extension programs of the State Department and the CIA, that was perhaps because it was set up directly with CIA funds under the guiding hand of Professor W. W. Rostow, former OSS officer and later director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff under Kennedy and Johnson. The Center's first director, Max Millikan, was appointed in 1952 after a stint as assistant director of the CIA. Carnegie and Rockefeller joined in the funding, which by now, as in so many other cases, has passed on to Ford."⁴⁶

How We've Paid For
Our New Rulers' Ineptness

So, we have examined how the CIA and the military had committed American power to ruinous military adventures through staged international incidents — reminiscent of the Oswald charade — but on an international level. These adventures, following close upon the assassination, have spilled the blood and sapped the moral fiber of our youth. Our cities have been turned into tense and neglected seas of metastasizing blight. Our economy, buffeted by push-and-pull war-induced inflation, has become unbalanced. Our international trade position has deteriorated, so that now we find ourselves with not only an unfavorable balance of payments, but also an unfavorable balance of trade. Our urban public schools are relegated to bare custodial functions. The standard of living of our workers and the middle class has dipped along with the quality of their

lives. All of us have paid for the ineptness of our new rulers who, by the killing of John F. Kennedy, had effectively overthrown the Republic.

The CIA's Follow-up Tactics

If our model of explanation, our hypothesis, of the assassination of John F. Kennedy accurately interprets the data of the assassination, then it should also be useful in ferreting out current operations in which the Central Intelligence Agency would have had to involve itself domestically as a natural and necessary followup to the Dallas assassination. For, as the CIA's clumsy cousin, the American military, persisted in its Vietnamese adventure, the costs became prohibitive.

Of course, secret elitist police organizations such as the CIA do not thrive on peace, democracy, and a contented and informed people. The power of intelligence agencies increases in direct proportion to the degree of sickness of a nation. A healthy and united people can localize the cancer of a power-
usurping intelligence agency and eventually extirpate its malignant cells from the nation's political life. Therefore, the intelligence apparatus which killed Kennedy has a need to keep our society in turmoil. It has — in order to maintain its power — to generate a high degree of chaos. Chaos is required to make a people willing to accept such strong medicine as is administered by the secret police in order to restore order and to stabilize a disintegrating society. It takes an acutely sick society to be able to accept as palatable the terrible cure — totalitarianism.

The Assassination Model As a Key to Domestic Events

One must look to our model of the assassination for an explanation of what has happened to our domestic society since the killing of President Kennedy. Now that the Vietnamese War has been rejected by our people, we must keep our eyes and ears open for an inevitable split between the CIA and military. For, although the military still looks to winning on foreign fronts the war against Communism, the super-slick non-ideological CIA sees the need to bring the war home. We must be alert to CIA agents who would promote the polarization of our society. We must examine the evidence which indicates that fake revolutionaries, who are inciting insurrection in our cities, have had their pockets and minds stuffed by the CIA.

The movement for peace in Vietnam has been silent too long on the critical issue of the assassination of President Kennedy. We cannot rest with the official federal government version of his assassination.

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Why Is the Rockefeller Commission So Single-Minded About a Lone Assassin In the Kennedy Case?

WHEN the Rockefeller Commission released its report on its investigation of the CIA and related matters, I was chagrined to find that my testimony concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy had been misrepresented. Indeed, the Rockefeller Commission created the impression that I agreed with the Warren Report—when in fact I had testified for more than five hours as to why that document is wrong in its conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole assassin.

Why will the Commission not make available to me a copy of my deposition or make it public so that the American people may be informed of my dissent with the reportedly unanimous conclusions of the medical witnesses called by the Commission? The Commission is perpetrating a fraud upon the public by seizing on and publicizing a secondary aspect of my testimony while ignoring the primary part. This would become evident if my testimony were released.


On May 7, 1975, I testified by deposition for approximately five and one-half hours to the effect that the Warren Report's principal conclusion, namely, that the President was assassinated by a lone gunman, was wrong and absolutely irreconcilable with the medical and scientific evidence in the case. In technical papers I have previously published on the case, I have stated that the available evidence, assuming it to be valid, gives no support to theories that postulate gunmen to the front or

right-front of the Presidential car; quite likely, I reiterated that statement in my lengthy deposition to the Rockefeller Commission. I have never taken the position that President Kennedy was shot from the grassy knoll or similar forward locations; this statement in no way, therefore, represents a change from my previous views.

The crux and primary thrust of my testimony, as well as my published papers, is that the Warren Commission's single-bullet theory is wrong and that the available medical, physical, and photographic evidence all point to the assassination being carried out by two gunmen. The fact that both gunmen were located to the rear of the President—which after all includes half the earth's surface—in no way diminishes the impact of that conclusion. Neither does such a conclusion have any bearing, pro or con, on the question of CIA involvement in the assassination; I have never claimed otherwise.

For the Commission to seize on a purely secondary aspect of my views, namely, that I see no evidence for gunmen in front of the President, to bolster its claims that the Warren Report is correct and that the CIA was not involved is so absurd as to suggest that the Commission or its staff deliberately sought to misrepresent my testimony.

Representatives of the Commission repeatedly asserted to me that the Commission's purposes in examining the Kennedy assassination have been restricted to the question of possible CIA involvement. On May 3, for



example, I was informed by Robert B. Olsen, senior counsel, that "the Commission was created for the purpose of investigating the activities of the CIA within the United States; it was neither directed nor authorized to undertake a general re-investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy or even a general critique of the autopsy performed on the President's body." In the report issued by the Rockefeller Commission, we find, however, that the Commission went well beyond that point, discussing evidentiary aspects of the case that suggest Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole assassin and citing various medical experts to bolster that claim. It is in this context that reference is made to a selected portion of my own testimony, as though I had concurred with the lone-assassin finding.

Obviously, it is a distortion to suggest, on the basis of such a selected portion, that I concur with the Commission's implied defense of the Warren Report when the great bulk of my testimony was directly to the opposite effect. Nor can the Commission justify its neglect of my other testimony on the ground that it lay outside its purposes of investigating only the question of CIA involvement when, in fact, its report went considerably beyond that question.

I asked for the opportunity to testify to the Commission directly and on the full range of my work on the medical and scientific aspects of the case. Although broad, this request was not intended to embrace a "general re-investigation of the assassination." My request for direct testimony was not granted.

By May 5, two days before my deposition to the staff, I had learned that the Rockefeller Commission had appointed a special panel of experts to review the autopsy and other medical and scientific evidence in the case. All had strong ties to the federal government or with persons who had formerly participated in studies defending the Warren Report. The panel was made up of people who are or have been associated with the Baltimore Medical Examiner's Office, the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine's Department of Radiology, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. These three facilities either supplied the members of the original autopsy team or provided members of a panel appointed by the Justice Department in 1968 to defend the Warren Report. Furthermore, David W. Belin, executive director

of the Rockefeller Commission, was one of the principal architects of the Warren Report in his capacity as staff counsel; he has spent much of the past 10 years defending the report and attacking its critics.

Additionally, the Rockefeller Commission did nothing to secure the release of certain items of medical and scientific evidence. In contrast, other critics and I have persisted in our efforts to obtain these materials. Only by full disclosure of all the facts will this case be resolved. From the statements attributed to members of the Belin-appointed panel, it is not clear that they are even aware of some of this evidence.

Two recently disclosed items have been withheld by the government for more than 10 years: autopsy specimens of the President's brain and specialized analysis of the bullet fragments. A "memorandum of transfer," prepared in 1965 by Admiral George Burkley, then White House physician, shows that numerous tissue sections and most probably the President's brain had been turned over to Evelyn Lincoln, the assassinated President's secretary, while she was working at the National Archives on papers for the John F. Kennedy Library. A copy of this memorandum was made available to me in April 1975. From it, we know that these materials existed in 1965 and were in the possession of responsible persons. They are extremely important autopsy materials, essential to a thorough, scientific review of the case. Yet no one has been allowed to examine them since 1965, and we do not even know what happened to them after their transfer to Mrs. Lincoln in 1965. How could the Belin panel do a competent job without seeing these materials?

The spectrographic analysis of bullet fragments is disclosed in a collection of papers and notes from the FBI

Why has hard evidence supporting alternative theories been shunned?

Laboratory. These papers were made available to me just about a week before my deposition by FBI Director Clarence Kelley after more than a year of effort on my part and unlawful delay under the Freedom of Information Act by the Justice Department.

In addition, data on neutron activation analysis of bullet fragments apparently exist.

Instead of pursuing data such as these, Mr. Belin as early as March 1 indicated what the Commission's conclusions were likely to be. A LPL news dispatch on that date quoted him as saying that conspiracy theories about President Kennedy's assassination are cases of "invisible gunmen shooting invisible bullets." In fact, the theories being given prominence in the press at that time were among the least supportable criticisms of the Warren Report and provided rotten strawmen that Belin could easily knock over.

In contrast, not one of the three papers I have published presenting "hard evidence"^{2,3} has been refuted by Mr. Be'lin or even addressed by him, nor any other defender of the Warren Commission.

Why did the Rockefeller Commission shun hard evidence that alternative theories to the lone-assassin conclusion are valid and that the Warren Commission's principal conclusion is wrong? The crux of the failure to solve the case lies in the "single-bullet theory," the hypothesis that President Kennedy's back and throat wounds and all of Governor Connally's wounds were caused by one bullet. The Warren Commission adopted this hypothesis against overwhelming physical, medical, and ballistic evidence that it could not be correct. It did so even against the objections of at least two of its own members. The hypothesis, however, was essential to the lone-assassin conclusion. As an example of a case where the desired conclusions dictated the selection of evidence, the supposed showcase of investigative thoroughness into America's crime of the century, must rank number one.

The autopsy was conducted in a military facility under military command. Five Secret Service or FBI agents

The failure to dissect and track the back wound is perplexing

were in the room. One roll of film of photos taken by a medical corpsman during the autopsy was seized by a Secret Service agent and ruined by deliberate exposure to light.

Because the presence of the anterior neck wound was not known or discovered at autopsy, no attempt was made to overcome the problems created by the tracheostomy and to examine it. The failure to communicate with the attending physicians in Dallas is perplexing. Even more so is the failure to dissect and track the back wound, especially since no exit wound was evident and x-rays showed no bullet.

In cases of gunshot wounds in the head, the routine procedure is to take coronal sections through the brain. This was not done.

The transcript of an executive session of the Warren Commission for January 27, 1964, shows that the members at that time—two months after the assassination—were under the impression that the throat wound was caused by a bullet fragment. From this transcript, which was withheld from the public for more than 10 years, it becomes evident that the Commission at that time did not have the autopsy report later published. What they apparently did have was an earlier and much different version. Why would an autopsy report be changed?

On August 23 and 24, 1972, I was the first pathologist outside the government to be allowed to inspect the

autopsy evidence in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. This evidence, however, does not include the brain or the sections prepared for microscopic examination. Nor were the sections taken through the skin at supposed wound sites on the scalp and upper back available. These items are described in the supplemental autopsy report in volume 16 of the Warren Commission Exhibits. Color photographs taken of the interior of the chest also are missing. Their existence was indicated in testimony by Commander James J. Humes of the government autopsy team. The path of the bullet that purportedly passed through the upper back could be determined from these photos.

Even without these mysteriously missing items, however, the single bullet theory cannot be sustained. In three previous articles, I have discussed the scientific evidence that points to the use of two rifles, to the shots being fired from points farther west in the Texas School Book Depository Building than indicated by the Warren Report and from two different floors, and to the improbability that the same bullet that passed through President Kennedy's shoulder and trachea also struck Governor Connally's back, broke his rib and wrist, and hit his femur.

The available medical evidence shows that all shots were fired from the rear. It also indicates that one bullet hit the President's shoulder and another his head. On the basis of available data, no conclusion is possible as to whether any of the bullet specimens were part of the fatal missile that struck the President's head.

One nearly intact bullet was recovered from under a stretcher at Parkland Hospital and two bullet fragments were found in the Presidential limousine. In addition, "smears" from bullets were evident on the car's windshield and on a nearby curb. Analysis revealed that both smears were composed of lead.

The Warren Commission concluded that the nearly intact bullet had struck both President Kennedy and



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The bullet was recovered in a remarkably unscathed condition, losing only about 2.5 gm over its bone-shattering course

Governor Connally. After passing from a point approximately 4.5 cm to the right of the spine's midline and some 6 cm below the lowest crease of the back of the President's neck, this bullet is said to have exited at the midline of the throat, some 15 cm away. Upon exit it singed the left edge of Kennedy's tie knot. Then, if the Warren Commission conclusion is to be believed, the bullet made an acute right turn in midair to strike the far right side of Governor Connally's back near the axilla. It fractured the right fifth rib and exited just below the right nipple. Next, it is said to have struck 5 cm above the wrist joint and exited 2 cm from the wrist crease on the palm side, leaving behind a comminuted fracture of the right radius. Finally, this single bullet is said to have pierced Connally's left thigh, and a small metal fragment (revealed by x-ray) lodged in the femur.

The single bullet said to have done all this, it must be stressed, was recovered in a remarkably unscathed condition. It weighed approximately 159 gm. This means that along its bone-breaking route, it had lost only about 2 to 2.5 gm, an unlikely condition after such a course. X-rays of the chests of both men and of the right wrist and left thigh of Connally show metallic fragments, indicating that the bullet or bullets lost mass over the course. Based on my extensive experience as a forensic pathologist, I am certain that such a trail of fragments in four locations in two different persons could not add up to the small amount of metal missing from the recovered bullet.

Furthermore, the upper 2 cm of the bullet (nose and midportion), which was fully jacketed in copper, exhibit no gross, visible deformities, areas of mutilation, or loss of substance. One small piece was removed from the jacket for spectrographic analysis by the FBI, according to a notation in the records. There is no other deformity in the upper two-thirds of the bullet. A minimal flattening is evident in the lower third and perhaps there was minimal outpouring of the inner lead core onto focal portions of the copper rim at the base. Could a bullet that had caused as much damage as this one is reputed to have done remained in this condition? I am certain it could not. It would have been more deformed and scarred and would have lost more substance. I am convinced of this particularly because one of the bones shattered was the distal end of the radius, a very dense bone, especially in a man the size of Governor Connally, who is 6' 4" tall.

In addition to this bullet, two copper fragments of bullets were found in the front of the car. No report has

even been made public as to whether these two fragments were part of the same bullet or from two separate ones. Such determination could have been made by neutron activation analysis. Such tests, in which a specimen is irradiated in a nuclear reactor and the induced radioanalysis assayed, apparently were done at the Atomic Energy Commission in 1964. These studies are alluded to in a letter written by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on July 8, 1964. Why were the findings derived from this highly sensitive testing method not made public for more than nine years?

The angles of the back wounds in the two men also deserve attention. On the basis of wound lines postulated by the 1968 review panel, I calculate that Kennedy was struck by a bullet travelling downward at an angle of 9.5 to 13.5 degrees relative to the horizontal plane and right to left at an angle of 15.5 to 19.5 degrees relative to the sagittal plane. Witnesses before the Warren Commission estimated that the bullet that hit Connally was traveling at a downward angle of 25 degrees and right to left at 20 degrees. On the basis of these calculations, I believe that shots striking the two men were fired from different windows and that neither originated where the rifle was found.

Tests of the rifle found in the Texas School Book Depository have demonstrated that it could not be re-fired in less than 2.3 seconds. Governor Connally was wounded less than two seconds after President Kennedy was struck in the back. This, undoubtedly, is why the Warren Commission came up with the single-bullet theory. It was the only way to explain away the rifle firing lag.

My questioning by a commission staff member was detailed and tenacious; in fact, the questions were much more in the form of cross examination than simple elicitation of direct testimony. I have written Vice President Rockefeller that I shall be most interested to learn whether the transcript of depositions will reveal the same manner of questioning of other persons called, particularly those whose avocational research has led them to concur with the Warren Report.

Why are the transcripts not being made public? Why was the original autopsy report revised? Why are known data and materials not being utilized to solve the case? Why must the official explanation remain that a lone assassin fired two or three shots and that a single bullet traveled an impossible course and emerged virtually unscathed? Is a conspiracy being concealed?

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